D. Smith

The accused brought a pretrial motion for a stay of proceedings, alleging a breach of their s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the date of the charge to the anticipated end of the trial was 35 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found that the Crown successfully rebutted the presumption of unreasonableness by demonstrating that the matter was a "particularly complex case" involving extensive wiretap evidence, multiple accused, and voluminous disclosure.

The court concluded that the Crown had a reasonable plan to manage the complexity and dismissed the application for a stay.

The parties separated after a 15-year marriage.

The trial judge granted the respondent a 50 per cent beneficial interest in the matrimonial home on a resulting trust and dismissed the appellant's claims for unequal division of net family property and retroactive support.

The appellant appealed, seeking an interest in the respondent's RRSP and retroactive support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant had not pleaded the RRSP trust claim at trial and that the trial judge made no errors in denying retroactive support based on the parties' conduct and circumstances.

The appellant appealed a final order regarding spousal support, arguing the trial judge erred in imputing income to her, setting the commencement date for support, fixing the quantum within the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, and calculating the respondent's income.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law or significant misapprehension of evidence.

The court upheld the trial judge's discretionary decisions, including the imputation of income based on the appellant's capacity and the selection of a post-application commencement date due to the appellant's delay in pursuing the claim.

The appellant appealed a formal order containing only support orders made by the trial judge, including an order for retroactive support of $53,800.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as the order fell within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court under s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The appellant challenged a family law decision awarding sole custody, a defined access schedule, and retroactive child support.

The appeal was confined to access and retroactive support.

The court held that the trial judge applied the correct best-interests test under the Children’s Law Reform Act, was entitled to reject the OCL report as unreliable, and provided reasons that satisfied the appellate standard for adequacy.

The court further held that the trial judge properly applied the D.B.S. framework holistically and made no reviewable error in awarding retroactive child support to the child’s birth based on blameworthy conduct and the recipient’s delay explanations.

The appeal was dismissed, the trust funds were applied against arrears, and appeal costs were awarded to the respondent.

On a defendants' motion for partial summary judgment in a franchise misrepresentation action, the court dismissed six remaining challenged causes of action relating to pre-opening events.

The court held that claims based on opening costs, profit-and-loss cost projections, alleged disclosure deficiencies, construction-manager selection, unsupported excessive-fee allegations, and an alleged exclusive-territory representation were either commenced outside the two-year limitation period or lacked evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue.

Applying the post-Hryniak summary judgment approach, the court rejected the responding parties' attempt to defer proof until discovery or future expert investigation.

The action was permitted to continue only on the remaining causes of action not disposed of by the motion.

In a will challenge concerning allegations of undue influence over the deceased, the court considered the proper procedural framework for managing the litigation following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The court held that proportionality principles should guide orders for directions in estate litigation and rejected the routine use of the traditional Estates List standard order for directions.

Instead, the court ordered limited documentary production, permitted written interrogatories in place of oral examinations for discovery, and scheduled a hybrid hearing using affidavit evidence with viva voce cross‑examination.

The court also transferred a related civil action to the Estates List and assumed case management of both proceedings to ensure a timely and cost‑effective resolution.

The court-appointed receiver sought approval for its counsel's fees totaling $255,955 for a 69-day receivership of a family farm.

The debtor opposed the fees as excessive.

The court found the receivership was relatively straightforward, the estate was modest, and the fees charged by senior Toronto counsel were disproportionate and inefficient.

The court reduced the approved fees to $157,500, applying local London rates.

The appellant appealed an order relating to two children.

The Court of Appeal found that the order did not finally resolve the issues between the parties and was therefore not a final order.

As the order was interlocutory, jurisdiction lay with the Divisional Court.

The appeal was quashed.

The respondent father applied in Ontario to vary a final consent order respecting the primary residence of the parties' six-year-old daughter.

The applicant mother moved to transfer the variation application to Manitoba under s. 6(3) of the Divorce Act.

The court found that the child, who had lived in Manitoba for almost her entire life, was most substantially connected to Manitoba.

The court concluded that transferring the proceeding was in the child's best interests and would not impede the proper administration of justice.

The motion to transfer was granted.

The accused was charged with criminal negligence causing bodily harm, aggravated assault, and unlawfully causing bodily harm arising from unauthorized buttocks augmentation procedures performed using PMMA injections.

The Crown sought detention on primary and secondary grounds, arguing risk of flight and danger to the community.

