COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO
Favreau, Copeland and Dawe JJ.A.
BETWEEN
His Majesty the King
Respondent
and
Alam Buoc
Appellant
Anil K. Kapoor, for the appellant
Alexander Alvaro, for the respondent
Heard: December 3, 2025
On appeal from the convictions entered by Justice Robert L. Maranger of the Superior Court of Ontario, sitting with a jury, on November 29, 2021, and from the sentence imposed on January 12, 2022.
1The appellant was convicted by a jury on two counts of second degree murder and one count of attempted murder, arising out of an incident in which three men were shot, two fatally. He was sentenced to life in prison with no chance of parole for 25 years for the second degree murder convictions and life in prison with no chance of parole for 7 years for the attempted murder conviction.
2The appellant raises three grounds of appeal from his conviction: 1) the trial judge erred in failing to include a caution regarding eyewitness identification in his jury charge; 2) the trial judge erred in his instruction regarding post-offence conduct; and 3) the trial judge erred in admitting the surviving shooting victim’s res gestae statements for the truth of their content. The appellant also seeks leave to appeal his sentence, arguing that the 25-year period of parole ineligibility for the second degree murder convictions is unjustified.
3I would dismiss the appeal. I would grant leave to appeal from the sentence but dismiss the sentence appeal.
A. background
4This section provides a high-level description of the circumstances of the offences and evidence in this case. I provide a more detailed description of the evidence relevant to each ground of appeal as necessary in the analysis section.
1. The shootings
5Late in the evening of July 23, 2017, Talal Al-Shammari, his brother Abdulrahman Al-Shammari[2] and their friend Dirie Olol went to a bar in Kanata, Ontario. The appellant, who had been friends with the Al-Shammari brothers for approximately 15 years, joined them at the bar. The four men drank together at the bar into the early morning of July 24.
6A few hours later, the four men gathered at the appellant’s house. While they were there, the appellant showed them his guns. Talal and Mr. Olol took photos of themselves with a shotgun. The phone used to take the photos showed that they were taken between 6:00 and 6:07 a.m.
7According to Talal’s evidence, after the photos were taken, the appellant accused him of stealing a bullet. The appellant became angry. He searched Talal and did not find the bullet. Talal, Abdulrahman and Mr. Olol then left the appellant’s house, but the appellant followed them into Abdulrahman’s car.
8Abdulrahman was driving the car, which was a white Mazda. Mr. Olol was in the front passenger seat, Talal was in the back passenger seat behind Abdulrahman and the appellant was in the back passenger seat behind Mr. Olol.
9Talal’s evidence was that the appellant started accusing him again of stealing a bullet. Abdulrahman pulled the car over. The appellant searched Talal again and did not find anything.
10According to Talal, the appellant then removed a handgun from his pocket and said, “this is why I came”. He pulled back the mechanism, chambered a clip and shot Talal in the neck. Talal briefly lost consciousness. When Talal awoke, the appellant was still beside him in the backseat. He saw that his brother was no longer in the car but Mr. Olol was still sitting in front of him. Talal tried to wrestle the gun from the appellant, and the appellant shot Talal in the shoulder. Talal then climbed out of the car and the appellant chased after him. Talal asked, “Why are you doing this? I am your friend”, to which the appellant responded, “You stole my stuff.” The appellant then pointed his gun at Talal’s head. Talal grabbed at the gun and was shot in the finger. The gun fell onto the ground and Talal escaped into the bushes. He then heard the car drive away. Talal was eventually able to flag down a vehicle.
11Hugh Manson was driving the van Talal flagged down. This was around 7:00 a.m. He stopped when he saw Talal waving. Talal told him that he had been shot and asked to be taken to the hospital. Mr. Manson drove Talal to the hospital. Mr. Manson’s evidence was that, on the way to the hospital, Talal seemed to be talking to himself. He said at least once, “Why would my friend shoot me?”
12Mr. Manson and Talal arrived at the Queensway Carleton Hospital before 7:30 a.m. Gregory MacDonald was working there as a security guard at the time. He saw two men, who turned out to be Talal and Mr. Manson, exit a vehicle and come toward the entrance of the hospital. Talal appeared to be injured. As Talal was being brought into the hospital, Mr. MacDonald heard him repeating, “I can’t believe my friend fucking shot me,” and similar statements several times.
