Matthew John Richard Asma

The appellant sought to initiate a private prosecution against Hydro One Networks.

After a Justice of the Peace declined to permit the prosecution, a Superior Court judge converted the appeal to an application for mandamus but declined to grant relief.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal and brought a motion seeking an interim order requiring Hydro One Networks to deliver hydro bills, an order under s. 683 of the Criminal Code for witnesses to testify, and other procedural relief.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no legal basis for the interim order and no basis established for the s. 683 order, but provided directions on time limits for oral submissions on the appeal.

The respondent, a licensed horse trainer, injected a performance-enhancing drug into a horse before a race.

He was acquitted at trial of fraud and cheating while playing a game.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by concluding the betting public was not at risk of deprivation, as bettors are entitled to rely on compliance with the regulatory scheme.

The trial judge also erred in finding horse racing is a game of pure skill without considering if it is a game of mixed chance and skill.

The acquittals for fraud were set aside and convictions entered, while a new trial was ordered for the cheating charges.

The applicant brought a Charter application under s. 24(1) seeking to quash search warrants authorizing the search of computers and hard drives allegedly containing child pornography.

The issue was whether leave to cross‑examine the affiant or sub‑affiants on a Garofoli application could be granted based solely on counsel’s submissions or whether some evidentiary foundation was required.

The court held that statements of counsel alone are insufficient; an applicant must point to evidence in the record or other admissible material supporting the alleged factual basis for cross‑examination.

Because the applicant failed to identify such evidence, the court declined to grant leave to cross‑examine the affiant or sub‑affiants at this stage.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing that the Board's finding that he continues to pose a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable.

Alternatively, he argued the Board erred in failing to grant a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the Board's conclusion regarding the threat to public safety.

The Court also held that a conditional discharge was unavailable because the appellant required supervised housing approved by the person in charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing that the trial judge failed to comply with s. 16.1(6) of the Canada Evidence Act by not explicitly asking the child complainant to promise to tell the truth.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that no particular words are required to comply with the provision, and the complainant's agreement after the trial judge explained the importance of telling the truth was sufficient.

The applicant sought relief under s. 24(1) of the Charter to quash search warrants executed against his computers and hard drives before any charges had been laid.

Because the applicant was a lawyer, the devices had been sealed pending a Lavallee procedure to protect solicitor‑client privilege, leaving the investigation at a pre‑charge stage.

The court considered whether the restrictive collateral‑attack framework from R. v. Wilson applied or whether the Garofoli regime governing Charter challenges to search warrants applied.

The court held that Charter‑based challenges to the legality of searches are governed by Garofoli rather than the stricter Wilson test, particularly where solicitor‑client privilege concerns justify hearing the challenge before any potential trial.

The applicant was entitled to disclosure of materials referenced in the Information to Obtain, and the issue of leave to cross‑examine would be determined after disclosure.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, seeking an absolute discharge or, alternatively, permission to live in the community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety.

The court rejected the argument that there was a treatment impasse, noting that the diagnosis had been clarified and the treatment team was trying different approaches.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple counts of kidnapping and robbery arising from two incidents.

The main issue at trial was the identity of the perpetrators.

The appellant argued the verdicts were unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the verdicts were not unreasonable but held that the trial judge failed to adequately caution the jury about specific frailties in the eyewitness identification evidence, including generic descriptions, lack of distinguishing features, and discrepancies in height.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board denying him an absolute discharge.

The Board concluded he remained a significant threat because there was a significant risk he would stop taking his medication if discharged.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the basis of inadequate reasons by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to consider exculpatory witness evidence, the physical unlikelihood of the appellant's alleged actions, a non-hearsay statement showing another person's knowledge of the gun, and the impact of the destruction of a TTC video.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking a person and receiving a financial benefit, arguing the trial judge failed to give an appropriate Vetrovec warning regarding the complainant and failed to adequately identify the defence's position in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's Vetrovec warning functionally sufficient and noting that the trial judge had properly incorporated the defence's written position into the charge.

Appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code from an Ontario Review Board disposition continuing detention subject to conditions permitting community living.

The appellant argued that the Board’s finding of significant risk to the safety of the community was unsupported by the evidence and therefore unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal held that, although the case was close, the evidence of the treating psychiatrist concerning the risk of a return to fire-setting and threatening behaviour supported the Board’s conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon arising from a knife attack on one complainant, and also appealed sentence.

He argued that the trial judge failed to properly consider prior inconsistent police statements, unevenly scrutinized defence and complainant evidence, and neglected a self-defence theory.

He further contended that the sentencing judge failed to meaningfully apply Gladue principles despite the appellant's Aboriginal heritage.

The Court of Appeal rejected all grounds, found the credibility analysis fair, held the self-defence argument had in substance been addressed, and concluded the sentencing judge properly considered s. 718.2(e), the Gladue report, and relevant sentencing authorities.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of multiple historic sexual offences against his niece and sentenced to a total of five years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued that the Kienapple principle should apply to stay one count, which the Crown conceded.

He also appealed his sentence, requesting that the five-year total be apportioned into consecutive sentences of less than two years each to preserve his right to appeal a deportation order under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that courts cannot impose inadequate or artificial sentences to circumvent Parliament's will on immigration matters, and that a sentence of less than two years for prolonged sexual assault of a child would be patently inadequate.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for offences involving cocaine and a firearm found in a vehicle.

He argued the trial judge erred in upholding a police search of a black bag and in instructing the jury on constructive possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the police had reasonable grounds to open the bag for officer safety and the jury charge was appropriate given the firearm was in plain view.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the sentence fell within the appropriate range.

The respondent backed his vehicle into a parked car in a supermarket parking lot and drove away.

He was charged with failing to report an accident under s. 199(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The lower courts dismissed the charge, relying on obiter dicta from a previous Court of Appeal decision suggesting the entire Act applied only to 'highways'.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the obiter was incorrect and that the reporting requirement in s. 199 applies generally, even if the accident occurs on private property that does not fall within the statutory definition of a highway.

The appellant appealed his criminal conviction, arguing the trial judge improperly relied on demeanour, reversed the burden of proof, and misapprehended evidence regarding a dropped wallet and lack of injuries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not improperly rely on demeanour or reverse the burden of proof, and that any misapprehension of evidence was not material.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that quashed his acquittal.

The trial judge had rejected the applicant's defence of non-insane automatism because he failed to lead expert evidence as required by R. v. Stone.

Furthermore, there was no evidence that the applicant was tricked into consuming alcohol.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding no issue of sufficient merit or importance.

The appellant appealed from convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, misapprehended evidence regarding online communications, and failed to properly consider inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the reasons adequate under the Dinardo standard, no misapprehension of evidence, and no error in the trial judge's treatment of inconsistencies.

The sentence was also upheld as fit.

The appellant pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death, impaired driving causing death, driving while disqualified, and breach of an undertaking.

He engaged in extremely dangerous driving while highly intoxicated, resulting in a crash that killed a passenger.

After the crash, he attempted to fabricate a story and left the passenger to die.

The trial judge imposed a global sentence of 12 years' imprisonment.

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing it was outside the established range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the sentence was the highest ever approved for such offences, it was not demonstrably unfit given the egregious nature of the appellant's conduct before and after the crash.