Kristianne Caitlin Anor

Aleth Duell, a 72-year-old first offender, was found guilty by a jury of two counts of fraud over $5,000 and one count of money laundering, related to romance fraud schemes.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of two years less a day, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a global custodial sentence of two years less a day, followed by two years probation, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence due to the large-scale nature and devastating impact of the frauds.

The court declined to issue a restitution order due to the offender's limited means and lack of quantifiable profit, but imposed a lifetime prohibition order under s. 380.2 of the Criminal Code against managing others' property, money, or valuable security, and waived the victim surcharge.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal challenged the trial judge's jury instructions on the defence of a third party and accident, arguing there was no air of reality to the former and the latter was inadequate, thereby undermining his primary defence of identity.

The sentence appeal challenged the 12-year parole ineligibility period, alleging misapprehension of evidence regarding aggravating factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the defences, which had an air of reality and did not prejudice the appellant's primary defence.

The court also found no reversible error in the parole ineligibility period, concluding that the trial judge's factual findings were supported by evidence and the sentence was proportionate.

The offender, a racialized transgender woman, was sentenced after being found guilty of assault with a weapon, three counts of assault with intent to resist arrest against police officers, mischief, and breach of probation.

The court considered her difficult background, prior criminal record including a manslaughter conviction, and community work, but found no remorse.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, particularly for assaults on police officers, and determined that a conditional sentence was inappropriate given the serious nature of the offences and the offender's record.

A total sentence of 12 months and 15 days' incarceration was imposed, followed by two years' probation, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, theft under $5,000, and unlawful confinement, stemming from an altercation with a complainant in a hotel room.

The trial judge had acquitted on other charges (sexual assault, robbery, choking, threatening death) where proof depended entirely on the complainant's uncorroborated evidence.

The appellant argued misapprehension of evidence, uneven scrutiny of evidence, and error in the self-defence analysis.

The Court of Appeal found no material misapprehension, noting the trial judge's reasoned rejection of the appellant's evidence.

It also found no uneven scrutiny, as the trial judge carefully examined both sides and properly applied rules of evidence.

The court upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant was the aggressor, which negated the self-defence claim.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with two counts of first-degree murder and two firearms offences following a nightclub shooting, brought a motion for directed verdicts at the close of the Crown's case.

The applicant argued there was no evidence of planning and deliberation for the intended target, and no basis for liability regarding the unintended victims.

The court agreed there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation, directing verdicts of second-degree murder on the homicide counts.

However, the court found sufficient evidence of co-principal liability and transferred intent to leave the charges relating to the unintended victims to the jury.

The appellant, Rayon Williams, appealed his convictions for possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, raising three grounds: errors in finding no ss. 9 and 8 Charter breaches regarding his arrest and vehicle search, and an error in jury instruction concerning sunglasses found with the drugs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly determined reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and search based on corroborated confidential informant information and police investigation.

The court also found no error in the jury instruction, as the sunglasses issue was not central and lacked sufficient evidentiary support.

The offender was convicted by a jury of two counts of second-degree murder, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of discharging a firearm with intent, arising from a shooting outside a Toronto nightclub.

The Crown sought 20 years of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 15 years.

The court considered the devastating impact on the victims' families and the community, the aggravating factor of using a loaded handgun in a crowded public place, and the mitigating factors of the offender's youth and lack of a prior criminal record.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility set at 20 years for the murders, and concurrent seven-year sentences for the other offences.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce a video chronology prepared by police.

The chronology compiled still shots from extensive surveillance video, adding identifying information, circles, arrows, and short neutral descriptions.

The defence objected, arguing the video itself is the only admissible evidence and the chronology amounted to Crown advocacy.

The court ruled the video chronology admissible as a demonstrative aid to assist the jury in comprehending voluminous and complex video evidence.

The court held that such summaries are permissible if they are neutral, introduced through a witness who can be cross-examined, and accompanied by limiting instructions to the jury.

During a trial for first degree murder, the Crown brought an application to adduce a post-arrest statement made by the accused to the police.

The accused brought a cross-application to exclude the statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing his s. 10(b) right to counsel was violated because he did not understand the legal advice he received from duty counsel and his own lawyer.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding the accused was advised of his rights multiple times, spoke to counsel three times, and clearly understood the advice.

The court also ruled the statement was admissible in the Crown's case-in-chief, as there was independent evidence of fabrication to support its use as after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during their jury trial.

The court balanced fair trial considerations against courtroom security.

Given that the accused were detained in custody, had histories of institutional misconduct, and there was hostility between the co-accused, the court found that security concerns outweighed the potential prejudice of sitting in the dock.

The application was dismissed.

The three accused were jointly charged with first-degree murder.

One of the accused gave a post-arrest video statement to the police implicating himself and his co-accused.

The accused brought pre-trial applications to redact portions of the statement, and two of the accused alternatively sought to sever their trials.

The court granted the redactions consented to by the Crown but refused further redactions, finding the contested portions highly probative of the maker's involvement and credibility.

The court dismissed the application for severance, holding that the strong policy preference for joint trials applied and that a mid-trial and final jury instruction would adequately cure any reasoning prejudice to the co-accused.

The Crown brought an application at the outset of a first-degree murder trial to admit six utterances made by the deceased shortly after being shot.

The court analyzed the admissibility of the statements under the dying declaration exception, the spontaneous utterance exception, and the principled approach to hearsay.

The court found that while only the statements made to police qualified as dying declarations, all six utterances were admissible as spontaneous utterances and under the principled approach to hearsay, as the pressure of the shooting excluded the possibility of concoction or distortion.

Michael MacKinnon was found guilty of manslaughter and aggravated assault.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a knife, the victims being unarmed, the severe loss to the deceased's family, and the life-threatening injuries to the aggravated assault victim.

Mitigating factors included the offender's pro-social life for 20 years, strong family support, and a diagnosis of PTSD stemming from childhood trauma and a past shooting incident.

The court rejected the Crown's submission that the dated criminal record was an aggravating factor and that the mental health issues should be given limited weight.

A total sentence of 9 years imprisonment was imposed, with 3 years concurrent for aggravated assault, after accounting for 69 months (5 years and 9 months) credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving 39 months (3 years and 3 months) remaining to serve.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

This is an application by the appellant to reopen his appeal, which was previously dismissed as abandoned due to his failure to surrender into custody as required by his bail release order.

The appellant had been convicted of drug-related offences, including possession for the purpose of trafficking, and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario denied the application, finding that the appellant's explanation for his failure to surrender was problematic, his grounds of appeal were not strong, the Crown would be prejudiced by the disposal of evidence, and the principle of finality weighed against reopening the appeal.