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CITATION: R. v. Arora, 2026 ONSC 3324

COURT FILE NO.: SCA(P) 24-335-00AP

DATE: 2026 06 22

SUMMARY CONVICTION APPEAL

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

Paul Renwick, for the Crown / Respondent

Respondent

– and –

JAGRIT ARORA

Applicant

Vineet Kaushal, for the Appellant

HEARD: April 3, May 13, June 23, 2025, and February 4, 2026

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

[On Appeal from the Judgment of Justice R. Ledressay, dated June 5, 2023]

J.M. WOOLLCOMBE J.

Overview

1On June 5, 2023, the appellant, Jagrit Arora, appeared before the Ontario Court of Justice self-represented. He was charged with operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood and with taking a motor vehicle without consent. His matter was set for a four day trial. He sought an adjournment, which was denied. After having an opportunity to speak to duty counsel, the appellant advised the court that he intended to plead guilty.

2At all times in court, a Punjabi interpreter was available to assist the appellant. Following a plea inquiry, he was arraigned and entered a guilty plea to one count of operate a conveyance with a blood concentration over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood, contrary to s. 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

3He was found guilty and was sentenced that day.

4Mr. Arora appeals his conviction, submitting, on the basis of fresh evidence, that:

a. the trial judge erred in law in dismissing his adjournment application; and

b. his guilty the plea was not informed as he was unaware of the immigration consequences that would result from his conviction.¹

5The Crown submits that there was no error in the trial judge dismissing the adjournment application. Further, it submits that the appellant has not established that he was uninformed of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty. Moreover, the Crown says that even if the appellant was uninformed of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty, he has not established that he would have acted differently had he known more.

6After reviewing the evidentiary record, including the fresh evidence, as well as the submission of counsel, the appeal is dismissed. These are my reasons.

Chronology of Events Leading up to Finding of Guilt

7The appellant was charged with offences alleged to have occurred on November 22, 2019. In addition to the two criminal charges, there were Provincial Offences Act charges.

8On the morning of June 5, 2023, the date set for the appellant’s trial, he appeared self-represented. He requested an adjournment so that he could retain counsel.

9The appellant told the trial judge that in December 2019, shortly after the offence date, he had gone to India and that he returned to Canada in January 2020. He then retained David Locke as counsel. He said that in September 2020 his father passed away from COVID in India, and so he returned to India. He did not say when he came back to Canada. But, in October 2021, he again returned to India because his mother was hospitalised. While there, his Visa for Canda expired.

10On March 24, 2022, Mr. Locke was removed as counsel of record.

11The Information suggests that on April 5, 2022, the appellant’s trial was set for June 5, 2023. The appellant appeared by zoom from India and was made aware that the trial had been scheduled for four days, with or without counsel.

12The appellant obtained a visa to return to Canada in December 2022. He returned to Canada on Friday, June 2, 2023, three days before his scheduled trial.

13To the trial judge, the appellant submitted that he needed some time to be able to retain counsel. He said that he was not prepared for trial.

14The trial judge reminded him that Mr. Locke had been removed from the record 14 months earlier, and that the trial had been scheduled. He asked what the appellant had done about getting a lawyer. The appellant said that he had not been able to do anything from India. He said that there was no family income, that he had not been able to work there, and that his plan had been to return to Canada to work and study here.

15Ledressay J. dismissed the appellant’s adjournment application. He noted that while the appellant wanted more time to retain counsel, there was no evidence of any efforts he had made to do so between Mr. Locke’s removal from the record on April 5, 2022, and June 5, 2023. The trial judge acknowledged that the appellant said that he had experienced financial difficulties, that he said he had just returned from India 3 days earlier after being there for a year and a half and that he sought an adjournment to be able to retain counsel. However, the trial judge also recognised that retaining counsel would likely take some time, which would delay the trial. The trial judge noted that the public expects those accused to be brought to trial expeditiously and that in this case, the appellant was alleged to have caused bodily harm to a victim. Given the 41 ½ months that had passed since the charge, the fact Mr. Locke had been removed 14 months earlier, the absence of efforts made by the appellant to retain counsel and the fact that the adjournment application was being made on the day of trial, the trial judge dismissed it.