13The police later found Abdulrahman’s body in a driveway in the vicinity where the car had first stopped. He was dead and had been shot in the face and neck.
14The police also found the white Mazda. Mr. Olol was found dead in the car. He had been shot in the forehead. There were signs that someone had tried to set the car on fire.
15The inside of the car was covered in blood. The DNA analysis confirmed that the blood was from Abdulrahman, Mr. Olol and Talal. DNA from one of the rear door handles could not be eliminated as coming from the appellant.
2. Talal’s identification of the appellant
16After the shootings, Talal gave five statements to the police.
17He gave the first two statements the day after he was admitted to the hospital. In both statements, he told the police he did not know who shot him because he was too drunk to remember. At trial, he testified that these statements were not true. He was afraid to tell the police the truth because he was worried something might happen to him or his family.
18Later that same day, after speaking to his family, Talal gave a third statement in which he named the appellant as the shooter. The police showed him a photo of the appellant and Talal immediately said, “That’s the motherfucker”.
19Talal maintained that the appellant was the shooter in his two subsequent statements to the police, at the preliminary inquiry and at trial.
3. The appellant’s activities after the shootings
20The evidence at trial was that, starting on the morning of July 24, 2017, the appellant made arrangements to travel to Sudan.
21On July 24, 2017, he attended a Walmart to get a passport photo under the name Alex Basso. On July 25, 2017, he went to a travel agency to buy a one-way ticket to Khartoum, Sudan. He said that he was attending a funeral and wanted to leave the following day. The travel agent told him a return ticket would be cheaper. He ultimately bought a return ticket for a flight scheduled to leave on July 27, 2017 at 10:40 p.m.
22The appellant attended a Service Canada office on July 25, 2017 to apply for a passport on a rush 48-hour turnaround.
23The police arrested the appellant on the evening of July 27, 2017. At the time, he identified himself as Alex Basso, but the police found identification with his real name. When the police searched the appellant and his residence, they found a passport photo dated July 23, 2017,[3] a receipt from the passport office dated July 25, 2017, documents related to the flight to Sudan and over $1,000 in cash.
4. The trial and the verdict
24The appellant was charged with the first degree murder of Abdulrahman and Mr. Olol, and with the attempted murder of Talal.
25The appellant represented himself at trial. The court also appointed an amicus curiae.
26The jury found the appellant guilty of second degree murder of both Abdulrahman and Mr. Olol, and guilty of the attempted murder of Talal.
27The trial judge sentenced the appellant to two life sentences without parole eligibility for 25 years for the second degree murder convictions, and to a life sentence without parole eligibility for 7 years for the attempted murder conviction. All sentences are to be served concurrently.
B. conviction appeal
28The appellant raises three issues on his conviction appeal:
(a) The trial judge erred by failing to provide an instruction regarding eyewitness identification evidence;
(b) The trial judge erred by providing an insufficient instruction regarding after-the-fact conduct; and
(c) The trial judge erred in admitting Talal’s res gestae statements.
29I see no reversible errors and would dismiss the appeal from conviction.
30I start with a brief summary of the standard of review and then address each ground of appeal in turn.
1. Standard of review
31The first two alleged errors relate to the trial judge’s jury charge. In R. v. Abdullahi, 2023 SCC 19, 483 D.L.R. (4th) 1, the Supreme Court stressed that appellate courts must read jury instructions as a whole, in the context of the entire trial. It is the substance of the charge that matters, not adherence to any prescribed formula or sequence. The trial judge’s charge does not have to be perfect, and the overriding question is whether the jury understood or was “properly equipped” with the law to apply to the evidence: Abdullahi, at para. 36. A properly equipped jury is one that is both (a) accurately and (b) sufficiently instructed. This requires an appellate court to have regard both to what was said and what was not said in the trial judge’s instructions: Abdullahi, at para. 37.
32The third alleged error relates to the trial judge’s admission of Talal’s res gestae statements, which is a form of hearsay evidence. The admissibility of hearsay evidence is a question of law, to be reviewed on a standard of correctness. However, an appellate court must accord deference to the findings of fact underlying the admissibility ruling. Further, trial judges are “well placed to assess the hearsay dangers in a particular case and the effectiveness of any safeguards to assist in overcoming them”: R. v. Charles, 2024 SCC 29, 496 D.L.R. (4th) 581, at para. 41, citing R. v. Youvarajah, 2013 SCC 41, 2 S.C.R. 720, at para. 31. Therefore, absent an error in principle, a trial judge’s determination of threshold reliability is entitled to deference.
