Court File and Parties
Court File No.: 17-731 Date: 2024-08-01 Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Between: A.D., Applicant And: A.B., Respondent
Counsel: David Danielson, for the Applicant SRL (Self-represented for A.B.) Office of the Children’s Lawyer (Kate Anderson)
Heard: July 22, 2024
Ruling on motion
Justice H. Desormeau
Overview
[1] The court heard the father’s motion for unsupervised parenting time with the child, V, born in 2015, pursuant to a graduated transition plan commencing with supervised and evolving to unsupervised visits.
[2] The mother opposed the motion. She brought a procedural motion to strike portions of the father’s evidence and to argue the motion ought not be heard as it has been settled in April 2024.
[3] Given the sensitive nature of the facts contained herein, weighing the possible effect on the child regarding any publication of full names in this decision versus the open court principle, with consent of the parties, this decision has been initialized.
Procedural Issues
Motion to strike
[4] At the outset, the mother asked the court to strike the following paragraphs of the father’s affidavit dated June 25, 2024:
(a) paragraph 5; (b) paragraph 6, including the entirety of Exhibit A; (c) paragraph 9; (d) paragraph 10, including the entirety of Exhibit B; (e) sentences 1 and 2 of paragraph 11, or in the alternative, sentence 1 of paragraph 11; (f) sentence 1 of paragraph 12; and (g) paragraph 25.
[5] At the motion, the argument was focused on paragraphs 5, 6, 9, and 10. The mother advanced that these paragraphs should be struck as they contained inadmissible hearsay evidence. One paragraph purported to refer to expert opinion evidence, but that evidence did not comply with the requirement for participant or litigation expert under the Rules. Further, given it was hearsay and did not comply with the requirements, the court ought to strike it. Finally, if the court were to allow the report form part of the evidence, the prejudicial effect of its admission would outweigh any probative value.
[6] The father argued that the court ought to consider all the evidence filed by him, including the expert’s report.
[7] A review of the evidence shows that the father’s June 25, 2024, affidavit at paragraphs 5 and 6 reference an expert report by Dr. Felicity Goodyear-Smith, which is attached as Exhibit A. There is no acknowledgement of expert’s duty filed on behalf of Dr. Goodyear-Smith; the report is called a “Draft report” and has a “draft” watermark throughout; the report is unsigned; and it is not appended to an affidavit signed by Dr. Goodyear-Smith, and she is not a participant expert. For all these reasons, this court finds this report to be inadmissible expert evidence and is struck from the affidavit, along with paragraphs 5 and 6.
[8] Paragraphs 9 and 10 reference and append studies which also were not in evidence. Appending webpages containing opinion evidence is not evidence at a motion. Those paragraphs and Exhibit B are also struck.
[9] As for paragraphs 11, 12 and 25 in the father’s affidavit, these were simply his views and, given that the father was self-represented, a greater leniency is accorded. As such, this court is not prepared to strike those paragraphs.
Motion has been settled
[10] The mother also argued that the motion had been resolved at a prior case conference before Abrams J., thus it was not properly before the court.
[11] For reasons put on record, this court found otherwise.
[12] The court relied on the order being an interim without prejudice order, and that the matter had returned before Abrams J., who had allegedly “settled the motion” on at least three subsequent occasions and yet the motion was set to proceed based on his endorsements.
Evidence
[13] The following seemed to be undisputed evidence.
[14] The parties were together from 2014 until approximately April 2016. Together they had one child, V, who was born in 2015. V is now 9 years old.
[15] On March 5, 2018, Justice Abrams signed a final order, pursuant to Minutes of Settlement, whereby the parties agreed to joint custody (as it was then known) and that the father’s parenting time with the child would be alternating weekends from Friday at 5:30 p.m. until Sunday at 5:30 p.m.; every Tuesday from 5:30 p.m. until Wednesday at 7:00 p.m., and any other times as both parties agreed.
[16] In March 2019, the child tested positive for gonorrhea. The father and his then girlfriend also had gonorrhea. The child went to CHEO, where she was examined by Dr. Anna Karwowska. Family and Child Services of Lanark, Leeds, and Grenville (“FCSLLG”) became involved. The Society “verified” that the child had been sexually abused by the father.
[17] The father was criminally charged on April 11, 2019, for sexual interference, incest and sexual assault. He was released the following day on conditions of no contact with the child or the mother.
