WARNING

The Court hearing this matter directs that the following should be attached to the file:

An order restricting publication in this proceeding under ss. 486.4(1), (2), (2.1), (2.2), (3) or (4) or 486.6(1) or (2) of the Criminal Code shall continue. These sections of the Criminal Code provide:

486.4(1) Subject to subsection (2), the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim or a witness shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way, in proceedings in respect of

(a) any of the following offences;

(i) an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 153.1, 155, 159, 160, 162, 163.1, 170, 171, 171.1, 172, 172.1, 172.2, 173, 210, 211, 213, 271, 272, 273, 279.01, 279.011, 279.02, 279.03, 280, 281, 286.1, 286.2, 286.3, 346 or 347, or

(ii) any offence under this Act, as it read at any time before the day on which this subparagraph comes into force, if the conduct alleged involves a violation of the complainant’s sexual integrity and that conduct would be an offence referred to in subparagraph (i) if it occurred on or after that day; or

(iii) REPEALED: S.C. 2014, c. 25, s. 22(2), effective December 6, 2014 (Act, s. 49).

(b) two or more offences being dealt with in the same proceeding, at least one of which is an offence referred to in paragraph (a).

(2) In proceedings in respect of the offences referred to in paragraph (1)(a) or (b), the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) at the first reasonable opportunity, inform any witness under the age of eighteen years and the victim of the right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application made by the victim, the prosecutor or any such witness, make the order.

(2.1) Subject to subsection (2.2), in proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice may make an order directing that any information that could identify the victim shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

(2.2) In proceedings in respect of an offence other than an offence referred to in subsection (1), if the victim is under the age of 18 years, the presiding judge or justice shall

(a) as soon as feasible, inform the victim of their right to make an application for the order; and

(b) on application of the victim or the prosecutor, make the order.

(3) In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 163.1, a judge or justice shall make an order directing that any information that could identify a witness who is under the age of eighteen years, or any person who is the subject of a representation, written material or a recording that constitutes child pornography within the meaning of that section, shall not be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way.

(4) An order made under this section does not apply in respect of the disclosure of information in the course of the administration of justice when it is not the purpose of the disclosure to make the information known in the community. 2005, c. 32, s. 15; 2005, c. 43, s. 8(3)(b); 2010, c. 3, s. 5; 2012, c. 1, s. 29; 2014, c. 25, ss. 22, 48; 2015, c. 13, s. 18.

486.6(1) Every person who fails to comply with an order made under subsection 486.4(1), (2) or (3) or 486.5(1) or (2) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

(2) For greater certainty, an order referred to in subsection (1) applies to prohibit, in relation to proceedings taken against any person who fails to comply with the order, the publication in any document or the broadcasting or transmission in any way of information that could identify a victim, witness or justice system participant whose identity is protected by the order. 2005, c. 32, s. 15.

CITATION: R. v. C.J.R., 2025 ONSC 1241

COURT FILE NO.: CR-23-00000072-0000

DATE: 2025Feb24

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

C.J.R.

Respondent

Ryan Makasare, for the Crown

R. Michael Rodé, for the Respondent

HEARD: November 26-27, 2024

Lacelle J.

REASONS FOR DECISION

(CCTV voir dire)

1The Crown applies for an order permitting the complainant to testify outside of the courtroom by means of closed circuit television [“CCTV”] pursuant to s. 486.2(2) of the Code, as well as an order that she be permitted to testify with a support person present pursuant to s. 486.1(2).

2The defence opposes the orders sought. It says the court should exercise its discretion by compelling the complainant to testify in the courtroom before the jury.

3The parties were previously advised that I had concluded that the Crown’s application should be allowed. These are my reasons for that ruling.

The background

The allegations

4The Crown’s application record sets out an overview of the anticipated evidence of the complainant, which I include for completeness here. During the hearing, the Crown also confirmed that the complainant’s date of birth was January 4, 2003. Accordingly, she was 19 at the time of the alleged events and will have just turned 22 when the trial occurs.

5The complainant and the accused were students at a local college.

6They started to spend some time together, including in the accused’s car.