16The Crown then proposed that he could have resolution discussions with the appellant. The trial judge suggested that duty counsel be enlisted to assist.

17After a break, the Crown advised the trial judge that the appellant had spoken to duty counsel and that he was going to plead not guilty to over 80 causing bodily harm, but guilty to the lesser and included offence of over 80².

18The trial judge then engaged in a plea inquiry with the appellant. In that inquiry, The appellant confirmed that he knew he was giving up his right to have a trial and to put the Crown to their onus of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was doing so voluntarily, that he was admitting the essential elements of the offence that his blood alcohol concentration was greater than 80 mg alcohol in 100 mL of blood. He said he understood all of that and was prepared to admit that the information in the documents respecting his blood alcohol concentration was true.

19The trial judge then asked what the Crown position was on sentencing. The Crown indicated that it was a high fine of $3,500 and a two year driving prohibition, given that the blood alcohol concentration readings had been 154 and in the 150s. The appellant confirmed that he understood the Crown position and that he would have the opportunity to made submissions, but that the final decision was for the trial judge, with a minimum fine of $1,500 and a minimum one year driving prohibition. The appellant also said he understood that the Ministry of Transportation could impose a license suspension that was longer than the driving prohibition.

20The trial judge confirmed with the appellant that while he had no prior criminal record, pleading guilty would mean that he would have a criminal record. There followed some discussion about the potential immigration consequences of entering a guilty plea and having a criminal conviction. The details of those discussions are set out below when the validity of the guilty plea is considered.

21Immediately before the plea, the appellant confirmed his understanding that if he applied for a job, it would show that he had a criminal record. Asked if he understood and still wished to enter the plea, the appellant said, “I don’t know what to do”. The trial judge asked if wanted a short time to think about it. He responded, “That’s why I asked for only 15 days like I…”. The trial judge responded:

I’ve already made a ruling on that, sir. We are going to deal with this matter by way of resolving it or we’re going to have to proceed to trial on it.

The Fresh Evidence

22The fresh evidence consists of the appellant’s affidavit, sworn June 17, 2024, and his testimony before me on April 3 and May 15, 2025.

The appellant’s trip to India

23In his affidavit the appellant set out more details about the reasons for his travel to India.

24He explained that his father died in September 2020 from COVID, and so he returned to India. He says this affected him and his ability to make informed decisions about his legal proceedings. At some point he came back to Canada. However, in October 2021, he again returned to India because his mother was hospitalised, and his sister was getting married. While he was in India, his Canadian visa expired. He applied for a new visa in December 2021 but did not get one until December 2022.

25During his evidence on the fresh evidence application, the appellant clarified that after receiving his visa to return to Canada in December 2022, he lacked the financial resources to buy a plane ticket because of his mother’s medical bills. He says that he tried to retain lawyers from India but was informed that he needed to be in Canada and to pay them before they could represent him. He consulted no lawyers other than Mr. Locke from India. Nor did he make any efforts to contact a lawyer when he returned to Canada on June 2, 2023.

The appellant’s adjournment request

26The appellant says that on June 5, 2023, he experienced “extreme tension and stress” as it was his first time in court.

27Under cross-examination, the appellant agreed that he knew when he returned to Canada that he had a trial set for June 5, 2023. He said he planned to seek an adjournment. He said that he did not know he would have a trial without counsel if the judge did not grant him an adjournment. He went to court because he did not want to be a no show and have a warrant issued.

Assistance from duty counsel

28In his affidavit, the appellant said that he was “offered no assistance by duty counsel present that day”. He goes on and says that “duty counsel neglected to explain the potential immigration consequences of entering a plea”. He says duty counsel exerted “undue pressure” on him to enter a plea without providing sufficient legal advice or clarifying the consequences for his immigration status.

