COURT FILE NO.: CR-24-51-MO
DATE: 2024-11-18
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Daniel Joseph Robert Paquin, Applicant
AND:
The Warden of Bath Institution and Attorney General of Canada, Respondents
BEFORE: Madam Justice L. Lacelle
COUNSEL: Daniel Joseph Robert Paquin, self represented
Narin Sdieq, for the respondent Attorney General of Canada
HEARD: October 3, 2024
Habeas corpus enDORSEMENT
[1] Mr. Daniel Paquin was declared a dangerous offender over thirty years ago and is now serving his sentence at Bath Institution. In January of this year, he filed a habeas corpus application seeking various forms of relief, including relief under ss. 9 and 12 of the Charter. Since filing his application, Mr. Paquin has advised by letter that he is not relying on some of the grounds set out in his application.
[2] The Attorney General of Canada (“the AGC”) brings a motion seeking to have Mr. Paquin’s habeas corpus application dismissed because the application requests relief that does not involve a deprivation of liberty. The law is clear that where there is no deprivation of liberty involved, the remedy of habeas corpus does not apply. The AGC says there is no factual or legal basis to grant any of the orders sought by Mr. Paquin and his application is therefore “frivolous” or “vexatious” at law.
[3] The motion to dismiss the habeas corpus application was heard a few weeks ago. Submissions were made on the motion by counsel for the AGC and Mr. Paquin. Following the hearing, my decision was reserved so that I might review some of the materials filed on the date of the hearing.
[4] These are my reasons and conclusion on the motion to dismiss brought by the AGC.
Mr. Paquin’s position on the motion
[5] In his submissions to the court, and by letter to counsel for the AGC in response to the motion to dismiss, Mr. Paquin raised a number of concerns about how his sentence was determined (and the evidence used to do that), and how it has been administered.
[6] In oral submissions, Mr. Paquin advised the court that he had appealed his sentence, but his appeal was denied. He further advised that he was a survivor of a residential school.
[7] Mr. Paquin’s concerns about his sentence and its administration are based on a number of circumstances, not all of which will be reviewed here. In his oral submissions, he made the following assertions:
a. The evidence during his sentencing hearing was tainted because it involved evidence from a psychologist (Mike Young) who had been convicted of sex offences against children;
b. The Crown Attorney who conducted his sentencing hearing and the psychologist perpetrated a fraud on the court during his sentencing hearing;
c. A second psychologist who assessed him during his sentence also provided a tainted assessment because this psychologist was sexually assaulting inmates;
d. The continued use of the assessments from these two psychologists in administering his sentence is a violation of his human rights and s. 12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and Correctional Service of Canada (“CSC”) should not be permitted to rely upon them in making decisions about his release;
e. He has been incarcerated and placed under the supervision of two people who abused him at the residential school, and this is a further violation of his human and Charter rights;
f. Since CSC has assigned sex offenders as staff on his case, he has had to direct his own program to rehabilitate himself, which he has done successfully. He says that while he is no longer violent, this is never mentioned in CSC’s reports;
g. His habeas corpus application is necessary and should not be dismissed because no one at CSC is writing in their reports that he has learned to become non-violent, and how he did that. He is relying on the legal remedy of habeas corpus so that a judge can remove him from the control of CSC. He says it is up to the judge how that will be done.
h. In his letter to counsel for the AGC, Mr. Paquin asks for a removal of his dangerous offender status and the corresponding indeterminate sentence he received. He also says he deserves a “political prerogative of mercy/pardon” because he has been supervised during his sentence by sex offender staff, two of whom had sexually molested him at residential school.
[8] Mr. Paquin relies on the case of R. v. Warren, 2024 ONSC 2785. He says it applies to this case because it also involved an inmate who was denied appropriate treatment. He says that if habeas corpus fits the circumstances of another prisoner, why not him? He asks the court not to let the AGC cloud or obstruct my decision-making. He is asking the court to ensure that “things are done properly” by CSC, and for his human rights to be respected.
[9] Mr. Paquin’s position is summed up in this portion of his letter to the court dated August 7, 2024, at p. 3:
If all that I have stated for the record doesn’t show cause the unjustness of rules of the Human Rights and Freedoms Act that have been clearly violated, then I beg my pardon. But I feel that I have proven that the usage of C.S.C. prison tainted psychology writings and those of the court-ordered psyche [sic] assessments done for the indeterminate dangerous offender sentencing Court hearing has literally restricted my personal growth, well-being and to properly progress in life as a better non-violent human being. … I respectfully rest my case to maintain the right to move forward with this Habeus [sic] Corpus Application.
