Matthew John Richard Asma

The Crown appealed an acquittal on drug and firearm charges following a trial judge's finding that police violated the accused's s. 8 Charter right by obtaining a search warrant based on insufficient information, and the subsequent exclusion of evidence.

A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown appeal, affirming the acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada, by majority, allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, adopting the dissenting reasons of the Court of Appeal judge who found there was no breach of s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown applied for an order granting prohibition with certiorari in aid to quash a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice.

The lower court had ruled that amendments to the Criminal Code (Bill C-75) limiting the availability of preliminary inquiries did not apply retrospectively to cases already scheduled.

The Superior Court held that the amendments are procedural, do not affect a vested or substantive right, and therefore apply retrospectively.

The lower court's decision was quashed, and an order was issued prohibiting the Ontario Court of Justice from conducting preliminary inquiries for the respondents.

The accused was tried on charges of fraud over $5,000 and money laundering arising from his operation of two investment companies.

The Crown alleged the accused ran a Ponzi scheme, soliciting funds from investors under the guise of short-term commercial loans while actually using the money to pay earlier investors, cover operating costs, and enrich himself.

The court found that the accused intentionally deceived investors about the nature, purpose, and security of their investments.

The accused was found guilty on both counts, with the court concluding he orchestrated an overarching fraudulent scheme that deprived investors of over $54 million.

The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions, with a majority substantially adopting Justice Nordheimer’s reasons and a dissent that would have allowed the appeal for reasons substantially aligned with Justice Pardu.

The appellant was convicted of operating a vessel over 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood causing bodily harm following a boating accident on Lake Muskoka.

She appealed on the grounds that evidence was obtained in violation of her Charter rights.

The trial judge found violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the hospital records containing blood-alcohol analysis while excluding the blood samples themselves.

The Court of Appeal (majority) upheld the convictions, finding that while Charter breaches occurred, the cumulative effect did not warrant exclusion of the hospital records under section 24(2).

Justice Pardu dissented, arguing the hospital records should be excluded due to the serious invasion of bodily integrity and dignity.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, weapons dangerous, and assault, arising from an altercation with his partner's uncle.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's self-defence claim.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made material misapprehensions of evidence, including regarding blood on a swivel chair and the complainant's actions in preparing for the fight.

These misapprehensions were key to the self-defence analysis and undermined the trial judge's credibility findings.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a directed verdict of acquittal entered at the close of its case on a charge of manslaughter.

The trial judge had held that the Crown was bound by its factual theory that the accused was the getaway driver and that witness evidence precluded such a finding.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the wrong legal test for a directed verdict and erred in restricting the Crown to a single factual theory.

The court found ample evidence upon which a reasonable jury could convict under section 21(2) of the Criminal Code based on a common unlawful purpose to commit robbery, regardless of the accused's specific role.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on two young persons, arguing it was manifestly unfit.

The Crown also sought to establish judicial criteria for the grant of a reprimand by a youth court judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was legally available and that the sentencing judge properly considered all relevant factors, including the seriousness of the offence and the circumstances of the offenders.

Both young persons had undertaken substantial rehabilitative measures independently.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery of a Cash in a Flash store on November 14, 2010, arguing that the jury's verdict was unreasonable because the video evidence was extremely poor and unreliable for identification purposes.

The trial judge had given strong warnings about the frailties of the video identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that while the video evidence had limitations, the totality of the evidence—including distinctive identifying details visible in multiple video recordings, photographic evidence, DNA evidence from a balaclava, and physical evidence recovered from the appellant's apartment building—provided a reasonable foundation for the jury's verdict.

The applicant was convicted of having care and control of a vehicle while impaired and over 80 after being found asleep in the driver's seat of his running truck.

His appeal to the Summary Conviction Appeal Court was dismissed.

He sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing the appeal judge erred in her interpretation of the statutory presumption of care and control.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the grounds of appeal weak and the legal issue already well-settled by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The appellant appealed his convictions for unauthorized possession of a prohibited weapon and other firearm-related offences.

