Anita Banicevic

The court held a case conference to settle the terms of a certification order following a decision to certify a class action regarding alleged price-fixing of packaged bread.

The court reviewed competing draft orders and approved the producer defendants' draft with specific amendments, including adjustments to the definition of packaged bread, the class definition, and the retention of constructive trust as a common issue.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against major producers and retailers of packaged bread, as well as their parent companies, alleging a 16-year price-fixing conspiracy.

The court certified the action against the producer and retailer defendants on behalf of direct and indirect purchasers of packaged bread.

However, the court refused to certify the claims against the parent companies, finding no material facts pleaded to support their involvement.

The court also refused to certify claims on behalf of 'umbrella purchasers' (those who bought fresh bread or packaged bread from non-defendants), finding no plausible methodology to prove that the price-fixing of packaged bread caused an actionable increase in the prices of those non-competing or diverse products.

The applicant sought remedies under Part VII.1 of the Competition Act after the respondents advertised that their wireless service had fewer dropped calls than competitors without conducting adequate and proper testing beforehand.

The court previously found the respondents engaged in reviewable conduct under s. 74.01(1)(b) for making an untested performance claim, although the applicant failed to prove the claim was false or misleading under s. 74.01(1)(a).

In determining remedies, the court assessed proportionality and the factors in s. 74.1(5), including market reach, financial position, and the fact that later testing substantiated the claim.

The court held that post-claim substantiation does not excuse the statutory requirement for prior testing but is relevant to penalty quantum.

An administrative monetary penalty of $500,000 was imposed, while the request for a 10‑year prohibition order was denied.

In an application alleging misleading advertising under s. 74.01(1)(b) of the Competition Act, the respondents sought leave to call eight expert witnesses despite the five‑expert limit imposed by s. 7 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The applicant opposed the request, arguing that some expert evidence was duplicative and that certain proposed opinions concerning the “general impression” of advertisements were inadmissible.

The court held that the proposed expert evidence was not unnecessarily duplicative and would not unduly prolong the hearing.

The court also determined that the admissibility of portions of the challenged expert evidence, including survey evidence and analysis of advertisements, could be addressed during trial if relied upon.

Leave was therefore granted to the respondents to call eight expert witnesses.

The Commissioner of Competition brought an application against Rogers and Chatr alleging that their advertising claims of 'fewer dropped calls than new wireless carriers' and 'no worries about dropped calls' were false, misleading, and made without adequate and proper testing, contrary to the Competition Act.

The court found that the applicant failed to prove the claims were false or misleading.

However, the court found that the respondents failed to conduct adequate and proper testing in certain cities prior to launching the advertising campaign, thereby engaging in reviewable conduct under s. 74.01(1)(b).

The court also dismissed the respondents' constitutional challenges, finding that s. 74.01(1)(b) is a justified limit on freedom of expression and that the administrative monetary penalty does not engage s. 11 of the Charter.

The defendants brought a motion seeking an order compelling the Commissioner of Competition to provide further particulars of alleged misleading representations pleaded under paragraph 74.01(1)(a) of the Competition Act concerning premium text messaging services.

The defendants argued that the statement of claim failed to identify the specific alleged misrepresentations and related details necessary to prepare their defences.

The court held that the pleading sufficiently described the alleged deceptive marketing practices and that the requested particulars largely sought evidentiary details, which are properly obtained through discovery rather than particulars.

Given that the alleged representations could number in the hundreds or more and concerned matters within the defendants’ knowledge, the court exercised its discretion to refuse the request for further particulars.

The motion was therefore dismissed.