29He also says in his affidavit that he “repeatedly inquired with duty counsel about the potential immigration consequences of entering a plea” because it was important to know these for his future status and opportunities. He says that duty counsel “failed to provide any explanation or guidance”, and that the lack of information on the critical issue of the effect of the plea on his immigration status left him “unable to make a fully informed decision” respecting his plea.

30The appellant says that during his 15 to 20 minute consultation with duty counsel, the Crown entered the room and advised that a plea was in his best interest. He says that the Crown tried to engage duty counsel in a manner that appeared to be to attempt him to plead guilty. He asserts that, “at no point was I informed that if I chose not to plea guilty, a trial would ensue”. Instead, he says that duty counsel said it was in his best interest to plead guilty because he was not prepared for trial and that if he did not plead guilty that day, he would be incarcerated, leaving him with what he believed was “no alternative”.

31The appellant further states in his affidavit that the notes he was given by duty counsel stated that there would be no consequences to his Permanent Residence Status or Work Permit were he to plead guilty, something that he relied upon when he entered his plea.

32He was asked in chief about the notes that are marked as an exhibit to his affidavit, Exhibit 2A on this appeal. He says that the duty counsel made the notes. In the middle of the page, duty counsel wrote, “PR/ Imm / work”. According to the appellant, duty counsel told him that since he was a temporary resident, there would be no problem and that a guilty plea would not affect his PR or immigration.

33According to the appellant’s evidence, he spent 15 to 20 minutes with duty counsel. He says he was told that it was in his best interest to plead guilty and that he was not prepared for trial and duty counsel did not know what would happen.

Information from the trial judge

34In his affidavit, he says that when asked by the presiding judge if he knew the consequences of the plea, he inquired about the potential immigration consequences and was “assured that there would be none”.

Whether the appellant had disclosure

35He said that Mr Locke had all of his disclosure and that he did not have the disclosure for the case. He testified that all he had wanted was an adjournment of 15 to 20 days, or a month, so that he could prepare. He said that he never told the court he did not have disclosure because “nobody asked me this question”.

Challenges to the appellant’s evidence

36Under cross-examination, Crown counsel put several apparent inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence to him. For instance:

a. In para. 19 of his affidavit, he said that he was not provided “sufficient legal advice” about the implications of pleading guilty on his immigration status. In his evidence in chief, he said he was told that the plea would have no impact on his status;

b. Similarly, in para. 20 of his affidavit, the appellant said that duty counsel failed to provide him any explanation or guidance about how the plea would affect his immigration status. Again, this was very different from his evidence in chief in which he said he was told that there would no impact;

c. While the appellant said in his affidavit that he believed that in Exhibit A2 duty counsel had “explicitly stated” that there would be no immigration consequences to his Permanent Residence Status or Work Permit if he pleaded guilty, he agreed that this was not what was written on that exhibit and said that the duty counsel had not explained this to him in detail, but had only written down the few words of notes;

d. Repeatedly, the appellant was asked how the words written in Exhibit A2 substantiated that there would be no consequences to his immigration status if he pleaded guilty. He insisted that the words written meant that because of what was said;

e. While the appellant’s affidavit said that the judge had assured him that there would be no potential immigration consequences of the plea, he qualified this under cross-examination. Initially, he said that the judge said that there might be and that there may not be. He then agreed that the judge never told him that there would be no immigration consequences. He did not agree that his statement at para.27 of his affidavit respecting what the judge had assured him of was false.

f. It was suggested to the appellant that he told the judge that if he had a criminal record, his life would be destroyed, suggesting that he was aware that there would be immigration consequences. He replied that he was speaking about the impact a conviction would have on his employment. It was suggested to him that it would be because of his immigration status and criminal record that he would not be able to get a job. He insisted that he was on a work permit and was only concerned about a job.

