George Weston Limited v. Domtar Inc. / 1318214 Ontario Limited et al. v. Sobeys Capital Incorporated

112 O.R. (3d) 190

2012 ONSC 5001

Ontario Superior Court of Justice,

D.M. Brown J.

September 3, 2012

Civil procedure -- Summary judgment -- Striking out motion for summary judgment -- Court not required to engage in detailed review of merits of summary judgment motion on motion to strike that motion -- Proportionality-oriented, case- management approach applying to issues of appropriateness or prematurity of summary judgment motions -- Review of appropriateness of summary judgment motion available following close of discoveries.

In George Weston, the plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment. The defendant initially consented to the motion being brought. After the release of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Combined Air Mechanical Services, the defendant brought a motion to strike the summary judgment motion. In 1318214 Ontario Ltd., the defendant proposed to bring a motion for summary judgment dismissing the actions of three of the plaintiffs in their entirety on the basis that they were time- barred and for partial summary judgment dismissing certain claims on the basis that they raised no genuine issue requiring a trial. The plaintiffs objected to the bringing of the summary judgment motion.

Held, the summary judgment motions should not be heard.

Combined Air should not be read as encouraging the development of a "motions to strike out" cottage industry around Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. That some procedural device should exist to deal with patently premature or inappropriate motions for summary judgment does not mean that motions to strike should now form "step one" in most summary judgment motions. Any review of the appropriateness of a pending summary judgment motion should not require a court to engage in a detailed review of the merits of the proposed motion. The abuse of process approach adopted in some cases should not be adopted. The introduction of the principle of proportionality in the Rules of Civil Procedure, when coupled with the direction of the Court of Appeal in Combined Air that the appropriateness of summary judgment motions falls to be decided under a combination of rules 1.04(1), (1.1), (2) and 1.05, signalled that a more proportionality-oriented, case-management approach should be applied to issues of the appropriateness or prematurity of summary judgment motions. A motions court should consider whether the proposed summary judgment motion is a good or appropriate candidate for a summary disposition because the "right fit" exists between, on the one hand, the nature of the issues raised on the motion and the quality of the record which the motion will generate and, on the other hand, the summary judgment procedure available under Rule 20. A case- management approach to addressing concerns about the scheduling of a motion for summary judgment should be available following the close of discoveries.

George Weston

The motion undertaken by the plaintiff was not, at this stage of the proceedings, a good candidate for summary judgment. The action involved complex issues of contractual interpretation. Significant factual disputes existed on the record which would have to be resolved. Both parties relied on expert evidence, yet had not indicated how a motion judge would be able to question those expert witnesses should he or she wish to do so. The plaintiff had agreed to produce a representative for discovery, and the defendant should not be required to argue the case on its merits without first examining that representative. Disputes existed about the adequacy of documentary production. The amount at issue in the action raised serious questions about the proportionality of employing a summary judgment procedure to determine the case on its merits. However, as a result of the defendant's initial consent to a summary judgment motion schedule, both parties had spent time and money in preparing a summary judgment record. That money should not go to waste. The most efficient means of satisfying the "full appreciation" test would be to develop a modified trial preparation plan, incorporating elements of traditional discovery and making use of the work undertaken to date in creating a summary judgment record, with a view to proceeding to a non-conventional trial in 2013.

1318214 Ontario Ltd.

The defendant's motion for partial summary judgment against four of the defendants would really involve a review of the evidence concerning all seven plaintiffs because the defendant wished to obtain partial summary judgment against them all in the event it failed on the prescription aspect of its motion against three plaintiffs. On its face, the summary judgment motion would require reviewing evidence of up to ten years of contractual dealing between the parties. The defendant acknowledged that success on that part of the motion would not avoid a trial. The partial summary judgment sought did not relate to a discrete claim or discrete issue. If successful, the motion would not eliminate the plaintiffs' claim for damages; it would only reduce some of the factual issues underpinning those claims. Such an objective was not consistent with the purpose of summary judgment motions and would risk expanding Rule 20 into a device drawing the court into multiple reviews of an underlying fact pattern. As for the prescription-based part of the defendant's motion, when the savings in trial time estimated to result from a successful prescription-focused motion was weighed against the potential for the delay in the action involving the other four plaintiffs and the need to consider the same limitations defence against those four defendants, the scheduling of a summary judgment motion on that matter would not promote the general principle contained in rule 1.04(1) or the principle of proportionality set out in rule 1.04(1.1).

MOTIONS to strike out motions for summary judgment.

Cases referred toCombined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch (2011), 108 O.R. (3d) 1, [2011] O.J. No. 5431, 2011 ONCA 764, 286 O.A.C. 3, 97 C.C.E.L. (3d) 25, 14 C.P.C. (7th) 242, 13 R.P.R. (5th) 167, 211 A.C.W.S. (3d) 845, 93 B.L.R. (4th) 1, 10 C.L.R. (4th) 17; Meditrust Healthcare Inc. v. Shoppers Drug Mart, [2000] O.J. No. 3762, 2000 CarswellOnt 3629, 100 A.C.W.S. (3d) 226 (S.C.J.); Millgate Financial Corp. v. BF Realty Holdings Ltd., [2003] O.J. No. 1309, [2003] O.T.C. 283, 2003 CanLII 6252, 121 A.C.W.S. (3d) 839 (S.C.J.), consd Other cases referred to 1318214 Ontario Ltd. v. Sobeys Capital Inc., [2012] O.J. No. 2121, 2012 ONSC 2784 (S.C.J.); Abrams v. Abrams (2010), 102 O.R. (3d) 645, [2010] O.J. No. 1928, 2010 ONSC 2703, 91 C.P.C. (6th) 337 (S.C.J.) [Leave to appeal refused [2010] O.J. No. 4599, 2010 ONSC 4714, 61 E.T.R. (3d) 317 (Div. Ct.)]; D'Addario v. EnGlobe Corp., [2012] O.J. No. 1400, 2012 ONSC 1918 (S.C.J.), supp. reasons [2012] O.J. No. 3669, 2012 ONSC 4380 (S.C.J.); Duff v. Oshust, [2005] A.J. No. 382, 2005 ABQB 117, 52 Alta. L.R. (4th) 190, 381 A.R. 386, 11 C.P.C. (6th) 92, 142 A.C.W.S. (3d) 68; Dumbrell v. Regional Group of Companies Inc. (2007), 85 O.R. (3d) 616, [2007] O.J. No. 298, 2007 ONCA 59, 279 D.L.R. (4th) 201, 220 O.A.C. 64, 25 B.L.R. (4th) 171, 55 C.C.E.L. (3d) 155, 154 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1097; Fairview Donut Inc. v. The TDL Group Corp., [2012] O.J. No. 834, 2012 ONSC 1252 (S.C.J.); Ghaffari v. Asiyaban, [2012] O.J. No. 2402, 2012 ONSC 2724 (S.C.J.); Harris v. Leikin Group Inc., [2011] O.J. No. 2667, 2011 ONSC 3556 (S.C.J.); Kentucky Fried Chicken of Canada, a Division of Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd. v. Scott's Foods Services Inc., 1998 CanLII 4427 (ON CA), [1998] O.J. No. 4368, 114 O.A.C. 357, 41 B.L.R. (2d) 42, 83 A.C.W.S. (3d) 382 (C.A.), varg [1997] O.J. No. 3773, 41 O.T.C. 241, 74 A.C.W.S. (3d) 45 (Gen. Div.); Kovach (Litigation guardian of) v. Kovach (2010), 100 O.R. (3d) 608, [2010] O.J. No. 643, 2010 ONCA 126, 80 C.P.C. (6th) 40, 92 M.V.R. (5th) 39, 261 O.A.C. 190, 316 D.L.R. (4th) 341, 186 A.C.W.S. (3d) 71; Livingston v. Gravel, March 8, 2012, Court File No. CV- 08-359997, Perell J.; Oz Optics Ltd. v. American Home Insurance Co. (2009), 95 O.R. (3d) 613, [2009] O.J. No. 1584, [2009] I.L.R. 1-4832, 2009 CanLII 18230, 176 A.C.W.S. (3d) 996 (S.C.J.); Smith Estate v. Rotstein (2011), 106 O.R. (3d) 161, [2011] O.J. No. 3075, 2011 ONCA 491, 281 O.A.C. 30, 336 D.L.R. (4th) 112, 203 A.C.W.S. (3d) 898, 68 E.T.R. (3d) 182, affg [2010] O.J. No. 1527, 2010 ONSC 2117, 56 E.T.R. (3d) 216 (S.C.J.); Valemont Group Ltd. v. Philmor Goldplate Homes Inc., [2010] O.J. No. 1217, 2010 ONSC 1685 (S.C.J.); Ventas, Inc. v. Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Investment Trust (2007), 85 O.R. (3d) 254, [2007] O.J. No. 1083, 2007 ONCA 205, 222 O.A.C. 102, 29 B.L.R. (4th) 312, 56 R.P.R. (4th) 163, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 95; Western Delta Lands Partnership v. 3557537 Canada Inc., [2000] B.C.J. No. 56, 2000 BCSC 54, 44 C.P.C. (4th) 382, 93 A.C.W.S. (3d) 985

Statutes referred to Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 3, ss. 3, 4 Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sch. B [as am.] Rules and regulations referred to Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, rules 1.04(1), (1.1), (2), 1.05, 6.1.01, 20, 20.01(1), 20.04(2.1), (2.2), 20.05(2), 21.01(1)(a), 22, 34.12(2), 39.03, 50.07(1)(c), 53.01, 53.02 Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, rule 9-7, (11) Authorities referred to Brown, David M., Sacred Cows and Stumbling Blocks: Whither Civil Procedure Reform? (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, May 31, 2011) Dr. Seuss, Green Eggs and Ham (New York: Beginner Books, 1960)

C. Bredt, M. Kremer and M. Furrow, for plaintiff/responding party George Weston Limited. A. Mark, O. Pasparakis and L. O'Brien, for defendant/moving party Domtar Inc. D. Sterns, for plaintiffs/moving parties 1318214 Ontario Limited et al. B. Hanna and G. Moysa, for defendant/responding party Sobeys Capital Incorporated.

D.M. BROWN J.: --

I. Rule 1.04/1.05 Motions to Strike Out or Stay Summary Judgment Motions

[1] A tension exists between the theoretical purpose of summary judgment motions and the reality of their practice. As articulated by the Court of Appeal in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch, the package of rule amendments introduced in 2010, including the expanded powers of motion judges on Rule 20 [of the [Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194] motions, was motivated by "the overriding objective of making the litigation system more accessible and affordable for Ontarians", with the motion for summary judgment "intended to provide a means for resolving litigation expeditiously and with comparatively less cost than is associated with a conventional trial", [^1] as well as offering a more efficient resolution of disputes. Indeed, the principle of proportionality is advanced by the expansion of the availability of summary judgment. [^2]

[2] That is the theory; the practice can be quite different. As the Court of Appeal observed:

[T]he inappropriate use of Rule 20 has the perverse effect of creating delays and wasted costs associated with preparing for, arguing and deciding a motion for summary judgment, only to see the matter sent on for trial. [^3]

[3] The Court of Appeal suggested one way this tension could be resolved in the event a party brought a motion for summary judgment which seemed inconsistent with the objectives of Rule 20:

A party faced with a premature or inappropriate summary judgment motion should have the option of moving to stay or dismiss the motion where the most efficient means of developing a record capable of satisfying the full appreciation test is to proceed through the normal route of discovery. This option is available by way of a motion for directions pursuant to rules 1.04(1), (1.1), (2) and 1.05. [^4]

[4] In these two Commercial List actions, separate motions were brought to strike out motions for summary judgment. The summary judgment motions arise at different stages of the proceedings. In the George Weston v. Domtar action, the plaintiff has embarked on developing a summary judgment motion before examinations for discovery have taken place. By contrast, in the 1318214 Ontario Ltd. v. Sobeys Capital Inc. [[2012] O.J. No. 2121, 2012 ONSC 2784 (S.C.J.)] proceeding discoveries basically are complete, although some undertakings and a few days of re-attendance examinations are required. When the plaintiffs in the Sobeys action sought a trial date, the defendant advised that it intended to bring a motion for partial summary judgment to limit the issues for trial.

[5] Since both motions raise important procedural issues about motions to strike, or stay, summary judgment motions, I have decided to release one set of reasons for both motions. Part I of these reasons will address common principles concerning motions to strike. Parts II and III will apply those principles to the particular facts of the motion in each action.

PART I: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT MOTIONS TO STRIKE, OR STAY, SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS

[6] To treat motions to strike out summary judgment motions as just another type of motion which should be added to the judicial docket would ignore, in my view, the larger context within which these hitherto uncommon motions must be considered. Consequently, before addressing the specific issues raised by these motions to strike, one must take account of the larger context in which contemporary civil litigation occurs in Ontario, a context which informs the proportionality-oriented case-management approach I propose for dealing with these motions to strike.

