D. Smith

The appellant appealed an order requiring payment of child support arrears and education expenses pursuant to a separation agreement.

He argued that support payments should be deducted from his income, that a 'first educational degree' limit should be implied into the support obligation, and that the child was no longer under parental control.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to imply terms into the contract or interfere with the trial judge's findings of fact.

The appellant solicitor appealed a decision permitting the assessment of her accounts by the respondent client.

The solicitor argued the client failed to request the assessment within the one-month statutory period under the Solicitors Act and missed the 15-day deadline stipulated in their retainer agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that the final account was delivered later than the solicitor claimed.

The Court also held that public policy prevents solicitors and clients from contracting out of the statutory rights granted to clients to have their accounts assessed within the statutory timeframe.

Following an appeal in which the respondent was largely successful, the Court of Appeal for Ontario awarded costs to the respondent.

The costs were fixed at $3,500, inclusive of Goods and Services Tax and disbursements.

The appellant husband appealed a divorce order, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to reduce his child support obligation by the amount of the CPP child benefit, dismissing his claim for spousal support, and miscalculating the equalization payment.

The Court of Appeal held that the CPP child benefit is the child's entitlement and does not offset a parent's child support obligation under the Guidelines.

The court upheld the dismissal of spousal support due to the appellant's undeclared income, but allowed the appeal in part to correct minor calculation errors regarding child support and the equalization payment.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judgment awarding custody of her child to the respondent grandparents.

She argued the trial judge should have restricted the issue to her proposed move and erred by treating the matter as a proceeding de novo rather than a variation application requiring a material change in circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the original applications sought custody and that the trial judge implicitly found a material change in circumstances based on the mother's unilateral decision-making, her troubled relationship, and her curtailment of the grandparents' time with the child.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her motion for production of documents from non-parties.

The motion judge found that the respondent had no ownership interest or authority over the non-party corporation, the documents were not germane to the litigation, and it would not be unfair to proceed to trial without them.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's application of the test or exercise of discretion and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant husband, an extraordinarily wealthy man, structured his affairs using nominee corporations to hide his assets and avoid paying spousal and child support.

The trial judge pierced the corporate veil, finding the husband was the beneficial owner of the lands held by the corporations, and ordered the lands vested in the respondent wife to satisfy over $11 million in support and other monetary awards.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming the court's broad discretion to grant vesting orders in family law cases where a spouse demonstrates a clear intention to evade support obligations.

The moving party, the first wife of the respondent husband, sought leave to intervene in an appeal regarding a vesting order made in favour of the husband's second wife.

The trial judge had ordered the husband's beneficial interest in certain corporate properties vested in the second wife to satisfy substantial support arrears.

The moving party, who also held foreign judgments for support arrears against the husband, sought to intervene to protect her interests.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the intervention was instigated by the husband to frustrate the second wife's recovery, and that allowing it at this late stage would unduly delay and prejudice the second wife's rights.

The appellant appealed an order varying the support provisions and setting aside the property division of a separation agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the variation of support, finding the judge had jurisdiction due to the appellant's failure to make required payments.

However, the Court set aside the portion of the order invalidating the property division, finding no evidence that the appellant failed to make full financial disclosure when the agreement was signed.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered four appeals regarding retroactive child support.

The Court held that parents have a free-standing obligation to support their children commensurate with their income, and courts have the jurisdiction to order retroactive child support under both the Divorce Act and provincial legislation.

In determining whether to make a retroactive award, courts must balance the payor parent's interest in certainty with fairness to the child by considering the reason for the recipient parent's delay, the payor parent's conduct, the child's past and present circumstances, and potential hardship.

The Court allowed the appeals in D.B.S. and T.A.R., restoring the chambers judges' decisions to deny retroactive support, and dismissed the appeals in Henry and Hiemstra, affirming the retroactive support awards.

The appellant husband was in substantial arrears of spousal and child support.

The motion judge granted an order vesting 100 per cent of the appellant's private pension in the respondent wife and ordering the garnishment of 100 per cent of his CPP and OAS benefits.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 100 of the Courts of Justice Act does not provide stand-alone jurisdiction for a vesting order and that section 66(4) of the Pension Benefits Act restricts execution against a pension to 50 per cent.

The Court also held that garnishment of CPP and OAS benefits must be capped at 50 per cent in accordance with provincial garnishment law.

Following the release of the main appeal decision, the Court of Appeal addressed the issue of costs.

Considering the general importance of the issues, the limited success achieved by the appellant, and the appellant's advancement of new arguments not raised before the motion judge, the court set aside the motion judge's costs order and ordered that the parties bear their own costs both in the Court of Appeal and in the court below.

The appellant appealed a judgment regarding custody and access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the issues of custody and access were being brought back before the Superior Court in Peterborough, which retained jurisdiction over the matter.

The appellant appealed a judgment regarding custody and access.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the issues of custody and access were being brought back before the Superior Court in Peterborough, which retained jurisdiction over the matter.

The mother brought a motion to vary a child support order, seeking increased contribution from the father for post-secondary education expenses for their two adult sons.

The sons had substantial capital assets from gifts.

The motion judge ordered the father to pay table support and a proportionate share of the education expenses, requiring the sons to contribute only from their summer earnings.

The father appealed, arguing the sons should use their capital assets first.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that the motion judge erred in failing to consider the extent to which the children should be expected to contribute to their own education expenses out of their capital assets under s. 3(2)(b) and s. 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision interpreting Minutes of Settlement in a family law dispute.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's conclusion, finding that the motion judge was entitled to look at the entirety of the circumstances given apparent inconsistencies in the language of the settlement and releases.

The Court agreed that further negotiations concerning the final equalization payment were limited to the ultimate disposition of a specific asset paid into court.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her application for spousal support and declaring her a vexatious litigant under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal on the basis that the appellant failed to obtain leave to appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that leave is not required to appeal a vexatious litigant order itself.

On the merits, the Court set aside the vexatious litigant order because the appellant was not given a fair hearing on the issue.

However, the Court upheld the summary dismissal of the spousal support claim, finding no genuine issue for trial given the lack of evidence of economic disadvantage or need arising from the marriage.

The appellant sought to set aside a separation agreement, alleging mistakes, material non-disclosure, and an unfair process.

The trial judge dismissed the application but rectified the agreement to account for a hidden gambling account.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his process and in failing to set aside the agreement based on errors in business valuation, income calculation, and spousal support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the substantive appeal, finding the parties had freely negotiated the agreement with full disclosure, but allowed the appeal in part to reduce the trial costs awarded to the respondent from a substantial to a partial indemnity scale.

The appellant husband, residing in Saskatchewan, obtained a provisional order to terminate spousal support.

The provisional order was sent to Ontario for a confirmation hearing because the respondent wife resided there.

The Ontario court found that not all evidence from Saskatchewan had been transmitted, failing to comply with s. 18(3) of the Divorce Act, but dismissed the motion for confirmation instead of remitting it back.

The Court of Appeal allowed the husband's appeal, holding that a proper record was essential, set aside the dismissal, and directed the matter be remitted for a confirmation hearing in Alberta, where the wife now resides.

Following a successful appeal that set aside a trial judgment awarding spousal support to the respondent wife, the appellant husband sought trial costs of over $250,000 and appeal costs of nearly $50,000.

The Court of Appeal declined to award costs to the husband despite his success and his offers to settle.

The court found that the costs sought were grossly excessive and that a costs award would have a devastating effect on the impecunious wife, destroying any chance she had to achieve financial self-sufficiency.

The court ordered each party to bear their own costs.