g. In his evidence, the appellant was clear that when he attended at court on June 5, 2023, he did not have and never had possessed the disclosure. He said that Mr. Locke had it, but that he did not. He also testified that no one had asked him about it. He was referred to the passage in the transcript when the judge expressly asked him if he had the disclosure and he had replied that he thought so. He explained that he had the paperwork in his car in a bag. He also testified however, that he did not know what disclosure was and that when he had said he had the paperwork, he understood that to mean the paperwork that he got from the police station on the night of his arrest

Immigration consequences of the plea

37There is nothing in the appellant’s affidavit or factum setting out what the immigration consequences of his plea have been. No letter from an immigration lawyer was filed. No information that the appellant received from the Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA”) has been filed. Counsel made no submissions as to the basis or reason for the appellant’s deportation. As a result, there is no evidence before the court as to whether the appellant has been issued a deportation order, or why.

38The parties agree that as part of the evidence on this appeal, the court may consider the testimony of the appellant from his application to extend time to serve and file his notice of appeal, heard on September 19, 2024.

39On that occasion, the appellant testified that after his plea, he received a document that I understand to have been some sort of deportation notice. He testified that he was called by the CBSA and attended for an interview. At the interview on May 22 or 28 of 2024, he was told that he had a serious conviction. He testified that he was told that they would not listen to anything that he had to say.

40There is no evidence as to whether he has ever appealed any deportation order.

41The appellant was a first offender and was convicted under s. 314(1)(b) Code. Punishment for this offence is set out in s. 320.19 (1)(a), which provides that the offence is punishable by a term of not more than 10 years.

42The legislation governing deportation is the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 ("IRPA"). Section 36(1)(a) of IRPA is relevant to the appellant’s case. Section 36(1)(b) and (c) are not relevant as they relate to offenses committed outside of Canada. Section 36(1)(a) states:

36 (1) A permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality for

(a) having been convicted in Canada of an offence under an Act of Parliament punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years, or of an offence under an Act of Parliament for which a term of imprisonment of more than six months has been imposed;

43The offence for which the appellant pled guilty made him inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality because the offence is punishable by up to 10 years.

44 Section 64(1) of the IRPA deals with appeals and states:

64 (1) No appeal may be made to the Immigration Appeal Division by a foreign national or their sponsor or by a permanent resident if the foreign national or permanent resident has been found to be inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human or international rights, sanctions, serious criminality or organized criminality.

(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), serious criminality must be with respect to a crime that was punished in Canada by a term of imprisonment of at least six months or that is described in paragraph 36(1)(b) or (c).

45As explained by Watt J.A. in Girn:

Taken together, ss. 36(1)(a) and 64(1)-2) of the IRPA render a permanent resident convicted of a Criminal Code offence punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of at least ten years inadmissible to, and thus, removable from Canada and without a right of appeal when sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least six months [emphasis added].

46The effect of the legislation is that the appellant is inadmissible on grounds of serious criminality. Because the sentence he received was under 6 months, there would appear to be no statutory bar to appealing under s. 64(2): R. v. Wong, 2018 SCC 25, at para. 38.

Analysis

Did the trial judge err in declining to grant the appellant an adjournment of his trial?

47The court’s power to adjourn a trial is set out in s. 645(1) and s. 645(2) of the Criminal Code. In R. v. Millard, 2017 ONSC 4548, at para. 79; aff’d 2023 ONCA 426, at paras. 121-123, Code J. summarized the legal principles that guide a trial judge’s discretionary decision whether to grant or refuse an adjournment request. The discretion must be exercised judiciously and in accordance with “proper legal principles and after considering and weighing the relevant circumstances of the particular case”.

48As Code J. noted, when the adjournment request is to retain counsel and prepare for trial, as was the case here, relevant considerations include: whether by denying the adjournment the accused will be deprived of counsel and the significant consequences that this may be, particularly if the accused faces a long, complex and serious trial; the gravity of the offence charged and whether there have been previous adjournments; whether the accused had ample opportunity to retain counsel and whether he acted diligently; the length of the requested adjournment and its impact on the fair trial rights of other parties; and the bone fides of the accused’s request for an adjournment to retain counsel and prepare for trial.