2. Did the jury charge require an instruction regarding eyewitness identification evidence?
33The appellant submits that the trial judge erred by failing to provide the jury with an instruction regarding Talal’s identification of the appellant. Specifically, the appellant argues that the jury should have been warned about the frailties of eyewitness identification and the potential tainting of the identification process by the police decision to show Talal a single photo of the appellant rather than conducting a photo lineup.
34I disagree.
35It is well recognized that eyewitness identification evidence is inherently unreliable: R. v. Burke, 1996 CanLII 229 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 474, at para. 52. This court and other appellate courts have repeatedly emphasized the dangers of eyewitness identification and the importance of proper pre-trial identification procedures: R. v. Mills, 2019 ONCA 940, 151 O.R. (3d) 138, at para. 184, leave to appeal refused, [2021] S.C.C.A. No. 263. The core concern with evidence of this kind is that eyewitnesses can be “honest and convincing, but mistaken,” especially where the witness is identifying a stranger, the circumstances of the viewing raise accuracy concerns, the pre-trial identification procedure is flawed, or there is no independent confirmatory evidence: R. v. Quercia (1990), 1990 CanLII 2595 (ON CA), 75 O.R. (2d) 463 (C.A.), at p. 465; R. v. Layne, 2024 ONCA 435, 439 C.C.C. (3d) 112, at para. 23, citing R. v. Tat (1997), 1997 CanLII 2234 (ON CA), 35 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.), at p. 673.
36The courts have also cautioned that when the police show a witness one photograph of an accused as a potential suspect rather than a photo lineup, the process is prejudicial because it suggests the identity of the perpetrator to the witness: R. v. Bao, 2019 ONCA 458, 146 O.R. (3d) 225, at para. 27; R. v. Goldhar, 1941 CanLII 311 (ON CA), [1941] 2 D.L.R. 480 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 480; R. v. Smokler, [1941] 2 D.L.R. 480 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 480; and R. v. Araya, 2015 SCC 11, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 581, at para. 36.
37Recognition evidence, where a witness identifies a person previously known to them, is a subset of identification evidence: R. v. Olliffe, 2015 ONCA 242, 322 C.C.C. (3d) 501, at para. 39. The same concerns apply and the same caution must be taken in considering its reliability as in dealing with any other identification evidence: R. v. Hudson, 2020 ONCA 507, 391 C.C.C. (3d) 208, at para. 34. In assessing the reliability of recognition evidence, the trier of fact should consider matters such as how familiar the witness is with the accused and the opportunity the witness had to observe the accused.
38Because of these inherent dangers, where there is eyewitness identification evidence, including recognition evidence, a trial judge must caution the jury about its unreliability generally, and about any specific frailties relevant to the facts of the case: Mills, at para. 187. The jury charge should identify any defects in the identification procedure followed by the police. Such defects are “factors the jury should be instructed to take into account in assessing the reliability of the identifications and determining the weight to be given [to] this evidence in reaching their decision as to the accused’s guilt or innocence”: R. v. D’Amico (1993), 1993 CanLII 8482 (ON CA), 16 O.R. (3d) 125 (C.A.), at p. 129. Juries should also normally be warned about the frailties of eyewitness identification even in cases involving recognition evidence: Olliffe, at para. 40.
39Despite the importance of these general principles, in this case there was no need to caution the jury about the frailties of eyewitness identification evidence and the identification process followed by the police.
40Talal and the appellant had known each other for approximately 15 years. They had just spent hours together. Their interactions prior to the shooting were not fleeting or brief. They met up at a bar during a night out and then continued socializing for several hours at the appellant’s home, following which Talal was shot in a car at close range. Therefore, there was no issue regarding Talal’s ability to recognize the appellant generally or at the time of the shooting, and the typical concerns about eyewitness evidence did not arise.