[7] In proceedings on the Toronto Region Commercial List, concerns about the prematurity or appropriateness of any summary judgment motion should be addressed through the 9:30 appointment or case conference case-management tools currently employed on the list. Given those case-management tools, motions to strike out summary judgment motions should only be brought with the leave of the Commercial List case-management judge. Treating the appropriateness of a summary judgment motion as a case-management type of issue flows from several factors: (i) the constrained operating environment facing the Superior Court of Justice, (ii) the flexibility of the inherent powers enjoyed by judges of this court, (iii) the guidance offered by the Court of Appeal in the Combined Air decision about when it is appropriate to resort to a summary judgment motion and (iv) the need to approach the alternative to summary judgment motions -- the civil trial -- in new ways. Let me turn, then, to consider these contextual factors which inform the approach I have adopted for dealing with these two particular motions to strike.

II. The Larger Context

A. The primacy of public courts in civil litigation

[8] Although not unheard of prior to the Combined Air decision, a motion to strike out, or stay, another motion was rare. The Combined Air decision suggested resorting to such motions as a possible means by which to address concerns about premature or inappropriate summary judgment motions and, not surprisingly, the bar has responded by initiating such motions.

[9] At the heart of these two motions lies the issue about how courts should best manage the summary judgment process and fashion an approach which ensures that parties use summary judgment motions in the circumstances identified as appropriate by the Court of Appeal in Combined Air. The disposition which I make of these two motions rests in a specific view of the case-management powers of a superior court of record and how those powers can and should be used to ensure that Ontario's public courts continue to provide timely, cost- effective and fair access to justice to civil litigants. If we, as judges of a superior court of record, are unable to respond to the challenges and stresses presently confronting our civil litigation system, we risk losing litigants to the private-sector justice system in which an ever increasing number of private arbitration centres offer parties dispute- resolution services employing modern technological systems and well-trained arbitrators, quite often retired judges of this court.

[10] Private arbitration, of course, is all well and good, and it enjoys a place in society's dispute-resolution processes. But, if we continue to believe that a democracy requires its public courts to play the primary role in adjudicating civil disputes and in driving the development of civil jurisprudence, then those involved in the public court system -- judges and administrators alike -- must work hard, and must work creatively, to preserve the primacy of public courts. Whereas courts enjoy a monopoly with respect to the adjudication of criminal cases, increasingly public courts are simply one of several options from which litigants can select the forum in which they wish to present their civil disputes. To limit judges who hear civil cases to the old ways of adjudicating disputes risks ceding the primary role in civil dispute resolution to the private sector. Such a result would be [a] sad day for a free and democratic society.

B. The present day challenges facing Ontario's civil litigation system

[11] Today this court operates subject to considerable pressures and handicaps. First, as the demand for judicial decision-making time has increased, especially in the larger urban centres of Ontario, the available amount of judicial decision-making time has not kept pace. [^5] Simply put, the demand for judicial time exceeds available supply. Put another way, no civil litigant reasonably can expect access to an unlimited amount of judicial time devoted to its case. If that occurred, intolerable delays would arise within the civil court system. Choices must be made by judges about how to best use scarce judicial resources in civil litigation.

[12] Second, as I have written elsewhere, our court's lack of a modern administrative infrastructure, including proper electronic case-management and document-filing technologies, results in the inefficient use of judicial and litigant time.

[13] Third, aspects of the litigation culture of those who practice in our courts add further pressures, in particular the spiralling costs of e-discovery, the preference of many in the bar to consume court time with process-related interlocutory motions instead of proceeding to a timely adjudication of a case on the merits and, finally, a puzzling reluctance to think creatively about how to conduct civil trials. Of course, these are generalizations, and amongst the bar there are, thankfully, exceptions, but I think these generalizations capture the prevailing trends within the contemporary Ontario bar.

[14] Combined, these three constraints and pressures risk imposing intolerable delays on the ordinary person or business who seeks access to our civil system of justice and also risk prompting those litigants with ample financial resources to look outside the public court system for more timely and efficient private dispute services. Failing to deal promptly and creatively with these pressures and constraints makes the emergence of a two-tier, private and public justice system a real possibility.

[15] So, how should our court respond? A comprehensive response requires actions by both judges and court administrators. In these reasons, I focus only on one aspect of how judges can respond, specifically how the court should treat requests to schedule complex summary judgment motions.

[16] In my view, the starting point for any response must be to recall first principles. As a "General Principle", rule 1.04(1) requires a liberal construction of the Rules "to secure the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination on its merits" of every civil case. A coordinate fundamental principle finds expression in rule 1.04(1.1), which requires the making of orders and the giving of directions "that are proportionate to the importance and complexity of the issues, and to the amount involved, in the proceeding". Too often these two rules are viewed as nothing more than vague expressions of "motherhood and apple pie" sentiments. They are not. They define how litigation should be conducted and, more importantly, how courts should manage civil litigation. Whether interpreting and applying the Rules of Civil Procedure, or exercising their inherent case-management powers, judges of this court are to manage the litigation before them in such a way as to secure fair results by using fast, affordable and proportionate procedures. Further, if litigants propose to stray from these fundamental principles, judges must pull them back to the Proportionate Way, so to speak.

[17] The judicial task of ensuring that disputants litigate in accordance with these fundamental principles is not limited to the interpretation and application of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rules constitute the legislative expression of a combination of mandatory and permissive steps applicable to civil actions. The Rules do not define the limits of what judges can do to manage litigation to "the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination on its merits". In a common law court system, judges of a superior court of record possess broad inherent powers to manage civil cases to achieve those fundamental principles; their inherent powers to regulate and control their own process and proceedings include tools other than those which are conferred on them by legislation, including delegated legislation such as rules of practice. [^6]

[18] These inherent powers are broad, and it is difficult to specify the limits upon the powers of the court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction to control and regulate its process because those limits cannot impair the need of the court to fulfill its judicial functions in the administration of justice. As I wrote in Abrams v. Abrams:

The scope of a court's contemporary inherent powers to control its own proceedings and to prevent abuse of its process necessarily reflects the trend that has emerged in the past few decades towards greater judicial oversight of civil proceedings. . . . . .

[J]udges have become more active in the pre-hearing phases of civil litigation. As put recently by Deschamps J. in her minority decision in Marcotte v. Longueuil (City), "[w]hat is clear from these different sources is that the purpose of [proportionality] is to reinforce the authority of the judge as case manager. The judge is asked to abandon the role of passive arbiter." . . .

The Alberta Court of Appeal articulated the contemporary duties and powers of judges in the following way:

In our view, it is the unpleasant duty of the courts to see to it that justice is not unduly delayed. Even when every party to a proceeding seems to be content to see litigation drag on, it is in the public interest to prevent that unhappy result. The modern concept of case management requires a judge not merely to see to it that every party has a fair hearing, but also to see to it that the parties do not abuse that right. For example, parties -- and their counsel -- should prepare for a step in a proceeding when preparation is required in order to move the proceedings along, and not just when it suits their calendars or their other interests. Courts today must decide, and give directions on, matters that unreasonably delay proceedings. Unreasonable delay can come from prolixity, but also hairsplitting and other techniques. Increasingly judges in the future will be required to ration time and effort for motions and objections in terms of the quality of the application.

The purpose underlying this recognition of the enhanced role of judges to manage proceedings was succinctly put in the Lesage-Code Report:

The common law powers are very effective tools of judicial case management because they encourage efficient, focused and well-prepared lawyering. [^7] Of course, the exercise of inherent powers must not undermine principles of procedural natural justice or fairness. [^8]

[19] In the world of contemporary civil litigation, judges of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice necessarily possess the inherent power to give directions to the parties, in appropriate cases, about the conduct and completion of both the pre-hearing and hearing steps in a proceeding, so that the case receives a just, expeditious and least expensive determination on its merits and the pre-hearing and hearing steps unfold in a proportionate manner. Such inherent powers are necessary to enable the court to act effectively within its jurisdiction. [^9]

[20] The term "case management" refers to the broad range of powers exercised by judges in the course of managing a civil proceeding. Through case management, a judge intervenes in the proceeding prior to trial in order to give directions for the preparation of the case for trial, for the actual conduct of the trial or to attempt to resolve the proceeding. Case management requires the application of a range of management tools in order to secure the just, most expeditious, least expensive and proportionate determination of the proceeding on its merits. [^10]

[21] Against this background, current pressures and constraints facing this court necessitate that judges find ways to manage civil litigation more efficiently, using their inherent powers, as well as the tools contained in the Rules, to ensure that the fundamental objective of a fair, fast and affordable final determination on the merits is met, and that intolerable delays in the adjudication of civil disputes do not become the norm. Such case management must focus on giving priority to two requests made by litigants of this court: (i) to make final determinations on the merits of their cases and (ii) to adjudicate urgent requests for interim relief to preserve the status quo until a final determination can be made. If reasonably timely justice remains a goal of our public court system, judges of our court hearing civil matters lack the resources to spend much time on other civil matters, especially the unreasonably high number of process-related interlocutory motions which infest our civil court system.

III. Combined Air: The Purpose and Place of Summary Judgment Motions

[22] To achieve this goal, the court must manage the civil litigation before it to ensure that summary judgment motions do not stray beyond their proper place in the adjudication of disputes. What is that proper place? Under our Rules of Civil Procedure several methods exist to secure a disposition of a case on the merits: (i) the determination of a question of law raised by a pleading (rule 21.01(1)(a)); (ii) stating a special case (Rule 22); (iii) judgment pursuant to an application; (iv) the grant of full summary judgment (Rule 20); and (v) a trial. For most actions where material facts are in dispute, the options for a final determination on the merits boil down to a choice between a summary judgment motion and a trial.

[23] In its Combined Air decision, the Court of Appeal provided extensive guidance about the purpose of summary judgment motions and the circumstances in which they are appropriate. The Court of Appeal observed that while the 2010 amendments to Rule 20 were meant to introduce significant changes in the manner in which summary judgment motions are to be decided, [^11] the purpose of the new rule was to eliminate unnecessary trials, not to eliminate all trials. [^12] The guiding consideration must be whether the summary judgment process, in the circumstances of a given case, will provide an appropriate means for effecting a fair and just resolution of the dispute before the court. [^13] The appropriateness of a summary judgment motion for the final determination of a claim on its merits, instead of proceeding to trial, depends on the nature of the issues posed and the evidence led by the parties:

In some cases, it is safe to determine the matter on a motion for summary judgment because the motion record is sufficient to ensure that a just result can be achieved without the need for a full trial. In other cases, the record will not be adequate for this purpose, nor can it be made so regardless of the specific tools that are now available to the motion judge. In such cases, a just result can only be achieved through the trial process. This pivotal determination must be made on a case-by-case basis. [^14]

[24] As the Court of Appeal noted, generally speaking there are three types of cases amenable to summary judgment: (i) cases where the parties agree that it is appropriate to determine an action by way of a motion for summary judgment; (ii) cases where the claims or defences can be shown to be without merit in the sense that they have no chance of success; and (iii) cases where the trial process is not required in the "interest of justice" to perform a final adjudication on the merits. [^15] In deciding if the powers under rule 20.04(2.1) should be used to weed out a claim as having no chance of success or be used to resolve all or part of an action, the motion judge must ask the following question: can the full appreciation of the evidence and issues that is required to make dispositive findings be achieved by way of summary judgment, or can this full appreciation only be achieved by way of a trial? [^16]

[25] The Court of Appeal stated that it is not necessary for a motion judge to try to categorize the type of case in question -- the second and third classes of cases described above are not to be viewed as discrete compartments. The important element of the analysis under the amended Rule 20 is that before using the powers in rule 20.04(2.1), the motion judge must apply the full appreciation test in order to be satisfied that the interest of justice does not require that these powers be exercised only at a trial. [^17]

[26] The full appreciation test requires motion judges to do more than simply assess if they are capable of reading and interpreting all of the evidence that has been put before them; a motion judge is required to assess whether the attributes of the trial process are necessary to enable him or her to fully appreciate the evidence and the issues posed by the case. In making this determination, the motion judge is to consider, for example, whether he or she can accurately weigh and draw inferences from the evidence without the benefit of the trial narrative, without the ability to hear the witnesses speak in their own words and without the assistance of counsel as the judge examines the record in chambers. [^18] Unless the full appreciation of the evidence and issues that is required to make dispositive findings is attainable on the motion record -- as may be supplemented by the presentation of oral evidence under rule 20.04(2.2) -- the judge cannot be "satisfied" that the issues are appropriately resolved on a motion for summary judgment. [^19]

[27] The Court of Appeal provided guidance -- although they stressed it was not exhaustive guidance -- on the types of cases which would, and would not, be appropriate for a summary judgment motion: (i) summary judgment usually is not appropriate in cases calling for multiple findings of fact on the basis of conflicting evidence emanating from a number of witnesses and found in a voluminous record. Hallmarks of the type of actions in which, generally speaking, the full appreciation of the evidence and issues can only be achieved at trial include (i) a voluminous motion record; (ii) evidence from a large number of witnesses; (iii) multiple defendants against whom different theories of liability are advanced; (iv) the need to make numerous findings of fact to decide the motion; (v) conflicting evidence on key issues requiring credibility determinations; and/or (vi) the absence of reliable documentary yardsticks against which to assess credibility; [^20] (ii) by contrast, summary judgment might be appropriate in (i) document-driven cases with limited testimonial evidence, (ii) cases with limited contentious factual issues; (iii) cases where the record can be supplemented to the requisite degree at the motion judge's direction by hearing oral evidence on discrete issues; [^21] (iv) the presence of limited and uncontentious documentary evidence; (v) a limited number of witnesses; and/or (vi) where no dispute exists about the governing legal principles. [^22]

[28] One cannot stress enough the passage in the Combined Air decision in which the Court of Appeal reminded the bar of their obligation to apply their professional judgment in advising their clients about when it would be appropriate to bring a motion for summary judgment:

It is important to underscore the obligation that rests on members of the bar in formulating an appropriate litigation strategy. [^23]

[29] A motion for summary judgment under Rule 20 is not intended to perform the same function as the device of the summary trial available under the British Columbia and Alberta rules of practice. What was called a Rule 18A summary trial in British Columbia (now Rule 9-7) afforded parties, under certain circumstances, the opportunity to conduct a trial using only a written record. [^24] Ontario's Rule 20 does not create an alternative mode of trial; it provides a mechanism by which an action may be disposed of on the merits without proceeding to a trial. Since the enactment of the 2010 amendments to Rule 20, parties, especially in more complex cases, often seem to ignore this important distinction between a summary judgment motion and a summary trial. That parties increasingly are looking for ways to avoid the costs of a "conventional" trial is quite understandable. As I will discuss below, new, creative approaches to modes of trial are necessary. But trying to push the square peg of a Rule 20 motion into the round hole of a trial is not the way to go about securing a less costly trial. Often the result is quite the opposite -- increased overall costs of the action.