[18] The mother brought a motion to change, seeking sole decision-making responsibility and that the father have no contact with the child, or alternatively contact (“access”) at the mother’s sole discretion.
[19] On or about June 23, 2021, the final order from 2018 was varied by Justice Abrams on an interim without prejudice basis giving the mother sole decision-making authority and suspending the father’s parenting time.
[20] The father’s charges were stayed on or about November 25, 2021, following the testimony of the Crown’s expert witness, Dr. Vanessa Allen. The mother’s affidavit dated June 23, 2022, at paragraph 37 indicated that “[i]t was my understanding that the stay was a result of the Crown’s determination that they could not prove the [father’s] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The doubt existed because Dr. Allen could not say that the gonorrhea is always, 100% transmitted sexually. She had to admit a possibility of another means of transmission no matter how improbable.”
[21] On July 5, 2022, Justice Johnston ordered the father have supervised parenting time with V, at the Rose Garden. V was uncomfortable with this, and after three refusals, the Rose Garden refused services. The Society then assisted, and the mother was present during the initial supervised visits. Thereafter, from August 2023 to April 2024, the visits occurred at the Rose Garden.
[22] On or about April 2024, the parties agreed that visits could occur in the community, and that the mother may be present.
[23] Since the making of Justice Johnston’s order providing for supervised parenting time through the Rose Garden, V has met with Justice Abrams four times as well as a CAS worker on several occasions.
[24] On behalf of the child, the OCL clinical investigator Sandra Kapasky provided evidence that she had met V on five separate occasions, had communicated with the parents, several collaterals, had reviewed the FCSLLG file, as well as police records.
[25] Ms. Kapasky confirmed that the father resides with the child’s paternal grandmother, M.T.
[26] According to Ms. Kapasky, the father denied sexual abuse of V throughout the OCL involvement and in all collateral records.
[27] Ms. Kapasky’s evidence was V is a strong student, she has a good group of friends, is involved in activities and sports, and excels in them as well as her academics. V was seeing Dr. Helen Bienert, clinical psychologist, and other mental health workers.
Disputed Evidence
[28] The father maintained that the child did not obtain gonorrhea through sexual contact, but rather it was obtained by non-sexual contact as a result of he and the child showering together, be it through the contaminated bath water or sharing a towel. He continues to assert his innocence regarding the allegations. He argued that there was no evidence or signs of sexual abuse, no prior concerns of sexual abuse and a lack of physical evidence supporting the allegations of sexual abuse.
[29] The mother argued that the father provided several contradictory explanations as to how the child contracted gonorrhea, including that it could have been contracted through sexual abuse by someone else, thus undermining his credibility. She questioned the veracity of the father’s denials, particularly considering the child’s comments about “daddy’s tail” when meeting with Dr. Helen Bienert, as well as Dr. Bienert observing and noting V’s sexualized behaviour through a “game” with a teddy bear.
[30] Dr. Vanessa Allen, former Chief Medical Microbiologist at Public Health Ontario provided an affidavit, coupled with the acknowledgement of expert’s duty. Appended to her affidavit was her report, whereby she stated “[t]he mode of transmission of Neisseria gonorrhoeae is sexually in almost all cases.” She went on to indicate, “[t]he role of fomites or physical objects in any transmission of gonorrhea is unproven.” She concluded that “[o]n this basis, sexual transmission is the most likely cause of [V’s] gonorrhea infection.”
[31] Dr. Anna Karwowska, a pediatrician in Child Maltreatment Pediatrics unit at CHEO, provided an affidavit, coupled with the acknowledgement of expert’s duty. Appended to her affidavit was her letter to the OPP, dated July 8, 2019, expressing her opinion on the likely source of gonorrhea transmission to V. As set out in her affidavit, her conclusion was that the likely source of gonorrhea was that it was sexually transmitted. Dr. Karwowska’s letter set out that it was her opinion, “that a genital swab from a 3 year old child that is positive for N. gonorrhea represents the direct transmission of this organism from infected secretions of another person to the child’s genitals.” She then concluded, “[f]ollowing literature review, it is not possible to make any statements on the possibility or likelihood regarding the transmission of gonorrhea via fomites.”
[32] Dr. Helen Bienert provided two affidavits, one from June 16, 2022 and one from March 3, 2023. Appended to both affidavits were letters to counsel from that same year offering opinions as to V and what was in her best interest. Dr. Bienert’s evidence, as a participant expert, was considered by this court, despite no longer being contemporaneous. However, it is acknowledged that Dr. Bienert strongly suggested that moving slowly regarding the father’s time with V.
