Markus F. Kremer

Following the dismissal of a proposed $2 billion class action regarding the Rana Plaza collapse in Bangladesh, the successful defendants sought costs totaling over $2.3 million.

The plaintiffs and the Class Proceedings Fund argued for no costs, asserting the case was novel and brought in the public interest.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the claims were grounded in established negligence principles and prosecuted aggressively with an expectation of costs.

The court awarded the defendants their claimed costs in full on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiffs, victims of the Rana Plaza factory collapse in Bangladesh, brought a proposed class action in Ontario against Loblaws (who sourced garments from the factory) and Bureau Veritas (who conducted social audits).

The defendants moved to dismiss the action under Rule 21, arguing the claims were governed by Bangladesh law, were statute-barred, and disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court held that while it had jurisdiction simpliciter, the claims were governed by Bangladesh law under the lex loci delicti rule and were statute-barred by a one-year limitation period.

Furthermore, the court found that under both Bangladesh and Ontario law, it was plain and obvious that the defendants owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs, nor was Loblaws vicariously liable or in breach of any fiduciary duty.

The action and the certification motion were dismissed.

In a multi-jurisdictional class action regarding credit card merchant fees, Class Counsel entered into a Fee Sharing Agreement with a competing law firm to resolve a carriage dispute.

The agreement provided the competing firm up to $800,000 from Class Counsel's fees in exchange for staying rival actions.

On a motion to approve a partial settlement and fees, the motion judge reduced Class Counsel's requested fees by 10%, declared the Fee Sharing Agreement unenforceable, and prohibited any payments to the competing firm.

The Court of Appeal upheld the fee reduction and the prohibition on paying the competing firm from the settlement or approved fees, finding the agreement was subject to court approval under the Class Proceedings Act.

However, the Court set aside the declaration that the agreement was entirely unenforceable from any source, as the competing firm was not given notice or an opportunity to make submissions on that specific issue.

This case concerns the interpretation of a 1985 indemnity agreement granted by the Province of Ontario to Great Lakes Forest Products Limited (now Resolute FP Canada Inc.) and its successors and assigns, regarding mercury contamination.

Weyerhaeuser Company Limited, a subsequent owner of the property, and Resolute sought indemnity from the Province for costs incurred complying with a 2011 environmental remediation order issued by the Ministry of the Environment.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that the indemnity's broad language covered statutory claims by provincial agencies and that the fettering doctrine did not apply to this business agreement.

Weyerhaeuser was also found to be able to rely on the indemnity as a successor or assignee.

Following a prior decision approving class counsel fees in a class proceeding settlement, class counsel sought clarification regarding the calculation of the fee award, treatment of consulting law firm fees, application of taxes, and comments regarding disclosure of a fee sharing agreement.

The court acknowledged that an arithmetic error had occurred in the original calculation and corrected the award by applying a 10% reduction to the claimed counsel fee before adding disbursements.

The court clarified that consulting law firms were to be paid from the approved counsel fee rather than treated as additional disbursements and confirmed that applicable taxes were payable in addition to the approved amount.

The court also addressed concerns about disclosure of the fee sharing agreement, reiterating that failure to fully disclose the agreement’s substance was a mistake despite counsel’s intentions.

Representative plaintiffs in a proposed national competition law class action sought court approval of partial settlement agreements with three defendants, approval of contingency fee agreements with class counsel, and approval of counsel fees and disbursements.

The court approved settlements totaling $13.63 million with Bank of America, Capital One, and Citigroup and found the agreements fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court also approved the contingency fee agreements but scrutinized a separate fee‑sharing agreement between class counsel and a rival law firm that had commenced competing class actions.

The judge held that the fee‑sharing agreement required court approval, was not fair or reasonable to class members, and may constitute champerty or maintenance.

Class counsel’s requested fee was reduced by 10%, and the court ordered that no payment be made to the rival firm under the unauthorized agreement.

The defendant bank sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order certifying a class proceeding arising from unauthorized access to customer information by a bank employee.

The proposed appeal challenged the class definition, the certification of a waiver of tort claim, and the certification of claims for non‑pecuniary damages in negligence and contract without proof of psychiatric injury.

The court held that the certification judge had applied the correct low threshold applicable at the pleadings and certification stage and that the bank had not shown conflicting authority or good reason to doubt the correctness of the order under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court further held that the class definition was not impermissibly over‑inclusive and that the waiver of tort issue met the “some basis in fact” standard for certification.

Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a proposed class proceeding for settlement purposes against a credit card network defendant in a competition law action alleging conspiracy to fix merchant discount and interchange fees for Visa and MasterCard credit card transactions.

The claims included alleged breaches of the Competition Act, tortious conspiracy, intentional interference with economic interests, and unjust enrichment.

The court considered the certification criteria under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 and held that the pleadings disclosed a cause of action, an identifiable class was established, common issues existed, and a class proceeding was the preferable procedure with an adequate representative plaintiff.

The court noted that certification for settlement purposes still requires satisfaction of the statutory criteria, though the analysis may be less strict given the settlement context.

Certification was granted as against the settling defendant and the proposed notice and notice plan were approved.

The plaintiffs sought certification of a class proceeding against a bank and a former employee who improperly accessed customers’ confidential financial information and disclosed it to third parties, leading to identity theft and fraud affecting numerous customers.