49I see no error in the trial judge’s discretionary decision to deny the appellant’s adjournment request.

50Counsel for the appellant submitted that had the trial judge granted a short adjournment, the appellant would have been able to consult with an immigration counsel prior to pleading. Counsel agreed, however, that the appellant did not ask for a brief adjournment to speak to an immigration lawyer. In fact, the appellant’s request was for time to pay and retain Mr. Locke for trial, a request that would have taken some time. While the appellant told the trial judge after his adjournment request had been denied that he had only wanted a 15 day adjournment, this was not what he sought when he made his adjournment request.

51I find that the trial judge considered and balanced the appropriate factors to decide whether the adjournment sought by the appellant should be granted. He noted:

a. that the four day trial related to allegations that were dated, having occurred 42 ½ months before;

b. that there was a victim who was alleged to have been injured by the appellant’s driving;

c. that the appellant’s previous counsel had applied to be removed 14 months before and that after that, the trial had subsequently been set “with or without counsel”;

d. that there was no evidence of the appellant having made any efforts to retain counsel since the trial had been set in April 2022;

e. that the appellant had acknowledged that retaining counsel would take some time and;

f. that the witnesses were at court and that they and the Crown were ready to proceed.

52Given the dated allegations and the fact that the appellant had not used the lengthy period of time since Mr. Locke had been removed as counsel to either seek an adjournment or to try to retain counsel, and had chosen to return to Canada only three days before his trial, I cannot conclude that the experienced trial judge erred in the exercise of his discretion to deny the last minute adjournment sought by the appellant.

Should the appellant’s plea be struck?

53To be valid, guilty pleas must be voluntary, unequivocal and informed: R. v. Taillefer, 2003 SCC 70, at para. 85. Wong, at para. 3; R. v. Gordon, 2025 ONCA 201, at paras. 23.

54The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that the plea resolution process is “central to the criminal justice system, and that maintaining the finality of guilty pleas is important to ensure the stability, integrity and efficiency of the administration of justice”: Wong, at para. 3, Gordon, at para. 19.

55This appeal relates to the “informed” requirement. Section 606(1.1) of the Criminal Code requires that an accused understand several factors including “the nature and consequences of the plea”. In order to strike a guilty plea on the basis that it was uninformed, the appellant bears the burden of satisfying the court both (a) that he was uninformed about or unaware of information that he needed to have in order to give an informed plea; and (2) that he suffered prejudice amounting to a miscarriage of justice: R. v. Espinoza-Ortega, 2019 ONCA 545, at para 35; Gordon at paras. 20-21; Wong, at paras. 6 and 65; R. v. Francis, 2023 ONCA 760, at paras. 28-31.

56In R. v. Girn, 2019 ONCA 202, at paras. 51-52 the Court of Appeal explained that to be informed, the accused must be aware of the criminal consequences of the plea and the “legally relevant collateral consequences”. The Court held that a “legally relevant consequence” is a consequence that “bears upon sufficiently serious legal interests of the accused”. Immigration consequences fall within legally relevant collateral consequences of a plea. See also: Wong, at paras. 3-4.

57As Favreau J.A. explained at para. 23 of Gordon, if an accused establishes that he was unaware of the consequences of the plea, the court considers the gravity of those consequences objectively.

58The prejudice component of the test requires an accused to establish that they suffered prejudice because of being unaware of a relevant consequence at the time of the plea. This means showing that there exists a reasonable possibility that, had they known of the consequences, they would have either elected to plead not guilty or to plead guilty with different conditions: Francis, at para. 31; Wong, at paras. 6, 9, 19 and 33.

59To assess the veracity of an accused’s claim of subjective prejudice, the court can look to objective, contemporaneous evidence, resulting in an inquiry that is “subjective to the accused, but allows for an objective assessment of the credibility of the accused’s subjective claim”: R. v. Evans, 2022 ONCA 23, at para. 7; Wong, at para. 6; Girn, at paras. 65-66.

