Hélène C. Desormeau

The accused faced charges of attempting to choke, assault, mischief, and criminal harassment involving a former partner and children.

The court acquitted the accused on the assault, choking, and harassment charges due to reliability issues, inconsistencies in the evidence, and concerns about witness contamination.

The accused was found guilty of mischief under $5,000 for damaging a bedroom door, which was supported by independent photographic evidence.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action against Ontario for historical sexual assault by a participant in the Witness Protection Program, Ontario sought costs of over $516,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff argued no costs should be awarded due to the nature of the claim and the Victims' Bill of Rights.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that victims of sexual assault should be presumptively shielded from costs when unsuccessful, but considered the plaintiff's good faith and the need for proportionality.

Costs were fixed at $275,000.

The respondent mother brought a motion seeking sole or joint medical decision-making authority for her child, who was in the temporary care of the Children's Aid Society.

The child had complex medical and behavioural needs requiring psychotropic medication.

The mother argued that the Society had delayed or minimized her concerns regarding medication side effects and behavioural deterioration.

The court found a material change in circumstances but declined to grant the mother decision-making authority due to the high level of conflict between her, the Society, and treating physicians.

Instead, the court varied the existing communication protocol to implement a structured escalation and managed communication model to ensure the mother's concerns were addressed in a timely and predictable manner.

In a child protection proceeding, the biological father brought a motion seeking interim care and custody of his young child, who has significant medical needs.

The child had been residing with a kin caregiver since being removed from the mother's care.

The court applied the two-part test under section 94 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and found that the child could not be safely returned to the mother.

In assessing the competing placement plans, the court considered the father's pending criminal charges and the child's need for stability.

The court ordered that the child remain in the care of the kin caregiver, with the father granted one overnight visit per week.

The plaintiff alleged she was sexually assaulted while in the Witness Protection Program and sought damages against Ontario on theories of negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract.

The court found on a balance of probabilities that the sexual assault occurred, but held that the protection team’s private duty of care was limited to protection from the identified outside threat and that no breach of the applicable standard of care was proven, particularly in the absence of expert evidence on the Witness Protection Program standard of care in 1987.

The court further held that legal causation and foreseeability were not established, and rejected the fiduciary and contract claims.

In an alternative assessment, the court would have awarded damages for psychological harm from the assault, but not for COPD, income loss, or housekeeping claims.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order to place two young children in extended society care.

The children had been out of their parents' care for significant periods due to concerns regarding intimate partner violence, untreated substance abuse, and mental health issues.

The parents did not file affidavit evidence in response to the motion.

The court found that despite periods of positive engagement, the parents had not demonstrated sustained progress or insight into their issues, and had not visited the children in several months.

The kin caregiver was unable to provide a permanent plan.

Applying the principles of summary judgment in child protection proceedings, the court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The children were found to be in need of protection and placed in extended society care, with specified access for the parents and the kin caregiver.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order for extended society care of a two-year-old child who had been in care for over 500 days.

The mother, who suffers from borderline personality disorder, had a history of chronic suicidal ideation and multiple hospitalizations under the Mental Health Act, leading to repeated breakdowns in caregiving.

The court found the child in need of protection under s. 74(2)(h) of the CYFSA due to the risk of emotional harm caused by the mother's mental health instability.

Concluding that the mother had not achieved sufficient stability to safely parent the child and that a supervision order would not adequately mitigate the risk, the court ordered the child placed in extended society care with specified access for the mother.

The accused stood trial on a charge of sexual interference alleged against his young daughter, arising from incidents said to have occurred in a bedroom, a bathroom, and a car.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court disbelieved the accused's evidence and found that it did not raise a reasonable doubt, while assessing the child complainant's evidence in accordance with the principles governing the testimony of children.

Material inconsistencies in the complainant's account of the car incident, together with the accused's evidence on that issue, left the court with a reasonable doubt as to that allegation.

The court found the complainant's evidence regarding the bedroom and bathroom incidents credible and reliable, treating her incremental disclosure as consistent with the recognized dynamics of child sexual abuse rather than embellishment.

The court was satisfied that the Crown proved the essential elements of sexual interference beyond a reasonable doubt in respect of those two incidents.

The accused was found guilty.

The appellant, Amy Cox, appealed a finding of Not Criminally Responsible by reason of Mental Disorder (NCRMD) made by Justice Kinsella.

The appeal focused on alleged procedural unfairness in the NCRMD process and the sufficiency of the trial judge’s reasons.

The Superior Court found that, although there was evidence to support the NCRMD finding, the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons explaining why the evidence justified the verdict.

As a result, the appeal was allowed, the verdict set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Applicant sought an order barring the Crown from prosecuting him for an allegation of choking, arguing that the charge formed part of a prior resolution and that prosecution would amount to double jeopardy under sections 725(1) and 725(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued that the choking allegation was not part of the previous proceedings and could be prosecuted.

The court found that the choking allegation was not previously adjudicated or considered, and therefore, the Crown was not barred from proceeding.

The application was dismissed.

