Saba Ahmad

Benjamin Cochrane, a beneficiary of a trust established after a childhood accident, brought a motion seeking the removal of his father, William Cochrane, as litigation guardian, the removal of his parents, William and Carol Cochrane, as trustees, an accounting of the trust, and compensation for alleged misappropriation.

The parents sought an adjournment, which was granted on terms.

The court removed William as litigation guardian, ordered William and Carol to provide a full accounting, and directed timely payment of annuity income to Benjamin.

Interim costs were awarded to Benjamin.

On appeal, the court concluded the appellant should have been successful at trial and awarded damages of $438,113 in addition to other relief.

The appellant had made a pre-trial Rule 49 offer to settle for $180,000.

The court determined the appellant was entitled to partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

However, because a significant portion of the trial involved testing claims the appellant made which the trial judge found to be untrue, and many of those findings were undisturbed on appeal, the costs award was adjusted to reflect that the trial was not an unqualified success for the appellant.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claims for a beneficial interest in the family home or equitable damages for services rendered to his mother, as well as the dismissal of his application to revoke his sister's power of attorney.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the trial judge erred in allocating the burden of proof for unjust enrichment by requiring the appellant to prove a 'net benefit'.

Applying the correct framework from Kerr v. Baranow, the Court awarded the appellant $438,113 in equitable damages for domestic services.

The Court also admitted the trial judge's findings of undue influence as fresh evidence and revoked the sister's power of attorney.

The Registrar of Alcohol and Gaming issued a Notice of Proposal to refuse to renew the appellant's liquor sales licence.

The appellant appealed to the Licence Appeal Tribunal.

At the hearing, the parties reached a settlement agreement wherein the appellant withdrew its appeal, and the Registrar undertook to treat any future application within eight months as an application to reinstate the licence, provided the appellant regains possession of the premises.

The matter was concluded on this basis.

Following a prior trial decision and endorsement directing the parties to finalize draft orders expeditiously, counsel for the applicants forwarded draft orders to opposing counsel for approval as to form and content.

No response was received from counsel for the opposing party despite the court’s direction.

After reviewing the draft orders prepared by the applicants’ counsel, the court made a minor revision and signed both orders.

The signed orders were directed to be circulated to counsel together with the endorsement.

Following a trial decision dismissing a claim for a beneficial ownership interest in residential property, the unsuccessful claimant filed a notice of appeal and sought to prevent the release of sale proceeds pending appeal.

The moving party argued that an automatic stay applied under Rule 63.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure or, alternatively, requested an interim stay while seeking relief from the Court of Appeal.

The court rejected the argument that the order constituted a payment of money subject to an automatic stay, relying on appellate authority distinguishing the release of trust funds from a money judgment.

Nevertheless, the court granted a limited interim stay to permit the moving party to bring a stay motion before the Court of Appeal.

The interim stay was restricted to 50% of the sale proceeds and was conditional on the appeal motion being argued by a specified deadline.

Following a family property dispute over a Toronto home, the court tried the remaining issues of whether the applicant son held a beneficial interest through constructive trust and whether he was entitled to damages for contributions to the property.

The court found pervasive credibility problems affecting all parties and held the evidentiary record did not permit the factual findings necessary to establish proprietary estoppel or unjust enrichment.

The applicant failed to prove any present promise of an interest in the property, detrimental reliance, unconscionability, or any net benefit conferred once long-term occupancy and unpaid market rent were considered.

The claim for damages also failed, and the net sale proceeds were ordered releasable to the respondents on their joint instructions.

Given the conduct of all parties, no costs were awarded.

The applicant son sought a declaration of beneficial ownership in his mother's residential property based on proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment, claiming he made financial and physical contributions to the property over decades.

The court found significant credibility issues with all parties.

The court held that the son did not establish the elements of proprietary estoppel, as his evidence regarding his expectation of an interest in the property was inconsistent and any alleged promise was for an inheritance, not a present interest.

The court also dismissed the unjust enrichment claim, finding that the son did not confer a net benefit on his mother, as the value of his rent-free accommodation far exceeded any financial contributions he made.

The application was dismissed with no costs awarded due to the unreasonable conduct of all parties.

In consolidated family property applications, the court addressed disputes over powers of attorney, alleged incapacity and undue influence, exclusive possession of a house, and competing trust and damages claims arising from an adult child’s alleged decades-long financial and labour contributions to the property.

The court held that the evidence did not establish incapacity under the Substitute Decisions Act, denied revocation of the attorney appointments, denied an order for passing of accounts, and dismissed claims to beneficial ownership and resulting trust.

Applying the injunction-style test for possession, the court granted the titled owners exclusive possession and leave for a writ of possession.

However, because material facts remained sharply disputed on unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and damages, those issues were directed to trial, with protective orders preserving the claimant’s ability to trace into sale proceeds or a replacement property.

The applicants sought judgment on a $5 million promissory note securing advanced commissions paid under a charity fundraising and consulting arrangement.

The respondent contended the advance had been fully earned through commissions on funds raised in 2008 and therefore nothing remained owing on the note.