IV. Trials as an Alternative to Summary Judgment Motions

A. Why are there not more trials?

[30] In light of the clear and detailed guidance given by the Court of Appeal in Combined Air about when it would be appropriate to bring a motion for summary judgment, why do counsel still attempt to bring summary judgment motions in inappropriate cases instead of proceeding to trial? Why does there continue to exist a "motions culture" in the Toronto Region -- which I again observed during my stints in civil Motions Scheduling Court this past summer -- which sees counsel preferring to wait nine months for a hearing date for a complex (i.e., full day) summary judgment motion instead of accepting a trial date three months hence? A summary judgment motion may result in the grant of full summary judgment, or it may not. By contrast, a trial will always result in a final determination on the merits. From the perspective of the allocation of scarce judicial resources, the trial exerts a strong attraction because the amount of judicial time devoted to hearing a trial always will result in a final determination on the merits, whereas devoting an equal amount of time to dealing with a complex summary judgment motion may or may not result in a final adjudication. In a time of constrained judicial resources, it should not surprise the Bar or litigants that judges prefer devoting time to achieving a final determination of a case than to dealing with a series of indeterminate, interlocutory motions, including summary judgment motions.

[31] Yet the bar, at least the Toronto Region bar, does not appear to share that perspective. From my observation, two reasons seem to influence the local bar's preference for summary judgment motions over trials. The first reason stems from a lack of experience and familiarity with civil trials, particularly amongst members of the bar who have practised for less than 15 years. In a sense, they have not tasted the trial process, which brings to mind the insights provided by an iconic story about the reluctance to taste something unknown.

[32] Recall the Dr. Seuss story of the efforts by Sam-I-am to persuade a skeptical interlocutor about the merits of green eggs and ham. Sam-I-am asked: "Do you like green eggs and ham?" [^25] To which the curmudgeonly interlocutor responded:

I do not like them,

Sam-I-am.

I do not like

Green eggs and ham. Persistent efforts by Sam-I-am to persuade the other of the fine merits of green eggs and ham culminated in his final exhortation to the interlocutor:

You do not like them.

So you say.

Try them! Try them!

And you may.

Try them and you may, I say. In the face of such repeated attempts at suasion, our interlocutor finally breaks down and says:

Sam!

If you will let me be,

I will try them

You will see. With a doubting look our interlocutor eyes, then tries, the proffered green eggs and ham. We all know the results of his taste-testing:

Say!

I like green eggs and ham!

I do! I like them, Sam-I-am! Our interlocutor then expounds at length on his new-found love for that which he previously shunned.

[33] Are civil trials the legal equivalent of green eggs and ham? Is Green Eggs and Ham an allegory in which Sam-I-am represents the bench, and the interlocutor the bar? I will leave the finer points of literary analysis to the critics, but the story does bear a striking resemblance to the ongoing dialogue between bench and bar regarding the respective merits of civil trials and motions.

B. "Conventional" and "non-conventional" trials

[34] So how can the court entice litigants and the Bar to taste the benefits of the trial and eschew the indeterminancy, delays and costs of motions, including complex summary judgment motions? That brings me to the second reason which appears to incline counsel to prefer giving summary judgment "a shot" over proceeding to trial -- the fear that a "conventional trial" is cost-prohibitive while summary judgment offers a cheaper alternative, albeit one with no guarantee of resulting in a final determination on the merits.

[35] The renewed interest in summary judgment motions has deflected attention from a more important task -- rethinking the civil trial, especially the judge-alone civil trial. While a school of thought (and practice) still exists that a civil trial is only a real civil trial if viva voce evidence reigns supreme from beginning to end, civil trials are capable of adapting (and indeed must adapt) to new ways of adjudicating cases. May I repeat what I wrote a few months ago in 1318214 Ontario Ltd. v. Sobeys Capital Inc.:

Counsel should no longer think of a trial as a "one size fits all" procedure. Our Court is open to creative ways to structure and conduct trials, including using hybrid written and viva voce records. Often the use of creative ways to present the evidence and argument at trial goes a long way towards addressing the concerns of litigants about the costs involved in going to trial. [^26] More recently, in my costs decision in D'Addario v. EnGlobe Corp., I wrote:

In my view the days of the so-called "conventional trial" in civil cases which uses only viva voce evidence must be put behind us. In a very real and pressing sense, if our courts do not discard the "conventional trial" as the norm in civil cases in favour of more creative and efficient modes of trial, public civil litigation in this province will atrophy. Our court lacks the resources to conduct each civil trial in a "conventional" fashion; they take too much time. In many cases, such as the present one, much of the factual evidence can be placed before the court in written form, whether by way of agreed statements of fact, affidavits of witnesses or out-of-court examinations of those witnesses. Any viva voce evidence at the trial should focus on enabling the trial judge to understand and decide credibility issues, including material disputed facts. [^27]

[36] Where the nature of the issues and the quality of the evidentiary record in a case do not permit a motion judge to gain a "full appreciation" of the issues in dispute, the result need not be propelling parties towards a costly, full-blown conventional viva voce trial. Creative, and less costly, alternatives do exist. The 2010 amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure made available to judges and counsel alike a big box of LEGO-like building blocks with which they can construct a wide variety of modes of trial: witnesses testifying by viva voce evidence; witnesses testifying, in whole or in part, by affidavit; using pre-hearing affidavits and cross-examinations as examinations for discovery; using pre-hearing affidavits as part of the trial evidence-in-chief of a witness and pre-hearing transcripts as part of the trial cross-examination of a witness; [^28] placing time limits on examinations at trial; using written opening statements; pre-trial hot-tubbing by experts; and filing an agreed statement of facts. [^29] The range of alternatives is not limited by the specific examples identified in the Rules because a judge "may give such directions or impose such terms as are just" in respect of the trial [^30] and make such order as the judge "considers necessary or advisable with respect to the conduct of the proceeding". [^31]

[37] Under our Rules, the "conventional trial" no longer exists as a norm; the Rules have made the civil trial modular in nature, with counsel and the judge able to fashion trials tailor-made to the circumstances of each particular case. Our court must use these trial building blocks to offer litigants creative, cost-attractive trial options if we stand any hope of limiting complex summary judgment motions to the role defined for them by the Court of Appeal in the Combined Air decision and preserving the role of the public courts as the primary adjudicators of civil cases.

V. How to Deal with Issues Regarding the Appropriateness of Summary Judgment Motions?

[38] Let me summarize my analysis to this point. The Combined Air decision described the purpose and place of summary judgment motions in the civil litigation process and stated that parties should have the means to raise concerns about premature and inappropriate summary judgment motions. Given the existing constraints on the judicial resources of our court, I suggested that any such concerns about summary judgment motions on the Toronto Region Commercial List should not be raised by way of motion, but through the Commercial List case-conference/ case-management process. In dealing with concerns through case management, judges of the Commercial List can draw on their broad inherent powers to manage the court process, including the proposed summary judgment motion, and they can offer litigants creative alternatives to the "conventional trial".

[39] Before considering such a case-management approach in more detail, let me first turn to consider the approaches taken to date by our court when faced with motions to strike out or stay other motions, including summary judgment motions.

A. The jurisprudence on motions to strike/stay other motions

A.1 The pre-Combined Air jurisprudence

[40] Much of the pre-Combined Air jurisprudence on motions to strike was summarized by Cullity J. in his decision in Millgate Financial Corp. v. BF Realty Holdings Ltd., [^32] where he considered a motion brought to stay motions for summary judgment as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of process. Drawing on the jurisprudence up until that point of time, Cullity J. concluded that he should apply a form of abuse of process analysis [at paras. 12-14]:

The Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for motions to strike notices of motion and I believe that the interests of efficiency and finality provide good reasons for this. There is no close analogy between a motion to strike pleadings in an action and a motion to strike another motion that would require the issues raised in the former to be determined. It was, however, common ground among counsel that there must be such a jurisdiction to deal with clear cases of abuse of process.

This was the view of Molloy J. in Meditrust Healthcare Inc. v. Shoppers Drugmart, [2000] O.J. No. 3762 (S.C.J.) and of Steele J. in Iona Corporation v. Town of Aurora (1991), 1991 CanLII 7278 (ON SC), 3 O.R. (3d) 579 (G.D.). In the former, the learned judge said:

I accept that the court has jurisdiction to dismiss (or perhaps, more correctly, quash) any motion that is improperly brought, including in appropriate circumstances, because it constitutes an abuse of process. For example, where a motion is brought prematurely, or is brought in the wrong court or under a Rule which has no application, it may well be appropriate to determine that issue as a preliminary matter without examining the merits of the motion itself . . . . The only case on point, as far as counsel could determine, is the decision of Steele J. in Iona Corporation v. Corporation of the Town of Aurora . . . In that case, the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's summary judgment motion. Steele J. held at p. 580:

"I am of the opinion that I do not have the power under rule 20.01 to dismiss a motion for summary judgment at this stage, unless I find the plaintiff's motion is an abuse of process."

In consequence, I believe I should deal with these motions on the basis that whether they succeed or fail will depend upon whether the grounds on which the defendants rely require the motions for summary judgment to be quashed as an abuse of process. In Canam Enterprises Inc. v. Coles (2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 481 (C.A.), Finlayson J.A. stated:

"Abuse of process is a discretionary principle that is not limited by any set number of categories. It is an intangible principle that is used to bar proceedings that are inconsistent with the objectives of public policy. The doctrine can be relied upon by persons who were not parties to the previous litigation but who claim that if they were going to be sued they should have been sued in the previous litigation."

[41] In Millgate, Cullity J. concluded that the motions for summary judgment did not constitute abuses of process, and he concurred with the view expressed by Molloy J. in the Meditrust Healthcare decision that a court should resist being sucked into ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence of a party bringing a motion for summary judgment in advance of the hearing of the motion through a preliminary motion to quash. [^33]

[42] In a 2009 decision in Oz Optics Ltd. v. American Home Insurance Co., [^34] Power J. struck out a motion for summary judgment brought by the defendant less than two months before the scheduled trial date. The court concluded that the motion for summary judgment was "a bad faith motion . . . made for tactical reasons" [at para. 39-40]: [^35]

Obviously, it is up to the trial judge to determine how she or he will conduct the trial. However, it is clear to me that the defendants' motion for an adjournment and for summary judgment is an abuse of process and that the motion for summary judgment, in all the circumstances, is a bad faith attempt to buttress the request for an adjournment of the trial.

In these circumstances, the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendants' motion is, in my opinion, the appropriate remedy[.]

[43] A year later, in Valemont Group Ltd. v. Philmor Goldplate Homes Inc., [^36] Karakatsanis J., as she then was, refused to strike a motion for summary judgment as an abuse of process, observing that the "mere bringing of a motion when a trial is pending is not itself an abuse of process". [^37] In that case, the motion for summary judgment was scheduled to be heard a full year before the fixed trial date.

A.2 Post-Combined Air jurisprudence

[44] Counsel brought to my attention two post-Combined Air decisions on motions to strike out summary judgment motions. In an unreported handwritten endorsement, Perell J. opined that in Combined Air the Court of Appeal "intended motions for directions for cases where the action had not proceeded to discoveries and it was therefore arguable that a motion for a summary judgment would be premature. The case at bar is post the discovery stage, and there should be no additional hurdle in the way of the summary judgment motion." [^38] Perell J. set one day for the argument of the summary judgment motion, but his endorsement did not describe the issues in play or the complexity of the proposed motion record.