[33] The mother provided evidence that the Society would not support the father having unsupervised parenting time. The mother also argued that the child does not want unsupervised time with the father.
[34] The father’s evidence was that the supervised visits have been going well. He also relied on the positive community visits with the child in support of his request to increase parenting time and gradually decrease supervision. The mother did not seem to dispute that the child has enjoyed the activities with her father.
[35] The father argued that transitioning the visits to not include the mother would build an independent relationship between he and the child; enhance the quality of the visits and demonstrate his commitment and ability to provide a safe and supportive environment for V on his own.
[36] He also argued that with trial as the next step, it was time to transition from supervised to unsupervised visits, as supervision is intended to be a temporary measure.
[37] Part of his plan involved the paternal grandmother, M.T. in supervising the first visits, that V would have a mobile phone available to communicate with the mother and provide her updates.
[38] On behalf of OCL, Ms. Kapasky noted that prior to the criminal charges, M.T. has been a support for both parents, though this significantly decreased thereafter.
[39] Ms. Kapasky’s evidence was that V recounted that she was two years old when the father’s “privates touched my privates and I had to go to the doctors.” V reported she “kind of remembers” and Mommy kind of explained it and she “kind of gets it.”
Analysis
[40] Determinations on parenting time is a child-focused analysis of the evidence, legislation and jurisprudence. Here, the relevant legislation is the Children’s Law Reform Act (“CLRA”), specifically, section 24. The primary consideration is the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being.
[41] The mother relied on s. 29 CLRA, which sets out that the court shall not make an order under this part that varies a parenting order or contact order unless there has been a material change in circumstances that affects or is likely to affect the best interests of the child who is the subject of the order.
[42] She argued that the party seeking to vary an interim order where there was already a final order has a strict, high, and onerous threshold to meet.
[43] As set out in Damaschin-Zamfirescu v. Damaschin-Zamfirescu, “neither the Divorce Act nor the Family Law Rules refer to temporary temporary without prejudice orders. However, as a matter of practice, such orders are often made at the early stage of Family Law proceedings to address very pressing issues and to provide some measure of order and stability to the parties' immediate affairs.” The court went on to state, “[t]he intention of temporary temporary without prejudice orders is to create an interim solution for an even shorter period of time than from the date of the order until trial. Having regard for this intention and the other considerations discussed above, the "substantial change in circumstances" test is not appropriate and does not apply. See Damaschin-Zamfirescu v. Damaschin-Zamfirescu, 2012 ONSC 6689 at paras 22-23.
[44] This decision was referenced in Musheyev v. Gilkarov, 2016 ONSC 4120, which was an appeal decision regarding the very issue of “without prejudice” orders. At para. 17, Justice R.E. Charney stated:
While Chappel J. was referring to spousal support [in Damaschin-Zamfirescu], the same observations can be made about any "without prejudice" temporary consent order in family law. The intention of the parties is often to break a litigation logjam and achieve "some measure of order and stability" in the short term. These agreements give parties a chance to disengage without formally giving up their position in the litigation. Such agreements may last only a short time, although they sometimes remain in place for extended periods through inertia or litigation fatigue. There is little doubt, however, that "temporary, without prejudice" agreements would be far more difficult to achieve if one or the other party thought that they were creating a new status quo requiring a material change in circumstances before it could be varied.
[45] Justice Charney went on to indicate, at para. 19:
This is not to say that a without prejudice order cannot affect the status quo over time. The existence of a court order - even a "without prejudice" order - may create a factual context that a court cannot ignore and should take into account in future proceedings. The court cannot, however, draw an adverse inference against a party for having agreed to something on a without prejudice basis. Arguably, requiring a party to persuade a court that there has been a material change in circumstances before a motion to vary will even be considered is such an adverse inference: Musheyev v. Gilkarov, 2016 ONSC 4120.
[46] It is recognized that courts wish to deter incessant motions over interim parenting time schedules. As noted in Thomas v. Wohleber, it is not in the interests of the children to be tossed back and forth pending the determination of an application for interim custody: Thomas v. Wohleber, 2022 ONSC 1258, at para. 40.
