Jennifer Woollcombe

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought judicial interim release under s. 522(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown opposed on secondary and tertiary grounds, arguing an overwhelming case and public safety risk.

The court found the Crown's case for first-degree murder was not overwhelming, and the applicant posed a low flight risk (primary ground).

While acknowledging the gravity of the offense and the group attack circumstances, the court determined that a stringent release plan, including house arrest with supervision and electronic monitoring, would sufficiently mitigate public safety concerns (secondary ground) and maintain confidence in the administration of justice (tertiary ground).

The applicant was granted bail on a substantial recognizance with specific conditions.

Shanice Waldron was found guilty by a jury of importing 2.753 kg of cocaine.

The court considered aggravating factors, including a prior criminal record for identity fraud, and mitigating factors such as her youth, status as a single mother, strong rehabilitation prospects, and a history of sexual abuse leading to vulnerability.

The Crown sought a seven-year sentence, while the defence proposed a range of five and a half to six and a half years.

The court imposed a sentence of six and a half years of incarceration, along with a mandatory 10-year firearms prohibition, a lifetime prohibition under s. 109(2)(b) of the Criminal Code, and a DNA order.

The court specifically found that the presence of her young son during the offence was not an aggravating factor.

The plaintiff, Ochea Ikpa, claimed an equitable mortgage over property previously owned by Godknows Itamunoala, based on a promissory note with a criminal interest rate.

The defendants, Tonye Itamunoala and Fiona Duckett (daughter and ex-wife of Godknows Itamunoala), who held a registered second mortgage on the property, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim against them and to release the sale proceeds to them.

The court found that the defendants had no notice of the plaintiff's alleged equitable mortgage, thus it could not take priority over their registered interest.

Furthermore, the promissory note itself was deemed unenforceable as an equitable mortgage due to its manifestly illegal and usurious interest rate, entered into for an illegal purpose with troubling bargaining power dynamics.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's claim of fraudulent conveyance, as there was no evidence the defendants had notice of the plaintiff's claim.

Consequently, the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the quantum of the defendants' registered mortgage.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the plaintiff's action against Tonye Itamunoala and Fiona Duckett.

During a trial for second degree murder, the Crown brought a motion to admit a bloodstain pattern analysis expert report as an exhibit to go to the jury.

The accused opposed the admission, arguing it would be prejudicial and redundant.

The court balanced the probative value and prejudicial effect, concluding that the report should not be filed as an exhibit because it only captured the expert's examination-in-chief, contained unaddressed photographs, and risked over-emphasizing the expert's opinion.

However, the court permitted the glossary from the report to be admitted.

The Crown brought a motion to determine the admissibility of crime scene and autopsy photographs in a second degree murder trial.

The defence objected to several photographs on the basis of relevance, redundancy, and prejudicial effect.

The court applied the test of whether the probative value of the photographs outweighed their prejudicial effect.

The court admitted most of the photographs, finding them probative of the deceased's position, the extent of her injuries, and the amount of blood, but required the Crown to edit certain photographs to protect the deceased's dignity and minimize prejudice.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to adduce hearsay statements made by the deceased to a co-worker shortly before her death.

The deceased allegedly stated her intention to end her relationship with the accused.

The court ruled the statements admissible for their truth under both the 'present intentions/state of mind' exception to the hearsay rule and the principled approach to hearsay, finding them relevant to motive and self-defence, and sufficiently reliable.

The plaintiff brought a motion for the penalty phase of a civil contempt proceeding against the individual defendant and a third party (his spouse) for failing to comply with orders to produce documents and attend examinations in aid of execution.

The respondents sought an adjournment pending a motion to set aside the underlying default judgment, arguing the individual defendant lacked capacity due to a brain injury.

The court refused the adjournment.

Recognizing the individual defendant's severe brain injury and lack of capacity, the court declined to impose a penalty on him.

However, the court found the third party's non-compliance was wilful and motivated by personal financial gain.

The court sentenced the third party to 12 days in jail, to be served intermittently, followed by probation and a further 30 days to purge her contempt.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking the appointment of a Therapeutic Reunification Therapist for his 13-year-old daughter, whom he had not seen for four months.

The applicant mother opposed the motion, arguing that therapy should wait until an ongoing section 30 assessment was completed.

The court granted the motion, finding that immediate intervention was necessary to prevent long-lasting damage to the father-daughter relationship and that the therapist's involvement would assist the assessor.

The applicants challenged the validity of a codicil and an amendment to a cohabitation agreement executed by their late father, arguing he lacked testamentary capacity and was subject to undue influence.

The court found that despite a diagnosis of mild dementia, the deceased had testamentary capacity and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the documents were not suspicious.

The codicil and amendment were declared valid.

However, the court found that the deceased's Life Income Fund (LIF) passed to his estate, not to the respondent spouse, based on the clear intentions expressed in the original cohabitation agreement.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of one count of sexual assault against his former domestic partner.

The court found as fact that the offender engaged in non-consensual digital penetration, forced fellatio, and attempted intercourse.

The offender, a permanent resident and pastor, faced deportation without a right of appeal if sentenced to more than six months.

The court held that while immigration consequences are relevant, they cannot dominate the sentencing process.

The court sentenced the offender to 20 months' incarceration, finding a reformatory sentence appropriate given the gravity of the offence and the offender's lack of criminal record.

This protracted and acrimonious family law trial addressed equalization, division of matrimonial home equity, child support arrears, spousal support arrears, and prospective spousal support.

The court found the respondent lacked credibility, particularly regarding his deliberate non-disclosure of a $3 million Retirement Compensation Arrangement (RCA) Trust and his intertwined finances with a common-law partner.

The applicant was found credible.