60When assessing the prejudice component and whether the accused would have pleaded not guilty and opted for a trial, the question is not whether the accused would have succeeded in being acquitted. Sometimes, an accused will opt for a trial even if the prospect of success is low because it is a chance worth taking. That said, an accused’s assertion that they would have chosen a trial must be measured against the objective evidence, including the strength of the Crown’s case and concessions or statements from the Crown about its case: Girn, at para. 70.

61I have reviewed the transcript of what occurred at the time of the plea and considered the appellant’s fresh evidence affidavit and evidence. There are many troubling aspects of his evidence that give rise to serious concerns about his credibility and reliability.

Inconsistencies respecting the information from duty counsel

62First, in relation to what information he received from duty counsel prior to his plea, the appellant has offered various different versions of events. In his affidavit, at para. 20, he says that during their meeting, he “repeatedly” asked duty counsel about the potential immigration consequences of entering a plea and that despite those persistent inquiries, duty counsel failed to provide “any explanation or guidance regarding about how a plea might affect my immigration status”.

63During his evidence in chief, his evidence changed. He testified that when he had asked duty counsel what would happen after the plea, duty counsel told him that since he was a temporary resident, there would be “no problem”.

64Under cross-examination on the difference between this and what was said in the affidavit, the appellant was unwilling to agree that there was any difference. There is an obvious and unexplained difference between being given no explanation or guidance about how the plea would affect immigration status and being told that there would be no problem flowing from the appellant’s temporary residence status.

65Second, in his affidavit, the appellant said, at para. 29, that the one page of hand-written notes of duty counsel (Exhibit A-2) “explicitly” stated that there would be no immigration consequences to his permanent residence status or work permit.

66This was challenged under cross-examination. Asked where duty counsel had explicitly said in this document that there would be no immigration consequences, the appellant seemed unprepared to acknowledge that the writing “PR / Imm / work” just did not contain such an explicit statement. Plainly, what is in the notes cannot be understood as an explicit statement that a plea would not affect the appellant’s immigration status.

Inconsistencies respecting what the appellant was told by the trial judge

67There are similar inconsistencies in the appellant’s evidence as to what the trial judge told him.

68First, in his affidavit, the appellant said at para. 27, that when asked by the trial judge if he knew the consequences of the plea, he asked the trial judge about potential immigration consequences and “was assured that there would be none”. The transcript reflects no such assurance having been made by the trial judge.

69When challenged about the veracity of this under cross-examination, he said that the trial judge had told him that there might be and might not be immigration consequences. He would not agree that para. 27 of his affidavit, where he said that the trial judge had “assured” him that there would be no immigration consequences, was false. Ultimately, in response to the challenge on the difference between his affidavit and evidence on this issue, the appellant did not respond and attempted to deflect the question saying, “how would I know if it would have an effect either way until I talk to a lawyer?”

70Second, in his affidavit the appellant said, at para. 24, that at no point was he informed that if he chose to plead not guilty, a trial would ensue. He said that duty counsel told him that if he did not plead guilty, he would be incarcerated that day.

71While this was not directly challenged under cross-examination, the transcript of what occurred before the plea suggests that the appellant’s statement that he did not know there would be a trial if he chose to plead not guilty cannot be true. First, at the end of his reasons dismissing the adjournment request, the trial judge said, “In the totality of the circumstances, in my view, it would be inappropriate to grant an application for adjournment and the trial will proceed as scheduled.” Second, as part of the plea inquiry, the trial judge asked the appellant if he understood that by pleading guilty, he would be giving up his right to have a trial. Third, immediately before entering the plea, the trial judge told him that the matter was going to proceed either by a resolution or by a trial.

72I do not accept that the appellant did not appreciate that he had the choice to plead guilty or to have a trial that day. While little turns on this, I view his incredible evidence on this point, as a further factor that causes me concerns about his credibility and reliability.