7The Crown alleges that the accused sexually assaulted the complainant in his car. He began by caressing the complainant’s shoulder with his hand. The complainant pushed the accused’s hand away and told the accused that she was uncomfortable. He stopped and went silent. After a short period of time, the accused began touching the complainant’s thigh with his hand. He progressed to touching the complainant’s vagina over top of her pants. The complainant pushed his hand away and told him to stop. The accused continued to touch the complainant’s vagina on top of her clothing several more times. Upon reaching the complainant’s home, the complainant quickly departed the accused’s car and entered her home.

8After this incident, the accused is reported to have texted and called the complainant repeatedly. He apologized for his behaviour and threatened suicide in an attempt to get a response from the complainant. He also consistently drove by the complainant’s home and waited in the area nearby while messaging her.

9One day the accused convinced the complainant to come out of her house to see him. The complainant agreed to drive around with the accused. While driving around, the accused apologized for his previous behaviour. He eventually parked his car by the Kingston Airport. Once parked, the complainant stated that she wanted to be taken home. The accused did not comply. He began touching the victim in her vaginal region, over top of her clothing. The complainant told the accused “No”, but he did not listen. The accused then moved out of the driver seat and over to the passenger seat, getting on top of the victim. He placed his arm and elbow on the complainant’s upper chest and throat area, which caused the complainant to have trouble breathing. The accused then removed the complainant’s pants and touched the complainant all over her body. Afterwards, he removed his pants and penetrated the complainant’s vagina until he ejaculated.

10Immediately after the assault, the accused began to drive around with the complainant as if nothing had happened. The complainant asked to go home, but the accused took her to his own house. The complainant did not want to go inside but the accused used aggressive demeanour and intimidation to convince the complainant to come into his house.

11Once inside, the accused told the complainant that they could go to his room to watch a movie and listen to music. The complainant said that she did not want to, but the accused used an aggressive demeanour to persuade her. Once in the accused’s bedroom, he closed the door. The complainant asked for the door to be opened but he would not comply. The accused then lay down on the bed, held his arms out, and asked the complainant to cuddle. The complainant said “no” and told the accused that she wanted to stay seated on the other side of the bed.

12Shortly after, the accused went over to the complainant and put his arm around her shoulder. She tried to move but the accused placed his hand on her leg. The complainant told the accused she did not want to be touched and wanted to leave, but he did not acknowledge her. He then stood up, grabbed the complainant’s wrist, and squeezed it. He forced the complainant to turn towards him and asked the complainant to have sex with him. She said “no” again. She told the accused that he was hurting her wrist and he eventually let go. The complainant felt helpless and sat back down on the bed, while the accused sat beside her.

13The accused then began touching the complainant’s leg with his hand and eventually progressed to touching the complainant’s vagina over top of her clothing. She told him to stop multiple times and attempted to move away from him. The accused then placed his hands inside the complainant’s pants touching her vagina. The complainant began to cry and pleaded with the accused to stop.

14The accused then mounted on top of the complainant, pinned her down, and removed her pants. He sexually assaulted her while holding her down until he ejaculated. The complainant was visibly emotional while she was being sexually assaulted and recalls the accused saying “That was good” after he ejaculated. The complainant was frozen and in pain after the sexual assault. Eventually, the complainant got dressed and the accused said he would take her home.

15Since this incident, the accused has tried to contact the complainant by spam texting and calling her.

The evidence on the voir dire

16In support of its application, the Crown filed a letter dated June 11, 2024, from the complainant’s psychotherapist, Brittany Burns. Ms. Burns states that the complainant experiences significant distress responses when faced with the possibility of encountering the accused at trial. These responses include severe anxiety, panic attacks, and dissociation. In the professional opinion of Ms. Burns, these responses could severely impair the complainant’s ability to participate effectively in the trial proceedings. She concludes her letter as follows:

For [the complainant’s] mental health and overall well-being, it is my recommendation that she not be required to be in the same room as the defendant, [Mr. C. R.]. I am concerned that a requirement of being directly in the presence of the defendant will cause significant distress to my client and pose a significant risk of re-traumatization, as well as greatly reduce [the complainant’s] ability to engage effectively in the trial when providing her testimony. Allowing for separate accommodations would greatly reduce these risks and allow for more effective engagement and participation in the trial.

17Ms. Burns also testified on the voir dire. During her evidence, she clarified a number of issues.