[45] More recently, in Ghaffari v. Asiyaban, [^39] J.E. Ferguson J. dismissed a motion to stay a summary judgment motion on the ground it was premature and inappropriate. The summary judgment motion was brought prior to examinations for discovery and involved the single issue of when the plaintiff had discovered her cause of action. In the course of her decision, J.E. Ferguson J. applied the following approach to the motion to stay:

I agree with the defence submissions as to the test a party must meet in order to obtain a stay (I was told that there is no case law yet on the point) which is as follows:

(i) the court should look at the motion for summary judgment and the reasonable chances of success in determining whether a stay is appropriate. The party seeking the stay should put their best foot forward as they would on a motion for summary judgment to say there is a genuine issue requiring a trial or why the matter is too complicated for the motion judge to ascertain the full appreciation of the case;

(ii) the court then ought to determine whether the matter is complicated; what are the issues; the nature of the evidence and law to determine the issues; and whether the case can be determined without the necessity of a full trial; and

(iii) only in the clearest of cases should the court impose a stay. [^40]

B. A case-management approach to dealing with concerns about lengthy, complex summary judgment motions brought on the Commercial List

[46] What, then, should a case-management approach to addressing concerns about pending or proposed summary judgment motions look like? Let me first offer a few comments on what it should not look like.

B.1 What a case-management approach should not look like

[47] First, I do not read Combined Air as encouraging the development of a "motions to strike out" cottage industry around Rule 20. That some procedural device should exist to deal with patently premature or inappropriate motions for summary judgment does not mean that motions to strike should now form "step one" in most summary judgment motions. Nor does our court possess sufficient judicial bodies to devote significant amounts of case-management time to all summary judgment motions. Only if the proposed summary judgment motion likely will consume significant court time, say one day or more of hearing time, does it make some sense to dedicate judicial time to deal with concerns about the appropriateness of a summary judgment motion. If our court possessed the resources to move towards a docket-like system such as exists in the United States federal court system, then universal case- management would be possible, but we do not have such resources, so we must be more selective in our case-management approach.

[48] Second, I agree whole-heartedly with the views expressed by Cullity J. and Malloy J. in the Millgate Financial and Meditrust Healthcare decisions that any review of the appropriateness of a pending summary judgment motion should not require a court to engage in a detailed review of the merits of the proposed motion. A court should only have to review the merits of a matter once; to require a motion judge hearing a motion to strike out a summary judgment motion (or case- managing concerns about a summary judgment motion) to dive into the merits of the motion and, if the motion is not strike out, then to require another judge to consider the merits of the summary judgment motion on the motion proper would result in an utter waste of scarce judicial resources.

[49] Third, I part company with the abuse of process approach adopted by the courts in the Millgate Financial and Meditrust Health cases because the introduction of the principle of proportionality in the Rules of Civil Procedure in 2010, when coupled with the direction of the Court of Appeal in Combined Air that the appropriateness of summary judgment motions falls to be decided under a combination of rules 1.04(1), (1.1), (2) and 1.05, signals that a more proportionality-oriented, case- management approach should be applied to issues of the appropriateness or prematurity of summary judgment motions. The analysis in Combined Air points a motions court more to examining whether the proposed summary judgment motion is a good or appropriate candidate for a summary disposition because the "right fit" exists between, on the one hand, the nature of the issues raised on the motion and the quality of the record which the motion will generate and, on the other hand, the summary procedure available under Rule 20.

[50] Finally, I respectfully disagree with my learned colleague, Perell J., that a post-discovery review of the appropriateness of a motion for summary judgment is not available. A case-management approach to addressing concerns about the scheduling of a motion for summary judgment should be available following the close of discoveries. Issues of the proportionality of process exist equally post-discovery as they do pre-discovery.

B.2 What a case-management approach should look like

Timing and forum

[51] As already mentioned, while in Combined Air the Court of Appeal referred to the possibility of bringing a "motion for directions" to deal with inappropriate or premature summary judgment motions, the scheduling practices of the Toronto Region Commercial List make the most appropriate mechanism for considering the appropriateness of setting a date for a summary judgment motion the 9:30 appointment or, perhaps more realistically, a slightly longer case conference, rather than a formal motion. Any dispute over the scheduling of a summary judgment motion involves, at its heart, the need to make directions about how scarce judicial resources should best be allocated to bring the adjudication of the parties' dispute on the merits closer to reality. Those directions, in the Toronto Region Commercial List practice, occur through the 9:30 appointment/case-conference mechanisms.

[52] Consequently, litigants on the Toronto Region Commercial List should not bring motions to strike summary judgment motions unless, in the circumstances, the case-management judge thinks leave to bring such a motion should be granted. Concerns about the appropriateness of any summary judgment motion should be addressed at a 9:30 appointment or at a 30 to 60-minute case conference when the moving party seeks to schedule a summary judgment motion which will require a full day or more of hearing time. Quite frankly, once counsel ask for more than three hours of hearing time for a Rule 20 motion, I begin to wonder where the "summary" is in the proposed "summary judgment" motion. Setting the line for case management at proposed motions of a full day or more initially may strike the right balance because a request for that amount of hearing time signals that the issues in the case, whether factual, legal or both, are moving towards the "complex" end of the spectrum, and the need for proportionality-oriented case management therefore arises.

Case managing pre-discovery requests for summary judgment hearing dates

[53] Where a judge faces a request to schedule a lengthy summary judgment motion before the parties have embarked upon or completed discoveries, factors to take into account would include (i) the nature and complexity of the issues raised in the action; (ii) the extent of the record the parties are likely to develop if a summary judgment motion proceeds prior to the completion of productions and discoveries; (iii) whether a record so built through a summary judgment motion will offer a less complete picture of the case than the responding party could present at trial and, if it would, in what respects; (iv) would the responding party to the summary judgment motion enjoy the equivalent access to key documents as would exist through the documentary discovery process? (v) would the responding party be able to examine the representative of the party which it would have selected for purposes of examination for discovery? (vi) whether the most efficient means of developing a record capable of satisfying the full appreciation test given the nature and complexity of the issues in play is to proceed through the normal route of discovery; and (vii) whether the most efficient means of satisfying the full appreciation test would be to develop a modified discovery plan, incorporating elements of traditional discovery and the preparation of a summary judgment record, with a view to proceeding to a non-conventional trial which would ensure the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of the case on its merits.

[54] In Combined Air, the Court of Appeal identified the concerns involved with summary judgment motions brought before the parties have exercised their production and discovery rights:

It will not be in the interest of justice to exercise rule 20.04(2.1) powers in cases where the nature and complexity of the issues demand that the normal process of production of documents and oral discovery be completed before a party is required to respond to a summary judgment motion. In such a case, forcing a responding party to build a record through affidavits and cross-examinations will only anticipate and replicate what should happen in a more orderly and efficient way through the usual discovery process.

Moreover, the record built through affidavits and cross- examinations at an early stage may offer a less complete picture of the case than the responding party could present at trial. As we point out below . . . counsel have an obligation to ensure that they are adopting an appropriate litigation strategy. A party faced with a premature or inappropriate summary judgment motion should have the option of moving to stay or dismiss the motion where the most efficient means of developing a record capable of satisfying the full appreciation test is to proceed through the normal route of discovery[.] [^41]

[55] Accordingly, where a judge faces a request to schedule a lengthy summary judgment motion before the parties have embarked upon or completed discoveries, factors to take into account would include (i) the nature and complexity of the issues raised in the action; (ii) the extent of the record the parties are likely to develop if a summary judgment motion proceeds prior to the completion of productions and discoveries; (iii) whether a record so built through a summary judgment motion will offer a less complete picture of the case than the responding party could present at trial and, if it would, in what respects; (iv) would the responding party to the summary judgment motion enjoy the equivalent access to key documents as would exist through the documentary discovery process? (v) would the responding party be able to examine the representative of the party which it would have selected for purposes of examination for discovery? (vi) whether the most efficient means of developing a record capable of satisfying the full appreciation test given the nature and complexity of the issues in play is to proceed through the normal route of discovery; and (vii) whether the most efficient means of satisfying the full appreciation test would be to develop a modified discovery plan, incorporating elements of traditional discovery and the preparation of a summary judgment record, with a view to proceeding to a non-conventional trial which would ensure the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of the case on its merits.

Case managing post-discovery requests for summary judgment hearing dates

[56] Where a request is made to schedule a lengthy summary judgment motion following the completion of the production and discovery process concerns about the appropriateness of such a motion relate not so much to the quality of the record developed in light of the nature and complexity of the issues -- the parties will have availed themselves of the discovery rights accorded by the Rules -- but (i) to whether any "upside" exists to spending client money and judicial time conducting a motion-based review of a case's merits when the parties can set the action down for and proceed to trial; and (ii) to whether the summary judgment process, in the circumstances of the case, will provide an appropriate means for effecting a fair and just resolution of the dispute [^42] by allowing the trier of fact to gain a full appreciation of the issues before the court. Put another way, the focus of the case-management analysis should be on (i) whether the proposed summary judgment motion will assist the efficient resolution of the proceeding or (ii) whether the issues raised by the action are suitable for disposition by way of a summary judgment motion. [^43] As I wrote in an earlier endorsement in the 1318214 Ontario Ltd. v. Sobeys Capital Inc. [^44] proceeding [at para. 14]:

. . . I think that on an attendance to schedule a lengthy Post-Discovery summary motion the ultimate question is whether the interest of justice is best served by scheduling such a motion or by requiring, instead, that the parties proceed to trial.

[57] Such a case-management analysis cannot occur in a vacuum. The parties must file information which will assist the court in performing this case-management analysis. For example:

Where one party wishes to bring a one day or longer Post- Discovery summary judgment motion and the other party opposes arguing, instead, that the court should set a trial date, in my view both parties should file on the scheduling appointment -- a 9:30 appointment or short case conference -- detailed, focused and reasoned (i.e. not speculative) information which will allow the court to answer the following questions:

(i) What will the proposed summary judgment motion look like?

(ii) What will the proposed trial look like?

(iii) If full or partial summary judgment were granted, what amount of pre-trial preparation and trial time would be saved? [^45]

[58] Schedule "A" to these reasons details the type of information a court could require from the parties in order to conduct the sort of cost/benefit analysis involved in requests to schedule lengthy summary judgment motions following the completion of discoveries.

[59] If the type of issues raised (complex) and the nature of record (many witnesses, material disputed facts, credibility) clearly make the case an inappropriate candidate for summary judgment, then [the] court should not schedule the proposed summary judgment motion and, instead, in consultation with parties, the court should issue directions for managing the case to a final determination on the merits in [a] more appropriate, proportionate way. If in light of nature of issues raised and the nature of record it is unclear whether a summary judgment motion would be appropriate, it would be open to the court to permit the development of a summary judgment motion record, on terms, but require periodic reporting from the parties. As the record develops, it may become apparent that a summary judgment motion would not be appropriate. The case- management judge and the parties would then need to work on crafting an appropriate mode for trial which makes use of the work product generated for the intended summary judgment. Finally, other cases will bear those hallmarks identified by the Court of Appeal in Combined Air which make it an appropriate candidate for a summary judgment motion: whether the motion succeeds is quite another matter.

[60] Does this proportionality-oriented case-management approach to more lengthy, complex proposed pre- and post- discovery summary judgment motions mean that in some cases a court may decline to schedule a summary judgment motion? Yes. The express powers of judges under the Rules to make proportional orders and their inherent powers to case-manage litigation, exercised in a time of scarce judicial resources, permit such a result if the court concludes that the proposed motion does not fall into the category of appropriate candidates identified by the Court of Appeal in Combined Air and the scheduling of the proposed summary judgment motion would not meet the principles set out in rule 1.04(1) and (1.2).

[61] Let me now apply those case-management principles to the two motions to strike out which were argued before me.

PART II: THE GEORGE WESTON LIMITED V. DOMTAR INC. ACTION

VI. Overview of the Action

A. Ripeness of the action

[62] The George Weston v. Domtar action is an old one which has not proceeded with appropriate dispatch. Commenced over five years ago on June 12, 2007, this action has not yet proceeded to trial. In fact, it has not even proceeded to examinations for discovery. Instead, just over a year ago the plaintiff, George Weston Limited, served a motion for summary judgment. Both parties have delivered their affidavits for the summary judgment motion, but cross-examinations have not commenced. On February 6 of this year, the defendant, Domtar Inc., took the position that the nature of the dispute made a motion for summary judgment inappropriate, so it brought a motion to strike out Weston's motion for summary judgment. So here the parties sit, almost precisely five years after the start of this action, fighting over whether a motion can or cannot be brought; a final adjudication of their dispute on the merits appears to remain well over the horizon.

B. Nature of the dispute

[63] Weston sues Domtar for $110 million alleging entitlement to that amount pursuant to the terms of a price adjustment clause contained in a June 16, 1998 share purchase agreement ("SPA") under which Weston sold Domtar its shareholdings in E.B. Eddy Ltd. for a combination of cash and Domtar shares. Section 2.3 of that SPA contained a purchase price adjustment clause which provided that in the event a person acquired more than 50 per cent of the outstanding voting shares of Domtar, the consideration payable by Domtar for Weston's shares in Eddy would increase by stipulated amounts.

