Craig Richard Collins-Williams

This decision concerns a dispute over the legal and beneficial ownership of lands surrendered by several First Nations to Canada in 1908, known as the Unsold Surrendered Lands (USL), including the Point Park and associated roads in Fort Frances, Ontario.

The Town of Fort Frances sought summary judgment declaring it the owner of these lands or, alternatively, a public trust or entitlement to damages.

The First Nations, Canada, and Ontario opposed, seeking dismissal of the Town’s claims.

The court found that the Agency One Reserve was a validly created reserve, that the 1908 Order-in-Council (OIC) did not convey the USL to the Town by fee simple or public trust, and that the Town’s claims to the lands, roads, and damages were without merit.

The Town’s motion was dismissed, and the counterclaim struck.

The Town of Fort Frances, as plaintiff by counterclaim, brought a motion to compel the First Nations, Canada, and Ontario to answer questions refused during cross-examinations on affidavits filed for an upcoming summary judgment motion.

The refused questions sought the defendants' legal positions on historical documents and the disclosure of a 2018 Settlement Agreement between the First Nations, Canada, and Ontario.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the questions regarding historical documents were in the nature of discovery and beyond the proper scope of cross-examination on an affidavit.

The court also held that the 2018 Settlement Agreement was protected by settlement privilege and did not need to be disclosed, as it did not change the ongoing litigation landscape of the Town's counterclaim.

The applicant imported oil country tubular goods and was assessed anti-dumping duties by the CBSA under the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA).

To appeal the assessment, SIMA required the applicant to first pay the outstanding duties.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of these appeal payment provisions, arguing they violated section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 by barring access to courts due to undue hardship, section 12 of the Charter by imposing cruel and unusual treatment, and section 1(a) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Federal Court dismissed the application, finding the provisions did not violate section 96 as the applicant failed to prove undue hardship, did not constitute cruel and unusual treatment under the Charter, and did not infringe the Bill of Rights, as the provisions were valid federal legislation.

The Plaintiffs sought costs on a partial indemnity basis after successfully opposing a motion for summary judgment and a Rule 21 motion to strike a claim concerning a breach of their s.6 Charter Mobility Rights.

The Defendant largely agreed to the quantum of costs but disputed the portion related to the novel Charter issue.

The court awarded $30,000 in costs, excluding the $7,000 associated with the novel Charter claim, which was ordered to be 'in the cause'.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for negligence and defamation on the basis that the two-year limitation period had expired, and a motion to strike the plaintiffs' claim for a breach of their section 6 Charter mobility rights.

The court found that the plaintiffs could not have reasonably discovered the material facts of their claim until the release of the Iacobucci Inquiry Report, meaning the limitation period had not expired.

The court also refused to strike the section 6 Charter claim, finding it was not plain and obvious that the claim would fail given the practical restrictions on the plaintiffs' ability to leave Canada.

Both motions were dismissed.

The plaintiff First Nations sought a declaration that a two-chain strip of land along the shores of Rainy Lake and Rainy River formed part of the Agency One Reserve, created pursuant to Treaty #3.

The court reviewed extensive historical, ethnohistorical, and surveying evidence regarding the creation of the reserve in the 1870s.

The court found that the Crown intended to exclude the two-chain allowance from the reserve to accommodate the Dawson Route and the developing forestry industry.

The court further held that this exclusion did not breach the Crown's fiduciary duty or the honour of the Crown, as the Ojibway retained access to the shoreline and no express promise had been made to include it.

The plaintiffs' claims were dismissed.

The appellants sought a new hearing before a differently constituted Human Rights Tribunal, arguing a lack of procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court found conflicting evidence regarding attempts at service, a suspicion of evasion, and a failure to use available translation services.

Concluding that procedural fairness was not achieved on the record, the court ordered a new hearing before a differently constituted Tribunal and made no order as to costs.

A federal agency received a request under the Access to Information Act for records pertaining to the respondent company.

The agency notified the company that the records might contain confidential business information and, after receiving representations, decided to disclose the records with redactions.

The company applied for a review under s. 44 of the Act, seeking to raise the personal information exemption under s. 19.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a third party may raise the s. 19 personal information exemption in a s. 44 review, as the plain language of the statute and the combined purposes of the Access to Information Act and the Privacy Act support protecting privacy rights.

The appellants, representing members of a salaried pension plan, appealed a decision of the Financial Services Tribunal that upheld the Superintendent's consent to merge their plan with an hourly-paid plan.

The appellants argued the merger would dilute their plan's surplus and that the surplus constituted 'other benefits' protected under s. 81(5) of the Pension Benefits Act.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the matter and that the appropriate standard of review was reasonableness simpliciter.

On the merits, the Court found that an actuarial surplus in an ongoing defined benefit plan is not an 'other benefit' under s. 81(5), and dismissed the appeal.