The court considered the requirements for certification under s. 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, including whether the pleadings disclosed causes of action such as negligence, breach of contract, intrusion upon seclusion, vicarious liability, and waiver of tort.

The court held that several pleaded claims disclosed viable causes of action and that the proposed class of 643 customers whose information had been accessed constituted an identifiable class.

The court further found that the issues of negligence, breach of contract, vicarious liability for intrusion upon seclusion, and waiver of tort raised common issues and that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure for resolving them.

The proposed representative plaintiffs were found to be suitable and capable of advancing the litigation.

Following an earlier refusal to schedule the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, the court directed the parties to develop a trial preparation plan.

The parties submitted a proposed plan addressing production, examinations for discovery, undertakings, interlocutory motions, witness evidence, mediation, and trial management.

The court issued detailed case management directions establishing timelines for documentary production, discoveries, undertakings, and mediation, and provided guidance on the conduct of witness evidence and trial scheduling.

The decision also required the parties to schedule discovery-related motions and a further case conference to determine time limits for the anticipated two-week trial.

The court heard two separate motions to strike or stay pending summary judgment motions on the Commercial List.

Applying the principles from Combined Air and the proportionality requirements of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that concerns about the appropriateness of summary judgment motions should be addressed through case management rather than formal motions to strike.

The court reviewed the proposed summary judgment motions in both actions and concluded that neither was an appropriate candidate for summary judgment due to the complexity of the issues, the voluminous records, and the need for a full trial to appreciate the evidence.

Both summary judgment motions were directed not to proceed, and the parties were ordered to prepare for trial.

A school board sought court approval of a proposed methodology to distribute approximately $1.7 million received following the windup of a group insurance trust.

The plan allocated a portion to future benefit premium reserves and distributed the remainder to non‑union employees enrolled in the insurance policies as of June 30, 2006, using a banding system based on years of participation.

An objector representing former employees argued that excluding individuals who ceased enrollment before that date was unreasonable because they had contributed premiums to the trust.

The court held that the board had broad discretion under the court‑approved trust windup terms and that basing distribution on enrollment as of June 30, 2006 was rational because that same metric determined the board’s share of the surplus.

The court also found it reasonable to consider administrative costs and data limitations in designing the methodology.

The proposed distribution methodology was approved.

The representative plaintiff brought a proposed class action against the defendant bank for unpaid overtime, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and negligence due to systemic policies requiring pre-approval for overtime and inadequate record-keeping.

The motion judge certified the action, and the Divisional Court upheld the certification.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the certification of most common issues and agreed that a class proceeding was the preferable procedure.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, striking the common issue regarding the aggregate assessment of damages under s. 24(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, finding that damages could not reasonably be calculated without proof by individual class members.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice regarding the interpretation of the Limitations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge's interpretation of section 22(i) read in conjunction with section 23.

Costs were fixed at $6,000 on consent.

The appellant appealed a decision recognizing and enforcing two Russian arbitral awards against it.

The application judge had refused to consider the appellant's evidence of alleged death threats, which the appellant claimed prevented its participation in the arbitration, on the basis of issue estoppel from a prior proceeding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that issue estoppel did not apply and that the application judge erred by failing to exercise residual discretion to prevent injustice.

The enforcement application was remitted for a fresh determination.

Following the respondents' complete success on an appeal and cross-appeal, the court determined the appropriate scale and quantum of costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs for the appeal, cross-appeal, and the underlying application.

However, the court awarded substantial indemnity costs for three related motions, noting the applicants had made unfounded and speculative allegations of wrongdoing, unnecessarily complicating the proceedings.

The court fixed the total costs payable by the applicants to the respondents at $125,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellant, a Canadian pig producer, appealed an order dismissing its motion for an anti-suit injunction and granting a stay of its Ontario action against a Russian corporation.

The appellant sought to avoid an arbitration clause requiring arbitration in Moscow, alleging the respondent's CEO made death threats against its chief operating officer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the injunction issues moot as the arbitration had already occurred.

The court upheld the stay of the Ontario action, concluding the arbitration clause was broad enough to encompass the appellant's related tort claims.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that a clause in their shareholders agreement was an unenforceable penalty.

The respondents cross-appealed the dismissal of their oppression application.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the application judge erred by reversing the onus of proof and failing to recognize the clause as a genuine pre-estimate of damages negotiated by sophisticated parties.

The cross-appeal was dismissed, as the application judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding no oppression.

A motion to introduce fresh evidence was also dismissed.

Following a successful appeal regarding the right to issue third party claims, the appellants sought costs.

The parties agreed on the quantum of costs but disputed the timing of payment.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs payable forthwith, finding no special circumstances to justify a delay in payment.

The appellants, an actuary and his employer, were sued by the successor administrator of a pension plan for allegedly preparing negligent actuarial reports that allowed the plan sponsor to underfund the plan before entering CCAA protection.

The appellants sought to bring third-party claims against the sponsor's former directors and officers, alleging they instructed the actuary to use improper methods.

The motion judge struck the third-party claims, finding they disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the successor administrator's claim did not depend on the sponsor's reasonable reliance on the reports, and that the CCAA orders protecting directors and officers did not bar the third-party claims because the individuals were acting as agents of the plan administrator, not merely as corporate directors.