Laurie Lacelle

The accused, a financial advisor, brought an application for a directed verdict following the close of the Crown's case, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on 30 of 37 counts of fraud, theft, misappropriation, and forgery.

The accused argued that the rule in Hodge's Case should apply to the circumstantial evidence, requiring the evidence to be consistent only with guilt.

The court rejected this argument, applying the test from Arcuri that requires only limited weighing to determine if the evidence is reasonably capable of supporting an inference of guilt.

After reviewing the evidence of multiple former clients whose funds were allegedly withheld, misdirected, or returned from unidentifiable sources, the court found sufficient evidence on all essential elements of the offences and dismissed the application.

During a fraud trial involving a financial advisor, the Crown brought an application to admit evidence of prior discreditable conduct across counts as similar fact evidence.

The Crown alleged the accused misappropriated funds from ten clients using a similar modus operandi.

The court applied the Handy framework and found the evidence highly probative to the issues of actus reus and mens rea, with minimal risk of prejudice in a judge-alone trial.

The application to admit the similar fact evidence was allowed.

The applicant brought a pre-trial motion seeking to exclude firearms and drugs seized from his rural property during a police search.

He argued that the search warrant was invalid due to misrepresentations in the ITO and that police breached his Charter rights by trespassing on a neighbour's property to conduct surveillance.

The court found no material misrepresentations in the ITO and held that the applicant had no reasonable expectation of privacy on the neighbour's property.

Although the court found minor s. 8 breaches regarding a late report to a justice and a defective copy of the warrant, it concluded under s. 24(2) that the evidence should be admitted.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, a vegetable farmer, brought a pre-trial application to exclude evidence of a large marijuana grow operation found on land he rented.

Police had trespassed on the rented land to make initial observations, which were then used to obtain search warrants.

The court found that the initial trespass violated the accused's s. 8 Charter rights and that the warrants could not have been issued without the unconstitutionally obtained information.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the police acted in good faith, the breach was minimally intrusive, and the evidence was highly reliable.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The child brought a motion to vacate a temporary order placing him in a secure treatment program.

The applicant conceded she did not meet the statutory definition of a parent, resulting in the application being dismissed for lack of standing.

The court further noted that even if standing existed, the temporary order would be vacated because the strict criteria for secure treatment, including evidence of serious bodily harm and the unavailability of less restrictive treatment methods, were not met.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm, mischief, breach of probation, and theft.

A trial was held to determine guilt for sexual assault and forcible confinement.

The court assessed the complainant's credibility and reliability, considering inconsistencies in her account, the absence of physical marks from restraints, her disposal of evidence, and an alleged motive to fabricate.

The court found the complainant credible and reliable, supported by corroborating evidence from the accused's admissions on other charges and physical evidence.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault and forcible confinement.

The accused, J-C.M., was found guilty of indecent assault and gross indecency committed in 1971 against his younger brother, then aged 14-15.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 3-5 years, while the defence requested a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court considered aggravating factors including the victim's age, the breach of trust by the older brother, and the significant, inter-generational impact on the victim and his family.

Mitigating factors included the accused's lack of prior convictions, pro-social life since the offences, low risk of re-offending, and community support.

The court found that a conditional sentence would not adequately address the principles of denunciation and deterrence given the seriousness and repeated nature of the offences.

A sentence of two years less a day in custody was imposed, along with a 10-year s. 109 order, a lifetime SOIRA order, and a DNA sample order.

Edward Hall was found guilty of aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, assault, and breach of probation.

The court considered sentencing principles, including the totality principle and Gladue factors for Indigenous offenders.

The defence sought a 4-year sentence with enhanced pre-sentence credit, while the Crown sought 6 years consecutive.

The court granted enhanced pre-sentence credit at 1.5:1 for both periods of custody, and an additional 20 days qualitative credit due to harsh detention conditions (lockdowns, triple bunking).

The final sentence was 265 days jail consecutive to any outstanding sentence, plus 765 days pre-sentence custody credit, resulting in a total custodial portion equivalent to 34 months, followed by 12 months probation with specific conditions.

The accused, Lewis Lauzon, was charged with sexually assaulting and threatening to kill the complainant.

The case hinged on the credibility and reliability of the complainant's evidence, who was an 18-year-old at the time of the alleged offences.

The defence highlighted inconsistencies in the complainant's memory and the implausibility of certain aspects of the account, while the Crown emphasized the complainant's core consistency, lack of motive to fabricate, and corroborating circumstantial evidence.

The court found the complainant to be a credible and reliable witness despite some inconsistencies and memory frailties, concluding that the Crown proved the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The accused, D.O., was charged with sexual offences under ss. 151 and 271 of the Criminal Code involving a 12-year-old complainant.

D.O. raised a mistake of age defence, claiming he believed the complainant was 15 and took all reasonable steps to ascertain her age, relying on her Facebook profile.

The Crown argued D.O. knew her true age or failed to take reasonable steps.

The court found the accused met his evidentiary burden for the defence.

The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that D.O. did not subjectively believe the complainant was 15, or that he failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain her age, considering the information on her Facebook profile and the absence of strong "red flags" requiring further inquiry.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.

The appellant appealed his assault conviction for spanking his four-year-old daughter, which caused serious bruising.