The court awarded the applicant a significant equalization payment, pre-judgment interest, and substantial retroactive and prospective lump-sum spousal support, while dismissing the respondent's claims for occupational rent and dispositional costs.

The RCA Trust was deemed income for support purposes, not an asset for equalization.

The accused, Michael Allen, was charged with assault causing bodily harm to his six-month-old stepson, Hayden Ouellette-Meissner, after the infant sustained bilateral humeral fractures.

The defense admitted the injuries but disputed causation, arguing they were accidental.

The court heard conflicting expert medical opinions from a pediatrician specializing in child abuse (Dr. Nolan) and a pediatric orthopedic surgeon (Dr. Wedge).

Dr. Nolan found the injuries highly suspicious for inflicted injury and inconsistent with the proposed accidental mechanism.

Dr. Wedge suggested an accidental mechanism involving the infant's arms getting caught in couch cushions during a fall, though his testimony was found less persuasive and inconsistent.

The court, applying the principles of R. v. W.(D.) and R. v. Griffin, found that while the case was highly suspicious, the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused caused the fractures, leading to an acquittal.

The accused, Lowell Somerville, applied for a stay of proceedings under ss. 7 and 24(1) of the Charter, alleging abuse of process.

The application stemmed from police misconduct during the execution of a search warrant at his storage unit, where an officer stole a valuable Tony Montana statue and subsequently fabricated evidence.

The court found that four police officers lied under oath to conceal the theft and their knowledge of it.

The court concluded that this egregious state conduct, including theft and perjury, profoundly undermined the integrity of the justice system, warranting a stay of proceedings despite the serious drug charges faced by the accused.

Erik Strong pleaded guilty to four drug-related charges and was found guilty by a jury on a fifth, including trafficking in large quantities of cannabis marihuana, conspiracy to traffic, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court considered aggravating factors such as Strong's leadership role in a sophisticated commercial wholesale operation, the large quantities of marihuana involved, and the significant value of the enterprise.

Mitigating factors included his guilty pleas, lack of significant prior record, and significant rehabilitative efforts since his arrest.

The defence argued for a reduced sentence due to anticipated changes in cannabis legislation and alleged state misconduct, both of which the court rejected.

The court also considered credit for onerous bail conditions.

A global sentence of 3 years (1095 days) was imposed, reduced by 78 days for pre-sentence custody and harsh bail conditions, resulting in a net sentence of 2 years, 287 days.

A fine of $25,000 plus a $7,500 victim surcharge was ordered, along with forfeiture of seized cash, a 10-year firearms prohibition, and a DNA order.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual interference.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the complainant's mother did not adopt portions of her police statement regarding the complainant's sexual knowledge, in using an absence of evidence to corroborate the complainant, and in failing to analyze inconsistencies cumulatively.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or credibility assessment.

The accused, Deanna Passera, was found guilty by a jury of importing cocaine.

Prior to sentencing, she filed a constitutional challenge to sections 719(1) and 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, arguing that the provisions, which govern the commencement of sentences and credit for pre-sentence custody, violated sections 7 and 12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

She contended that the legislative scheme resulted in offenders detained pending trial serving a lengthier period in custody before parole eligibility compared to identically situated offenders released on bail, thereby being overbroad, arbitrary, and grossly disproportionate.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, finding that the legislative scheme, when considered holistically with the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, was not unconstitutional.

It held that Parliament's intent was to create reasonable parity at the statutory release date and that any disparity in parole eligibility was justified by public safety and rehabilitation objectives.

The court then proceeded to sentence Ms. Passera to six years imprisonment for importing 1.994 kg of cocaine, crediting her 1.5:1 for 992 days of pre-sentence custody (1488 days) and an additional 90 days (3 months) for harsh lock-down conditions, resulting in a remaining sentence of 613 days.

Allen Taylor appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's decision to exclude only the second breath sample under s. 24(2) of the Charter, following a s. 10(b) right to counsel breach.

The appellant argued both breath samples should have been excluded and that the remaining evidence was insufficient for conviction.

The Superior Court found the trial judge erred in not excluding both breath samples, applying the principles from R. v. Pino regarding evidence obtained prior to a Charter breach.

However, the court upheld the impaired driving conviction, finding that even without the breath samples, the remaining eyewitness and police observation evidence was compelling and sufficient to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

A.R. was charged on a ten-count indictment with three counts of assault, two counts of uttering a threat to cause death or bodily harm, and six counts of sexual assault, all in relation to his former spouse, L.R., their baby, C.R., and L.R.'s mother, J.S. The trial involved extensive testimony from the complainants and examination of text messages.

The defence challenged the credibility and reliability of L.R.'s evidence, citing issues with disclosure of text messages, timing of allegations, and perceived exaggeration.

The court carefully assessed the credibility of L.R. and J.S., finding their evidence credible and reliable despite some defence arguments.

The court found the accused guilty on all ten counts, concluding that the Crown proved the essential elements of each offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The offender was found guilty of two counts of possession of child pornography and challenged the constitutionality of the six-month mandatory minimum sentence under s. 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The court determined that a fit sentence for the offender was ten months' imprisonment, making the mandatory minimum not grossly disproportionate for him.

The court also rejected the argument that the mandatory minimum would be grossly disproportionate for a reasonably foreseeable offender.

The offender was sentenced to ten months' imprisonment, less sixty days' credit for time spent on house arrest bail, followed by two years of probation.

The offender, a 19-year-old first offender, was convicted of robbery, being disguised with intent, and dangerous driving following a home invasion where he and three others forced their way into an apartment while masked and armed with knives.

He later fled police, driving dangerously.

The court weighed the serious aggravating factors of the home invasion against the offender's youth, lack of record, and supportive family.

The court imposed a total sentence of 3 years in custody, prioritizing denunciation and deterrence.