[64] In March 2007, Domtar acquired the fine paper business of Weyerhauser Company through back-to-back transactions carried out by way of a plan of arrangement. Weston contends that the Weyerhauser arrangement, in particular its treatment of the Domtar shares, triggered Domtar's obligation to pay the purchase price adjustment under s. 2.3 of the SPA. Domtar disagrees, arguing that the arrangement fell within exclusions contained in s. 2.3.

C. Procedural history

[65] Weston has not prosecuted this action with diligence. Pleadings were closed in September 2007. Weston waited almost 18 months before serving its affidavit of documents in May 2009 and sought to examine Domtar. The defendant served its affidavit of documents in August 2009 and sought to examine Mr. Stewart Green, the person at Weston whom it viewed as playing the principal role in negotiating the SPA.

[66] Nothing more happened until March 2011, when Weston served its summary judgment motion record. Between March 2011 and February of this year, the parties served their respective records for the summary judgment motion. Cross-examinations have not commenced.

[67] In a February 6, 2012 e-mail, Domtar's counsel advised Weston:

[W]e are now of the view that this case is not suitable for summary judgment motion. It is complex with multiple factual and legal issues including credibility issues. Frankly even if neither of us objected very much I doubt any judge would agree to hear it. Thus came about this motion to strike.

D. Positions of the parties

[68] Domtar submitted that Weston's motion for summary judgment was not appropriate in light of (i) the volume of the evidence and the complexity of the contractual interpretation issues; (ii) the existence of material disputed facts regarding the factual matrix from which the SPA emerged; (iii) the need to examine for discovery a representative of Weston, Mr. Green, whom Domtar had sought to discover, but who did not file an affidavit on the summary judgment motion; and (iv) the existence of expert evidence on the motion. Alternatively, Domtar contended that the summary judgment motion should be stayed until examinations for discovery had been conducted.

[69] Not surprisingly, Weston sees matters differently, describing its action as "the quintessential case for summary judgment". Pointing to a recent decision of this court in Fairview Donut Inc. v. The TDL Group Corp., [^46] Weston argued that complex document cases are well-suited to summary judgment motions. Although Weston acknowledged that certain factual disputes existed on the record, it contended that the disputed evidence would be inadmissible in any event. Weston argued that it was open to Domtar to examine Mr. Green pursuant to rule 39.03 as a witness on a pending motion.

VII. Analysis of the Relevant Factors

A. The significance of the procedural history of the summary judgment motion

[70] This case involves a "transitional" summary judgment motion -- i.e., one which was started, but not completed, before the release of the Combined Air decision. Domtar initially consented on several occasions to the scheduling of Weston's summary judgment motion. Weston served its motion on March 31, 2011. That led to an attendance by the parties before Cumming J. on May 27, 2011. A consent order emanated from that attendance under which the parties agreed to a timetable for the preparation of the record for the summary judgment motion, including cross-examinations, and in which Cumming J. ordered that the summary judgment motion be heard in February 2012.

[71] Certain delays ensued which led the parties to attend before Wilton-Siegal J. on September 27, 2011, at which time they consented to an order amending the timetable for the summary judgment motion which would see the argument of the motion soon after May 18, 2012.

[72] On November 30, 2011, Domtar delivered its responding motion record for the summary judgment motion. Weston delivered its reply record on January 12, 2012. As noted, on February 6 Domtar took the position, for the first time, that the summary judgment motion was inappropriate, yet it served sur-reply materials on February 29, 2012.

[73] In sum, Domtar now seeks to strike out a summary judgment motion which previously it had agreed could be heard in accordance with a consent timetable and in respect of which both parties obviously have spent a lot of time and money in preparing their respective records. Weston's motion record runs to 776 pages; Domtar's responding record totals 1,313 pages; Weston's reply record stands at 31 pages; and Domtar filed a 12-page supplementary responding record.

[74] The time for objecting to the hearing of a summary judgment motion as inappropriate is when the moving party first proposes to bring the motion -- i.e., before time and money is spent on developing a record. By that time, the pleadings will have framed the issues in dispute, and it should be apparent from the pleadings which issues are in dispute and those which are not. It follows that by the close of pleadings, both parties should possess some idea about the material facts which are in dispute -- for that is the purpose of pleadings -- and the type and amount of evidence which they will have to file at trial to support their respective cases (apart from admissions from the other side which they might obtain on examinations for discovery). If one party proposes to bring a summary judgment motion before discoveries have commenced, then the other should raise any concerns about the appropriateness of a summary judgment motion in light of the issues framed by the pleadings when the moving party seeks to schedule its motion and before money is spent preparing a summary judgment record, not 11 months after the fact, following the expenditure of money on preparing the evidentiary record.

[75] One cannot ignore, however, the distinctive timing feature of this case -- Domtar consented to the hearing schedule before the Court of Appeal had released its decision in Combined Air. Although parties should be held to the procedural bargains which they have struck, at the same time it would be fair to say that the notion of bringing a motion to strike or stay summary judgment motions was not commonplace before Combined Air was released. However, as a result of the consent timetable for the summary judgment motion both parties in this action have expended time and money in preparing their motion records. That expenditure of money should not go to waste.

B. The nature of the claim and its quantum

[76] Weston estimated that its summary judgment motion would require two days to argue; Domtar contended that three to four days was a more realistic estimate.

[77] From the materials filed, I have very strong reservations about whether Weston's motion is an appropriate candidate for summary judgment. First, Weston's action and motion engage important issues of contractual interpretation which bear very significant financial consequences. If the court accepts Weston's claim, then damages indeed will amount to $110 million by virtue of the terms of the SPA. Given such stakes, the court deciding the merits of Weston's claim will want to have the fullest appreciation of all factual and legal issues before making its decision. I question whether a summary proceeding under Rule 20 brought prior to examinations for discovery is a proportionate mechanism to adjudicate the claims asserted by Weston. Further, s. 2.3 of the SPA is a complex price adjustment clause and, from the factums filed by the parties, it certainly appears that its application to the Weyerhauser arrangement will require some intricate contractual interpretation.

C. Disputed facts and issues of admissibility

[78] Second, the summary judgment motion record compiled to date disclosed disputes on the evidence about what arguably might constitute material facts concerning the "factual matrix" in which the SPA was negotiated. Weston's initial motion record contained only one affidavit which, in turn, appended a handful of key documents. The affiant, Mr. Robert Balcom, provided a brief history of the SPA transaction (although he had had no direct involvement in negotiating or drafting the SPA), but he spent most of his affidavit explaining why Weston thought the Weyerhauser arrangement triggered the price adjustment clause.

[79] Domtar filed a three-volume responding record which contained four affidavits, two of which were from participants in the SPA negotiations who dealt at length with the "factual matrix" leading up to the execution of that agreement, including evidence of the parties' understanding of the business purpose of certain terms, including the purchase price adjustment clause. Domtar also filed two expert reports. The report from Morrison Park Advisors provided expert evidence on the benefits and risks of the exchangeable debenture structure used by Weston as part of the SPA transaction, as well as expert evidence designed to show that the structure used for the Weyerhauser arrangement did not trigger the price adjustment clause under the SPA. An expert report from Duff & Phelps Canada Limited addressed the issue of the economic equivalency of one exchangeable share of Domtar Canada Paper Inc. to one common share of Domtar Corporation in the Weyerhauser arrangement.

[80] In reply, Weston filed an affidavit from Mr. Bradley Holland, who had participated in the negotiations for the SPA. Mr. Holland disputed assertions made by the two Domtar witnesses about the business understanding surrounding certain terms of the SPA, including the purpose of the purchase price adjustment clause. A second affidavit contained expert evidence focusing on one element of the issue about whether the structure of the Weyerhauser arrangement would have triggered the purchase price adjustment clause.

[81] Finally, Domtar filed two further affidavits, both of which provided additional evidence about the circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the SPA, and both of which disputed certain evidence given by Mr. Holland, Weston's affiant.

[82] Weston took the position that the obvious factual disputes between its affiant and those of Domtar regarding the factual matrix were not relevant to the issue of contractual interpretation lying at the heart of its claim because evidence about the subjective intentions of the parties is not admissible to interpret a contract. [^47] Domtar responded that the disputed evidence went not to any issue of subjective intent designed to alter the words of the contract, but to the factual matrix or context informing the interpretation of the words agreed to by the parties, and Domtar argued that a consideration of the context in which the written agreement was made is an integral part of the process of interpreting a contract. [^48]

[83] Given that Weston's summary judgment motion will put in play a dispute about the admissibility of evidence and the contested evidence is characterized by material disputes, it is worth recalling the approach taken by the trial judge in Kentucky Fried Chicken of Canada, a Division of Pepsi-Cola Canada Ltd. v. Scott's Foods Services Inc. [^49] to the issue of the admissibility of extrinsic evidence on the issue of contractual interpretation. In that case, at the conclusion of opening statements the plaintiff moved to exclude as inadmissible any evidence of the negotiations leading up to the agreement in dispute and evidence of either party's subjective intention. The defendants opposed the motion on the grounds that it was premature, that the court should not determine the issue of parol evidence in a vacuum and, in any event, the law was in an unsatisfactory state and it was difficult to determine what evidence would be permissible as forming part of the "factual matrix". In the result, the trial judge reserved his decision until the end of trial because

. . . until I had heard all of the factual evidence I believed that it was premature to give a decision, even if I was so inclined, no matter how desirable it might have been to shorten the trial. There were no reported cases cited where blanket types of evidence were ruled out in advance. I stated that to rule on part only of the motion might create arguments during trial as to what was covered or not covered by my ruling. I stated that by reserving the decision, all of the evidence would be available for consideration by me at the end of the trial and, in the event that I should err in my conclusion, by an appellate court. The risk of an erroneous ruling on blanket areas of evidence is far greater than a ruling on an isolated question. The admission of evidence can create no harm. [^50]

[84] Such an approach affords the trier of fact the best opportunity to gain the fullest appreciation of the contested evidence and its relevance, if any, to the issues requiring adjudication. Yet, such an approach would be very difficult to employ on a summary judgment motion where disputes exist about which evidence goes to the "factual matrix" and the contested evidence itself is marked by disputed facts. Further, in the circumstances of this case, credibility findings would have to be made in the absence of an extensive documentary record which could act as a reliable yardstick to make such findings.

[85] Weston submitted that even if oral testimony was required to decide contested factual issues, the court could order, in advance of the motion hearing, that viva voce evidence be given on the summary judgment motion. As I read the Combined Air decision, making such an order in advance of the hearing is not an option available to a case-management or scheduling judge. The Court of Appeal stated:

[W]e stress that the power to direct the calling of oral evidence under rule 20.04(2.2) is not intended to permit the parties to supplement the motion record. Nor can the parties anticipate the motion judge directing the calling of oral evidence on the motion.

The latter point requires that we address a practice issue in the Toronto Region. As a case management matter, parties to a summary judgment motion in Toronto are required to complete a summary judgment form, which includes questions about whether the parties intend to call viva voce evidence on an issue in dispute, and estimating the time required for such evidence. Although no doubt well-intentioned, these questions are misplaced in that they create the misconception that a summary judgment motion is in fact a summary trial. [^51]

[86] Accordingly, in the present case it makes no sense, from a case-management perspective, to "park to one side" the issue of how the obvious factual disputes may or may not be handled at the hearing of the summary judgment motion and to permit the motion to proceed, undirected, with full knowledge that this issue must be addressed before a final determination on the merits can be made.

D. Use of expert evidence on a summary judgment motion

[87] Both parties filed evidence from expert witnesses directed toward aspects of the issue of whether the nature of the Weyerhauser arrangement did or did not trigger the price adjustment clause. Expert evidence operates to assist the trier of fact in understanding complex, technical issues, in this case issues relating to the financial aspects of the Weyerhauser arrangement. Judges often wish to ask experts questions about their evidence, both to gain a better understanding of the area of technical specialty in question as well as to understand how the expert applied his expertise to the particular facts of the case.

[88] I asked counsel how, on a Rule 20 motion using a written record, a judge would be able to ask questions of the three experts who had filed reports. It appeared that the parties had not turned their minds to that issue, although Weston's counsel submitted that a "mini-trial" could be held. I do not agree. If a "mini-trial" were directed for the expert evidence, why not use a "mini-trial" for the other contested evidence? At that point, the summary judgment motion would be slipping into a regular trial mode with a number of witnesses giving viva voce evidence.

[89] The simple reality is that usually if a case is sufficiently complex that its adjudication requires resorting to expert evidence, then that case most likely is not a good candidate for a summary judgment motion. There may be exceptions, such as where the expert evidence is uncontested, but that is not this case.

E. The lack of examinations for discovery

[90] Domtar submitted that prior to bringing its motion for summary judgment, Weston had agreed to produce Mr. Green for discovery. Weston did not include an affidavit from Mr. Green in its summary judgment records, and now takes the position that Domtar should examine Mr. Green as a witness on a pending motion under rule 39.03. Domtar argued that requiring it to examine under rule 39.03 would be unfair because Weston would enjoy rights to cross-examine Mr. Green on such an examination.