He argued the trial judge erred by inferring causation without expert evidence and by rejecting his defence under s. 43 of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that expert evidence was not required to establish causation and that the trial judge reasonably concluded the force used exceeded what was reasonable under the circumstances.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault following a stabbing at a house party.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the attacker.

The accused testified and denied stabbing the complainant, but the court rejected his evidence due to significant inconsistencies with his post-arrest statement.

The court found the complainant's testimony credible and corroborated by DNA evidence on the knife and a Facebook message from the accused expressing remorse.

The accused was found guilty on all charges.

The accused stood trial on historical sexual offence allegations said to have occurred when the complainant was approximately seven years old during babysitting visits with a family member.

The court applied the W.D. framework and the governing approach to children's evidence, recognizing that peripheral inconsistencies about time and place may carry less significance when childhood events are recalled in adulthood.

However, major conflicts between the complainant's account and other evidence, particularly documentary evidence about where the accused lived during the relevant period and inconsistencies with other family witnesses, undermined the reliability of the identification and surrounding circumstances.

Although the court found the complainant credible and did not conclude she fabricated the allegations, the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial subject to a publication ban, the court convicted the accused of threatening death and sexual assault arising from sexual activity at a cottage on an island.

The central issue was whether the complainant's apparent participation was negated because she submitted after the accused threatened to kill her.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court rejected the accused's account, found corroborative support for the complainant's evidence in surrounding witnesses and physical circumstances, and held that consent was vitiated under s. 265(3)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The court also ruled that the 911 recording was not admissible for the truth of its contents under the principled hearsay exception, but was admissible as evidence of post-offence demeanour.

The accused, Sauve and Stewart, were charged with various weapons offences after police seized a handgun and ammunition from a backpack carried by Stewart.

The Crown alleged they jointly possessed and transferred the firearm.

The court found insufficient evidence that Stewart knew the backpack contained a firearm, resulting in his acquittal on all counts.

For Sauve, the court found he was wilfully blind to the fact he was picking up a firearm, establishing possession.

However, the Crown failed to prove he knew about the ammunition, possessed it for a dangerous purpose, or knew it was obtained by an offence.

Sauve was found guilty of careless transport and transferring a prohibited firearm, as he handed the backpack to Stewart knowing it contained a gun.

The applicants, charged with firearms offences, brought pre-trial applications alleging breaches of their Charter rights and seeking the exclusion of a handgun and ammunition found in a backpack.

The police detained one of the applicants under the Customs Act after observing suspicious activity near the St. Lawrence River.

The court found the detention was lawful under s. 9 of the Charter, but the subsequent warrantless search of the backpack violated s. 8 as it did not meet the standard for a safety search.

The court also found breaches of the applicant's s. 10(a) and 10(b) rights.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court concluded that the evidence should not be excluded, as the breaches were not wilful or flagrant, the evidence was reliable and discoverable, and its exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The evidence was ruled admissible against both applicants.

Jarrett Sauve, charged with various weapons offences, challenged the admissibility of his utterances and videotaped statement to police.

The applications were based on alleged violations of his right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter and involuntariness under the common law confessions rule.

The court conducted a voir dire and found that initial utterances to D/Cst.

McGillis were made when Sauve was not detained, thus no Charter breach.

Utterances to Cst.

St-Amand were deemed spontaneous, and no Charter breach was found.

For the videotaped statement, the court concluded that Sauve had waived his right to counsel and that the statement was voluntary, not induced by threats or oppression.

Consequently, all challenged statements were ruled admissible.

G.B. was sentenced following convictions for sexual offences against his two daughters, J.B. (17) and A.B. (14-15).

The court considered aggravating factors including breach of trust, victim vulnerability, the number of victims, the invasive nature of the assault on J.B., and G.B.'s substance abuse as an aggravating risk factor.

Mitigating factors included community support and G.B.'s disadvantaged background as a survivor of sexual abuse.

The defence proposed a global sentence of 3 years and 9 months, while the Crown sought 5 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 3 years and 9 months (including 9 months pre-sentence custody), consisting of 2 years for the offence against J.B. and 1 year consecutive for the offence against A.B. Various ancillary orders were made, including a DNA order, SOIRA order for life, weapons prohibition, and a 10-year contact prohibition for A.B.

Sentencing following convictions after trial for sexual assault and assault arising from a prolonged, invasive attack against a physically vulnerable complainant at an assisted living residence.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, treating as aggravating the complainant's mobility limitations, the additional force used to subdue and control her, the pain and injury inflicted, the offender's criminal record, and his substance abuse while offending.

The court held that the three-to-five-year appellate range for serious sexual assault applied and that authorities outside that range were distinguishable.

A global sentence at the high end of the range was imposed together with ancillary criminal orders.

The Crown brought an application to admit evidence of the accused's prior convictions for sexual assault from 1990 as similar fact evidence.

The accused is charged with sexual offences against a complainant with cognitive disabilities.

The Crown sought to adduce evidence that the prior victims also had mental disabilities.

The court found that the Crown failed to provide sufficient cogent detail about the circumstances of the prior offences, rendering the evidence merely indicative of general propensity.

The application was dismissed as the evidence lacked probative value and its admission would be highly prejudicial.