David Jules Gray

The Respondent Father brought a motion to terminate his child support obligation, while the Applicant Mother sought a retroactive increase in child support and Section 7 expenses dating back to 2001.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the father's significantly increased income and the children's independence.

Applying the D.B.S. factors, the court determined that the mother's delay in seeking variation was unreasonable, but the father was blameworthy for not voluntarily disclosing his increased income.

The court ordered the father to pay $25,000 in retroactive child support for the three years prior to the motion, rejecting both parties' calculations.

However, the mother's new claim for Section 7 expenses was dismissed, as the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a new claim for relief after the children were no longer 'children of the marriage' and no prior order for such expenses existed.

This addendum to reasons for judgment formally terminated the respondent father's child support obligation, effective May 1, 2017, a point counsel agreed had been inadvertently omitted from the original judgment.

This hearing confirmed a provisional order from the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia that varied spousal support.

The applicant sought to terminate spousal support, while the respondent requested refusal of confirmation or a variation to $900 per month.

The court confirmed the provisional order but varied it to nominal support of $1 per year, rather than complete termination, citing the long marriage and economic disadvantage to the respondent.

The court also ordered ongoing income disclosure between the parties.

The applicant father sought to vary child support and access orders.

The respondent mother brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the father's application.

The court dismissed the mother's motion regarding child support, finding genuine issues for trial regarding the father's income and the proper amount of support.

The court adjourned the motion regarding access, ordering an updated report from the Office of the Children's Lawyer to ascertain the 13-year-old child's current wishes before determining if a genuine issue for trial exists.

A family law motion addressed spousal support sought by the applicant and a cross‑motion by the respondent seeking child support and other relief, including claims for retroactive child support and special expenses.

The court had previously issued an endorsement awarding the applicant $1,000 per month in spousal support and leaving other financial issues to the trial judge.

After the respondent filed a supplementary affidavit concerning past special expenses before the formal order was issued, the court confirmed it was not functus and reviewed the new material.

The additional affidavit did not change the court’s conclusions and the remaining financial issues were left for determination at trial.

The court approved the draft order with a minor wording variation.

Following the dismissal of a plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment in a franchise dispute, the court addressed the appropriate scale and quantum of costs.

The defendants sought substantial indemnity costs relying on two offers to settle, but the court found that neither offer triggered enhanced cost consequences because their conditions were not met.

The court held that the appropriate scale was partial indemnity throughout.

Considering the factors under Rule 57.01(1) and the Court of Appeal guidance in Boucher, the court fixed costs at $22,000 all-inclusive payable by the unsuccessful moving parties.

Franchisees sought rescission of a franchise agreement nearly two years after execution on the basis that the franchisor delivered the disclosure document by email rather than by personal delivery or registered mail as required by s. 5(2) of the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure).

The moving party argued that any breach of the Act relating to disclosure entitled a franchisee to the two‑year rescission remedy under s. 6(2).

The court rejected this interpretation, holding that the two‑year rescission right applies only where there is a complete failure to provide a disclosure document or where the disclosure is materially deficient.

Because a complete disclosure document had been delivered—albeit by email with the franchisee’s consent—the alleged breach related only to the method of delivery.

The court held that such a breach does not justify rescission under s. 6(2) and instead limits the franchisee to a damages remedy under s. 7(1).