[91] I accept Domtar's submission that it should not be required to argue the case on its merits without first examining Mr. Green as a representative of the plaintiff on discovery. Weston had agreed to that arrangement before bringing its motion for summary judgment.

[92] Domtar also identified what it contended were several deficiencies in Weston's documentary productions and submitted that to date Weston had only produced 55 documents in respect of the issues in this action. Weston contended that Domtar had made no prior complaints about the adequacy of its productions, and therefore its present complaints should be viewed as nothing more than tactical positioning to avoid the summary judgment motion.

[93] I cannot assess the adequacy or inadequacy of productions on the record before me. Suffice it to say that any judge hearing this matter on the merits will want to be satisfied that each party has produced all relevant documents. That issue must be worked out before any adjudication on the merits takes place.

F. The complexity of the issues

[94] Weston pointed to the recent decision of Strathy J. in Fairview Donut Inc. v. The TDL Group Corp. as signalling that summary judgment motions are appropriate in complex cases. Any decision of a judge must be read with due regard to the case that was placed before him or her. Counsel should read with care the comments made by Strathy J. about the summary judgment motion aspect of that decision. He noted that (i) the case was "an exception" to the general practice of not permitting summary judgment motions before or at the time of certification and (ii) the summary judgment motion he heard was the product of an agreement between the parties. [^52] Strathy J. also had the following to say about the nature of the evidence in that case concerning the factual matrix:

I pause here to ask whether the resolution of the contractual interpretation issues requires the weighing of evidence, evaluation of credibility or the drawing of inferences and, if so, whether a full appreciation of the evidence and issues can only be achieved by a trial. In my view, the resolution of the issue does not require this kind of fact-finding or the exercise of the court's powers under Rule 20.04(2.1). The plaintiffs' arguments turn almost entirely on the interpretation of the franchise agreements and the evidence concerning the factual matrix underlying the contracts -- the contractual history between the parties -- is not contentious and is primarily documentary. [^53]

[95] The circumstances of the present case differ from those in Fairview Donut; here, clear factual disputes exist regarding the factual matrix and they are overlain with the issue of the admissibility of some of that evidence.

G. Summary

[96] By way of summary, I do not regard the motion undertaken by Weston at this stage of the proceedings as a good candidate, or "fit", for summary judgment: (i) the action involves complex issues of contractual interpretation and the application of the price adjustment clause to an intricate plan of arrangement; (ii) significant factual disputes exist on the record which will have to be resolved, even if only in the context of a voir dire regarding the admissibility of some of the extrinsic evidence about the formation of the SPA; (iii) both parties rely on expert evidence, yet have not indicated how a motion judge would be able to question those expert witnesses should he or she wish to; (iv) Weston agreed to produce Mr. Green for discovery, yet failed to include his affidavit in its summary judgment record; (v) disputes exists about the adequacy of documentary production; and (vi) the amount at issue in this action raises serious questions about the proportionality of employing a summary judgment procedure to determine the case on its merits. To this should be added the dilatory approach which Weston has taken to prosecuting its case. A party who delays so long in moving its case along should not be surprised that a court may take a skeptical view about the appropriateness of a planned summary judgment motion.

[97] Notwithstanding that conclusion, I cannot ignore that as a result of Domtar's initial consent to a summary judgment motion schedule, both parties have spent time and money in preparing a summary judgment record. As I said, that money should not go to waste.

[98] In my view, the most efficient means of satisfying the full appreciation test would be to develop a modified trial preparation plan, incorporating elements of traditional discovery and making use of the work undertaken to date in creating the summary judgment record, with a view to proceeding to a non-conventional trial in 2013 to adjudicate finally this far-too-old claim. To that end, I direct the parties to consult and develop a trial preparation plan, for presentation to me at a 9:30 attendance to be held before October 5, 2012, which contains the following features: (i) the completion of all examinations for discovery by December 30, 2012; (ii) the use of rule 34.12(2) on the examinations for discovery, save for documents or facts in respect of which privilege is claimed. Since the parties already have raised issues about the admissibility of certain evidence which the trial judge will have to decide, I see no point in delaying this action further with a potential refusals motion. All issues of relevance and admissibility arising on the examinations for discovery can be determined by the trial judge pursuant to rule 34.12(2) if, in fact, any remain by the time of trial; (iii) the use of the affidavits filed by each party as part of the evidence-in-chief of each affiant at trial. The parties should discuss what additional examination-in-chief, if any, would be required from each such witness; (iv) the parties shall identify any other witness whom it intends to call at trial and who has not filed an affidavit and shall propose a timetable for the filing of affidavits or "will says" from any such witness so that each party fully understands the evidence it will be facing at trial; (v) the setting of time limits for the additional examination- in-chief and cross-examination of each witness, including expert witnesses; and (vi) the utility of requiring some of the opposing experts to meet with a view to narrowing any disagreements expressed in their expert reports.

[99] Further, I allocate each party only one hour for any remaining interlocutory motions to be brought prior to trial, such motions to be heard no later than January 31, 2013. The parties really must focus on moving this action to trial, instead of spending time on interlocutory motions.

[100] I will issue further pre-trial directions following the attendance. The directions I have given above are intended as guidelines for shaping the trial of this claim. I am open to receiving creative proposals from counsel about the method of conducting the trial with a view to reducing trial time and moving this action along to a final adjudication on the merits.

[101] The costs of this motion are reserved to the trial judge.

PART III: THE 1318214 ONTARIO LTD. V. SOBEYS CAPITAL INC. ACTION

VIII. Overview of the Action

A. The nature of the dispute

[102] The seven plaintiffs were franchisees of Sobeys Capital Incorporated operating Price Chopper grocery stores in Ontario. The plaintiffs allege that as a result of the manner in which Sobeys exercised its discretion under their franchise agreements, they have been systematically deprived of the ability to earn genuine profits from their businesses. They further allege that Sobeys administered the Price Chopper program contrary to the franchisees' legitimate expectations in such a way as to keep the profits of the system for itself, to keep the franchisees perpetually indebted to it and to prevent the franchisees from building equity in their businesses. In particular, the franchisees contend that Sobeys, by controlling both the wholesale and retail prices of merchandise bought and sold by the franchisees, fixed their gross margins in such a way as to ensure the franchisees suffered large, systemic losses.

[103] The plaintiffs allege that Sobeys breached the terms of their franchise agreements and, as well, breached its duty of fair dealing under s. 3 of the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 3 by acting to prevent the plaintiffs from realizing a reasonable gross margin consistent with the Price Chopper program being an overall successful and valuable system for the franchisees as well as for itself (the "Contract/Fair Dealing Claims"). As put in paras. 65 and 67 of their amended statement of claim:

65. Sobeys has knowingly and intentionally misused its discretionary powers to generate substantial revenues and profits for itself, including from supplier monies, to the Franchisees' extreme detriment. Sobeys institutionalizes and encourages this practice by awarding bonuses to senior Price Chopper executives based on Sobeys' revenues from the franchise operations, including supplier monies, without regard to franchisee profitability. . . . . .

66. Sobeys has knowingly and intentionally breached its contractual obligations and the duty of fair dealing by administering the Price Chopper Program and exercising its significant contractual discretion in such a way as to consistently generate massive losses for the Franchisees under the Price Chopper Program, while appropriating all profits for itself. Sobeys has ensured, through its control over the Franchisees' costs, that the Franchisees will not earn profit beyond the token, discretionary and episodic amounts which Sobeys chooses to confer on them.

[104] The plaintiffs also advance a claim against Sobeys for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence in respect of its accounting obligations under the franchise agreements (the "Accounting Claims"). As pleaded, the plaintiffs stated that they were required under their franchise agreements to use Sobeys' retail and cost accounting systems. The plaintiffs allege that Sobeys misused the accounting system to their detriment:

71. Sobeys has used its role as accountant to the Franchisees and its exclusive access to the costing and other financial information to increase costs to the Franchisees without notification to them. . . . . .

72. At the direction of Mr. Gilpin and other senior Sobeys executives known only to Sobeys, Sobeys has used its control over the Franchisees' accounting information to increase the Franchisees' costs in Sobeys' favour, and to claw back amounts that the Franchisees would otherwise be entitled to under the Price Chopper Program. For example, at the direction of Mr. Gilpin and other senior Sobeys executives known only to Sobeys, Sobeys has:

(a) systematically reduced the Franchisees' gross margins in order to maximize Sobeys' wholesale profits knowing that this would exacerbate the Franchisees' losses;

(b) increased rents payable by the Franchisees under their leases;

(c) clawed back most of the rebates and allowances which are paid by suppliers to Sobeys intended for Price Chopper franchisees; and

(d) reduced the Franchisees' allowable expenses to below actual requirements, such as maintenance on aging equipment, so that the Franchisees would absorb greater costs. . . . . .

75. In addition to the above acts, at certain periods beginning in or around 2006 following the mandatory introduction of the SAP accounting software, Sobeys denied the Franchisees access to certain costing information and failed to consistently and accurately record the cost of merchandise purchased and sold by the Franchisees.

76. Sobeys has failed to monitor, prevent and correct costing errors, which errors are consistently to the Franchisees' detriment and to Sobeys' benefit. Where such errors have been brought to Sobeys' attention by the Franchisees, Sobeys has corrected costing errors only for the Franchisee which noticed the error, and has deliberately failed to correct the same errors for other Franchisees whose costing information was equally erroneous.

[105] The plaintiffs seek damages of $3 million each for their breach of contract, breach of fair dealing and breach of accounting duties claims. Their claims cover a period of time dating from 2001 (in the case of four franchisees) to 2010.

[106] In addition, the plaintiffs allege that on the day they commenced this action Sobeys issued notices of default alleging breaches of the franchise agreements and stating the agreements would be terminated four days after delivery of the notices unless the particularized breaches were cured. The plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction preventing the termination of their franchise agreements and relief from forfeiture of the franchise agreements.

[107] In its June 11, 2010 statement of defence and counterclaim, Sobeys denied that it had administered the franchise agreements in bad faith or in a manner which prevented the plaintiffs from realizing genuine profits or equity in their businesses. Sobeys pleaded:

9. The matters about which the plaintiffs now complain were all fully known to them, or would have been fully known to them had they exercised reasonable diligence and skill, before and at the time they entered into the LEP contract documents and became Price Chopper LEP franchisees.

10. In this litigation, the plaintiffs are effectively asking this court to ignore or rewrite the contractual agreements they entered into with Sobeys. The plaintiffs entered into these agreements freely and voluntarily, after having had the opportunity to obtain, and after having obtained, independent professional advice.

11. Contrary to the allegations made throughout the Amended Statement of Claim, Sobeys did not violate any contractual, common law or statutory obligation owing to the plaintiffs in its operation or administration of the LEP. Further, and as pleaded in greater detail below, Sobeys did not exercise any discretion in a manner contrary to the LEP contractual documents, the reasonable expectations of the plaintiffs or Sobeys' obligations at law.

12. By contrast, the plaintiffs have failed to comply with the requirements of the LEP. In breach of their contractual obligations and their duties of good faith and fair dealing to Sobeys, in 2009 and early 2010 they collectively transferred approximately $560,000 (much of it in a single day) from their business accounts to build a war chest to fund this litigation.

[108] The plaintiffs commenced their action on April 8, 2010. Sobeys pleaded that all of the plaintiffs had received franchise disclosure documents by September 30, 2007 and all plaintiffs had experienced operating as a Price Chopper franchisee by December 31, 2007. Sobeys pleaded:

85. Accordingly, the plaintiffs knew or ought to have known of the facts relating to their alleged claims against Sobeys as pleaded in the Amended Statement of Claim by or before December 31, 2007 (the "Discovery Date").

86. Pursuant to the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002 c. 24, Sch. B (the "Limitations Act"), the plaintiffs were required to commence their claims within two years of the Discovery Date. The plaintiffs failed to do so and this action, which was not commenced until April 8, 2010, is therefore statute- barred. Sobeys pleads and relies upon the provisions of the Limitations Act.

[109] Sobeys also counterclaimed for declaratory, injunctive and compensatory relief in respect of the transfer by the plaintiffs of funds "from their business accounts to build a war chest to fund this litigation". Sobeys also claimed against three of the plaintiffs any amounts which a reconciliation might show they owed to Sobeys when their franchise agreements expired on May 2, 2010 in accordance with their terms. As against the other four franchisees, Sobeys pleaded:

108. Further, or in the alternative, the four remaining plaintiff franchisees have also breached their contractual obligations and duties of good faith and fair dealing to Sobeys, as pleaded above. As a result, the four remaining plaintiff franchisees are liable to provide an accounting to Sobeys in order to determine the proper amounts owing to Sobeys upon the expiry of their LEP Documents in accordance with same.

[110] The pleadings in this action are lengthy: statement of claim, 86 paragraphs; statement of defence and counterclaim, 110 paragraphs; reply and defence to counterclaim, 16 paragraphs. While lengthy, the pleadings are not prolix. Their length reflects the radically different views the parties take about the meaning and administration of the franchise agreements (and related agreements) over the long period of time during which they dealt with each other. The pleadings put in issue numerous, complex issues about the meaning of the contractual documents between the parties and the manner in which they were administered over a period of up to ten years. This is a factually dense action.

