Sophie Côté Langlois

The Applicant, Valoris for Children and Adults of Prescott-Russell, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a final order for extended society care for the child B.J.M.O., who had previously been found in need of protection.

The respondent parents opposed, arguing for a trial on disposition and access, proposing custody to kin or interim supervision.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial.

It ordered extended society care for the child, with access to parents at the Society's discretion (due to criminal no-contact conditions and a broken relationship) and sibling access as determined by the Society.

The decision emphasized the child's best interests, stability, and the unsuitability of other options.

K.R. appealed an order finding her in contempt of court for allegedly violating a temporary order concerning supervised visits for her child with the father.

The original order granted Valoris discretion to remove supervision if no longer necessary.

K.R. refused to allow visits at the father's home, insisting they remain at Valoris's office due to concerns about the child's behaviour.

The Court of Appeal found the original order insufficiently clear regarding visit location or K.R.'s obligation to support a gradual transition plan.

It also noted that Valoris had not yet made a final decision to remove supervision.

The court emphasized the need for clear orders in contempt proceedings and the importance of considering the child's best interests and less severe remedies in family law disputes.

The appeal was allowed, the contempt order quashed, and the contempt motion dismissed.

The applicant child protection agency brought a motion for contempt against the respondent mother for refusing to comply with a temporary order granting the father supervised access that could transition to unsupervised access at the agency's discretion.

The mother refused to allow visits at the father's home despite investigations into abuse allegations being closed without charges.

The court found the mother in contempt, as the order was clear, her disobedience was deliberate, and the contempt was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also modified the prior order to implement a gradual schedule for unsupervised access at the father's home.

The applicant filed a complaint against the children's aid society under section 120 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, alleging the society failed to hear his concerns and failed to provide reasons for its decisions regarding his children.

Following a documentary hearing, the Child and Family Services Review Board dismissed the complaint.

The Board found that the applicant had ample opportunity to express his views to the society and that the society had adequately provided explanations and context for its actions and decisions.

The applicant mother sought an extension of time to file a notice of motion for leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision that upheld a trial judge's order making her child a Crown ward with no access for adoption purposes.

The applicant was 11 days late in filing her motion.

She explained the delay was due to attempts to secure financing, finding appeal counsel, and counsel's illness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for extension of time, finding no potential merit to the proposed leave to appeal application.

The trial judge and Divisional Court had thoroughly considered all grounds of appeal and found ample evidence supporting Crown wardship as being in the child's best interests.

The appellant mother appealed a final order granting Crown wardship with no access for the purpose of adoption of her child.

She argued the trial judge erred in finding the child was in need of protection, improperly applied expert psychological evidence, and placed undue weight on her mental health history and lack of cooperation with the child protection agency.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that Crown wardship was the only viable plan to protect the child and serve the child's best interests.

The children's aid society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of a four-year-old child.

The society sought to have the child remain in the mother's care, subject to strict supervision by the maternal grandfather, due to allegations of physical abuse involving the mother's partner and another child.

The mother opposed the supervision order, while the father sought temporary custody.

The court found credible evidence that the child would be at risk of harm if left unsupervised with the mother or her partner.

The court granted the society's motion, ordering that the child remain with the mother under the grandfather's supervision, with the father having access every second weekend.

The applicants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing their motion for summary judgment in a child protection proceeding.

The applicants had sought to dismiss the protection application on the basis that the child was over 18 years old at the time of apprehension.

The motion judge concluded that the child's age could not be determined summarily due to contradictory evidence and directed the matter to trial.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding the applicants failed to meet the test under Rule 62.02(4).

There were no conflicting decisions, no reason to doubt the correctness of the order, no procedural unfairness, and the issue was not of general importance.

The applicant Children's Aid Society sought an order making three children Crown wards without access for the purpose of adoption.

The respondent parents opposed the application, seeking the return of the children or, alternatively, placement of the eldest child with the paternal grandparents.

The court found the children to be in need of protection due to a history of domestic violence, substance abuse, and lack of parenting capacity, which resulted in significant emotional and behavioral issues for the children.

The court admitted the children's out-of-court statements under the principled approach to hearsay.

Concluding that the parents and grandparents could not meet the children's special needs, the court ordered Crown wardship without access to facilitate adoption.