The Crown conceded that the indictment incorrectly charged possession of a 'prohibited weapon' instead of a 'prohibited firearm' and requested an amendment.

The Court of Appeal granted the amendment under section 683(1)(g) of the Criminal Code, finding no prejudice to the appellant.

The appellant also argued the trial judge erred in finding the stolen firearms were operable.

The Court dismissed this ground, noting the owner's testimony and photographic evidence supported the finding of operability.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to the availability of an Aboriginal-specific treatment program.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was reasonable for the sentencing judge to conclude there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk the appellant posed in the community, especially given his lengthy criminal record, history of violent offences while on drugs, and the lack of supervision that would follow a long-term offender order.

The accused appealed convictions for fraud and an order for a new trial on cheating-related counts arising from attempts to rig horse races by drugging horses.

The Court held there was evidence a horse race can involve mixed chance and skill through randomized post positions, supporting a new trial on cheating counts.

It further held the drugging scheme constituted dishonest conduct creating a non-remote risk of deprivation to bettors, and upheld entered fraud convictions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, arguing the Board lacked jurisdiction because he did not suffer from a 'disease of the mind' and challenging the constitutionality of the process under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's jurisdiction is statutory and unaffected by medical assertions regarding a 'disease of the mind', which is a legal concept relevant to criminal accountability, not public safety risk assessments.

The Court also rejected the Charter arguments, noting the constitutionality of the process was settled by the Supreme Court in Winko.

The Crown obtained an ex parte transmission data recorder warrant and an assistance order compelling a telecommunications company to provide subscriber information for unknown phone numbers communicating with a target.

The company sought a review of the assistance order, arguing that a general warrant was required to obtain subscriber information due to privacy interests recognized in R. v. Spencer.

The Superior Court of Justice held that it had jurisdiction to review the order and concluded that an assistance order under s. 487.02 of the Criminal Code is sufficient to compel the production of subscriber information to give effect to a transmission data recorder warrant.

On an ex parte application arising from a police investigation, the court considered whether subscriber name and address information linked to cellular telephone numbers could be compelled through an assistance order issued with a transmission data recorder warrant.

The responding telecommunications company argued that such subscriber information required a general warrant, relying principally on privacy reasoning from Spencer.

The court held that subscriber information was not itself encompassed by the definition of transmission data, but that an assistance order under s. 487.02 could properly compel disclosure where reasonably required to give effect to a valid warrant.

The court further held that a general warrant under s. 487.01 is a remedy of last resort and was unavailable because another statutory route existed.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 12-month conditional sentence arising from his attempt to board a flight with a handgun and ammunition in his checked baggage.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended his mother's testimony that she had packed the bag without his knowledge.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge misapprehended one minor aspect of the mother's evidence, the record amply supported the conclusion that her testimony was unbelievable due to multiple inconsistencies.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court agreed that a conditional discharge would be contrary to the public interest given the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for multiple offences relating to an armed home invasion robbery.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding sufficient evidence of identity, misapprehended evidence, and erred in law by reversing the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge reasonably inferred identity from circumstantial evidence, including the doctrine of recent possession, and did not misapprehend material evidence or misapply the W.(D.) framework.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a self-represented litigant, appealed his conviction for failing to stop at a red light under the Provincial Offences Act.

He argued his right to make full answer and defence was violated because the prosecutor did not advise him of his right to disclosure, and the Justice of the Peace failed to assist him.

The City conceded that the appellant was not adequately informed of his right to disclosure and that significant video evidence had been lost.

Based on these concessions, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The Court declined to rule on the broader constitutional and procedural issues regarding disclosure for unrepresented litigants, finding them moot.

The appellant, a fuel delivery truck driver, was convicted of fraud and theft based on GPS and machine-generated delivery records suggesting he delivered fuel to a third party instead of his employer's customers.

He appealed his convictions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and entered acquittals, finding the trial judge erred by failing to explain why potentially exculpatory signed delivery acknowledgements did not raise a reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to prove that the GPS and delivery slip systems were time-synchronized, rendering the records unreliable.