The wife brought a motion to change seeking retroactive and ongoing high-range spousal support due to her deteriorating health.

The husband, a doctor, sought to terminate spousal support due to his impending retirement.

The court found that both the wife's increased medical expenses and the husband's retirement constituted material changes in circumstances.

The court reduced the husband's spousal support obligation for a two-year transitional period, after which support will terminate when the wife turns 65.

The wife's claim for retroactive support was dismissed due to her delay and the hardship it would cause the husband.

The husband's life insurance obligation was also reduced to reflect the remaining support payable.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the Respondent for sexual assault.

The appeal raised four grounds: wrongful admission and use of section 276 evidence (prior sexual activity), erroneous reliance on "implied consent" misapplication of the "de minimis" principle, and failure to apply or provide sufficient reasons regarding the decision in R. v. Chase concerning the sexual purpose of the touching.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in admitting certain evidence, it was not material to the acquittal, which was based on reasonable doubt regarding the sexual assault.

The court also clarified that implied consent does not apply to sexual assault and upheld the trial judge's reasoning on the de minimis principle and the application of Chase.

The father brought a motion seeking unsupervised parenting time with the child, V, through a graduated transition plan.

The mother opposed, also bringing a procedural motion to strike portions of the father's evidence and arguing the main motion was previously settled.

The court partially granted the motion to strike, finding certain expert and opinion evidence inadmissible.

It also determined the main motion was not settled.

Applying the best interests of the child principle under the Children's Law Reform Act, the court found that while unsupervised parenting time was not yet appropriate, a gradual increase in supervised parenting time by the paternal grandmother was in the child's best interest, given the child's increased comfort and the temporary nature of supervision.

The mother (Respondent) brought a motion for disbursement of proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home (Hanlon property), seeking to apply them to various debts, including a second mortgage on her current residence.

The father (Applicant) brought a cross-motion seeking distribution of the Hanlon proceeds according to a marriage contract, distribution of proceeds from another jointly owned property (Tremblant), and an adjustment to child support.

The court upheld the validity of the marriage contract, found the father had frustrated the sale of the Hanlon property, and largely granted the mother's requests for immediate disbursement of the Hanlon proceeds, including payment of outstanding child support and section 7 expenses from the father's share.

The father's child support claim was dismissed due to insufficient disclosure, and his request for distribution of the Tremblant property proceeds was dismissed without prejudice to be argued at trial.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b).

The total delay from the charge to the anticipated end of trial was 36 months and 11 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

However, the court found significant defence delay attributable to the accused's failure to retain counsel and provide necessary financial documentation to Legal Aid.

After deducting the defence delay, the net delay fell below the presumptive ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The respondent mother brought a contempt motion against the applicant father for breaching various court orders and domestic contracts related to children's psychological services, dietary restrictions, non-disclosure, civil conduct, child support, and Section 7 expenses.

The applicant father brought a cross-motion to stay and vary child support.

The court found the father in contempt of one count (refusing to follow physician referrals) and in non-compliance of seven other counts.

Several other allegations were dismissed.

The father's cross-motion to vary child support was dismissed due to insufficient financial disclosure and non-compliance.

The court issued specific orders for both parties to ensure compliance with parenting, support, and disclosure obligations.

The appellant, N.S., appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting two complainants, C.C. and R.Z., raising multiple grounds of appeal.

These grounds included alleged errors by the trial judge in dismissing a directed verdict motion, admitting similar fact evidence, failing to consider innocent collusion, applying different standards of scrutiny, creating a reasonable apprehension of bias, improperly applying the R. v. W.(D.) test, and imposing an excessive sentence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the conviction and the 15-month incarceration sentence.

The Crown brought a bail review application under s. 521 of the Criminal Code, seeking to vacate a release order and have a bail hearing de novo for the respondent, Brandon Van Allen.

The Crown argued that the Justice of the Peace erred in law by failing to address submissions regarding the surety's contradictory evidence and gaps in the supervision plan (secondary grounds), and by unduly focusing on triable issues and the respondent's non-participation in an altercation when assessing public confidence (tertiary grounds).

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that the Justice of the Peace properly applied the test for release, assessed the surety's credibility, and was entitled to deference in her determinations, concluding that no error in law occurred.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault and breach of probation.

The court considered sentencing principles, aggravating factors (intimate partner relationship, abuse of trust, significant victim impact), and mitigating factors (no prior sexual offence record).

Despite the defence seeking a conditional sentence, the court found it would not meet denunciation and deterrence objectives given the seriousness of the offence and the accused's history of non-compliance with court orders.

A custodial sentence was imposed.

The appellant, convicted of assault and unlawful presence in a dwelling, appealed his conviction, seeking to introduce new evidence as an alibi.

The court applied the Palmer and Snyder tests for admitting new evidence on appeal.

The proposed new evidence, a witness statement, was deemed not to constitute a true alibi and was found to be neither credible nor reliable.

The court concluded that the new evidence was not sufficiently cogent to have influenced the trial judge's decision.

Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the new evidence was not admitted.