J. Daniel Dooley

Following a jury trial in a solicitor's negligence action where the plaintiffs were awarded $190,000, the court determined the issue of costs.

Although the plaintiffs beat their offer to settle, the court departed from the prima facie rule of substantial indemnity costs due to the improper conduct of plaintiffs' counsel and the perverse nature of the jury's damages findings.

Applying the principle of proportionality under Rule 1.1, the court significantly reduced the plaintiffs' costs claim from $237,535.25 to $129,316 on a partial indemnity scale.

Following partial judgment in an application concerning whether an easement of necessity existed to access landlocked property, the court addressed costs.

The court had previously determined that an easement of necessity existed over one parcel of land, leaving the precise route of the easement to be determined at trial if the parties could not agree.

The applicant achieved substantial success on the central issue of the existence of the easement.

However, one corporate respondent was entirely successful because no easement was granted over its property.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the applicant against certain respondents while also awarding costs to the successful corporate respondent against the applicant.

The applicant bank, holding a mortgage on a landlocked property, applied for a declaration of an easement of necessity over an adjoining property previously severed by the original owner.

The respondents argued that the landlocked property had water access, which should defeat the claim for an easement of necessity.

The court found that the water access was impractical due to a steep slope, satisfying the modern test of practical necessity.

The court declared an easement of necessity over the adjoining land and directed a trial to determine its precise location.

The applicant sought rectification of a 2006 divorce order that omitted agreed corollary relief, including $100,000 in support arrears and ongoing support, after solicitor error resulted in a divorce simpliciter.

Following a trial directed on the factual dispute, the court found a sufficient common intention between the parties to support rectification and held that Rule 25(19)(b) permits amendment where an order contains a mistake arising from inadvertent omission.

The court rejected arguments based on solicitor negligence, delay, laches, and res judicata, finding no prejudice sufficient to bar equitable relief.

After crediting specified payments made since the order, the court fixed remaining support arrears at $51,392.11.

The appellant sought to purchase the respondents' business and the parties executed a letter of intent.

On the closing date, the appellant was in Florida with the respondents' knowledge, but the respondents refused to close the transaction.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's action for specific performance and damages, finding the letter of intent was not a binding contract.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the letter of intent and the parties' subsequent conduct evidenced a clear intention to be legally bound.

The Court declined to order specific performance but awarded damages for loss of opportunity, increasing the damages period from three to seven months.

The appellant insurance company appealed a summary judgment decision.

The motion judge found no genuine issue for trial regarding the negligence of anyone other than an unidentified driver, noting the appellant's affidavit lacked a statement of belief in its truth, while the respondents' affidavits unambiguously blamed the unidentified driver.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's conclusion and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its motion to set aside a default judgment.

The motion judge found that the statement of claim was properly served, the appellant made a tactical decision not to defend, and the appellant failed to raise an arguable defence on the merits.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, noting the appellant failed to explain its failure to defend under Rule 16.07(a) and did not respond to the respondent's allegations regarding the mortgages.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent was injured when a spider rope, left secured to a guardrail by the appellant's employees, was released by an unknown vandal and struck her car on the highway below.

The trial judge found the appellant liable in negligence for failing to meet industry standards to prevent tampering.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while a duty of care was owed, the trial judge erred in finding a breach of the standard of care.

The intervening act of vandalism was not reasonably foreseeable given the lack of prior incidents and the location of the work.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellant sued his former solicitor for negligence regarding the sale of a taxi business, claiming the solicitor failed to advise him of a discrepancy in interest payments under the sale agreement.

The trial judge found the solicitor negligent but dismissed the action because the appellant failed to prove damages.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, noting that without the solicitor's negligence, the sale would not have occurred, and the appellant provided no evidence that the business was worth more than the amount received.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that conducted an accounting between the parties following a failed joint venture in an excavating business.

The trial judge found the appellants owed the respondents a net amount of $3,271.60.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge exhibited bias, ignored evidence, and decided the case on an unpleaded issue.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no bias, no reviewable error in the accounting, and that the pleadings broadly contemplated an accounting.

The respondents' cross-appeal for costs was also dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that offset their damages claim against the respondents' claim for unpaid wages, resulting in a net amount owed to the respondents.

The appellants argued the trial judge exhibited bias, improperly limited evidence, and decided the case on an unpleaded issue.

The respondents cross-appealed the trial judge's refusal to award costs to two dismissed defendants.

The Divisional Court dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, no reviewable error in the accounting, and that the pleadings were broad enough to encompass the accounting conducted.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his solicitor negligence claim against his former lawyer.

The appellant alleged that the lawyer's negligence in advising him and representing him at a bail hearing resulted in his 30-day detention.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings that there was no causal connection between the lawyer's actions and the detention.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $10,000.

The respondent employee was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident after leaving an office Christmas party where alcohol was served at an unmonitored open bar.

At trial, the judge discharged the jury on grounds of complexity and publicity, and found the employer 25% liable for the respondent's damages.

The employer appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred in law by discharging the jury based on his own difficulty in explaining the law, and erred in his analysis of causation by failing to consider evidence that the respondent was not inebriated when she left the party and by failing to address the assumptions underlying the toxicologist's opinion.

The insurer appealed from a declaration that it was obliged to defend and indemnify its insured in a negligence action arising from a child pedestrian injury during a vehicle drop-off.

Applying the broad coverage language in the standard motor vehicle policy and the two-part framework from Amos, the court held that stopping a car temporarily to drop off passengers is an ordinary use of an automobile and that there was a sufficient nexus between that use and the injuries.

The insured's conduct after exiting the vehicle did not sever coverage because the motor vehicle need not be the instrument of injury.

The appeal was dismissed and the declaration was varied to track the language of the motion.