The accused proposed two sureties with pledges totalling $11,000.

The court found the Crown's case strong, the accused's conduct reckless and dangerous, and the proposed release plan inadequate due to the sureties' unwillingness to provide residential supervision and their lack of commitment.

Detention was ordered.

The parties entered into a marriage contract during an attempted reconciliation.

Due to a drafting error, the written agreement provided the appellant husband with the entire value of the matrimonial home, contrary to the respondent wife's intention of an equal division.

The trial judge set aside the contract, finding no meeting of the minds and unconscionability.

On appeal, the appellant sought rectification, which he had resisted at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant could not seek rectification after insisting on enforcing the erroneous written terms at trial, and found no error in the trial judge's findings on the meeting of the minds, property valuation, support, or costs.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after arriving at Toronto Pearson International Airport carrying 80 pellets of cocaine internally.

At trial, the accused testified that he had been kidnapped in St. Lucia and forced at gunpoint to swallow and insert the drug pellets, raising the defence of duress.

The court reviewed the elements of the common law defence of duress, including the requirement of a threat, reasonable belief in its execution, absence of a safe avenue of escape, and proportionality.

The judge rejected the accused’s testimony as inconsistent and implausible, finding multiple opportunities existed to seek help from authorities or airline personnel.

Concluding that the explanation of coercion was not credible and did not raise a reasonable doubt, the court inferred that the drugs were ingested voluntarily and intentionally imported into Canada.

Following the dismissal of an action on summary judgment as statute-barred, res judicata, and an abuse of process, the court considered the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiff had commenced a second action arising from the same underlying facts as a prior lawsuit that had already been dismissed and upheld on appeal.

The court held that the re-litigation of the same dispute justified an award of substantial indemnity costs due to the abusive nature of the proceeding and the allegations of misconduct made against the defendants.

However, the court declined to order costs personally against the plaintiff’s counsel despite finding that unnecessary costs were incurred, emphasizing the need for extreme caution and the protection of solicitor-client privilege.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded against the plaintiff in the amount of $24,007.07 payable to the Scotia defendants.

The appellant appealed an order varying the respondent's child support obligations.

The respondent had suffered a catastrophic injury, constituting a material change in circumstances.

The motions judge retroactively recalculated child support arrears based on actual income rather than the previously imputed income.

The appellant argued the motions judge lacked jurisdiction to retroactively recalculate arrears under s. 37(2.1) of the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 37(2.1)(a) provides the court with broad discretion to vary an original order retroactively when a change in circumstances is established.

The applicant, charged with numerous serious offences including home invasion, unlawful confinement, and firearms offences, applied for a detention review after spending approximately 2.5 years in pre-trial custody.

He argued that the delay constituted a material change in circumstances and that the original show cause justice erred in principle by detaining him on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that much of the delay was attributable to the applicant himself.

The court also upheld the original justice's findings that detention was necessary for the protection of the public and to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, given the horrific nature of the allegations and the strength of the Crown's case.

The appellant sought to appeal a judgment and a vesting order granted following an uncontested trial, which occurred after his statement of defence was struck for failure to comply with disclosure obligations.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that an appellant must exhaust their remedies to change, vary, or set aside a default order in the court of first instance before an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal.

The parties entered into a marriage contract to exclude the appellant's farm property from equalization.

The respondent later applied to set aside the contract, and the trial judge did so under s. 56(4)(a) of the Family Law Act, finding the appellant failed to make proper disclosure regarding the property's composition and value.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the mistaken belief about the property consisting of one parcel instead of two was an innocent, common mistake.

The respondent had independent legal advice, understood she was giving up claims to the entire property, and was aware of the uncertainties regarding its value, meaning there was no failure to disclose warranting the setting aside of the contract.

The mother, residing in Ontario, applied under the Family Law Act to vary a child support agreement made with the father, who resided in the United States.

The application judge varied the agreement, but the appeal judge set aside the order, finding the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act provided a complete code for such proceedings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the mother's appeal, holding that the agreement was a domestic contract under the Family Law Act, the Ontario court had jurisdiction, and the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act provides an alternative process rather than displacing the Family Law Act.

The appellant father appealed a trial judgment awarding custody of the parties' five children to the respondent mother, delaying an equalization payment, and ordering substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the children's best interests, noting the mother's proposal avoided extensive nanny care and the father had undermined the mother's role.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.