Cynthia Erin Heather Silver Nadler

The accused, charged with multiple offences across three dates including uttering death threats, unlawful confinement, and weapons offences against his wife, applied to sever the charges into separate trials.

The court dismissed the application, finding a strong factual and legal nexus between the events, a risk of inconsistent verdicts given the complainant's recantation, and that evidence from each incident would likely be admissible in the others to provide context and establish post-offence conduct.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The Crown's case relied on civilian witness testimony of erratic driving, police observations of impairment, and breath sample results of 185 mg and 176 mg.

The defence advanced a "last drink" argument under section 258(1)(d.1) of the Criminal Code, claiming the accused consumed minimal alcohol before driving and substantial alcohol after arriving home.

The trial judge rejected the defence evidence as incredible and fabricated, finding the accused had consumed substantial alcohol prior to driving.

The court found the statutory presumptions of identity were not rebutted and convicted on both charges.

The accused was charged with driving with an excess amount of alcohol in his blood.

The accused alleged violations of his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b), seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of breath readings.

The court found no breach of sections 8 or 10(b) rights.

However, the court found a breach of section 9 rights due to arbitrary detention (overholding) for approximately four hours and twenty minutes after the investigation was complete.

The court rejected a stay of proceedings and exclusion of evidence as remedies, finding that the breach occurred post-offence and was unrelated to evidence gathering.

The breath test readings were admitted and the accused was found guilty, with the court indicating it would consider a sentence reduction as a remedy for the section 9 breach.

The Crown charged the defendant with breaching a house arrest condition of his recognizance on December 24, 2013.

The defence brought a motion for a directed verdict challenging whether there was sufficient evidence of identity to pass the Shephard test.

Officer Perreault identified the defendant based on a mug shot and surveillance observations, but the Crown failed to establish an admissible evidentiary link between the defendant and the person named in the recognizance and Information.

The court found the Crown's case fatally flawed due to reliance on hearsay evidence regarding the defendant's identity and lack of admissible evidence connecting the defendant to the named person in the legal documents.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired care or control and driving with excess alcohol.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay, in exhibiting a reasonable apprehension of bias by preparing reasons before hearing submissions, in failing to exclude breath readings due to a s. 2(a) Charter breach involving the removal of his turban, and in rejecting his evidence of bolus drinking.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in his s. 11(b) analysis, his s. 2(a) analysis, and his credibility findings regarding the appellant's bolus drinking defence.

A new trial was ordered on both counts.

The accused was charged with driving with over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on breathalyzer readings of 137 and 139 milligrams.

The defence challenged the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 5000C readings by arguing that the accused had unmedicated diabetes which would produce acetone in his breath, and that the acetone detection system in the machine could malfunction without alerting the operator.

The court found that the accused's evidence regarding his alcohol consumption and failure to take medication was credible, and that expert evidence established a realistic scientific possibility that the machine's acetone detection system could have malfunctioned.

The Crown failed to rebut this evidence, and the presumption of accuracy was rebutted.

The charge was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample into an approved screening device under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

She argued that the trial judge misapplied the W.D. credibility framework, misapprehended evidence relating to the police officer, her own testimony, and medical evidence regarding asthma, and convicted her on a charge not properly particularized in the information.

The appeal court held that the trial judge’s factual findings and credibility assessments were entitled to deference and were supported by the evidence, including the officer’s testimony that the appellant had numerous opportunities to provide a sample but failed to do so.

The court also concluded that the trial judge’s reasons were functionally sufficient and disclosed an intelligible basis for the verdict.

The appellant failed to establish any palpable and overriding error or miscarriage of justice.

The accused was charged with one count of assault and two counts of sexual assault against his spouse.

The prosecution relied primarily on the complainant’s testimony regarding three alleged incidents occurring between 2009 and 2010.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the complainant’s accounts across her police statement, preliminary inquiry testimony, and trial evidence, as well as contradictions when considered alongside surrounding circumstances and other witness testimony.

Applying the credibility analysis and the principles in W.(D.) v. The Queen, the court concluded that the accused’s evidence was believable and at minimum raised a reasonable doubt.

The court also noted the timing of the complaint in the context of marital breakdown and custody disputes as relevant to assessing credibility.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The appellant appealed a conviction for care or control of a motor vehicle while over 80 mg of alcohol in blood.

She argued that the Crown failed to disclose police notes, that the investigative detention in a private parking lot was unlawful, that the breath samples constituted an unlawful search, and that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence.

The court held that the appellant failed to demonstrate prejudice arising from the alleged disclosure breach and that the issue was not properly pursued at trial.

Applying the ancillary police powers doctrine and the framework from Mann and Clayton, the court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to investigate a potential impaired driver in a bar parking lot and that the detention and breath demands were lawful.

Minor misapprehensions of evidence by the trial judge were found to be peripheral and not material to the conviction.

The accused was charged with failing or refusing to comply with a demand to provide a breath sample under section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

A peace officer observed the accused exhibiting signs of impairment and made an approved screening device demand.

The accused failed to provide a suitable sample on two attempts and then verbally refused.

The accused claimed he had provided two suitable samples both registering 0.00, attributed the odour of alcohol to spilled beer on his clothing, and alleged racial abuse by the officer.

The court found the Crown's evidence credible and the accused's evidence incredible and internally inconsistent.

The court convicted the accused, finding he had violated section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol following an incident on July 14, 2010.

The Crown's case relied on observations of erratic driving by civilian witnesses, police observations of impairment, and breath test results.

The court found that the police violated the accused's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 by conducting an illegal search of the accused's garage without informed consent.

The court excluded the breath test results and the accused's admissions as a remedy for these violations.

On the admissible evidence, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver of the vehicle, as the only evidence linking him to the vehicle was the illegal search of his garage.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.