The AGC’s position on the motion
[10] The AGC relies on Rule 6.11(2) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which permits a judge to dismiss an application where it is “frivolous” or “vexatious”. The AGC argues that Mr. Paquin’s application meets the definition of “frivolous” because Mr. Paquin is incorrectly trying to use the remedy of habeas corpus to address grievances unrelated to what the remedy of habeas corpus is permitted to do at law.
[11] The AGC argues that Mr. Paquin’s complaints about tainted evidence used in his sentencing hearing were issues to be addressed in an appeal from his sentence. His complaints about living with other sex offenders cannot be addressed by habeas corpus. Finally, counsel argues that the case relied upon by Mr. Paquin does not apply to his circumstances.
The law
Motions to dismiss pursuant to subrule 6.11(2) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
[12] A judge may dismiss an application pursuant to subrule 6.11(2) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure where she finds that: 1) the application is frivolous or vexatious; and 2) the application may be determined without a full hearing.
[13] Case law has determined that an application may be found “frivolous” where it has no reasonable prospect of success, even assuming the applicant establishes the allegations being made.
Habeas corpus applications
[14] On an application for habeas corpus, the applicant must establish a deprivation of their liberty and raise a legitimate ground upon which to question the legality of the deprivation. In that event, the respondent must show that the deprivation of liberty was lawful.
[15] Various courts have considered the types of liberty deprivation within penitentiaries that are capable of review using the remedy of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court has held that in this context, there are three significant deprivations of liberty: the initial deprivation of liberty, a substantial change in conditions amounting to a further deprivation of liberty and a continued deprivation of liberty. A continuation of an initially valid deprivation of liberty can be challenged if it becomes unlawful: Dumas v. Lecler Institute, 1986 CanLII 38 (SCC), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 459, at para. 11. This might occur, for instance, where an inmate who has achieved the status of parolee continues to be detained.
[16] Habeas corpus may not be used to challenge all decisions relating to an inmate’s sentence. For instance, it may not be used to challenge a decision not granting parole: Dumas, at para. 12.
Analysis
[17] Mr. Paquin’s Notice of Application frames the nature of his application as a review of the lawfulness of the continuation of his sentence (see para. 3 of the Notice of Application). There is no suggestion he has been deprived of liberty because of a security classification or transfer decision. As noted by the AGC, his application appears to primarily pertain to his inadmissibility for parole.
[18] I agree with the AGC that inadmissibility for parole is not an unlawful continued detention that can be challenged by way of a habeas corpus application.
[19] Mr. Paquin’s arguments on the motion also appear to raise issues with how his designation as a dangerous offender was arrived at. Habeas corpus is not the correct tool to use in this instance. According to his oral comments, Mr. Paquin did use the correct tool of an appeal of his sentence within a year of its imposition. I have no power on a habeas corpus application to revisit the issues that are properly dealt with by way of an appeal.
[20] As for Mr. Paquin’s reliance on Warren, that case did not involve a habeas corpus application. The evidentiary record in that case was also quite different than in this one. Given the evidence before me, and the nature of the challenge posed by Mr. Paquin, I cannot rely upon Warren to provide Mr. Paquin with the same remedy obtained by Mr. Warren in that case (e.g. an order that notwithstanding his designation as a dangerous offender who should serve an indeterminate sentence, he should be transferred to a provincial psychiatric hospital).
[21] I am persuaded by the AGC that Mr. Paquin’s application does not show any ground for the order sought as it fails to identify a deprivation of liberty that is properly reviewable by using the remedy of habeas corpus. Having made this finding, I conclude that the application is “frivolous”, since it has no reasonable chance of success. I also find that the issues may be determined without a hearing. Accordingly, the AGC has satisfied me that the test under subrule 6.11(2) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure is met, and Mr. Paquin’s habeas corpus application must accordingly be dismissed.
Conclusion
[22] For these reasons, the motion brought by the AGC is granted, and the habeas corpus application brought by Mr. Paquin is dismissed.
[23] While I am sympathetic to Mr. Paquin’s concerns, and I thank him for his courtesy toward the court and counsel during the hearing, I cannot allow his habeas corpus application to continue given the findings I have made on this motion.
[24] However, I encourage Mr. Paquin to seek legal assistance in determining whether any remedy is available at this time to address his concerns about his sentencing hearing and his continued detention. Mr. Paquin seems likely to benefit from advice on how to proceed with future parole hearings as well, and I encourage him to seek that advice.
Lacelle J.
Date: November 18, 2024