18In terms of her qualifications, Ms. Burns is a registered psychotherapist. For the past 5 years, she has worked at a centre for abuse and trauma therapy. She received a referral regarding the complainant at the end of 2023 and began working with her in early 2024. Their sessions became more difficult after the complainant had a baby. Their last in person session was on June 25, 2024, but they have spoken a couple of times since about these proceedings. In total, the complainant attended for 9 sessions and 7.5 hours of therapy. This was just shy of the 8 hours that were authorized pursuant to the referral.

19Ms. Burns confirmed that the referral indicated that the complainant suffered from PTSD, though she was not aware that there had ever been any formal diagnosis. She was clear that her discussion of the complainant’s symptoms was not meant to suggest she had made a diagnosis.

20Ms. Burns confirms she still holds the views expressed in her letter about the complainant having to testify in the presence of the accused. She testified that the complainant had expressed to her that having to be in the accused’s presence was distressing to her, both in regard to the court process and in everyday life. Because of concerns about seeing the accused, the complainant had started to attend school remotely instead of in person, and limited how often she left the house. She had experienced distress, including panic attacks, in relation to going for groceries and other activities in public.

21Ms. Burns clarified that when she spoke of “distress”, she meant experiencing unpleasant emotions that can have an impact on ability to function. This term could also include experiencing overwhelming stress.

22Ms. Burns also testified that the complainant experienced dissociation. The complainant described experiencing these symptoms, and Ms. Burns saw some evidence of that during their sessions. Ms. Burns testified that in the process of being asked to testify and recall memories, distress and dissociation might make it difficult for the complainant to communicate and remember effectively. Because she had yet to fully process her experience, she was also at risk of re-traumatization, which would involve a dissociation from her sense of safety in the moment.

23Ms. Burns testified that in her opinion, testimony by CCTV would directly impact the complainant’s level of stress about testifying since not being in the presence of the accused would limit her distress. She also testified that she believed that the presence of a support person would limit the complainant’s distress and increase her sense of safety.

24Even so, she acknowledged that she and the complainant had not discussed using other tools, like a screen in the court room. She was not aware of what the options were. When asked if a screen could work for the complainant, Ms. Burns said she thought CCTV would be the better and preferred option to limit stress.

25Ms. Burns agreed that testifying in this kind of case would typically be very stressful. She was asked if it was possible to “parse out” normal stress levels from what might occur for the complainant if she had to testify in the presence of the accused. She responded that while some level of stress is to be expected, some levels are manageable and a person can continue to provide evidence effectively, but some levels are overwhelming and interfere with the ability to do so. She agreed she could not say for certain that testifying in the presence of the accused would be overwhelming for the complainant. She also agreed that while she had witnessed some intense anxiety in the complainant during their work, as well as dissociation, these symptoms were not observed specifically when they were discussing the issue of the complainant being in the accused’s presence. Rather, she observed these symptoms when the complainant was discussing “the instances and her history related to that”.

26Ms. Burns confirmed that while her sessions with the complainant began in person, they switched to the phone part way through. She was asked if she agreed that it was better to communicate in person, and agreed with counsel for the defence that there are more cues in body language that you would not get over the phone.

The legal principles

27Where a witness is over 18 and suffers no disability, that witness may be permitted to testify outside the courtroom or behind a screen or other device, where the court concludes that allowing this accommodation would facilitate the witness giving a “full and candid account of the acts complained of”, or where it would otherwise be in the interests of the proper administration of justice. The court may also make an order to allow a witness to testify with a support person present if the same test is met.

28The authority for an order allowing a witness to testify by means of CCTV is found in sections 486.2 of the Criminal Code, while the authority for an order permitting a support person is found in s. 486.1. Similar factors must be considered in determining whether to make an order under each sub-section.

29The factors to be considered in respect of each order are:

a. the age of the witness;

b. the witness’ mental or physical disabilities, if any;

c. the nature of the offence;

d. the nature of any relationship between the witness and the accused;

e. whether the witness needs the order for their security or to protect them from intimidation or retaliation;

f. whether the order is needed to protect the identity of a peace officer who has acted, is acting or will be acting in an undercover capacity, or of a person who has acted, is acting or will be acting covertly under the direction of a peace officer;

(f.1) whether the order is needed to protect the witness’s identity if they have had, have

or will have responsibilities relating to national security or intelligence;

g. society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of offences and the participation of victims and witnesses in the criminal justice process; and

h. any other factor that the judge or justice considers relevant.