[47] That being said, as set out in R.A. v. D.A., 2023 ONSC 2873, supervised parenting time visits “should be ordered only in circumstances where the best interests of the child requires it. When it is ordered, it should not be viewed as a permanent or even a long-term solution. The supervision requirement should be reviewed, on a fairly regular basis, to ensure that it remains necessary in order to address a specific issue that poses a risk to the child, like (in this case) an unhealthy pattern of alcohol consumption on the part of the parent (that was, in essence, the finding of this Court back in January of this year). The objective should always be to move from supervised to unsupervised parenting time, provided that the said transition is in the best interests of the child. The reasons for that objective are obvious and do not require references to caselaw, psychology, or expert evidence. There is something artificial, something unnatural, a barrier of sorts between child and parent, that is inherent with supervised parenting time. We would like to avoid that.”
[48] The mother argued that should the court vary the current order, as set out in Rigillo v. Rigillo, 2019 ONCA 548, then the court should only modify an order based on what the status quo was before the interim without prejudice order. The status quo prior to this motion to change, was a final order from 2018 whereby the father had very generous parenting time with V. After the mother commenced the motion to change, the parties consented to an interim without prejudice order suspending the father’s parenting time. Following that order, Justice Johnston ordered visits supervised at the Rose Garden. All parties appeared to be ad idem that visits have moved forward since then, and it was not the intention to go back to visits at the supervised access centre.
[49] As set out in K.M. v. J.R., courts allocating parenting time are required to adhere to the principle that "a child should have as much time with each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child". Knapp v. Knapp, 2021 ONCA 305; O'Brien v. Chuluunbaatar, 2021 ONCA 555.
a. This provision does not override the best interests analysis. Rather, it is part of the best interests analysis. b. There is no presumption of equal time-sharing of children after parents separate. Bembenek v. Bembenek, 2019 ONSC 4050. c. The most appropriate allocation of time in any given situation will depend on many factors including the child's age; temperament; stage of development; the relevant schedules and commitments of the child and each parent; and any other considerations relevant to the determination of the child's best interests. The parenting schedule must accord with the child's best interests. McBennett v Danis, 2021 ONSC 3610; Morrison v. Harder, 2021 ONSC 5107; Ammar v. Smith, 2021 ONSC 3204. d. This is a child-focussed approach with an important goal of achieving as much parenting time as possible with each parent, so long as it is consistent with the child's best interests. It may end up being equal time. It may end up being some other division of time. Each family is different, and the principle is a general guide set out to benefit children. Knapp v. Knapp, 2021 ONCA 305; R.F. v. J.W., 2021 ONCA 528. e. The court must ascertain a child's best interests from the perspective of the child rather than that of the parents. Kirichenko v. Kirichenko, 2021 ONSC 2833. f. While maximizing contact is important, it is not an unbridled objective. If the evidence indicates that increased parenting time with a parent would not in fact support the child's best interests, it should not be ordered. McBennett v Danis, 2021 ONSC 3610: Young v. Young; Gordon v. Goertz; B.V. v. P.V., 2012 ONCA 262; Rigillo v. Rigillo, 2019 ONCA 548: K.M. v. J.R., 2022 ONSC 111, at para. 373.
[50] This court finds that since the criminal charges were laid in 2019, the mother has been the primary caregiver to the child. The evidence supports a finding that V has a secure attachment and strong bond with her mother. As noted by Dr. Bienhert, the mother is V’s safe person.
[51] The mother argued that the court should consider under the “ability to meet the needs of the child” question, the father has been seen outside a “well-known drug dealer’s house,” which, due to the father’s history of drug use, is a concern. There was no evidence as to who this drug dealer was, or that the father attended that home due to drugs.
[52] She also submitted that the father takes action to undermine her parenting during his supervised parenting time. She relied on examples such as the father asking the child if she wanted to go places without first asking the mother privately, thus forcing her to agree. This was disputed by the father, who argued that his intentions were solely to build a positive and loving relationship with V. This court does not find these actions to undermine the mother’s parenting, but nevertheless ought to be discouraged.
[53] Under the family violence consideration, the mother advanced that she believed the father “sexually transmitted gonorrhea to [V] and has not accepted any responsibility or accountability for it. While [the father’s] criminal charges were stayed, [the father] was never acquitted of the charges.” In the mother’s affidavit she replied to the father asserting his innocence by indicating “the evidence suggests the opposite.”
[54] She also argued that he should have said something sooner when he realized that V had the same symptoms as he did for gonorrhea, but instead these went undiagnosed for a week, and only due to the mother acting, not the father.