41The appellant submits that the jury should nonetheless have been cautioned about the risks of eyewitness evidence in relation to Talal because there was some risk that he was mistaken about the identity of the person he was with for at least part of the night. He points to: (a) the fact that Talal could not fully account for what he had being doing between the time he left the bar with the three other men and the time he was at the appellant’s residence; and (b) the fact that Talal initially told the police he did not know who shot him. He also highlights concerns about the reliability of Talal’s memory and perception at the relevant time. Specifically, Talal had been drinking and consuming marijuana in the hours prior to the shooting, Talal was diagnosed with schizophrenia and it was unclear whether he had taken his medication prior to the shooting, and the circumstances of the shooting were traumatizing. These are valid issues regarding the reliability of Talal’s evidence. However, they did not require the trial judge to caution the jury about the dangers of eyewitness identification evidence. Rather, these issues required the trial judge to caution the jury about the reliability of Talal’s recollection of what occurred in the hours prior to the shooting, which he did.
42The trial judge’s instruction to the jury included a lengthy discussion regarding the reliability of Talal’s evidence, including that there were a number of inconsistencies between his testimony at trial, his evidence at the preliminary inquiry and some of the statements he gave to the police. The trial judge highlighted the areas of inconsistency, which included whether Talal was on olanzapine, how much alcohol he consumed on the evening before the shooting, and whether he consumed marijuana that evening. The trial judge further highlighted the time gaps in Talal’s evidence, stating, “[h]is recollection of the time they left the bar, attended Alam Buoc’s residence, to the point of the shooting leaves several hours unaccounted for.” He also observed that the shooting would have been traumatizing and disorienting for Talal. The trial judge ultimately instructed the jury to consider these reliability concerns while pointing out that Talal had consistently identified the appellant as the person who shot him:
It is fair to say that the cross-examination on the whole disclosed a level of inconsistency from Talal Al-Shammari on many of the details of that evening. This is something you have to carefully consider in assessing the reliability of his evidence on certain issues.
However, it is fair to say that Talal Al-Shammari maintained throughout his testimony that Alam Buoc was the person who shot him. This included the times that the accused suggested to him the possibility that he was delusional or hallucinating.
43This left the jury sufficiently prepared to weigh Talal’s evidence in light of its apparent weaknesses.
44It was also not necessary for the trial judge to tell the jury that the police followed a flawed identification process, because there was nothing improper in this case about showing Talal a single photo of the appellant rather than compiling a photo lineup. At trial, the officer who showed Talal the photo explained that he did not think a photo lineup was necessary because Talal knew the appellant. I agree. Given the longstanding relationship between the two and the fact that they were together in the hours immediately prior to the shooting, there was no risk that showing a photo of the appellant to Talal would “[stamp] upon his memory the face he has seen in the photograph, rather than the face he saw on the occasion of the crime”: Goldhar, at p. 480; see also Mills, at para. 191; Araya, at para. 36; Bao, at para. 27.
45In response to the appellant’s argument regarding the need for a photo lineup instruction, the respondent submits that there was no need for such an instruction in this case because Talal named the appellant as the shooter before the police showed him the photo. However, the evidence on this point is unclear. Talal gave conflicting evidence regarding when the police showed him the photo. Nevertheless, given my conclusion that the circumstances of this case did not raise the usual risks associated with identification or recognition evidence, whether the police showed the photo to Talal before or after he named the appellant does not affect my conclusion that there was no need for a jury instruction on identification evidence and the identification process in this case.
46The trial judge did not commit an error by not instructing the jury regarding the frailties of eyewitness identification evidence and the alleged deficiencies in the identification process. Given the instruction regarding Talal’s evidence, the jury was well equipped to decide whether his evidence in naming the appellant as the shooter and confirming his identity in a photo was reliable. I would dismiss this ground of appeal.
3. Did the jury charge sufficiently instruct the jury on the use of after-the-fact conduct evidence?
47As reviewed above, there was significant evidence that the appellant took steps to leave Canada and go to Sudan immediately after the shooting. The appellant submits that the trial judge’s instruction regarding this after-the-fact conduct was inadequate because he failed to instruct the jury on how they could use the evidence. Specifically, he submits that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that after-the-fact conduct is circumstantial evidence and that they could only rely on it to infer the appellant’s guilt if it was the only available inference on all the evidence.