Cases interpreting s. 486.2 following the 2015 amendments to the legislation

30The case law recognizes the presumptive rule that a witness will testify in the courtroom in the presence of the accused. However, as noted by Di Luca J. in R. v. Blake and Khabemba, 2019 ONSC 6026 at para. 15,

[i]n certain circumstances, however, a witness’ presence in the courtroom may cause unwarranted inconvenience, or in some cases may inhibit the search for the truth; see R. v. S.D.L., 2017 NSCA 58 and R. v. Levogiannis, 1993 CanLII 47 (SCC), [1993] S.C.J. No. 70. Mechanisms [such as section 486.2(2) of the Code] provide an alternative to requiring a witness’ physical presence inside the courtroom. These mechanisms do not displace the presumptive rule that witnesses should be present inside a courtroom. Rather, they recognize that in certain circumstances, trial fairness is not sacrificed and the goal of the search for the truth is enhanced where a witness is permitted to testify outside the courtroom.

31There is no appellate authority in Ontario interpreting the modern incarnation of s. 486.2, and the meaning of the term “facilitate”. Di Luca J. held in Blake at para. 20 that “[t]he test under this section does not require exceptional circumstances”. Other judges, such as those in R. v. Shammo, [2024] ONSC 2614, R. v. Q.T.D., 2023 ONSC 4628, and R. v. J.A., 2024 ONSC 2125, have taken a more restrictive view.

32Two appellate courts have considered the provision. The Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan did so in R. v. Theodore, 2020 SKCA 131. In that case, the defence argued that the general presumption that a witness shall testify in person “should not be overcome by mere anxiety, fear, inconvenience, personal preference, or the fact that the witness is testifying about a particularly violent crime” (see para. 100). This argument is similar to the argument by the defence advanced before me.

33In considering the defence’s position, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal noted at para. 106 that Parliament has recognized that in certain circumstances, permitting a witness to testify remotely or with the use of a testimonial aid does not sacrifice trial fairness but rather enhances the truth-seeking function of the courts. It noted that the amendment to s. 486.2 in 2015 removed the language that an order under the section was “necessary to obtain” a full and candid account and replaced that phrase with “would facilitate the giving of” a full and candid account. The new provision also added “or otherwise be in the interest of the proper administration of justice”. The court reasoned at para. 108 that “Parliament must be taken to have acted with purpose when it enacted the Victims Bill of Rights amendment to s. 486.2(2). That amendment marks a notable change in the standard that must be met before a judge can exercise his or her discretion to make the order.” The court agreed with the conclusion of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in R. v. N.M., 2019 NSCA 4, 370 CCC (3d) 143 that “while orders under s. 486.2(2) should not be granted perfunctorily, the amendment to s. 486.2(2) reflects a “newly lowered threshold” that properly permits an order for remote or screen-protected testimony on either of the bases listed in the section (at paras 6570).”

34The court cited Blake with approval, to the effect that s. 486.2(2) does not require special circumstances for a judge to exercise her discretion in favour of making the order: at para. 109. It further held at para 109, “a different sort of analysis is now required, with the operative inquiry being whether making a testimonial accommodation order will enhance, rather than impede, the truth-seeking function of the trial”. It found that the trial judge, who concluded that “facilitate” should be interpreted to have its normal meaning, had not erred. The trial judge had noted that the threshold for an order was low, and held that “the question … becomes, is there evidence that allowing the witness to testify out of sight would make it easy, easier or less difficult for the witness to give a full and frank testimony”. The court of appeal held that this was a correct statement of the law: at para. 112.

The Positions of the Parties

The Crown

35The Crown says that this case involves serious allegations, and the complainant will have difficulty talking about them. It argues that the orders it seeks are discretionary and may be granted on the basis that the accommodation sought will facilitate the giving of a full and candid account by the witness. The amendments in 2015 changed the wording from “necessary” to “facilitate”, thus lowering the standard for these discretionary orders. The Crown submits that it need not show that the complainant needs this accommodation, but only that it will make it easier for her to give a full and candid account.

