Kelly Slate

Pre‑trial motions concerning severance and the admissibility of similar fact evidence in a multi‑count indictment arising from four bank robberies and an attempted armoured truck robbery.

The Crown sought to rely on evidence from separate robberies as similar fact evidence to establish identity, motive, and intent.

The court held that evidence of the second, third, and fourth robberies was admissible count‑to‑count on the issue of identity for one accused due to significant similarities and linking evidence, but evidence from the first robbery was not sufficiently similar.

The court further ruled that the bank robbery evidence was not admissible as similar fact evidence to prove motive or intent regarding the attempted armoured truck robbery.

Applying the severance factors in R. v. Last, the court ordered the armoured truck counts severed from the bank robbery counts and also severed the first robbery from the remaining robbery counts.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code and driving with excess blood alcohol contrary to s. 253(1)(b).

The trial addressed two issues: whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol consumption, and whether the accused's rights to counsel were violated by police failing to provide legal advice in Korean.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts, rejecting the accused's explanations for observed signs of impairment and finding no Charter violation regarding the right to counsel.

Following a jury conviction for second degree murder arising from the prolonged abuse and death of a child, the court determined the appropriate periods of parole ineligibility under ss. 235 and 745.4 of the Criminal Code.

The sentencing judge assessed the character of each offender, the nature and circumstances of the offence, and the jury’s recommendations.

The evidence established prolonged physical abuse, malnutrition, and deprivation of medical care, culminating in a fatal assault.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that one accused committed the final assault causing death, while the other was complicit through failure to protect and participation in the ongoing abuse.

The primary perpetrator received life imprisonment with 18 years’ parole ineligibility, while the secondary participant received life imprisonment with 13 years’ parole ineligibility.

During a murder trial involving allegations that a child died following assaults and a failure to provide necessaries of life, the court considered whether the defence of duress should be left with the jury for one accused.

Evidence was led of a long history of domestic violence and threats by the co‑accused spouse.

The Crown argued there was no evidence that threats were made for the purpose of compelling the accused to commit the underlying unlawful acts.

Applying the air of reality test from Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court concluded that the evidence was capable of supporting an inference that the accused’s failure to act was compelled by ongoing threats and violence.

The defence of duress was therefore left to the jury in relation to omissions arising from a legal duty, though not for acts of commission.

During a joint trial for the murder of a child, the co-accused's counsel produced previously undisclosed photographs depicting the victim chained to a bed.

The applicant sought a severance of his trial, arguing the late disclosure undermined his cross-examination strategy and created fundamental unfairness.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the late production was a natural response to the applicant's cutthroat defence tactics and did not violate Crown disclosure obligations or create an injustice requiring separate trials.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused to police during a pre-arrest telephone call and a post-arrest interview.

The accused argued the telephone statements were involuntary because she was not cautioned, and the post-arrest statements were the product of oppressive circumstances, including continued questioning after she requested counsel.

The court found that the accused had an operating mind and made a meaningful choice to speak during the telephone call.

The court also held that the post-arrest interview was not oppressive, as the accused had already consulted with counsel and the police were not required to facilitate further contact.

Both statements were ruled voluntary and admissible.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assault with a weapon under s. 267 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s admission of a 911 call under the principled exception to the hearsay rule and argued the trial judge improperly relied on judicial notice regarding the complainant’s injuries.

The appeal court held that the trial judge correctly assessed threshold reliability and necessity when admitting the 911 call and was entitled to consider surrounding circumstances, including corroborating observations by police and the complainant’s availability for cross‑examination.

The court also held that the trial judge did not improperly take judicial notice but instead made permissible credibility findings based on the evidentiary record.

Deference was owed to the trial judge’s credibility assessments and factual findings.

The Crown brought a certiorari application seeking to quash a preliminary inquiry judge’s decision discharging the accused on first degree murder and committing them only on second degree murder following the death of a child.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge failed to consider the whole of the evidence when assessing whether there was some evidence of planned and deliberate murder or murder while committing forcible confinement under ss. 231(2) and 231(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court held that the preliminary inquiry judge had reviewed the relevant evidence and determined that the circumstantial evidence did not permit a reasonable inference of planning, deliberation, or forcible confinement forming part of the same transaction as the killing.

Errors relating to the sufficiency of the evidence, even if wrong, are within the preliminary inquiry judge’s jurisdiction and do not justify certiorari.

The court found no jurisdictional error.

The accused was charged with two driving-related offences and required a Korean interpreter.

The defence challenged the competency of the proposed interpreter, Mr. Hu-Kal Kim, who held only conditional accreditation, having failed to achieve the passing grade of 70% on two of three accreditation tests.

A voir dire was held to determine whether the interpreter was competent to provide forensic interpretation services.