The court accepted the respondent's position, relying heavily on the charity's 2008 tax filings to find that the advanced commissions had been earned and that the note debt was extinguished by statutory set-off under s. 111 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court dismissed the applicants' claim, discharged the related security, and held that the respondent's attempt to recover an additional commission balance was statute-barred.

The moving party sought to vacate an ex parte Mareva injunction freezing assets, arguing that the injunction had been obtained through material misrepresentations and failures of full and frank disclosure.

The court accepted that inaccuracies had been presented in the original application, including overstated assets, understated income, and failure to disclose proceeds from a home sale.

However, given ongoing concerns about the disappearance of significant funds and unresolved factual disputes, the court declined to set aside the injunction entirely.

Instead, the injunction was varied to permit the release of a portion of frozen funds reflecting assets the moving party credibly established were independently earned.

The court also dismissed the opposing party’s cross‑motion for additional funding and awarded costs to the moving party.

The applicant moved for judgment on a demand promissory note and related security, seeking payment of a liquidated debt and dismissal of any set‑off claims raised by the respondent.

The respondent asserted a contractual right of set‑off arising from a services agreement and also brought motions seeking security for a Mareva damages undertaking and security for costs.

The court held that the existence of significant factual disputes, including whether contractual set‑off applied and limitation issues, made the matter unsuitable for determination on motion.

The court also found insufficient evidence to justify security for the damages undertaking or security for costs.

Both motions were dismissed and the issues were directed to proceed to trial.

The applicant sought continuation of a Mareva injunction freezing the respondent’s assets in connection with a disputed promissory note and security agreement.

The respondent argued the injunction should be set aside due to material non‑disclosure on the original ex parte motion, including the applicant’s assignment of the security underlying the debt and the respondent’s asserted set‑off claim.

The court held that the potential weakness of the undertaking as to damages arising from the assignment should have been disclosed to the judge who granted the ex parte order.

Although the court declined to continue the Mareva injunction in its existing form, it found that some interim relief was justified to preserve the status quo pending a short trial.

The injunction was continued temporarily for ten days with limited permitted expenses and directions for proposals regarding payments and trial scheduling.

The plaintiffs sought partial summary judgment declaring that no binding contract existed for a nationwide roll‑out of a stored value “Tim Card” payment system and that they had not misused confidential information obtained during a pilot program.

The defendants alleged that a binding agreement had been reached or, alternatively, that the plaintiffs breached confidentiality obligations and a duty to negotiate in good faith after abandoning negotiations and conducting an RFP process.

The court held that the evidence showed only an agreement in principle and ongoing negotiations, not a finalized contract, as material terms remained unresolved and the parties’ conduct did not demonstrate a binding commitment.

The court also found no misuse of confidential information, concluding that the operational data from the pilot project belonged to the restaurant chain and did not constitute protectable confidential information of the technology vendor.

However, genuine issues remained regarding whether the plaintiffs breached a contractual obligation to negotiate in good faith.

The applicant sought judicial review of the respondent transit authority's decision to enter into a contract for diesel multiple units for an air-rail link.

The applicant argued the respondent exceeded its jurisdiction by failing to conduct an electrification feasibility study and improperly accepting ministerial direction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the decision to enter a commercial contract did not constitute a 'statutory power of decision' under the Judicial Review Procedure Act as it did not determine any legal rights.

Furthermore, the court held that the respondent acted within its statutory authority under its governing legislation.

The applicant, a public interest group opposing the use of diesel trains on the air rail link, brought a motion for leave to file an affidavit after completing cross-examinations.

The affidavit sought to explain the applicant's delay in bringing its application for judicial review.

The court applied the four-factor test for granting leave under Rule 39.02(2) and found that the evidence was relevant, responsive to cross-examination, would not cause non-compensable prejudice, and had a reasonably adequate explanation for its late filing.

Leave was granted to file the affidavit, subject to the exclusion of several irrelevant paragraphs.

The appellants brought a motion in writing to amend the court's previous judgment to address the issue of costs granted by the motions judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, noting that the appellants had failed to mention the costs award in their notices of appeal, factum, or oral argument.

The court held that it was too late to raise the issue and that allowing the motion would be unfair and prejudicial to the respondents.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the respondents in the amount of $5,000.

The parties made costs submissions following an appeal decision.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario maintained its view that success on the appeal was equally divided.

Consequently, the court ordered that there be no costs of the appeal.

The United States government sought to enforce a $19 million Illinois judgment and permanent injunction against the defendants, who operated a cross-border lottery telemarketing business.

The motion judge refused summary judgment, finding a triable issue on a 'new' defence of denial of a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

The motion judge also ordered an immediate damages inquiry regarding undertakings the U.S. gave when it previously obtained Mareva and Anton Piller orders that were later dissolved.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that there is no new defence to foreign judgment enforcement based on a meaningful opportunity to be heard, which is indistinguishable from natural justice.

The Court enforced the U.S. judgment but upheld the order for a damages inquiry, finding no special circumstances to relieve the U.S. of its undertakings despite the alleged illegality of the defendants' business.