36As for any prejudice such an order may cause in a jury trial, the Crown submits that R. v. Levogiannis, 1993 CanLII 47 (SCC), [1993] S.C.J. No. 70 has answered this question, since that case holds that a properly instructed jury will not be swayed by the use of a testimonial aid. The Crown argues that it is wrong to make too much of the risk that the jury might not follow instructions on this issue.

37The Crown notes that the complainant has sought mental health support. She has experienced intense anxiety and dissociation when talking about traumatic events. Given the threshold for the order, and the evidence on the voir dire from a mental health professional, the orders should be made.

The defence

38The defence argues that the Crown has not produced any evidence of what options have been discussed with the complainant aside from CCTV. Counsel notes that the court has not heard directly from the complainant to determine what she requires to be accommodated.

39The defence argues that allowing the Crown’s application, as it pertains to the use of CCTV, would be prejudicial to the defence. The jury will notice that the complainant is testifying from a separate room. Further, this is a case that turns on credibility assessments, and the jury will be unable to pick up the same bodily cues if the complainant is in a separate room. The defence notes that Ms. Burns acknowledged the impact of bodily cues on communication. Counsel argues that the complainant’s response to talking about the events is “something the jury needs to see”, and with CCTV they will not be able to pick up on all the cues that they would were the witness to testify in person. It will also be difficult for counsel to question the witness and still see the impact of the testimony on the jury.

40The defence further argues that it is not clear that the stress involved in testifying is outside what would normally be experienced in a case of this nature. Counsel suggests that how the experience of stress for the complainant would change were she to testify in the presence of the accused “is a big question mark”.

41Counsel relies on various cases to support its position. One case, decided prior to the amendment of the section, was decided by Nordheimer J. (as he then was) in R. v. C.D., 2010 CanLII 22061 (ON SC), [2010] O.J. No. 4351 (S.C.J.), and discusses the risks associated with the use of a screen in a jury trial. The defence also relies on the post-amendment decisions in R. v. Shammo, [2024] ONSC 2614, R. v. Q.T.D., 2023 ONSC 4628, and R. v. J.A., 2024 ONSC 2125. It notes that the cases suggest that more than discomfort is required to meet the test. It argues that this court has not heard from the complainant and cannot decide if this request is based on anything more than the complainant’s discomfort. It points the court to Shammo, where the court held that there “must be a real concern that if required to testify the complainant would be unable to furnish a full and candid account”, and that “bald and/or vague assertions” will not suffice as an evidentiary basis for such orders.

42The defence also opposes an order allowing the complainant to testify with a support person present. It says there is insufficient evidence to support this order.

Analysis

43I have concluded that it is appropriate to permit the complainant to testify from outside the courtroom by video link and with a support person present. I am satisfied that each of these accommodations will facilitate the giving of a full and candid account, and that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to extend each of them to the complainant.

44As a preliminary matter, I confirm that I accept the evidence of Ms. Burns about her observations of the complainant. I accept that the complainant has experienced intense anxiety and dissociation when discussing the alleged offences and, as Ms. Burns put it, “her history related to that”.

45Further, I accept that Ms. Burns is a registered psychotherapist with experience in treating persons coping with trauma. The evidence clearly demonstrates that the complainant has sought professional mental health support to assist her in coping with the alleged offences. The evidentiary record goes far beyond a perfunctory request by the Crown for this testimonial aide.

46I also consider that in Ms. Burns’ opinion, the use of CCTV and the presence of a support person would limit the complainant’s distress. Contrary to the defence argument, Ms. Burns did address the need for a support person in her evidence. I recognize, however, that while her opinion is relevant to the analysis, it is not determinative.

47In arriving at the conclusion that both testimonial aids should be permitted, I have considered the factors outlined in ss. 486.2(3) and 486.1(3). Before addressing these factors, I pause to say that I agree with certain comments in R. v. Parisee, 2022 SKKB 241 about their application.

48For instance, while the statute requires that a judge consider all the enumerated factors, as well as any others that are relevant, I agree they should not be considered “a checklist or series of separate hurdles for an applicant to overcome before such an order can be granted”: at para. 37. Nor are the factors listed automatically entitled to equal weight in every case. Some may have greater weight attached to them than others, depending upon the circumstances: at para. 38.

