Jennifer Woollcombe

The plaintiffs, who held a second mortgage on a partially completed retirement home, sued the first mortgagee for damages, alleging an improvident sale of the property under a power of sale.

The property was sold at auction for $2,500,000, leaving no proceeds for the plaintiffs.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the actual cost to complete the project was significantly higher than estimated in the appraisal, meaning the property actually sold for more than its true market value.

Furthermore, the court held that the defendant took reasonable precautions to market the property and obtain fair market value.

The defendant estate moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' medical malpractice action for delay.

The action was commenced in 2008 regarding treatment provided in 2006.

The plaintiffs failed to answer undertakings for years and did not move the action forward.

The defendant doctor died in 2015.

The court found the delay of almost nine years to be inordinate and inexcusable, rejecting the plaintiffs' explanation that family stress prevented them from pursuing the litigation.

The court concluded that the defendant would suffer substantial prejudice due to the doctor's death, as discovery transcripts could not adequately replace his viva voce evidence on the key issues of informed consent and negligence.

The action was dismissed.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of importing 11.95 kilograms of heroin into Canada.

He acted as a courier, concealing the drugs in his suitcases.

The Crown sought a 20-year sentence, while the defence argued for 12 years, emphasizing the low purity of the heroin and the offender's status as a first-time federal offender.

The court applied the Sidhu range for heroin importation, rejecting the argument that low purity alone justified a sentence at the bottom of the range.

The offender was sentenced to 14.5 years in custody, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused stood trial on historical sexual offence allegations involving a child relative over a period from 1994 to 2000.

The court found the complainant to be a very credible witness notwithstanding memory gaps about peripheral details, accepted her explanations for delayed disclosure, and found corroborative support in parts of her mother's evidence.

The court convicted the accused of two counts of sexual interference, one count of sexual exploitation based on a conceded position of trust, and two included counts of assault arising from non-consensual touching.

The accused was acquitted on two remaining counts.

The accused, a teacher, was charged with sexual assault and sexual touching of a nine-year-old student in a school portable.

The trial judge assessed the credibility and reliability of the child complainant's evidence, noting several inconsistencies and a fabricated sighting of the accused after his arrest.

Applying the principles for assessing children's evidence, the court found the complainant's testimony unreliable and the accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

Sentencing decision following guilty pleas to incest and sexual assault with another person arising from two incidents of sexual intercourse involving the offender and her 14-year-old son, orchestrated by her then-husband.

The court treated denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for child sexual abuse, while also considering the offender's status as an Aboriginal first offender, guilty plea, rehabilitative efforts, and some degree of pressure and control exerted by the co-offender.

The court held that the mandatory minimum sentence of five years was inadequate because the offender failed to prevent a second incident after the first was known to her.

A sentence of five and a half years concurrent on both counts, less enhanced pre-sentence custody credit, together with DNA and lifetime SOIRA orders, was imposed.

The appellant, Jasvinder Shoker, appealed his convictions for impaired driving and driving over 80 mg.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding impairment and erred in finding no s. 10(b) Charter breach concerning his right to counsel.

The appeal court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of impairment, noting sufficient indicia despite some inconsistencies.

Regarding the Charter issue, the court upheld the trial judge's finding that no breach occurred, as the appellant had agreed to speak with duty counsel if his preferred lawyer was unavailable and expressed no dissatisfaction with this arrangement at the time.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants, Michael Wong and Michael Singh, brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay in their criminal trial for drug production and trafficking.

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan, calculating the total delay from the date charged to the anticipated end of trial, subtracting defence-attributable delay.

The total delay for Mr. Wong was 29 months and for Mr. Singh was 28 months and three weeks, both falling below the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

The court also considered potential exceptional circumstances, such as jurisdictional issues and the striking of guilty pleas due to a misapprehension about conditional sentences, but ultimately found no breach of section 11(b) and dismissed the applications.

Tristen Mignot brought an application to exclude evidence (gun, ammunition, and drugs) obtained during a search, alleging violations of his s. 8 Charter rights due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds for the search warrant and improper execution.

The court found that the Information to Obtain a Warrant (ITO) contained significant errors and omissions, failing to establish reasonable grounds for the search of the residence at 1 Celestial Crescent.

Consequently, a s. 8 Charter violation occurred.

While the execution of the warrant itself was deemed reasonable, the court balanced the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct against the impact on the accused's privacy interests and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court concluded that the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute by admitting the evidence, thus excluding it.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a default judgment of $243,400 obtained by the plaintiffs for unpaid loans.

The defendant claimed he was never served with the statement of claim and only learned of the action later.

The court found the defendant was personally served, failed to act promptly, and did not present an arguable defence.

The motion to set aside the default judgment was dismissed.