[55] The father suggested that after the CAS visits, the visits at the Rose Garden happened with ease. The mother disagreed and set out the preparation involved leading up to the visits and following them. She also disputed the father’s level of consistency in V’s extracurricular activities.
[56] The FCSLLG have opened an investigation to assess V’s safety considering the possibility of unsupervised visits.
[57] The mother’s evidence was that the community visits only occurred because she put herself in the position to supervise them to ensure V was comfortable.
[58] The evidence supports a finding that the supervised visits at the Rose Garden were positive. The child expressed natural affection toward her father, smiling, and laughing with him. She has spontaneously told her father she loved him during a visit. Clearly her comfort with her father has increased, demonstrating V’s resilience and adaptability.
[59] At this court’s request, M.T. provided viva voce evidence at the motion. She testified that she would prioritize the child’s safety over the father’s desire for parenting time. She understood the allegations and undertook to ensure the father was not left alone with the child. She was prepared to have the mother attend any visits, or the child’s paternal grandparents. She was prepared to terminate any parenting time should anything inappropriate occur. Her evidence withstood cross-examination.
[60] The mother argued that for M.T. to be considered as a supervisor for parenting time, that she needed to be made a party. She provided no authority for that proposition, which is rejected by this court.
[61] This court also rejects the submission that having M.T. supervise the father’s visits is tantamount to the father having unsupervised parenting time.
[62] This court has considered the evidence and the argument presented, the relevant legislation and caselaw.
[63] The court is alive to the father’s argument regarding the presumption of innocence. While his criminal charges have been stayed, as correctly argued by the mother, the test in family court is based on a balance of probabilities, as opposed to the criminal test of beyond a reasonable doubt.
[64] While the allegations might raise to the threshold of family violence, this court declines to make the finding of same. However, the court has considered the impact to the child and the mother in the context of this motion.
[65] The mother asked the court to find that the only way the child could have been infected with gonorrhea was by the father sexually assaulting her. She argued that this was the only conclusion the court could make given the expert’s views that this is what likely occurred, coupled with the lower burden of proof. This court declines to make this finding based on contradictory affidavit evidence. A trial judge can make the ultimate determination on this issue.
[66] While the mother argued that the father’s credibility was undermined by his lack of accountability for the allegations, this court is not persuaded such to be the case.
[67] The court was presented as part of the evidence the “words and pictures” document created to tell V “her story.” While this was only dealt with in passing by the OCL, the court is doubtful given the legal terminology used in it, and the complexities of the criminal justice system, that V would properly understand what is being conveyed. There are also some statements contained therein which are troubling when they draw conclusions that are not as crystalized as the evidence, but this court leaves those issue to the trial judge.
[68] The OCL’s evidence regarding the visits with the father was that initially, V did not think she would feel safe if she were alone with her father, but added this was partly because she had not seen him very much. Shortly thereafter, in November 2023, she felt the visits were going good, giving a thumbs up. By February 2024, V was happy at the Rose Garden. At that time, she did not want things to change.
[69] V expressed fond memories of M.T.; however, she did not think she would feel safe with her and her father outside the Rose Garden or without her mother present. She clarified that she would feel safe with M.T. “watching” but uncomfortable because of “what happened with dad.” This view changed when Ms. Kapasky met with V in April 2024, where V spoke positively of a recent outing with M.T. present, and agreed she felt more comfortable when with her without her mother present.
[70] By June 2024, when the OCL met with V again after community visits had commenced, V spoke excitedly about the visits, and felt they were better than the Rose Garden because they were outside. She also liked the visits better as there were occurring more frequently, being once per week rather than every second week. There was nothing that was happening at the visits that made her feel uncomfortable and agreed that the information of what happened in the past with her father was part of why she did not feel comfortable to be alone with him.
[71] Importantly, and as noted by Ms. Kapasky in her affidavit at paragraph 51, V “has been consistent with the following:
a. Whether from information told by collaterals or her mother, or from experiences recalled, she believes her father sexually abused her. b. She does not feel “comfortable” or “safe” alone with her father as a result of this information, and as she does not feel she knows him well. c. She identifies her mother as the person she looks to when feeling uncomfortable.”
[72] Ms. Kapasky noted that V’s preferences have changed over time as she becomes more comfortable with her father and has been able to adopt to incremental expansions of parenting time, with the agreement and support of both parents. It appeared as though V was aware of the adult issues, and again, believes she was sexually abused by her father. As set out at paragraph 53 of Ms. Kapasky’s affidavit, “[w]hether or not this is actually the case or based on factual evidence, this is what the child believes and any parenting plan needs to take her beliefs into account.”