49I turn now to those factors set out in s. 486.2 and s. 486.1 that apply in this case:

a. The age of the witness: the complainant will be 22 years old at trial. While she is over 18 and an adult, she is still relatively youthful;

b. The nature of the offences: the allegations include sexual assault, forcible confinement and criminal harassment. These are very serious charges which will require testimony about highly personal and sensitive issues. Recalling these types of events may reasonably be expected to cause distress or anxiety to a witness, and there is evidence the complainant has experienced such distress in this case;

c. The nature of any relationship between the witness and the accused: the accused and complainant were classmates who came to spend some time together. In the aftermath of the alleged offences, because of her concerns about seeing the accused, the complainant reportedly attended school remotely instead of in person and limited how often she left the house;

d. Society’s interest in encouraging the reporting of offences and the participation of complainants and witnesses in the criminal justice process: given the nature of the charges, this factor weighs strongly in favour of an order that might encourage others to participate in the court process. It is particularly important for others to know that if they have experienced distress and dissociation when discussing what has happened to them, a judge may allow certain accommodations to facilitate the giving of their testimony.

50I also consider other factors, including the impact of the orders sought upon the accused’s right to make full answer and defence. The defence argues that because credibility is the central issue in this case, he is entitled to cross-examine the complainant in a way that permits counsel and the jury to observe her demeanour and to ascertain other non-verbal cues that she might display. On this point, I agree with the reasons and conclusion in Parisee at paras. 27-28. As noted in that case, while it is usually preferable to have a complainant testify in person, “the case law establishes credibility issues can be appropriately assessed when a complainant testifies from outside the courtroom”.

51Further, the presentation of evidence by way of video or zoom link has become increasingly common since the pandemic, and in my experience, this mode of proceeding has not interfered with credibility assessments. I am not satisfied that this mode of proceeding will impair anyone’s ability to assess the complainant’s demeanour or credibility, including the accused, counsel, or the jury.

52As for other conclusions that might be drawn by the jury about the use of CCTV by the complainant, it seems doubtful that this mode of proceeding is more prejudicial than a screen in front of the witness or accused so that the complainant does not see him in the court room (the defence has suggested that if the court grants the application this is the better tool to protect the accused’s interests). Because of the pandemic, our society has become increasingly reliant on communication by video. Counsel anticipate other witnesses in this trial may testify by video so that they need not travel to attend court, or otherwise disrupt their schedules. Regardless, the jury will be instructed not to make anything of the mode of testimony for any witness. A member of the public might easily wonder if a witness was not testifying in the court room for health or other reasons, if they think about it at all. In any event, the jury will be given instructions that will ensure that the use of this procedure results in no prejudice to the accused. The same will be true regarding the use of a support person.

53In arriving at my conclusion, I have considered the authorities relied upon by the defence. To the extent that they were decided under the current legislation and reason, as did the court in Shammo, that there must be a “real concern that if required to testify the complainant would be unable to furnish a full and candid account” [emphasis added], with respect, they are applying a more stringent test than is set out in the legislation. All that is required is that the order facilitate the giving of evidence.

54In this instance, the evidence includes testimony from a mental health professional who has treated the complainant over multiple sessions and who has observed the complainant’s distress and dissociation when discussing the alleged events. That the complainant has not testified on the voir dire is not surprising given the nature of the accommodation sought, and in any event, does not preclude the making of the order.

55The evidence is that the complainant has experienced distress and dissociation when speaking about the facts underpinning the charges. I accept that she may have significant difficulties in giving a full and candid account if required to testify in the presence of the accused, even if a screen is used. I am satisfied that having the support of a known person close by, and not being in a court room and in the presence of the accused, are accommodations that will make it easier for the complainant to come to court and answer questions about the alleged offences. I find that the evidence in this case amply satisfies the threshold that the orders sought will facilitate the giving of a full and candid account, and that they are in the interest of the proper administration of justice.

56For these reasons, the Crown’s application is granted.

Honourable Madam Justice Laurie Lacelle

Released in writing: February 24, 2025

Released in writing for publication: December 10, 2025

CITATION: R. v. C.J.R., 2025 ONSC 1241

COURT FILE NO.: CR-23-00000072-0000

DATE: 2025Feb24

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

C.J.R.

Respondent

REASONS FOR Decision

(CCTV voir dire)

Lacelle J.