John Paul Budarick appealed his conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The appeal raised two grounds: whether the trial judge erred in finding that Constable Crowhurst had the subjective belief required to make a blood demand under s. 254(3)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code, and whether the trial judge erred in concluding there was no s. 10(b) Charter violation when police did not offer a second opportunity to consult counsel after making a blood demand following a breath demand.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusions on either ground.

The solicitor brought a motion to stay the assessment of his accounts pending the trial judge's decision in the underlying matrimonial matter, to restrict the assessment to his final account, and for production of certain documents from the client.

The court granted a temporary stay of the assessment until the trial judge released the substantive decision, finding that the assessment officer needed to know the results achieved to properly assess the accounts.

However, the court refused to restrict the assessment to the final account, concluding that all 37 prior accounts were interim, not final.

The court also dismissed the solicitor's request for production of the client's communications with another lawyer and her tax returns, finding them privileged and irrelevant.

The appellant, Matthew Connors, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving.

The trial judge found him guilty after rejecting the evidence of a defence witness, Kayla Cochrane, and accepting the consistent evidence of four Crown witnesses.

The appeal grounds were that the trial judge erred in assessing Ms. Cochrane's evidence and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The appellate court found no error in the trial judge's assessment of Ms. Cochrane's credibility and reliability, noting her failure to provide a timely police statement and her obvious bias.

The court also found the verdict reasonable given the accepted evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of importing approximately 2.9 kilograms of cocaine hidden in his suitcase.

The Crown and defence presented a joint submission for a sentence of five and a half years, which is below the usual range of six to eight years for first-time importers.

The court accepted the joint submission, finding that the offender's severe cognitive deficits and the certainty of his deportation to Guyana were unusual mitigating circumstances that justified a departure from the usual range.

The offender was sentenced to five and a half years in custody, less pre-sentence custody credit.

In an uncontested family law trial where the applicant husband failed to appear, the court determined equalization of net family property, spousal support, and costs.

The parties were married for two years.

The respondent wife sought equalization of the matrimonial home, contents, and vehicles, which the court granted, ordering the applicant to pay $95,855.79.

The respondent also sought an extension of spousal support for four more years to complete language and paralegal training.

The court declined, finding the requested duration excessive for a short marriage, and terminated support effective May 1, 2016.

The respondent was awarded $12,000 in costs on a partial recovery basis.

Criminal trial involving allegations of sexual assault and sexual interference against two complainants arising from historical events when each complainant was under 16.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework and assessed the adult complainants' testimony in light of appellate guidance on evaluating evidence about childhood events, while guarding against propensity reasoning between counts involving different complainants.

The first complainant's evidence was found credible and reliable, and the accused's denial was rejected.

The second complainant's evidence raised sufficient credibility, reliability, and plausibility concerns to leave a reasonable doubt.

The accused was convicted on the counts relating to the first complainant and acquitted on the counts relating to the second complainant.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of importing heroin and conspiracy to import heroin.

The sentencing judge determined that the offender was a joint principal and organizer of a sophisticated international drug smuggling operation involving multiple importations from Africa to Canada and the United States.

The court rejected the argument that the offender's tragic personal history as a survivor of the Rwandan genocide warranted a departure from the usual sentencing range, as there was no link between her history and the offences.

The offender was sentenced to a total of 15 years in custody, less pre-sentence credit, along with mandatory weapons prohibition and DNA orders.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $25,000 for personal property left in her possession after their common-law relationship ended.

The Divisional Court found the Deputy Judge erred by misapprehending an acknowledgment of ownership as an acknowledgment of value, and by failing to consider the appellant's challenge to the respondent's valuation.

The Court also admitted fresh evidence, including an appraisal report and medical records, finding the appellant's self-represented status and medical impediments excused her inability to present the evidence at trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a seized charge against the defendants' property.

The defendants acknowledged the debt but sought relief from accrued interest under the Unconscionable Transactions Relief Act, arguing they could not make payments after the original lender's principal was arrested.

The court found the 13% interest rate was not excessive given the risk, and the transaction was not unconscionable as the defendants freely entered into it and failed to utilize the Mortgages Act to pay the debt into court when the lender could not be found.

Summary judgment was granted for the plaintiff.

The accused brought a Garofoli application alleging a s. 8 Charter breach and seeking to exclude evidence obtained through a search warrant.

As a preliminary step, they sought leave to cross-examine the affiant and several sub-affiant police officers regarding the Information to Obtain supporting the warrant.

The court reviewed the governing test from Garofoli and Pires and emphasized that cross-examination is permitted only where it is reasonably likely to assist in determining whether the issuing justice had sufficient grounds.

Most proposed areas of questioning were rejected as speculative, irrelevant, or risking disclosure of confidential informant identities.

Limited cross-examination was permitted on specific issues relating to informant independence, the meaning of “successful result” in relation to informant compensation, certain TPS disclosure materials, and errors in the ITO.