48I am satisfied that the jury’s instruction regarding the use of after-the-fact conduct was adequate.
49An accused’s conduct after the commission of an offence may provide circumstantial evidence of the accused’s guilt: R. v. White, 1998 CanLII 789 (SCC), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 72, at para. 19. Evidence of an accused’s after-the-fact conduct is admissible if it is relevant, material, not contrary to an applicable admissibility rule and its probative value exceeds its prejudicial effect: R. v. Mullin, 2019 ONCA 890, 383 C.C.C. (3d) 16, at para. 48. However, evidence of after-the-fact conduct can pose reasoning risks; a jury may jump too quickly to the conclusion that after-the-fact conduct is evidence of guilt without properly considering alternative explanations for the conduct: White, at para. 22.
50Therefore, when instructing a jury on the use of after-the-fact conduct, a trial judge must provide a clear cautionary instruction against drawing incriminating inferences from after-the-fact conduct without considering alternate explanations for the conduct: R. v. Hall, 2010 ONCA 724, 263 C.C.C. (3d) 5, at para. 136, leave to appeal refused, [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 499; White, at para. 57. The jury should also be cautioned that, before inferring guilt from an accused’s after-the-fact conduct, they must consider all the evidence and be satisfied that the accused’s guilt is the only reasonable inference they can draw from the after-the-fact conduct: Hall, at para. 136; White, at para. 57.
51In this case, the trial judge explained to the jury that the appellant’s after-the-fact conduct may or may not be evidence of his guilt:
The evidence of what a person said or did after an act was committed may help you decide whether that person is conscious of having done something wrong. It may help or it may not.
What a person said or did after an act was committed may indicate that he acted in a way which, according to human experience and logic, is consistent with the conduct of a person who committed an offence, and inconsistent with the conduct of someone who did not do so. On the other hand, there may be other explanations for what Alam Buoc said or did afterwards that are unconnected to his participation in the offences charged.
52The trial judge then reviewed the evidence of the appellant’s efforts to make arrangements to go to Sudan after the shooting, and instructed the jury to decide whether or not they believed this evidence, noting that, while it was for the jury to make the determination, “the evidence seems to support the proposition that following the shootings, the accused was attempting to fly to the Sudan.” The trial judge next instructed the jury that, if they were satisfied the appellant was trying to fly to Sudan following the shootings, they should proceed as follows:
If you do, then you must consider whether or not it is related to the commission of the offence as charged or something else.
For instance, in this case consider the alternative explanation that Alam Buoc was going to the Sudan to attend a funeral, which is what Richard Norris indicated he said to him when discussing the purchase of the airline tickets and the reason for the trip.
Whether what Alam Buoc said or did after the shooting is in any way related to the commission of the offences is for you to decide. You must not consider this evidence on its own separate and apart from the rest of the evidence.
You must consider it together, with and in light of all of what you have heard, including any other explanation of what was said or done that emerges from the evidence.
Remember that you must look at this matter in light of all of the evidence and it is on a consideration of all of the evidence that you decide whether the Crown has proven Alam Buoc’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Emphasis added.]
53The appellant argues that this instruction was insufficient. First, it does not instruct the jury to reserve their final judgment about the meaning of the accused’s conduct until all the evidence has been considered in the normal course of their deliberations. Second, it does not explain what to do if, at that juncture, the jury cannot decide whether to accept the inculpatory explanation over any alternative explanation. The appellant argues that the jury should have been told explicitly that after-the-fact conduct evidence is circumstantial evidence and that they can only consider it after they consider and reject all innocent explanations for the conduct. The appellant relies on the model instruction for after-the-fact conduct in Watt’s Manual of Criminal Jury Instructions, 2026 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, 2026), at pp. 317-318 (Final 27-A), which states that evidence of after-the-fact conduct is circumstantial evidence:
What a person said or did after (an) offence(s) was (were) committed, in other words, evidence of after-the-fact conduct, is a type of circumstantial evidence. Like any circumstantial evidence, it is for you to say what, if any inference should be drawn from this evidence. You may use this evidence, along with all the other evidence in the case, in deciding whether Crown counsel has proven (NOA)'s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But you must not find (NOA) guilty on the basis of this evidence of after-the-fact conduct unless, when you consider it together with the rest of the evidence, you are satisfied that the evidence as a whole is consistent only with (NOA)'s guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion, after considering (all) other plausible theories and reasonable possibilities that are inconsistent with guilt. [Italics original, underline added.]