[73] Ms. Kapasky went on to indicate at paragraph 54 of her affidavit regarding the strength of V’s views, that there are nevertheless concerns that V is highly influenced by what she has been told. “Given her age, level of understanding and complex issues in this case, her views and preferences should not be seen as determinative in this case. At the same time, her views and preferences cannot be ignored.”
[74] When considering the child’s views and preferences, given that OCL is a neutral third party, this court has preferred their evidence over the statements the mother wished to rely on in her affidavit.
[75] This court notes that the mother replied that she was careful not to influence V in her views, and had done what she was told to do by professionals, while being careful to protect V.
[76] This court finds that the mother has put the child’s best interest at the forefront in facilitating visits and being present to supervise the visits. She is commended for this.
[77] OCL’s position was that community visits supervised by the mother were unsustainable on a long-term basis. That a transition to supervision by M.T. was the next logical step, providing a natural atmosphere for parenting time with her father while ensuring safety and maximizing comfort for V.
[78] The burden is on the father to establish that it is appropriate to vary the interim order. This court notes that this is a motion within a motion to change. There have already been a few orders made during these proceedings, which include changing the father’s fulsome parenting time to become more restrictive, and the joint custody being varied to sole decision-making responsibility.
[79] Based on the evidence at the motion, including that the current order is a without prejudice order, this court finds the father has met his burden. The order was made on a without prejudice basis, thus allowing this court to review it.
[80] Alternatively, this court finds that there has been a significant enough change in circumstance, in particular the child’s comfort with visits occurring outside the Rose Garden as well as her views and preferences as voiced by the OCL. Further, this court recognizes that there must be a natural progression to parenting time as is contemplated by this motion.
[81] Additionally, having heard the evidence of M.T. in the context of the evidence as a whole, this court has confidence in her ability to prioritize V’s needs over those of the father. This court has confidence that she is aware of her obligation to terminate the visits should something inappropriate occur or if V is in distress, as well as her ability to communicate with the mother regarding how the visits progress.
[82] Based on all the above, this court finds that it is in the child’s best interest to gradually increase the father’s parenting time, supervised by M.T.
[83] However, on the evidence as it stands at the motion, this court is of the view that unsupervised parenting time is not yet appropriate.
Disposition
[84] On an interim without prejudice basis:
The father shall have supervised parenting time with V as follows: a. Commencing the week of August 5, 2024: i. For the following four weeks, once per week, for three hours per visit, in the community, supervised by M.T. The date is to be agreed upon between the parties. b. Commencing the week of September 2, 2024: i. For the following four weeks, once per week, for five hours per visit, in the community, supervised by M.T. The date is to be agreed upon between the parties. c. Commencing the week of September 30, 2024: i. For the following four weeks, once per week, for six hours per visit, at an unrestricted location, supervised by M.T. The date is to be agreed upon between the parties. d. Commencing the week of October 28, 2024, and until further order of this court or agreement in writing by the parties: i. For the following four weeks, once per week, for 8 hours per visit, at an unrestricted location, supervised by M.T. The date is to be agreed upon between the parties. e. The father shall purchase V a cell phone, which shall be in her possession during her visits with the father. V is permitted to check in with her mother as much as she wishes during this parenting time. f. The father shall provide the mother updates during his parenting time to keep her informed regarding activities and V’s emotional state. g. The father shall meet with the mother as required to share observations and concerns as they arise.
Based on M.T.’s undertaking at the motion of July 22, 2024: a. She shall supervise the father’s visits with V, and at no time leave V unsupervised with her father; b. She shall immediately terminate any visits should anything inappropriate occur between the father and V; c. She shall be responsible for assisting V if and when necessary to change clothes or go to the bathroom; d. She shall communicate with the mother to provide any feedback as requested;
[85] The next step is trial scheduling conference and/or settlement conference. Dates to be set through trial coordination.
[86] The parties are invited to resolve the issue of costs between them. Failing resolution, costs submissions shall be sent to my attention. The father has 20 days from the release of these reasons, and the mother (and if required, OCL) 30 days thereafter. Maximum 3 pages plus bills of costs and (case name, citation and paragraph number only for caselaw).
Justice H. Desormeau Released: August 1, 2024