Laurie Lacelle

The accused was charged with aggravated assault after striking her ex-partner in his left eye during an argument.

The complainant had a pre-existing condition that caused his left eye to bulge and required him to wear protective glasses.

The blow ruptured the eye, ultimately necessitating its surgical removal and replacement with a prosthetic.

The court found that the accused intentionally applied force without consent, that a reasonable person would have foreseen the risk of bodily harm, and that the resulting loss of the eye constituted permanent disfigurement.

The accused was found guilty.

In a child protection status review under the Child and Family Services Act, the child protection agency sought a Crown wardship order for two young children with a view to adoption.

The mother sought the return of the children to her care with assistance from the maternal grandmother, while one father supported that position and alternatively requested an extension of statutory timelines.

After hearing extensive evidence from agency workers, foster parents, and family members, the court found the children continued to be in need of protection due to persistent concerns regarding parental capacity, safety of the home environment, substance use, and lack of cooperation with the agency.

The court concluded that the proposed family care plans were not realistic and would expose the children to continued instability and risk.

The children were therefore made Crown wards without access, enabling adoption planning to proceed.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that declared the mandatory victim surcharge under s. 737(1) of the Criminal Code unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter.

The accused, who pleaded guilty to multiple offences and was indigent with mental health and addiction issues, argued that the mandatory surcharge imposed a crushing financial burden.

The Superior Court agreed that the surcharge constitutes punishment for Charter purposes but held that the evidentiary record was insufficient to establish that the surcharge was grossly disproportionate.

The court emphasized the high threshold for s. 12 violations and the availability of statutory mechanisms such as extensions of time to pay.

The appeal was allowed and the surcharge was ordered imposed.

The accused brought a pre‑trial application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code seeking leave to adduce evidence of prior consensual sexual activity with the complainant in a sexual assault prosecution.

The proposed evidence concerned a previous incident of consensual “rough sex,” including biting and scratching, which the defence argued was relevant to credibility and necessary to understand the nature of the parties’ relationship in support of a consent defence.

The court held the proposed evidence effectively relied on the prohibited inference that because the complainant previously consented to similar activity, she was more likely to have consented on the charged occasion.

The court further found the evidence lacked sufficient relevance and significant probative value under s. 276(2) and that the factors in s. 276(3) weighed against admission.

The application was dismissed.

The accused brought an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code seeking leave to adduce evidence of prior sexual activity between the accused and the complainant in a prosecution for sexual assault and assault.

The accused argued the evidence was relevant to challenge the complainant’s credibility by establishing inconsistencies regarding prior meetings between the parties.

The court held that the sexual nature of the alleged prior encounters was not relevant to the credibility issue and that the defence could challenge the complainant’s testimony about prior contact without introducing evidence of sexual activity.

The proposed evidence therefore failed to meet the relevance requirement under s. 276(2)(b) and, in any event, lacked significant probative value outweighing its prejudicial effect under s. 276(2)(c).

Considering the factors in s. 276(3), admission was not necessary for full answer and defence and would undermine the proper administration of justice.

Following a summary judgment motion and mini‑trial under Rule 20.04(2.2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure concerning whether the moving defendants possessed a contractual right of indemnity against subcontractor defendants, the court had previously dismissed the indemnity claim.

The remaining issue concerned the costs of the mini‑trial and related steps.

Applying s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, the court held that the moving defendants unnecessarily prolonged the litigation, failed to meaningfully engage in settlement efforts, and advanced an indemnity theory unsupported by evidence.

The conduct justified a costs award on a substantial indemnity basis.

The moving defendants were ordered to pay substantial indemnity costs to both the plaintiffs and the subcontractor defendants.

The appellant brought a summary conviction appeal from findings of guilt for sexual interference and sexual assault following a trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, where the sexual assault count was stayed under the Kienapple principle.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred by failing to adequately assess the reliability of the complainant’s evidence and by applying an unequal level of scrutiny to the evidence of the complainant and the accused.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge was alive to the distinction between credibility and reliability and sufficiently addressed the reliability of the complainant’s evidence in the reasons.

The court also found no basis to conclude that different standards of scrutiny were applied to the respective evidence of the accused and the complainant.

The trial judge’s reasons were found to meet the functional adequacy standard required for appellate review.

The applicant mother brought a motion to determine whether Ontario had jurisdiction over her post-divorce application concerning the child's school placement.

The court held that s. 4 of the Divorce Act governed because the proceeding was a new corollary relief application rather than a variation motion, and the applicant was ordinarily resident in Ontario when she commenced it.

Because the Ontario proceeding was commenced first and had not been discontinued, Ontario had exclusive jurisdiction and the respondent father's later Quebec proceeding was deemed discontinued under s. 4(2).

The court further held that any request to transfer the matter to Quebec under s. 6 was premature because no Answer had yet been filed and the issue was not properly before the court.

On a rule 20.04(2.2) mini-trial, the moving defendants sought a declaration that an implied oral contract with a blasting contractor contained a right of indemnity arising from a quarry fly rock incident.

The court held that while the evidence showed a long-standing business relationship and shared expectations about operational responsibility and safety, it did not establish any oral or implied agreement to indemnify.

Applying the implied terms jurisprudence, the court found such a term was not necessary for business efficacy and failed the officious bystander test.

The indemnity claim was dismissed, and the matter was left to proceed to trial on remaining issues.