B. Procedural history

[111] After commencing their action, in July 2010 the plaintiffs sought and obtained an interlocutory injunction restraining Sobeys from terminating their franchise agreements. Nevertheless, most of the franchise agreements expired in accordance with their terms and, at present, only one of the seven plaintiffs remains a store operator.

[112] The parties have completed their basic examinations for discovery, save and except for any re-attendances required to answer undertakings or refusals ordered to be answered. To date, the plaintiffs have conducted three days of examinations of Sobeys; the defendant has conducted eight days of discovery of the plaintiffs. E-discovery issues were addressed through case management over the course of 2011.

[113] On May 7, 2012, the parties attended before me at a 9:30 appointment raising the following issues [at paras. 3-4]:

Counsel for the plaintiff franchisees wishes to timetable all matters relating to undertakings and refusals, and also to set dates for a pre-trial conference and the trial, which he estimates will take two to three weeks. Counsel for Sobeys concurred with the timetable regarding undertakings and refusals, but advised that his client wants to bring a motion for partial summary judgment "to narrow the issues for trial", and he sought dates for a one to two day summary judgment motion.

In response plaintiffs' counsel stated that his clients would resist the attempt to bring a summary judgment motion, and he sought a date for a motion to stay the defendant's summary judgment motion. [^54]

[114] I gave directions for the filing of materials, in the form set out in Schedule "A" to these reasons, so that I could better understand the positions of the parties. That ultimately led to Sobeys filing a draft notice of motion setting out the relief it plans to seek on its summary judgment motion, and the plaintiffs filing a notice of motion seeking an order staying Sobeys' motion for summary judgment and setting a trial date.

C. Sobeys' proposed summary judgment motion

[115] Sobeys' draft notice of motion disclosed that it would seek the following relief on the summary judgment motion which it wants to schedule:

THE MOTION IS FOR: (a) an order for summary judgment dismissing the actions of the plaintiffs 1464167 Ontario Ltd., 1469789 Ontario Ltd. and 2144011 Ontario Inc. (together, the "Time- Barred Plaintiffs") in their entirety on the basis that they are time-barred; (b) further, or in the alternative in the case of the Time- Barred Plaintiffs, an order for partial summary judgment dismissing the following claims of the plaintiffs on the basis that they raise no genuine issue requiring a trial: (i) That Sobeys failed to disclose the features of the Price Chopper Low Equity Program of which they now complain; (ii) That Sobeys exercised its discretion with regard to the features referred to in subparagraph (i) above in a manner inconsistent with the plaintiffs' franchise agreements or in bad faith; and (iii) That Sobeys interfered with the plaintiffs' right to associate under section 4 of the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000[.]

D. Positions of the parties

Sobeys

[116] Sobeys submitted that its summary judgment motion would take two days to argue. Sobeys intends to file affidavits from two persons: Mr. Rob Adams, whom the plaintiffs examined for discovery, and another affiant. Their affidavits will deal with the specific contracts executed by the plaintiffs and the pre- contractual representations allegedly made by Sobeys to the plaintiffs regarding the equity they could expect to earn and the expected repayment schedule for their loans. Sobeys does not intend to file expert evidence on the summary judgment motion. It expects the documents will be limited to the package of contractual documents between Sobeys and each plaintiff, as well as excerpts from the discoveries of the plaintiffs.

[117] Sobeys acknowledged that a trial will be required in any event to adjudicate the Accounting Claims advanced by the plaintiffs. Its summary judgment motion was limited to the Contract/Fair Dealing Claims advanced by the plaintiffs. As well, Sobeys argued that three of the seven plaintiffs had acknowledged on discovery that they were aware of most of or the entirety of their complaints more than two years prior to commencing their action, so Sobeys would seek to dismiss the claims by those plaintiffs as statute-barred.

[118] If this matter went to trial, Sobeys estimated that it would require up to four weeks of trial time, involving 15 to 20 witnesses. If granted the summary judgment it seeks, Sobeys submitted that the number of witnesses would be reduced by seven to ten, saving at least one week of trial time on the Contract/Fair Dealing Claims and an additional three days if the action were dismissed against three of the plaintiffs as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs

[119] Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs took a different view of the suitability of this action to determination by a summary judgment motion. The plaintiffs submitted that their Contract/ Fair Dealing Claim required "detailed analyses of the complex agreements between the parties; how and why Sobeys changed those agreements mid-stream without disclosure of the material changes; how Sobeys has operated under the agreements; and an analyses of the net result in producing yearly losses to the franchisees and millions of dollars in profit to Sobeys".

[120] The plaintiffs estimated that Sobeys motion for summary judgment would require a five-day hearing, preceded by a week of cross-examinations of a minimum of eight witnesses. Affidavits would be required from each of the plaintiffs and would cover their up to ten-year involvement with Sobeys. The plaintiffs contended that up to 300 documents would be filed on the motion. While the plaintiffs intend to call one or two experts at trial, they could not say whether they would file expert evidence on the summary judgment motion.

[121] The plaintiffs submitted that their Accounting Claims are interrelated with their Contract/Fair Dealing Claims and neither is susceptible to discrete adjudication.

[122] The plaintiffs estimated that a trial will require three to four weeks, and they intend to file 200 to 300 documents at trial with the assistance of an electronic database.

[123] If the summary judgment sought by Sobeys were granted, the plaintiffs saw no potential savings in trial time because of the intertwined nature of the issues asserted against Sobeys.

IX. Analysis

[124] Let me deal first with Sobeys' request to schedule a motion seeking partial summary judgment against four of the plaintiffs in respect of aspects of their Contract/Fair Dealing Claim. First, this part of the motion really would involve a review of the evidence concerning all seven plaintiffs because Sobeys wishes to obtain partial summary judgment against them all in the event it fails on the prescription aspect of its motion against three plaintiffs. Accordingly, on its face the summary judgment motion will require reviewing evidence of up to ten years of contractual dealing between the parties.

[125] Second, Sobeys acknowledges that success on that part of its motion will not avoid a trial; one will be necessary in any event to deal with the plaintiffs' Accounting Claims. But, Sobeys argued, its motion would "resolve some of the issues in this litigation" [^55] so hearing it would be of procedural benefit.

[126] In Smith Estate v. Rotstein, [^56] I attempted to summarize the jurisprudence concerning the availability of partial summary judgment [at paras. 44-45]:

Rule 20.01 provides that summary judgment may be sought "on all or part of a claim" or to dismiss "all or part of the claim". Old Rule 20.05(1) recognized that summary judgment could be "granted only in part". In its general application Old Rule 20 certainly permitted a court to grant summary judgment in respect of only part of a claim. In Ford Motor Company of Canada, Limited v. Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement Board, the Court of Appeal held that the availability of partial judgment in a particular case was defined and limited by the purpose of Rule 20 as articulated in the Irving Ungerman Ltd. v. Galanis and 1061590 Ontario Ltd. v. Ontario Jockey Club cases:

[44] The purpose of the summary judgment provisions of Rule 20 was described in this way by Morden A.C.J.O. in Ungerman Ltd. v. Galinas, supra, at p. 550:

A litigant's "day in court", in the sense of a trial, may have traditionally been regarded as the essence of procedural justice and its deprivation the mark of procedural injustice. There can, however, be proceedings in which because they do not involve any genuine issue which requires a trial, the holding of a trial is unnecessary and, accordingly, represents a failure of procedural justice. In such proceedings the successful party is being both unnecessarily delayed in the obtaining of substantive justice and is being obliged to incur added expense. Rule 20 exists as a mechanism or avoiding these failures of procedural justice.

[45] In Ontario Jockey Club, the purpose of Rule 20 was described in this way:

The purpose of Rule 20 is clear. The rule is intended to remove from the trial system, through the vehicle of summary judgment proceedings, those matters in which there is no genuine issue for trial . . .

The Court of Appeal in Ford Motor Company observed that cases in which summary judgment had been granted for "part of" a claim seemed to fall into three groups -- where the evidentiary basis for the judgment consists of an admission by the opposite party; where a party seeks recovery of an amount equal to or less than its "inevitable recovery at trial"; and,

. . . actions where the evidence establishes that there is no genuine issue for trial in respect of a discrete claim. These partial summary judgment cases require no further comment except to say the result of summary judgment for "part of" a claim is consistent with the purpose of Rule 20; the partial summary judgment removes a discrete issue from the issues to be tried and thus shortens the trial. This is consistent with "procedural justice" concerns referred to by Morden A.C.J.O. in Ungerman and with the purpose of Rule 20 as referred to in Jockey Club.

[127] Having reviewed the pleadings and both parties' summaries of the issues in play in this action, I cannot share Sobeys' view that the partial summary judgment it seeks relates to a "discrete claim" or "discrete issue". At the heart of the plaintiffs' action rests the allegation that Sobeys exercised its discretion under the franchise and related agreements in an unlawful manner, including the wrongful administration of the accounting services it provided to the plaintiffs under those agreements. The judge reviewing that allegation will have to consider detailed evidence about the lengthy history of the business dealings between the franchisees and Sobeys. To have one judge (the motion judge) review that history to consider some of the complaints asserted by the plaintiffs in respect of the long course of contractual dealings between the parties and then to have another judge (the trial judge) review most or all of that history to review other complaints would involve an unnecessary and wasteful duplication of judicial effort. In Combined Air, the Court of Appeal stated:

In cases that call for multiple findings of fact on the basis of conflicting evidence emanating from a number of witnesses and found in a voluminous record, a summary judgment motion cannot serve as an adequate substitute for the trial process. Generally speaking, in those cases, the motion judge simply cannot achieve the full appreciation of the evidence and issues that is required to make dispositive findings. Accordingly, the full appreciation test is not met and the "interest of justice" requires a trial. [^57] The materials filed by the parties clearly indicate that this case falls into that category.

[128] In addition, the availability of partial summary judgment must take into account the policy concerning the bifurcation of issues enacted as part of the 2010 amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure. As put by the Court of Appeal in Kovach (Litigation guardian of) v. Kovach:

Rule 6.1.01 -- effective January 1, 2010 -- is the first time a rule speaking to bifurcation has been promulgated. It signals that, in the opinion of the Rules Committee at least, the bifurcation of a trial, jury or non-jury, is not generally a good idea unless the parties consent. To repeat, rule 6.1.01 states:

With the consent of the parties, the court may order a separate hearing on one or more issues in a proceeding, including separate hearings on the issues of liability and damages. . . . . .

They are more clearly tied to the appropriateness of granting a bifurcation order in particular circumstances -- which this Court has said in Elcano, at p. 59, is only to be done "in the clearest cases." [^58]

[129] Rule 20.01(1) authorizes a motion for summary judgment on "part of the claim in the statement of claim". Rule 6.1.01 addresses when separate hearings may be held on "issues". As I read Sobeys' proposed notice of motion, it conflates "issues" with "claims". Although I have followed counsel's short-hand in referring to the Contract/Fair Dealing Claim and the Accounting Claim, in fact both are simply facets of the single claim for damages pleaded in para. 1(a) of the amended statement of claim. If successful, the motion would not eliminate the plaintiffs' claims for damages; it only would reduce some of the factual issues underpinning those claims. Such an objective, in my view, is not consistent with the purpose of summary judgment motions and would risk expanding Rule 20 into a device drawing the court into multiple reviews of an underlying fact pattern. Further, a review of the amended statement of claim discloses that the Contract/Fair Dealing issues are connected factually with the accounting issues; not a surprising circumstance given the length of the history of dealings between the parties put in play in the action.

[130] Moreover, making due allowance for the underestimating of potential savings of trial time by the plaintiffs and the accompanying overestimation by the defendant, from the very helpful materials filed by counsel realistically one is looking at a three- to four-day summary judgment motion, preceded by several days of cross-examination, which, if the motion were granted, would still result in a trial of at least two weeks in length. In terms of the overall expenditure of time and money by the parties, I simply do not see any material savings resulting from Sobeys' proposed motion. Indeed, I strongly suspect the motion, even if successful, would increase the overall costs of this proceeding and, without a doubt, it would delay the trial of this action by at least a year. The motion will require a significant amount of judicial time to review the extensive record which will accompany it, pushing back the start of the trial.

[131] Consequently, applying the principles articulated by the Court of Appeal in Combined Air about those cases which are appropriate candidates for summary judgment motions, considering the potential savings in trial time resulting from a successful motion for partial summary judgment, and exercising the inherent powers of this court to manage its own process, I decline to grant Sobeys a hearing date for its proposed motion for summary judgment in respect of the Contract/Fair Dealing issues -- i.e., para. (b) of its draft notice of motion.

[132] Turning to para. (a) of the draft notice of motion, which seeks full summary judgment against three plaintiffs on the basis that their claims are statute-barred, Sobeys submitted that it intended to rely on admissions given on discovery by three defendants to support this part of its motion for summary judgment. In its statement of defence and counterclaim, Sobeys pleaded that the claims of all seven defendants are statute-barred. Sobeys gave no indication that it was abandoning that plea against the four defendants against whom it would not seek summary judgment based on the prescription period, so I proceed on the basis that the limitations defence will also be asserted in any event at the trial against the other four plaintiffs.