The discussion on the record about potential immigration consequences of pleading guilty

73In his affidavit, the appellant said at para. 22 that he “expressly sought clarification from the trial judge about potential immigration consequences” of pleading guilty and did not receive a “coherent or satisfactory response”.

74During his cross-examination, he was taken to the discussion he had with the trial judge. It was suggested to him that he knew the consequences of pleading guilty before he entered the plea, which he denied.

75The discussion that took place between the appellant and the trial judge, before the plea, included the following.

76At page 29 of the transcript, after being told by the trial judge that if he pled guilty, he would have a criminal record, the appellant said, “Is there any chance like there will be – like, I’m on a work permit, I’m temporary resident, so if I have a criminal record, my life will be destroyed”.

77The trial judge responded:

Well, there’s nothing I can do about that. You can subsequently apply for something later. I don’t know what the immigration consequences will be for this type of offence, but you should be aware that potentially there could be immigration consequences.

78The appellant then said, “…if I have a criminal record, there would be a consequence”. The trial judge continued, making very clear that there would be a criminal record if the appellant chose to plead guilty. The trial judge continued, saying, “there may be some potential immigration consequences that aren’t dealt with by me, but you’ll have to deal with those through Immigration, do you understand that sir, you’re nodding your head yes?” The appellant confirmed he understood and that he still wished to enter the guilty plea to the one charge.

79Shortly after, at page 32 of the transcript, as His Honour was explaining that he understood the appellant would plead guilty to one charge and that the other would be withdrawn, the appellant asked whether, if he applied for a job, “it will show in my background I have a criminal record, right?”. Ledressay J. confirmed that this was what he had wanted to be clear about and again confirmed that the appellant understood he would have a criminal record. When he asked the appellant to confirm he wanted to plead guilty, the appellant said, “I don’t know what to do” and said that was why he had requested the adjournment. His Honour said he had ruled on the adjournment and that the matter was going to proceed by way of resolving or with a trial. The appellant again confirmed that he would plead guilty and entered his plea.

Conclusions

80After carefully considering the totality of the appellant’s evidence and the record, I reject his evidence that duty counsel assured him that there would no effect on his work permit or immigration status if he entered a guilty plea. His evidence on this issue changed from his affidavit, in which he said he was told nothing about immigration consequences, to his testimony, when he claims to have been told that a plea would not affect his immigration status. The document the appellant relies on for this does not support what he says.

81I cannot say what the applicant was told by duty counsel. Clearly, as the notes reflect, there was some discussion of the immigration consequences. The evidence does not satisfy me as to what was said, or that the appellant was in any manner mis-led by duty counsel. I find that the appellant was offered no assurance that a plea would have no immigration consequences.

82I am left with real concerns about the reliability of what the appellant has said as to his understanding of pleading guilty. His evidence about what duty counsel told him is inconsistent. His affidavit evidence about what the trial judge said to him was inconsistent and is at odds with the transcript. Under cross-examination, he did not answer questions in a responsive and clear manner, acknowledging the obvious. He chose to deflect and repeat what he wanted the court to hear, rather than answering in a forthright manner. I cannot conclude that his evidence was truthful about his understanding of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty and find that his evidence is too unreliable to accept.

The record reflects that the appellant was sufficiently aware of the potential immigration consequences that his plea was informed

83The transcript of the plea inquiry conducted by the trial judge persuades me that, at the time he entered the guilty plea, notwithstanding his evidence, the appellant understood that by doing so, he would have a criminal conviction and that there could be immigration consequences because he was in Canada on a work permit.

84The next question is whether the appellant was sufficiently aware of the immigration consequences to enter an informed plea.

85As Dennison J. explained in R. v. Amandeep Singh, 2025 ONSC 5997, at paras. 59 and following, the court must take taka case by case approach to determining whether an accused is sufficiently informed of collateral consequences for the plea to be informed. When the collateral consequence relates to immigration, the possibility of deportation is sufficient for a plea to be informed.