The court applied the five-part test from R. v. Tran and found that despite partial accreditation, the interpreter possessed sufficient competency based on his extensive experience in forensic interpretation since 1981, prior successful qualification voir dires, and specific expertise in drinking and driving trials.

The appellant appealed a conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal alleged that the trial judge failed to address whether the accused was given a final opportunity to provide a breath sample, misapprehended evidence regarding the accused’s attempts to blow into the approved screening device, and misapplied the credibility analysis from R. v. W.(D.).

The summary conviction appeal court held that the trial judge made clear credibility findings, reasonably rejected the accused’s evidence, and properly placed the burden of proof on the Crown.

Applying the deferential standard owed to findings of fact and credibility, the court found no reversible error in the trial decision.

The conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg, arguing that the police failed to make an approved screening device demand under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code and thereby breached his Charter rights under ss. 8 and 9.

The trial judge had found that no roadside screening demand was made but concluded that the officer nevertheless had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and make a breath demand.

On appeal, the court held that there is no requirement that police administer a roadside screening test before forming reasonable and probable grounds for arrest if those grounds arise from observations during a rapidly unfolding encounter.

Considering the totality of the circumstances and the brief timeline between the stop and arrest, the court found no legal error in the trial judge’s reasoning.

The conviction was upheld.

In a criminal trial arising from a shooting at a house party, the complainant initially identified the accused as the shooter but later refused to confirm the identification at trial.

The Crown sought to admit five prior statements made to police, including statements at the scene, at hospital, a hospital photo identification, a later written statement, and a formal photo line-up.

Applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule under R. v. KGB and subsequent jurisprudence, the court found the necessity requirement satisfied because the witness recanted or claimed lack of memory.

The court held that threshold reliability was met, particularly due to the videotaped photo line-up and the opportunity for meaningful cross-examination at trial.

The prior formal statement and photo line-up were admitted as substantive evidence, while earlier statements were admitted to provide contextual background.

The applicant applied for certiorari to quash his committal for trial on charges of attempted murder and aggravated assault, arguing there was no admissible evidence identifying him as the shooter.

The victim had identified the applicant in a photo line-up but testified at the preliminary inquiry that the applicant was not the shooter, though he acknowledged his memory was better at the time of the line-up.

The reviewing court held that a trier of fact could disbelieve the victim's in-court denial and conclude he had adopted his prior statement, meaning there was 'some evidence' of identification.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for uttering threats to cause bodily harm and to damage property arising from telephone statements made during a dispute with real estate agents regarding the listing of a family member’s property.

The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge erred by refusing to admit letters from the Real Estate Council of Ontario that allegedly supported his claim the complainants fabricated the allegations after he threatened to report them.

The appeal court held that the verdict was supported by the evidence and that credibility findings were owed deference.

Although the trial judge may have erred by refusing to review the letters before ruling them inadmissible under the collateral fact rule, any error was harmless and caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The convictions and sentence were therefore upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in concluding that a boot print found at the scene matched his boot print.

The Crown had called two expert witnesses on footwear analysis who testified that the characteristics of the boot print were not manufacturing defects but natural wear and tear.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge was entitled to accept the expert evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial because it could not be certain from the trial judge's reasons that the defences of reflex response or self-defence were properly addressed.

The appellant pled guilty to criminal harassment, five counts of breach of probation, and breach of recognizance arising from attempts to reconcile with his estranged wife.

He was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment and three years' probation, in addition to 160 days' credit for pre-sentence custody.

He appealed the sentence, arguing it was excessive.

The majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the sentence excessive given the absence of violence, the appellant's lack of prior criminal record before the family breakdown, and his psychological issues.

The sentence was reduced to time served (effective 12 months), with the probation order remaining unchanged.

The dissenting judge would have dismissed the appeal, emphasizing the need for specific deterrence and deference to the sentencing judge.

The appellant, a senior manager, was convicted of fraud and attempted fraud for engaging his girlfriend to provide recruitment services to his company without authorization.

He appealed his convictions and his sentence of 90 days' intermittent incarceration and a $20,000 fine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding ample evidence of a dishonest act and deprivation, and rejecting the defence of authorization.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting the sentence was merciful given the appellant's breach of trust.

The young person pleaded guilty to assault simpliciter after intervening in a confrontation between his friend and a homeowner.

The trial judge imposed a disposition of 45 days secure custody and 15 months' probation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to explore alternative dispositions short of custody for a first-time young offender.

The appeal was allowed, and the disposition was varied to time served, with the probation order remaining in place.

The appellants appealed their sentences, arguing the sentencing judge erred in finding their actions constituted premeditated, planned criminal activity.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding an insufficient basis on the record to support this aggravating circumstance.

Without this finding, the original sentence of a short, sharp term of imprisonment was deemed excessive.

The appeal was allowed and the sentences were varied to time served (9 days) plus probation.