54The appellant also points to the following language from Hall, at para. 138:
However, it is unlike other pieces of circumstantial evidence in a very significant way. Other circumstantial evidence, such as the classic example of wet ground in the morning, need only be consistent with a conclusion that a certain fact occurred, e.g., that it rained overnight. That fact might be an important piece of the Crown’s case. But it is just one piece that, together with others, may prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The difference with post-offence conduct [and] circumstantial evidence is that, to be evidence that meets the circumstantial evidence test, it must be consistent only with the ultimate conclusion of guilt. [Emphasis added.]
55The appellant relies on this passage to argue that the trial judge ought to have instructed the jury that they must first rule out all alternative explanations before they could consider the after-the-fact conduct as evidence of guilt.
56I agree with the appellant that the trial judge did not specifically instruct the jury that after-the-fact conduct is circumstantial evidence and that they could not find him guilty on the basis of after-the-fact conduct unless, after considering all the evidence, they were satisfied that the evidence as a whole is consistent only with the accused’s guilt and inconsistent with any other reasonable conclusion. However, I am satisfied that, reading the jury charge as a whole, the jury would have understood that they could not consider the appellant’s after-the-fact conduct in isolation as evidence of his guilt and that they must weigh the competing explanations for the after-the-fact conduct in light of all the evidence. In other words, there was no risk that the jury would rush to conclude that, because the appellant’s actions after the shootings were consistent with consciousness of guilt, he must be guilty of the offences.
57First, the trial judge specifically told the jury to consider alternative explanations for the appellant’s arrangements to go to Sudan, namely his statement to the travel agent that he was going there for a funeral. Second, the trial judge told the jury that they could not consider this evidence in isolation, but that they had to consider it in the context of the evidence as a whole. Third, he told them that they could not find the appellant guilty unless they were satisfied, based on the evidence as a whole, that the Crown had proven his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, while the trial judge did not explicitly explain that after-the-fact conduct is circumstantial evidence, the jury charge included the standard instruction regarding circumstantial evidence, including that:
[W]here the Crown seeks to establish an offence or the element of an offence based on circumstantial evidence, the Crown must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the whole of the evidence is the guilt of the accused or that the element of the offence has been made out.
58The appellant’s reliance on this court’s language in Hall is misplaced. The discussion in Hallmerely makes the logical observation that after-the-fact conduct evidence is unique in that it can only be useful to the jury if it is consistent with the ultimate guilt of the accused. The proper approach is still to consider the after-the-fact conduct in light of all the evidence and determine whether the Crown has established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
59The appellant does not argue that the trial judge should have provided a limiting or no probative value instruction to the jury because the after-the-fact conduct was equally consistent with competing inferences: R. v. Arcangioli, 1994 CanLII 107 (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 129, at p. 145. Indeed, there would be no basis for this position given the strength of the after-the-fact conduct and the relative implausibility of the alternative inferences. Thus, the trial judge made no error in leaving the jury to draw whatever inference they chose from the after-the-fact conduct, with reference to the competing explanations and in the context of the evidence as a whole.
60The jury was sufficiently instructed on the use they could make of the after-the-fact conduct. I would dismiss this ground of appeal.
4. Did the trial judge err in admitting the res gestae statements?
61As reviewed above, soon after he was shot, Talal told two people that his friend had shot him. First, after Mr. Manson found Talal and while they were on the way to the hospital, Talal said, “Why would my friend shoot me?” Once they arrived at the hospital, Mr. MacDonald, the security guard, heard Talal make similar statements.
62At trial, the Crown brought an application to have the statements admitted for the truth of their contents. The trial judge ruled that the statements could be admitted based on the res gestae, or spontaneous utterances, exception to the hearsay rule, because Talal made the statements while he was in a state of stress and excitement caused by the shootings. The trial judge reasoned as follows:
The circumstances of Talal Al-Shammari giving the statements to Mr. Hugh Manson and Mr. Greg MacDonald fall squarely into these types of statements. He was shot through the shoulder, the neck and the finger shortly before Mr. Hugh Manson escorted him to the hospital. He would have clearly been in a state of shock, the possibility of concoction simply did not exist. That state of mind would have continued seven or eight minutes later when he arrived at the hospital and made similar statements in the presence of Mr. Greg MacDonald.