Les intimés ont présenté une motion pour jugement sommaire afin de rejeter une requête en protection de l'enfance, alléguant que l'enfant était âgée de 20 ans au moment du dépôt de la requête, dépassant ainsi les limites d'âge statutaires de la Loi sur les services à l’enfance et à la famille.

La requérante, Valoris, a contesté cette motion, affirmant que l'enfant avait 15 ou 16 ans, se basant sur des documents officiels.

Le tribunal a examiné des preuves documentaires et orales contradictoires concernant la date de naissance de l'enfant et le décès de sa mère.

La Cour a jugé que les documents officiels burundais et canadiens, ainsi que l'historique personnel et scolaire cohérent de l'enfant, soutenaient l'âge de 16 ans.

Les intimés n'ayant pas prouvé, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, que l'enfant avait plus de 16 ans, la motion pour jugement sommaire a été rejetée.

The Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship of the child, V.T., without access, for the purpose of adoption.

The mother, C.A.T., sought the child's return to her care.

The court found the child to be in need of protection due to the mother's inability to prioritize the child's needs, lack of insight into parenting deficits, and inappropriate conduct during supervised access, including delusional thoughts and threats related to the mafia.

Despite the mother's community integration and efforts to improve her lifestyle, the court determined that the risks of returning the child were real and that a supervision order would be unworkable due to the mother's lack of cooperation with the Society.

The court ordered Crown wardship without access, finding it to be in the child's best interests for permanent placement through adoption.

The applicant brought a motion seeking an order to allow a witness to testify via videoconference at an upcoming trial.

The witness suffered from severe back pain and had limited ability to travel or remain seated for long periods.

The court granted the motion, finding that the balance of convenience favoured videoconference testimony and that any concerns regarding cross-examination or assessing credibility could be addressed by the court's directions.

In a child protection status review under the Child and Family Services Act, the child protection agency sought a Crown wardship order for two young children with a view to adoption.

The mother sought the return of the children to her care with assistance from the maternal grandmother, while one father supported that position and alternatively requested an extension of statutory timelines.

After hearing extensive evidence from agency workers, foster parents, and family members, the court found the children continued to be in need of protection due to persistent concerns regarding parental capacity, safety of the home environment, substance use, and lack of cooperation with the agency.

The court concluded that the proposed family care plans were not realistic and would expose the children to continued instability and risk.

The children were therefore made Crown wards without access, enabling adoption planning to proceed.

In a child protection proceeding, the child protection agency brought a motion to terminate the respondent mother's supervised access to a young child pending trial.

The court considered whether there had been a material change in circumstances sufficient to vary a temporary access order under the Child and Family Services Act.

Evidence included psychological assessments, reports of problematic behaviour during supervised visits, and a lengthy period without contact between the mother and child.

The court found that the mother had engaged in conduct during access visits that posed emotional and developmental risks to the child and demonstrated an inability to comply with the conditions of supervised access.

Concluding that continued access would not be in the child’s best interests pending trial, the court suspended the mother’s access.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination with respect to services on the grounds of disability, creed, sex, marital status, and race.

Valoris for Children and Adults of Prescott-Russell filed a Request to Intervene to address issues regarding the interpretation of the Child and Family Services Act and to provide relevant documentary evidence.

The Tribunal granted the request to intervene, finding that Valoris had a significant interest in the proceeding as the applicant had interactions with the organization and the application made allegations against it.

In a child protection proceeding concerning a newborn apprehended shortly after birth, the grandmother moved to be added as a party and sought leave to file a plan of care.

The court applied the established discretionary factors governing party addition in child protection matters, including the child’s best interests, delay, necessity, and the proposed party’s capacity to advance a viable plan.

The motion was dismissed because adding the grandmother was not in the child’s best interests, would likely delay permanency, and the evidence did not satisfy the court that she could put forward a plan in the child’s best interests.

Child protection motion under the Child and Family Services Act seeking a temporary care and custody order.

The court considered evidence of chronic school absences, unsanitary living conditions including mold, concerns about supervision, sexualized behaviour by one child, and a positive hair follicle drug test for amphetamines/methamphetamines by the father.

The court found the father had not demonstrated the ability to protect the children from ongoing harm and instability.

It concluded that supervision would be insufficient to protect the children.

A temporary order placing the children in the care and custody of the child protection agency for six months was granted.