Matthew John Richard Asma

The appellant was convicted of operating a vessel over 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood causing bodily harm following a boating accident on Lake Muskoka.

She appealed on the grounds that evidence was obtained in violation of her Charter rights.

The trial judge found violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the hospital records containing blood-alcohol analysis while excluding the blood samples themselves.

The Court of Appeal (majority) upheld the convictions, finding that while Charter breaches occurred, the cumulative effect did not warrant exclusion of the hospital records under section 24(2).

Justice Pardu dissented, arguing the hospital records should be excluded due to the serious invasion of bodily integrity and dignity.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, weapons dangerous, and assault, arising from an altercation with his partner's uncle.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's self-defence claim.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made material misapprehensions of evidence, including regarding blood on a swivel chair and the complainant's actions in preparing for the fight.

These misapprehensions were key to the self-defence analysis and undermined the trial judge's credibility findings.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a directed verdict of acquittal entered at the close of its case on a charge of manslaughter.

The trial judge had held that the Crown was bound by its factual theory that the accused was the getaway driver and that witness evidence precluded such a finding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the wrong legal test for a directed verdict and erred in restricting the Crown to a single factual theory.

The court found ample evidence upon which a reasonable jury could convict under section 21(2) of the Criminal Code based on a common unlawful purpose to commit robbery, regardless of the accused's specific role.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on two young persons, arguing it was manifestly unfit.

The Crown also sought to establish judicial criteria for the grant of a reprimand by a youth court judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was legally available and that the sentencing judge properly considered all relevant factors, including the seriousness of the offence and the circumstances of the offenders.

Both young persons had undertaken substantial rehabilitative measures independently.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery of a Cash in a Flash store on November 14, 2010, arguing that the jury's verdict was unreasonable because the video evidence was extremely poor and unreliable for identification purposes.

The trial judge had given strong warnings about the frailties of the video identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that while the video evidence had limitations, the totality of the evidence—including distinctive identifying details visible in multiple video recordings, photographic evidence, DNA evidence from a balaclava, and physical evidence recovered from the appellant's apartment building—provided a reasonable foundation for the jury's verdict.

The applicant was convicted of having care and control of a vehicle while impaired and over 80 after being found asleep in the driver's seat of his running truck.

His appeal to the Summary Conviction Appeal Court was dismissed.

He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing the appeal judge erred in her interpretation of the statutory presumption of care and control.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the grounds of appeal weak and the legal issue already well-settled by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unauthorized possession of a prohibited weapon and other firearm-related offences.

The Crown conceded that the indictment incorrectly charged possession of a 'prohibited weapon' instead of a 'prohibited firearm' and requested an amendment.

The Court of Appeal granted the amendment under section 683(1)(g) of the Criminal Code, finding no prejudice to the appellant.

The appellant also argued the trial judge erred in finding the stolen firearms were operable.

The Court dismissed this ground, noting the owner's testimony and photographic evidence supported the finding of operability.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to the availability of an Aboriginal-specific treatment program.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was reasonable for the sentencing judge to conclude there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk the appellant posed in the community, especially given his lengthy criminal record, history of violent offences while on drugs, and the lack of supervision that would follow a long-term offender order.

The accused appealed convictions for fraud and an order for a new trial on cheating-related counts arising from attempts to rig horse races by drugging horses.

The Court held there was evidence a horse race can involve mixed chance and skill through randomized post positions, supporting a new trial on cheating counts.

It further held the drugging scheme constituted dishonest conduct creating a non-remote risk of deprivation to bettors, and upheld entered fraud convictions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board lacked jurisdiction because he did not suffer from a 'disease of the mind' and challenging the constitutionality of the process under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's jurisdiction is statutory and unaffected by medical assertions regarding a 'disease of the mind', which is a legal concept relevant to criminal accountability, not public safety risk assessments.

The Court also rejected the Charter arguments, noting the constitutionality of the process was settled by the Supreme Court in Winko.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 12-month conditional sentence arising from his attempt to board a flight with a handgun and ammunition in his checked baggage.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended his mother's testimony that she had packed the bag without his knowledge.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge misapprehended one minor aspect of the mother's evidence, the record amply supported the conclusion that her testimony was unbelievable due to multiple inconsistencies.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court agreed that a conditional discharge would be contrary to the public interest given the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple offences relating to an armed home invasion robbery.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding sufficient evidence of identity, misapprehended evidence, and erred in law by reversing the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge reasonably inferred identity from circumstantial evidence, including the doctrine of recent possession, and did not misapprehend material evidence or misapply the W.(D.) framework.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a self-represented litigant, appealed his conviction for failing to stop at a red light under the Provincial Offences Act.

He argued his right to make full answer and defence was violated because the prosecutor did not advise him of his right to disclosure, and the Justice of the Peace failed to assist him.

The City conceded that the appellant was not adequately informed of his right to disclosure and that significant video evidence had been lost.

Based on these concessions, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The Court declined to rule on the broader constitutional and procedural issues regarding disclosure for unrepresented litigants, finding them moot.

The appellant, a fuel delivery truck driver, was convicted of fraud and theft based on GPS and machine-generated delivery records suggesting he delivered fuel to a third party instead of his employer's customers.

He appealed his convictions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered acquittals, finding the trial judge erred by failing to explain why potentially exculpatory signed delivery acknowledgements did not raise a reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to prove that the GPS and delivery slip systems were time-synchronized, rendering the records unreliable.

The appellant sought to initiate a private prosecution against Hydro One Networks.

After a Justice of the Peace declined to permit the prosecution, a Superior Court judge converted the appeal to an application for mandamus but declined to grant relief.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal and brought a motion seeking an interim order requiring Hydro One Networks to deliver hydro bills, an order under s. 683 of the Criminal Code for witnesses to testify, and other procedural relief.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no legal basis for the interim order and no basis established for the s. 683 order, but provided directions on time limits for oral submissions on the appeal.

The respondent, a licensed horse trainer, injected a performance-enhancing drug into a horse before a race.

He was acquitted at trial of fraud and cheating while playing a game.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in law by concluding the betting public was not at risk of deprivation, as bettors are entitled to rely on compliance with the regulatory scheme.

The trial judge also erred in finding horse racing is a game of pure skill without considering if it is a game of mixed chance and skill.

The acquittals for fraud were set aside and convictions entered, while a new trial was ordered for the cheating charges.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing that the Board's finding that he continues to pose a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable.

Alternatively, he argued the Board erred in failing to grant a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence to support the Board's conclusion regarding the threat to public safety.

The Court also held that a conditional discharge was unavailable because the appellant required supervised housing approved by the person in charge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing that the trial judge failed to comply with s. 16.1(6) of the Canada Evidence Act by not explicitly asking the child complainant to promise to tell the truth.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that no particular words are required to comply with the provision, and the complainant's agreement after the trial judge explained the importance of telling the truth was sufficient.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, seeking an absolute discharge or, alternatively, permission to live in the community.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety.

The court rejected the argument that there was a treatment impasse, noting that the diagnosis had been clarified and the treatment team was trying different approaches.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple counts of kidnapping and robbery arising from two incidents.

The main issue at trial was the identity of the perpetrators.

The appellant argued the verdicts were unreasonable and that the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal found the verdicts were not unreasonable but held that the trial judge failed to adequately caution the jury about specific frailties in the eyewitness identification evidence, including generic descriptions, lack of distinguishing features, and discrepancies in height.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.