Anaïs Paré-Chouinard

Valoris for Children & Adults of Prescott-Russell sought summary judgment to find the child, A.J., in need of protection and to place him in Extended Society Care for adoption.

The parents opposed, arguing for genuine issues requiring a trial, including the inconclusive nature of medical evidence regarding A.J.'s injuries and alleged Society misconduct.

The court found A.J. was in need of protection due to serious unexplained injuries, the father's history of physical discipline, and the parents' failure to engage with the Society to address protection concerns, especially after moving out of jurisdiction.

The motion for Extended Society Care was granted, as no less intrusive alternatives were viable and permanency was required for the child.

The court ordered weekly access for the parents, an increase from the Society's proposed monthly access.

The applicant filed a complaint against the children's aid society under section 120 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, alleging the society failed to hear his concerns and failed to provide reasons for its decisions regarding his children.

Following a documentary hearing, the Child and Family Services Review Board dismissed the complaint.

The Board found that the applicant had ample opportunity to express his views to the society and that the society had adequately provided explanations and context for its actions and decisions.

This judgment addresses high-conflict family law and child protection proceedings involving two children.

Valoris for Children and Adults of Prescott-Russell sought to close the protection proceedings, while both parents, E.D. and J.S., brought motions for interim orders regarding the children's principal residence and access.

The court denied the parents' requests for sole principal residence, finding their high-conflict behaviour detrimental to the children.

Valoris's application to close the protection file was granted.

The court established a detailed interim parenting schedule, granted the mother exclusive interim authority over educational and religious matters, and primary responsibility for medical treatment, while imposing strict communication rules on both parents to mitigate conflict.

The applicant children's aid society applied for a status review, initially supporting the child's adoption by his foster mother, but later amending its application to support adoption by the child's paternal aunts.

The foster mother, who had cared for the child for 28 months and helped him overcome severe attachment and anxiety issues, was added as a party and sought to adopt him.

The court found that removing the child from the foster mother's care would cause significant emotional harm and that remaining with her was in his best interests.

Finding a legislative gap in the Child and Family Services Act that prevented a custody order in favour of a foster parent on a status review, the court exercised its parens patriae jurisdiction to declare the child a Crown ward with the express purpose of being adopted by the foster mother.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario in a child protection matter.

The appellant, a foster-to-adopt mother, sought costs against the respondent child protection agency (Valoris Pour Enfants et Adultes de Prescott-Russell) for both the appeal before the Court of Appeal and the prior appeal before the Divisional Court.

The appellant argued that exceptional circumstances existed because the agency had acted unfairly in appealing the motion judge's decision granting her status in the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs, finding that the agency's decision to appeal did not warrant a costs award, particularly as the court's decision provided guidance on relevant factors for adding parties in child protection proceedings.

A foster-to-adopt mother sought party status in child protection proceedings concerning a child placed in her care at seven months of age.

The child's biological parents' rights had been terminated, and the child protection society initially supported the foster-to-adopt mother's adoption plan but later changed course to support the paternal aunt's adoption plan.

The motion judge granted the foster-to-adopt mother party status.

The Divisional Court reversed, holding that foster parents should only be added as parties in exceptional circumstances and that the foster-to-adopt mother's existing participatory rights under the legislation were sufficient.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, reinstating the motion judge's order granting party status, finding that the paramount consideration of the child's best interests supported the foster-to-adopt mother's involvement as a party.

This motion concerned a justification hearing under section 51(2) of the Child and Family Services Act regarding a temporary order placing two children, R.M. and S.M., in the care of Valoris.

The respondent mother sought to modify the temporary order to return S.M. to her care, subject to Valoris's supervision.

The court found that Valoris met its burden under section 51(3) to demonstrate reasonable grounds to believe S.M. would likely suffer harm if returned to the mother's care, and that supervision alone would be insufficient.

Concerns included the mother's inability to address S.M.'s special needs (hygiene, school absenteeism), her volatile relationship with a partner with a history of violence, and the physical discipline of R.M. The motion to return S.M. was dismissed, and the children were ordered to remain in foster care.

The applicant children's aid society sought an order making the child a Crown ward without access.

The child was apprehended at birth due to concerns regarding the parents' intellectual limitations and lack of parenting skills, which had previously led to the apprehension of their older child.

Despite extensive support and supervised visits over two years, the parents were unable to acquire or maintain the necessary parenting skills to safely care for the child.

The court found that the parents lacked the minimal parenting capacity required and that a supervision order would not sufficiently mitigate the risk.

The child was made a Crown ward without access for the purpose of adoption.

The foster parents of twin girls brought a motion to be added as parties to the child protection proceeding in order to present an adoption plan.

The biological father, who had been permitted to participate despite delays, was currently undergoing a gradual reintegration plan with the children.

The court dismissed the foster parents' motion, finding that adding them as parties was unnecessary at this stage and would inappropriately create a debate between the foster parents and the biological father while he was being given the opportunity to demonstrate his capacity to care for the children.

Child protection agency sought summary judgment declaring three children in need of protection and requesting permanent Crown wardship for twin infants.

The evidence included medical findings of multiple fractures consistent with physical abuse inflicted while the children were in the care of the mother and her partner, along with evidence of parental instability and limited parenting capacity.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the twins’ protection status and their best interests, and found that adoption planning through Crown wardship was appropriate.

However, the court determined that a trial was required to decide the appropriate long‑term placement for the older child.

The biological father of the twins was permitted to participate and propose a care plan.

La requérante a présenté une motion pour jugement sommaire dans une instance de protection de l’enfance visant une ordonnance de pupille de la Couronne sans accès aux parents.

Elle soutenait qu’il n’existait aucune question en litige véritable concernant les capacités parentales, les limites intellectuelles des parents, leur logement, leur réseau de soutien et les besoins particuliers de l’enfant.

Le tribunal a examiné la preuve par affidavit et a conclu que plusieurs questions factuelles demeuraient sérieusement contestées et dépendaient d’évaluations de crédibilité et d’appréciations subjectives.

Les questions relatives aux capacités parentales, aux limites cognitives, au logement et au soutien familial nécessitaient un examen complet par témoignage et contre‑interrogatoire.

La motion pour jugement sommaire a donc été rejetée et l’affaire renvoyée pour procès.