[133] Although proceeding to secure dismissal of an action against some plaintiffs based on a limitations defence may constitute the sort of discrete claim more susceptible to partial summary judgment, several important factors militate against splitting off that issue from the others in this action. First, if no objection has been taken to the joinder of claims in an action by multiple plaintiffs -- as none has in this case -- then the presumption is that all joined claims will proceed to trial at the same time. Such a presumption flows from the well-established policy of avoiding the multiplicity of actions. However, permitting a defendant who has pleaded limitations defences against all plaintiffs to move for summary judgment on that basis only against certain of the plaintiffs would result in the same defence being adjudicated by the court on multiple occasions -- the limitations defence would be a live issue at the trial involving the remaining four plaintiffs -- thereby risking increased costs.

[134] Further, conducting a "summary" review of the prescription defence against three of the plaintiffs may well delay the trial of the action asserted by the other four. The unsuccessful party on the summary judgment would be entitled to appeal and, as a practical matter, the trial involving the remaining four plaintiffs could not proceed until that appeal was heard. As a result, a prescription-focused summary judgment motion which Sobeys argued would save no more than two or three days of trial if successful, could significantly delay the trial of the balance of the action, a trial which Sobeys concedes is necessary at least on some issues. Such an approach would not result in "the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination" of the proceeding on the merits.

[135] In sum, when the savings in trial time estimated by Sobeys resulting from a successful prescription-focused motion is weighed against the potential for the delay in the action involving the other four plaintiffs and the need to consider the same limitations defence against those four defendants, I do not regard the scheduling of a summary judgment motion on that matter as promoting the general principle contained in rule 1.04(1) or the principle of proportionality set out in rule 1.04(1.1). To the contrary, I view the scheduling of such a motion as violating both principles, and I therefore refuse to schedule that part of the motion planned by Sobeys.

A. Summary

[136] In sum, for the reasons set out above I decline to schedule the motion for summary judgment sought by Sobeys. This matter must proceed to trial as requested by the plaintiffs. I therefore make the following directions: (i) further examinations on undertakings and refusals, if any, shall take place by October 30, 2012; (ii) if any issue arises about refusals, the parties shall book a 9:30 appointment on my list. As in the George Weston v. Domtar case, my inclination would be to require the parties to adhere to rule 34.12(2) on their examinations, save for questions involving privilege; (iii) before the end of September, the parties shall consult and prepare a proposed trial plan, specifying the anticipated length of the trial, identifying all witnesses, establishing deadlines for the delivery of expert reports and proposing how the parties intend to adduce the documentary evidence at the trial. I repeat my earlier statement that the court is open to receiving creative proposals from counsel about the method of conducting the trial; (iv) no later than October 30, 2012 the parties shall appear before Morawetz J. to secure a date for the trial of this action. The parties shall present Morawetz J. with a copy of their proposed trial plan; and (v) the costs of this motion are reserved to the trial judge.

X. Final Comment

[137] I wish to express my appreciation to counsel in both actions for the most helpful written and oral submissions which they made on these motions. They were of great assistance.

Motion granted.

SCHEDULE "A" Information to be provided by the parties when requesting a date for the hearing of a lengthy post-discovery motion for summary judgment (excerpted from 1318214 Ontario Ltd. v. Sobeys Capital Inc. [^59])

A. What will the proposed summary judgment motion look like?

[18] In order to paint a reasonably detailed and accurate picture for the court about what will be involved in the requested motion for summary judgment, both parties should address the following issues:

(i) Length of motion: How long will the motion take using a "real world", not an "ideal world", time estimate? How do the parties propose to divide the time at any motion hearing?

(ii) Issues: What specific issues will the court be asked to determine on the motion for summary judgment? Vague descriptions such as "breach of contract" or "breach of fiduciary duty" are not helpful. Specifics are required[.]

(iii) Affiants: Who will they be? What issues will they address? How long will their affidavits be? What period of time will the affiants cover in their affidavits -- is this a case where the factual chronology spans a few weeks or several years? Has the affiant been examined for discovery? If so, how long was the discovery? Will the affiant be cross-examined? If so, for how long? Are there any issues about the availability of the affiant as a witness for the trial -- e.g. illness, out-of-jurisdiction location, etc.? What, if any, issues are anticipated about the admissibility of the evidence offered by the affiants and how long do counsel expect the argument over admissibility to take?

(iv) Documents: Will the documents go in on consent? If not, what admissibility issues may arise? How many documents in total do the parties anticipate placing before the court on the summary judgment motion? How many key documents really are engaged by this case? Usually it is only a handful.

(v) Experts: Will there be any expert reports? If so, from whom and on what issues? Are the reports ready? How long will it take to prepare any responding expert report?

(vi) Prior examinations: What volume of transcripts from previous examinations do the parties intend to place before the court? From which witnesses?

(vii) Legal arguments: What legal issues will the parties address in their factums? What length of factums do the parties anticipate? How many legal authorities do the parties intend to ask the court to read?

B. What will the proposed trial look like?

[19] To enable the court to understand the alternative to a lengthy Post-Discovery summary judgment motion -- i.e. a trial -- the parties should submit information which details the following:

(i) Length of trial: How long will the trial take, broken down amongst time for opening statements, evidence, closing submissions and intra-trial motions?

(ii) Evidence: Each party should identify the witnesses they intend to call at trial and specify the anticipated lengths of the examinations- in-chief and cross- examinations for each witness, including the expert witnesses[.]

(iii) Documents: How many documents do the parties anticipate adducing at trial? How many documents may be contested?

(iv) In-trial motions: What motions, if any, do the parties anticipate bringing at the start of or during the trial? How much time should be allocated for each motion?

C. If full or partial summary judgment were granted, what amount of pre-trial preparation and trial time would be saved?

[20] If full summary judgment is granted either dismissing an action or granting judgment in favour of the plaintiff, obviously the entire amount of anticipated trial time would be saved. However, if only partial summary judgment is requested, the moving party should provide the following information:

(i) What issues -- factual and legal -- would no longer require an adjudication at trial?

(ii) Identify which witnesses, including expert witnesses, would not need to testify at trial or what reduction in the length of their overall trial testimony might occur;

(iii) Identify the anticipated reduction in the number of documents which would be filed at trial;

(iv) Identify the anticipated reduction in the length of opening and closing submissions;

(v) Provide an overall estimate of the anticipated reduction in the length of the trial.

[21] The responding party should provide the court with the following information:

(i) Does the responding party agree with the anticipated trial time savings submitted by the moving party? If not, the responding party should detail the reasons for its disagreement;

(ii) The responding party should identify the areas in dispute upon which it is prepared to agree on the facts.

Notes

[^1]: (2011), 108 O.R. (3d) 1, [2011] O.J. No. 5431, 2011 ONCA 764, paras. 1 and 2.

[^2]: Ibid., para. 3.

[^3]: Ibid., para. 4.

[^4]: Ibid., para. 58.

[^5]: I developed this point in some detail in Sacred Cows and Stumbling Blocks: Whither Civil Procedure Reform? (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, May 31, 2011).

[^6]: See the extensive discussion of the source of inherent powers in Abrams v. Abrams (2010), 102 O.R. (3d) 645, [2010] O.J. No. 1928, 2010 ONSC 2703 (S.C.J.), paras. 30-34 and 42-45, leave to appeal refused [2010] O.J. No. 4599, 2010 ONSC 4714 (Div. Ct.).

[^7]: Abrams (S.C.J.), supra., paras. 35, 37, 38 and 39.

[^8]: Ibid., para. 34.

[^9]: Ibid., para. 41.

[^10]: Ibid., para. 56.

[^11]: Combined Air, supra., note 1, para. 36.

[^12]: Ibid., para. 38.

[^13]: Ibid., para. 38.

[^14]: Ibid., para. 39.

[^15]: Ibid., paras. 40-45.

[^16]: Ibid., para. 50.

[^17]: Ibid., para. 75.

[^18]: Ibid., paras. 53-54.

[^19]: Ibid., para. 55.

[^20]: Ibid., para. 148.

[^21]: Ibid., paras. 51 and 52.

[^22]: Ibid., para. 219.

[^23]: Ibid., para. 68.

[^24]: An extensive jurisprudence exists under the British Columbia and Alberta rules of practice about when a summary trial would be appropriate. See, for example, Duff v. Oshust, [2005] A.J. No. 382, 2005 ABQB 117, para. 24; and Western Delta Lands Partnership v. 3557537 Canada Inc., [2000] B.C.J. No. 56, 2000 BCSC 54, para. 24.

[^25]: Dr. Seuss, Green Eggs and Ham (New York: Beginner Books, 1960).

[^26]: [2012] O.J. No. 2121, 2012 ONSC 2784 (S.C.J.), para. 23.

[^27]: [2012] O.J. No. 3669, 2012 ONSC 4380 (S.C.J.), para. 16.

[^28]: Harris v. Leikin Group Inc., [2011] O.J. No. 2667, 2011 ONSC 3556 (S.C.J.), para. 404; D'Addario v. EnGlobe Corp., [2012] O.J. No. 1400, 2012 ONSC 1918 (S.C.J.), para. 14.

[^29]: See rules 20.05(2), 50.07(1)(c), 53.01 and 53.02.

[^30]: Rule 20.05(2).

[^31]: Rule 50.07(1)(c).

[^32]: [2003] O.J. No. 1309, 2003 CanLII 6252 (S.C.J.).

[^33]: Meditrust Healthcare Inc. v. Shoppers Drug Mart, [2000] O.J. No. 3762, 2000 CarswellOnt 3629 (S.C.J.), para. 11.

[^34]: (2009), 95 O.R. (3d) 613, [2009] O.J. No. 1584, 2009 CanLII 18230 (S.C.J.).

[^35]: Ibid., para. 19.

[^36]: [2010] O.J. No. 1217, 2010 ONSC 1685 (S.C.J.).

[^37]: Ibid., para. 10.

[^38]: Livingston v. Gravel, Court File No. CV-08-359997 (unreported endorsement dated March 8, 2012).

[^39]: [2012] O.J. No. 2402, 2012 ONSC 2724 (S.C.J.).

[^40]: Ibid., para. 14.

[^41]: Combined Air, paras. 57 and 58 (emphasis added).

[^42]: Ibid., para. 38.

[^43]: This language is taken from rule 9-7(11) of the British Columbia Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009.

[^44]: Supra, note 26, paras. 14 and 17.

[^45]: Ibid., para. 17.

[^46]: [2012] O.J. No. 834, 2012 ONSC 1252 (S.C.J.).

[^47]: Dumbrell v. Regional Group of Companies Inc. (2007), 85 O.R. (3d) 616, [2007] O.J. No. 298, 2007 ONCA 59, paras. 51-56; Ventas, Inc. v. Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Investment Trust (2007), 85 O.R. (3d) 254, [2007] O.J. No. 1083, 2007 ONCA 205, para. 24.

[^48]: Dumbrell, supra, paras. 53 and 54.

[^49]: [1997] O.J. No. 3773, 41 O.T.C. 241 (Gen. Div.), vard 1998 CanLII 4427 (ON CA), [1998] O.J. No. 4368, 114 O.A.C. 357 (C.A.).

[^50]: Ibid., para. 12.

[^51]: Combined Air, supra, note 1, paras. 61 and 62. I respectfully disagree with this portion of the Combined Air decision, although I am bound to follow it, and I do follow it. I understand the need to prevent Rule 20 motions from sliding into a form of summary trial. As I set out earlier in these reasons, ample authority exists for a court to direct a mode of trial which is hybrid in nature, drawing extensively on a written record. Turning Rule 20 into a summary trial rule is not necessary to achieve that result. However, the judicial power to direct the hearing of oral evidence under rule 20.04(2.2) will only gain traction if it does not result in unduly higher motion costs to the parties. By preventing a judicial direction in advance of the motion hearing about whether some oral evidence should be heard, the Combined Air decision, for all practical purposes, creates a two-stage Rule 20 hearing in the event that oral evidence is heard. The cost of a two-stage hearing no doubt will prove unattractive for most parties and risks severely restricting judicial resort to the powers contained in rule 20.04(2.2).

[^52]: Fairview Donut Inc. v. The TDL Group Corp., supra, paras. 367 and 386.

[^53]: Ibid., para. 422 [emphasis added].

[^54]: 1318214 Ontario Ltd. v. Sobeys Capital Inc., supra.

[^55]: Sobeys' written submissions, para. 20.

[^56]: [2010] O.J. No. 1527, 2010 ONSC 2117 (S.C.J.), affd (except with respect to costs) (2011), 106 O.R. (3d) 161, [2011] O.J. No. 3075, 2011 ONCA 491.

[^57]: Combined Air, supra, para. 51.

[^58]: (2010), 100 O.R. (3d) 608, [2010] O.J. No. 643, 2010 ONCA 126, paras. 33 and 41 [emphasis in original].

[^59]: Supra, paras. 18-21.