63The appellant submits that the trial judge should not have admitted the statements Talal made to Mr. Manson and Mr. MacDonald because they did not meet threshold reliability.[4] He argues that, given Talal’s consumption of alcohol and his general state of mind in the hours prior to his shooting, his statements to Mr. Manson and Mr. MacDonald were inherently unreliable and should not have been admitted.
64I see no error in the trial judge’s admission of the statements at issue.
65As a general rule, spontaneous utterances made during or in the aftermath of a shocking event are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule: R. v. Nurse, 2019 ONCA 260, 145 O.R. (3d) 241, at para. 78; R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144, at para. 212. This is because such statements are inherently reliable where the surprise and stress of the event remove the possibility of concoction or deception: R. v. Khan (1988), 1988 CanLII 7106 (ON CA), 42 C.C.C. (3d) 197 (Ont. C.A.), at p. 207, aff’d 1990 CanLII 77 (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531; Ratten v. The Queen, [1972] A.C. 378, (P.C.), at pp. 389-90. In deciding whether to admit a spontaneous utterance for the truth of its contents, the court is not to just look at the timing of the utterance, but at all of the circumstances at the time of the utterance, including the circumstances that diminish the possibility of concoction or distortion: R. v. Dakin (1995), 1995 CanLII 1106 (ON CA), 80 O.A.C. 253 (C.A.), at para. 20; Nurse, at para. 82.
66The Supreme Court has recognized that, in rare circumstances, evidence that fits within one of the traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule can nevertheless be excluded on the basis that it does not meet the requirements of threshold reliability: Starr, at para. 214; R. v. Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 787, at para. 42.
67The evidence at trial did not support a finding that Talal’s statements to Mr. Manson and Mr. MacDonald were so unreliable that they should not be admitted as spontaneous utterances. While there was evidence that Talal had been drinking in the hours prior to the shooting, there was no evidence that his drinking was excessive or that his drinking or any other issues impaired his ability to perceive what was happening to the point that his evidence should not be placed before the jury. The appellant argues that Mr. Manson’s evidence was that Talal appeared agitated and confused on the way to the hospital, which undermines the reliability of his statement that his friend shot him. On the contrary, Talal’s state of agitation forms part of the circumstances that support the admission of his statements for the truth of their contents.
68Ultimately, it was for the jury to decide what to make of the statements once they were admitted, having regard to all the frailties in Talal’s evidence. The trial judge’s jury charge addressed the use the jury could make of these hearsay statements as follows:
During the trial, you’ve heard evidence from witnesses as to utterances made to them by Talal Al-Shammari. Ordinarily neither Crown nor the accused are entitled to tender through one witness the out of Court utterances of another for the truth of that utterance. This is what is referred to as hearsay. […]
In this case, because of the physical condition of Talal Al-Shammari and the circumstances of when he made the utterances, they can be seen to go to his state of mind, and can also be considered for the truth of their contents.
However, you cannot use the mere repetition of what was said to support the proposition that what was said was truthful. You should also consider the condition of Talal Al-Shammari at the time and the circumstances he was in when making the statements.
69I see no error in the trial judge’s determination that the statements Talal made to Mr. Manson and Mr. MacDonald could be admitted as spontaneous utterances. I would dismiss this ground of appeal.
C. sentence appeal
70The trial judge imposed two concurrent life sentences with no chance of parole for 25 years on both convictions for second degree murder. He also imposed a life sentence with no chance of parole for 7 years for the attempted murder conviction.
71The appellant’s sentence appeal focuses on the period of parole ineligibility for the two second degree murder convictions. The appellant submits that the trial judge committed errors in principle by imposing a period of parole ineligibility of 25 years and that this period is unduly harsh. I disagree. While I would grant leave to appeal the sentence, I would dismiss the sentence appeal.
72This court owes significant deference to a sentencing judge’s decision. The court will only intervene where (1) the sentence imposed is demonstrably unfit, or (2) where the sentencing judge committed an error in principle, failed to consider a relevant factor or erroneously considered an aggravating or mitigating factor, and it appears from the decision that such an error had an impact on the sentence: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at paras. 44, 51; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at paras. 26-28.
