Anil K. Kapoor

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that set aside his acquittal on three counts of sexual assault and entered convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge misdirected himself on the objective test for sexual assault.

The Court held that the Court of Appeal properly exercised its power under section 686(4)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Code to substitute a conviction, as the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the touching occurred in circumstances of a sexual nature and the appellant would necessarily have been convicted but for the trial judge's error of law.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing phone records evidence and the credibility of a complainant regarding an assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions on the unreliability of the phone records and the credibility of the complainant were open to her and warranted no interference.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of second degree murder, seeking to strike his guilty pleas based on fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the proposed fresh evidence incredulous, contrived, and unworthy of belief.

The Court concluded the pleas were fully informed and voluntary, and that the appellant was manipulative and attempting to deceive the court.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder on three grounds: the admission of drop cloths and a shovel as evidence of planning and deliberation, the use of evidence regarding a gun from a prior home invasion, and the admission of evidence found in his vehicle despite an error in the search warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The court found that the physical evidence had sufficient probative value, the gun evidence was properly admitted for motive and identity with appropriate limiting instructions, and the search warrant error was a minor technical breach that did not warrant exclusion of the evidence under the Charter.

The applicant applied for bail pending his appeal from a conviction for second degree murder.

He argued that the trial judge erred in failing to disclose the identity of a confidential police informer and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The court reviewed the grounds of appeal and found them to be arguable but weak.

Applying the public interest test, the court concluded that the interest in enforceability of the murder conviction outweighed the interest in reviewability.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in foreclosing the appellants from challenging the factual underpinnings of the counselling to commit murder charges for which the appellant Vanderheyden stood convicted.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that the counselling convictions provided a significant boost to the credibility of two unsavoury witnesses.

The court found that the curative proviso could not be applied, as it could not be satisfied that Vanderheyden would not have testified had the trial judge ruled differently.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of second degree murder.

The accused had punched the victim, causing him to fall and hit his head, which resulted in fatal injuries.

The accused also kicked the victim shortly after.

The trial judge limited the Crown's cross-examination of the accused on his prior convictions for crimes of violence, and instructed the jury on self-defence and causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary ruling on the criminal record.

Although the trial judge erred in her instructions regarding whether the punch and kick constituted a single transaction, the error did not affect the verdict, as the jury clearly found the punch was in self-defence and the medical evidence did not support the kick as a contributing cause of death.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation.

The predicate offences occurred before the 1997 Criminal Code amendments introducing the Long Term Offender (LTO) designation.

At the sentencing hearing, the parties and the trial judge proceeded on the basis that the LTO designation did not apply as a matter of law.

The trial judge found the appellant to be a dangerous offender without properly considering the LTO criteria.

The Court of Appeal held that this was an error in law, as it is possible to meet the criteria for both designations, and the LTO criteria cannot be eliminated simply because the dangerous offender criteria are met.

The appeal was allowed, the dangerous offender designation was set aside, and a new sentencing hearing was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis of inconsistent verdicts.

He had admitted participation in all charged offences but relied on the defences of duress and necessity, which applied equally to all crimes as part of a single transaction.

The Court of Appeal found that the jury must have reached an unjustifiable compromise, allowed the appeal, set aside the convictions, and entered acquittals.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of seven bank robberies based on a videotaped confession, eyewitness identification, and circumstantial evidence.

On appeal, he argued that his videotaped statement was inadmissible because police did not reiterate his right to counsel when questioning shifted to other robberies, that the jury was inadequately instructed on photo lineups, that the trial judge's interventions caused a miscarriage of justice, and that the jury was not told to consider evidence for each count separately.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant understood his jeopardy and right to counsel, and dismissed the first three grounds.

While the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider the identification evidence separately for each count, the Court applied the curative proviso because the videotaped confession provided overwhelming evidence of guilt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for murder and his sentence, which included a 14-year period of parole ineligibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions on aiding and abetting, recent possession, or other evidentiary issues.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The Court found the trial judge erred in principle by placing undue emphasis on the appellant's minor criminal record when setting the parole ineligibility period.

The period of parole ineligibility was reduced from 14 years to 12 years.

The Crown appealed the global sentence of ten years (less four years pre-trial custody) imposed on the respondent for aggravated sexual assault and assault causing bodily harm against his six-year-old stepdaughter, and aggravated assault against his five-week-old biological son.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence manifestly inadequate, noting the trial judge over-emphasized the principle of totality and failed to adequately reflect the gravity of the offences, deterrence, denunciation, and the need to separate the respondent from society.

The global sentence was increased to sixteen years (less four years pre-trial custody).

The appellant appealed his murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt (the W.(D.) test), the assessment of out-of-court confessions, the restriction of cross-examination of a police officer, and the Crown's theories of entry into the victim's apartment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions as a whole were adequate, there was no prejudice from the restricted cross-examination, and there was sufficient evidence to support the Crown's theories of entry.

The appellant was charged with robbery and using an imitation firearm.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant of robbery due to an error of law, but convicted him of the firearm offence.

A month later, at sentencing, the trial judge realized his error and changed the robbery acquittal to a conviction.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was functus officio on the robbery count and had no jurisdiction to change the verdict.

Furthermore, the firearm conviction could not stand without a conviction on the underlying robbery charge.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals entered on both counts.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay two charges of sexual interference due to a 31-month delay between the accused's arrest and the proposed trial date.

The trial judge had attributed delays caused by the defence's difficulties in serving third-party record materials to systemic or Crown delay.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in this characterization, determining that approximately 15 months of the delay should not be attributed to the Crown.

The remaining 16 months of systemic delay fell within the acceptable range for matters in the Superior Court of Justice.

The appeal was allowed and the stay of proceedings was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after DNA evidence linked him to the 1986 killing of an eleven-year-old girl.

On appeal, he argued that his right to silence under section 7 of the Charter was violated during an eight-hour police interview following his arrest, and that his statements should have been excluded under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the appellant had an operating mind, understood his rights, and made a strategic choice to speak to the police rather than exercising his right to silence.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four grounds: lack of juror impartiality, admissibility of discreditable conduct evidence, the trial judge's instruction on discreditable conduct evidence, and the reasonable doubt instruction.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in any of the grounds, noting that defence counsel at trial was satisfied with the juror inquiries and that the evidentiary record did not demonstrate a reasonable possibility of collusion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for arson.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the first two grounds of appeal, holding there was sufficient evidence that the fire threatened firefighters and was of incendiary origin caused by the appellant.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on the third ground, finding the trial judge improperly treated the case as a credibility contest and failed to apply the W.(D.) framework.

The trial judge erred by inferring guilt directly from his rejection of the appellant's evidence without analyzing the Crown's evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant pleaded guilty to five counts of sexual assault with a weapon against his former spouse and was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment, consecutive to a sentence he was already serving for a separate sexual assault.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding he was a sexual sadist based on expert testimony and that the sentence violated the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the 10-year sentence was fit and appropriate given the brutal, protracted, and horrendous nature of the offences, regardless of the sexual sadism finding.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and trafficking after shooting a police officer during a drug takedown.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and the jury instructions on cross-racial eyewitness identification were inadequate.

The Crown appealed the 8-year sentence, arguing it failed to reflect the principle of parity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence overwhelming and the jury charge adequate.

The Court allowed the Crown's sentence appeal, increasing the sentence to 10 years (6 years net of pre-trial custody) to better reflect the gravity of the offence.