86This was made clear in Girn, where the Court of Appeal held, at para. 75:

The authorities teach that where immigration consequences may ensue from a guilty plea, conviction and sentence, an accused must be aware of those consequences for his or her plea to be informed. Those immigration consequences include removal from Canada -- in a word, deportation. But the authorities have resisted imposition of a fixed quantum or standard of information necessary to characterize the plea as "informed". Instead, the jurisprudence counsels a case-by- case analysis consistent with both the subjective nature of guilty pleas and the level of understanding of the consequences of entry of guilty pleas generally. No trial. Conviction. Sentence. No case suggests that knowledge of "consequences" includes knowledge of appellate rights and their limitations…

87There are a number of other appellate cases, from Ontario and elsewhere in the country, that make clear that for a plea to be informed, the accused must understand the possibility of serious immigration jeopardy resulting from the plea. See, for example: R. v. Johnson, 2024 SKCA 58, at paras. 26-30; R. v. Berhe, 2022 ONCA 852, at paras. 69-76; R. v. Coffey, 2017 BCCA 359, at paras. 36-50; R. v. Shiwprashad, 2015 ONCA 577, at para. 3.

88Counsel for the appellant submits that the plea was not informed because, while the appellant was aware that there would be immigration consequences, he was not aware of what they would be.

89I have rejected the appellant’s evidence that he received inaccurate information from duty counsel that there would be no immigration consequences from a guilty plea. The record reflects that while he did not consult an immigration lawyer, he received some accurate information from the trial judge.

90In my view, the appellant was sufficiently informed of the risk of significant immigration consequences for him to enter a valid plea. I accept that he may not have understood that the plea would result in him being inadmissible under s. 36(1) of the IRPA. He may not have known that he would receive a deportation notice. But, as a person who understood that he was a foreign national with a work permit, he certainly appreciated that a criminal record could have a serious impact on him and that there were potential immigration consequences. He was expressly told, twice on the record, that there may be immigration consequences. There is no legal requirement for a person who will be inadmissible as a result of their plea to have specific knowledge that they will be “inadmissible”, will be deported and what their routes of appeal may be: Singh, at para. 61; Shiwprashad, at para. 3; R. v. Tyler, 2007 BCCA 142, at para. 23. What the appellant knew was sufficient for his plea.

The appellant has not established prejudice

91In addition to the appellant having not satisfied me that he was uninformed as to the immigration consequences of his plea, he has also not met his onus of establishing that he suffered subjective prejudice as a result.

92In Wong, the majority of the course explained that “an accused seeking to withdraw a guilty plea must demonstrate prejudice by filing an affidavit establishing a reasonable possibility” that they would either have pleaded differently or pleaded guilty but with different conditions. The accused must credibly assert that they would have proceeded differently and not pleaded guilty: Wong, at paras. 19, 22.

93There is no evidence before the court from the appellant that, had he been aware of the fact that he would be deemed inadmissible as a result of the guilty plea, he would not have entered the plea and would have proceeded to trial. There is just no evidence – by affidavit or his testimony- that he would have done anything differently.

94I acknowledge that the appellant was in a very difficult position on the day he pleaded. He had done nothing for months from India. He had just returned to Canada three days before his trial. He had taken no steps to speak to or retain counsel, choosing instead to gamble that he would be granted an adjournment. While he told the trial judge that he had the disclosure in his car, he now says that he did not have it and indeed that he never had it.

95Moreover, the Crown witnesses were present at court and ready to proceed. The charges were serious. The Crown’s evidence appears to have been strong.

96Following the dismissal of the appellant’s adjournment application, the Crown was prepared to resolve the case with a very lenient, non-custodial position in exchange to the plea.

97It is highly speculative to conclude, in the absence of any evidence from the appellant, that in all these circumstances, he would have pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial had he been aware that he would be inadmissible. I cannot conclude that he has met his onus of establishing subjective prejudice.

Conclusion

98The appeal is dismissed.

Woollcombe J.

Released: June 22, 2026