73On appeal, the court is not to interfere with a sentencing decision because the appellate court would have imposed a different sentence or weighed relevant factors differently: R. v. W.V., 2023 ONCA 655, 169 O.R. (3d) 68, at para. 26.
74A conviction for second degree murder carries an automatic life sentence: s. 235(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46. The minimum length of parole ineligibility is 10 years with a maximum of 25 years: s. 745(c) of the Criminal Code.
75The appellant submits that the trial judge committed an error in principle and that the 25-year period of parole ineligibility is unduly harsh because the sentence fails to recognize that the jury found him guilty of second degree murder rather than first degree murder. He says that the 25-year period of parole ineligibility therefore does not give effect to the jury verdict. While a 25-year period of parole ineligibility is available for second degree murder, consistent with prior decisions, such sentences should be reserved for cases involving prolonged torture, cruelty or depravity.
76In his sentencing reasons, the trial judge described the murders of Abdulrahman and Mr. Olol as “cold-blooded execution style murders.”
77In imposing a life sentence for Talal’s attempted murder, the trial judge recognized that this required him to find that this was “an exceptional set of circumstances, one that involves stark horror, one where the intent to kill was clear and obvious.” The trial judge noted that the appellant had a prior record, including for possessing and discharging illegal firearms. He also observed that the escalation of gun violence in the City of Ottawa was alarming, requiring a message “in no uncertain terms that gun violence will be met with the harshest of penalties.” The trial judge found that a life sentence was appropriate in this case based in part on his view that the appellant’s moral culpability was “absolute”:
Alam Buoc’s moral culpability is absolute here. He tried to kill Talal Al-Shammari more than once, he shot him through the neck, then he shot him through the shoulder and when that failed, once out of the vehicle when presumably things could have cooled down, he put the gun to Talal Al-Shammari’s head and tried to shoot him once again. It was a miracle that the murder did not succeed.
78In imposing a 25-year period of parole ineligibility, the trial judge described these crimes as “the actions of a homicidal maniac”. He reviewed the circumstances of the offences, the appellant’s circumstances, the victim impact statements and the jury recommendations. He refused to impose consecutive periods of parole ineligibility because the murders did not involve separate transactions.[5]
79I see no error in principle, nor was the sentence imposed unduly harsh.
80As the trial judge found, these were horrific offences that displayed a high level of moral blameworthiness. The appellant murdered two people over what the trial judge described as a “trivial, at best imaginary slight.” These murders had devastating consequences for the families of the deceased. The appellant was not a youthful first-time offender. He was 30 years old when he committed the offences and had a prior record for possession and discharging illegal firearms. He was entitled to no mitigation for showing remorse; indeed, he tried to escape to Sudan immediately after committing the offences and showed no remorse during sentencing.
81While the trial judge imposed the maximum period of parole ineligibility – the same period of ineligibility as for first degree murder – he was entitled to do so. He committed no error in principle and the sentence was not unduly harsh given the circumstances of the offences and of the appellant.
D. disposition
82I would dismiss the conviction appeal. I would grant leave to appeal the sentence but dismiss the sentence appeal.
Released: July 7, 2026 “L.F”
“L. Favreau J.A.”
“I agree. J. Copeland J.A.”
“I agree. J. Dawe J.A.”
1This appeal is subject to a publication ban pursuant to 486.5 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. This publication ban applies to the identities of two witnesses, neither of whom is named in this judgment.
2In order to differentiate between Talal Al-Shammari and Abdulrahman Al-Shammari, I refer to them by their first names in the rest of the judgment. This is not meant to be disrespectful but for ease of identification.
3Although the passport photo was dated July 23 (the day prior to the shootings), the transaction receipt for the photo session was dated July 24. The Walmart associate who processed the transaction testified that it was possible that she could have forgotten to update the date stamp used on the passport photo, since it had to be manually adjusted each day.
4In his factum for the appeal, the appellant had originally also submitted that the statements should not have been admitted because Talal was available to testify. However, the appellant abandoned this argument in a letter sent to the court before the hearing.
5At the time of sentencing, the Supreme Court had not yet ruled that consecutive life sentences are impermissible: R. v. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 597.