Helen Song

The appellant, unrepresented at trial, was convicted of impaired care or control and refusing a breath sample.

The appeal court found that the trial judge failed to adequately assist the unrepresented accused by not explaining the essential elements of the offences, particularly regarding the evidentiary shortcut for care or control and the reverse onus for reasonable excuse in refusing a breath sample.

This failure resulted in an unfair trial, constituting a miscarriage of justice.

The curative proviso was deemed inapplicable.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered on both counts.

The applicants, charged with fraud and conspiracy, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to anticipated trial completion was 60.5 months, significantly exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

While a previous s. 11(b) application was dismissed, finding the case complex and acknowledging transitional circumstances, a subsequent 11-month adjournment was caused by the unavailability of judges due to medical reasons and systemic resource shortages.

The court found that while judicial illness is a discrete exceptional circumstance, the extended 11-month delay was primarily attributable to scarce judicial resources, which does not qualify as an exceptional circumstance under the Jordan framework.

Consequently, the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay, and the applications for a stay of proceedings were granted.

The defendant was convicted of impaired driving, drive over 80, and dangerous driving, and acquitted of fail to remain.

Following conviction, the defendant's new counsel brought an application to reopen the trial to introduce new evidence regarding an alleged sexual assault, potential ineffective assistance of prior counsel, and the defendant's alleged confusion during cross-examination.

The court declined to reopen the trial, finding no merit to the application and emphasizing that the authority to grant a mistrial post-conviction should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances and in the clearest of cases.

The five accused, charged with fraud and conspiracy related to a multi-million dollar tax avoidance scheme, brought applications for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was approximately 44 months.

The court dismissed the delay application, finding the delay justified by the exceptional complexity of the case, which involved voluminous disclosure and multiple accused, as well as transitional exceptional circumstances under the Jordan framework.

The court granted an adjournment for three accused to retain counsel but denied a severance application by the remaining two accused, emphasizing the strong presumption in favour of joint trials for alleged co-conspirators.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, drive over 80, and dangerous driving on December 4, 2011, with the information sworn on January 6, 2012.

Following a trial that spanned over five years, eight months, and two weeks, the accused was convicted on all counts on September 19, 2017.

The accused subsequently brought a section 11(b) application alleging a breach of the right to trial without unreasonable delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the total delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan, exceptional circumstances justified the extended timeline, including a change in counsel, the illness of a defence expert, the accused's medical difficulties during cross-examination, a gross underestimation of trial time, and the transitional nature of the case occurring largely under the pre-Jordan legal framework.

The accused was charged with four driving offences: impaired driving, drive over 80, dangerous driving, and fail to remain.

The central issue was whether the accused voluntarily consumed alcohol or whether a drug was surreptitiously placed in her drink, rendering her intoxication involuntary.

The court rejected the accused's evidence that her drink was spiked and found that her alcohol consumption was voluntary.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired operation, drive over 80, and dangerous driving, but acquitted her of fail to remain due to reasonable doubt regarding her intent to escape liability.

The accused struck and killed a highly intoxicated pedestrian who was wandering on Highway 401 after being abandoned by a taxi driver.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing death and 'over 80' causing death.

While the Crown proved the accused was impaired and had a blood-alcohol level over the legal limit, the court found the accused was not the legal cause of the death.

The pedestrian's unpredictable presence on the live lanes of the highway created an unavoidable hazard.

The accused was acquitted of the 'causing death' offences but convicted of the included offences of impaired driving and operating a vehicle while 'over 80'.

The offender was convicted by a jury of three counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and three counts of failing to remain at the scene of an accident following a road rage incident on Highway 401.

The collision caused the other vehicle to roll over, resulting in catastrophic injuries to the other driver and serious injuries to two passengers.

The court weighed the offender's terrible driving record and the egregious nature of the offence against his deteriorating physical and mental health due to Huntington's disease.

The offender was sentenced to 18 months' incarceration, a 10-year driving prohibition, and ordered to provide a DNA sample.

The accused was charged with driving while having over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood.

The defence brought a disclosure application seeking manuals used by police in conducting periodic inspections of the Intoxilyzer 8000C.

The Crown initially refused disclosure, arguing the materials were third-party records requiring an O'Connor application.

The court determined that certain manuals in the possession of the investigating officer were subject to Stinchcombe disclosure obligations.

The court ordered partial disclosure of training materials and maintenance protocols relevant to the proper functioning and operation of the instrument, finding such materials essential to preparing a defence.

The defendant was charged with dangerous driving following an incident on the 401 highway in north Toronto on March 7, 2012.

The complainant and defendant provided directly conflicting accounts of the driving behaviour, each accusing the other of reckless and dangerous conduct.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework for assessing credibility in cases of testimonial conflict.

While the complainant's evidence was found to be more persuasive, the court determined that the defendant's account could reasonably be true and that a reasonable doubt existed as to the defendant's guilt.

The defendant was acquitted.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol with a blood alcohol level over the legal limit.

The Crown sought to rely on the presumption under s. 258(1) of the Criminal Code based on the accused occupying the driver's seat when police arrived.

The court found the presumption was rebutted because the accused was initially outside the vehicle, was directed into the car by police for safety reasons, and the vehicle was inoperable.

The court further found that even without the presumption, the Crown failed to prove care or control beyond a reasonable doubt because the vehicle posed no realistic risk of danger given its location in a remote ditch, its inoperability, and the absence of any attempt by the accused to operate it.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, failure to provide name and address at the scene of an accident, and a second count of impaired driving.

The Crown's case relied on the testimony of the victim, Muzaffar Abbas, who was struck from behind by the accused's vehicle on Lakeshore Boulevard West in Toronto.

Abbas testified to observing signs of impairment including slurred speech, inability to make eye contact, smell of alcohol, and unsteadiness.

A cell phone video recorded by Abbas captured the post-accident conversation.

The accused did not testify.

The court found the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt based on the combination of physical symptoms, erratic driving, and impaired decision-making.

The court also found the accused failed to provide her name and address, instead saying "you know me" and "you have my licence plate." The court convicted on counts 1 and 2, and dismissed count 3 based on the Kienapple principle against multiple convictions for the same transaction.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" (impaired driving) on March 10, 2010.

The defence brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging breaches of s. 11(b) (right to trial within a reasonable time) and s. 7 (right to life, liberty, and security of the person).

The total delay from charge to the second continuation date was approximately 21 months and three weeks.

The court analyzed the delay using the framework established in R. v. Morin, categorizing it into neutral intake period, institutional delay, Crown delay, and inherent time requirements.

The court found institutional delay of 13 months and 27 days, which exceeded the guideline of 8 to 10 months established in Morin.

Additionally, there was approximately 3 months of delay attributable to the Crown's tardy disclosure.

The court found no actual prejudice to the accused beyond presumed prejudice.

Despite the seriousness of drinking and driving offences, the court granted the stay of proceedings, finding the institutional delay alone was sufficient to breach the accused's s. 11(b) rights.