COURT FILE NO.: 47/17

DATE: 20180601

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

Malcolm Copeland

A. Khoorshed, for the Crown

E. Sapiono and A Trica, for the Accused

HEARD: May 29, 2018

RESTRICTION ON PUBLICATION

Pursuant to s. 648(1) of the Criminal Code, no information regarding this portion of the trial shall be published in any document or broadcast or transmitted in any way before the jury retires to consider its verdict.

REASONS FOR DECISION

Admissibility of hearsay statement of the deceased

Woollcombe J.

Introduction

[1] The accused, Malcolm Copeland, is charged with second degree murder in connection with the death of Elizabeth Nugent on October 27, 2014. His trial with a jury is scheduled to begin on June 4, 2018.

[2] At the time of Ms. Nugent’s death, Mr. Copeland was staying with her at her apartment. On October 27, 2014, tenants called the superintendent about concerning noises coming from the direction of that apartment. Police were called. After a stand-off lasting about three hours between Mr. Copeland, who was in the apartment, and the police, Mr. Copeland was restrained and ultimately arrested. Ms. Nugent was deceased in the apartment. The Crown alleges that she died from blood loss caused by two wounds in her neck said to have been inflicted with a box cutter.

[3] It is common ground that Mr. Copeland caused Ms. Nugent’s death. I understand that this will be conceded at the outset of the trial and that the defence position before the jury will be that Mr. Copeland acted in self-defence.

[4] The Crown brings a pre-trial application to adduce, for their truth, utterances alleged to have been made by the deceased on October 26, 2014 to Samantha Wrigley. The defence opposed the admission into evidence of these utterances.

[5] The evidence proffered by the Crown on this application includes both the transcript of the evidence of Ms. Wrigley from the preliminary inquiry, which she adopted before me, and her vive voce testimony on the voir dire. At the conclusion of submissions of counsel on May 29th, I indicated that I would provide reasons for my decision respecting the admissibility of these utterances on June 1, 2018. These are those reasons.

Brief Background

[6] At the time of her death, Ms. Nugent worked as a server at the Queen’s Head Pub in Burlington. There is no issue that she worked at the pub on Sunday, October 26, 2014 until it closed at midnight.

[7] Also working in the pub that evening was a colleague of Ms. Nugent’s named Samantha Wrigley. Ms. Wrigley was a bartender. The two women closed the pub that evening.

[8] Ms. Wrigley described the two of them as very friendly acquaintances who chatted about social things, but said that they had not known each other long enough to build a friendship. Ms. Wrigley knew that the deceased lived on Martha Street.

[9] Ms. Wrigley testified that she was aware at the time that Ms. Nugent was seeing somebody. While Ms. Nugent had never used the word “relationship”, she used the word “friend-ish”. Ms. Wrigley was able to identify the accused as the person with whom Ms. Nugent was in some sort of relationship. She explained that he had come to the bar before and that she had seen him.

[10] At the preliminary inquiry, Ms. Wrigley said that she knew the person with whom Ms. Nugent was in a relationship as Michael. On the voir dire before me, she explained that she had been confused at the preliminary inquiry and that, in fact, she knew that the person’s name was Malcolm. She explained that Ms. Nugent and she had never had much discussion about the person’s name. Though she was sure that Ms. Nugent had used his name, she said that she was just not sure that she had heard her do so. However, she was clear that she understood that Ms. Nugent was seeing someone, that she had told people that she was seeing someone and that he had come into the bar.

[11] On the evening of October 26th, Ms. Wrigley said that her boyfriend, Brandon Gibson, was at the bar having a drink while he waited for her to be finished work so that he could drive her home. Ms. Nugent had a conversation with Mr. Gibson. Ms. Wrigley joined into that conversation and described what was said.

[12] At the preliminary inquiry, Ms. Wrigley said that the conversation between Mr. Gibson and Ms. Nugent was about the fact that whatever type of relationship she was in with her “friend-ish”, “was going to be no longer in said thing”, that “she was not very happy” and that she was “going to be free of that situation”. Ms. Wrigley explained that she and Mr. Gibson asked Ms. Nugent if she wanted a ride home. Ms. Nugent responded that her “friend-ish” was picking her up and that she planned to break things off with him that night.

[13] On the voir dire before me, Ms. Wrigley was again asked about the conversation that she overheard. She said that she heard Mr. Gibson ask Ms. Nugent if she wanted a ride home and that she replied “no”, that she was going to get a ride from Malcolm and so did not need one, and that she was going to break things off with him “tonight” and to be free of him.

[14] Under further questioning, she agreed that Ms. Nugent had not referred to the person picking her up as Malcolm, but had used the term “friend-ish”. Because of the fact that she had seen him in the bar and knew that Ms. Nugent was seeing Mr. Copeland, she inferred that he was the person picking her up.

[15] Ms. Wrigley was also cross-examined on the issue of whether Ms. Nugent had indicated when she was going to be free of her “friend-ish”. She agreed with counsel’s suggestion that Ms. Nugent had not given an indication of the timing, and that she had assumed that Ms. Nugent’s plan was to end things that night or the next morning.

[16] Ms. Wrigley was asked a number of questions about a statement that she made to police. She did not recall saying most of the things that counsel put to her that she had said during that statement. The statement was not filed and is not evidence on the voir dire. The one part of the statement that Ms. Wrigley seemed to recall was having told the police that there was a side of Ms. Nugent that it seemed like she was not telling her co-workers about. Ms. Wrigley adopted this as true.

[17] In re-examination, Ms. Wrigley was unequivocal that she recalled some specific words used by Ms. Nugent including that she was going to “break it off” and that she was going to “be free” of him. She also clarified that because Ms. Nugent told her that she did not need a ride because her “friend-ish” was going to pick her up, and then said that she was going to be free of him, that she assumed that Ms. Nugent was going to break it off that night.

Positions of the Parties

[18] The Crown seeks a ruling that Ms. Nugent’s utterances that she did not need a ride home because her “friend-ish” was picking her up, that she was going to break it off with him and that she was going to be free of him are admissible through Ms. Wrigley for their truth. The Crown submits that these utterances are admissible on two basis. First, Mr. Khoorshed says that the utterances are admissible under the “state of mind” or “present intention” exception to the hearsay rule. Second, the Crown says that the utterances are admissible under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

[19] Mr. Sapiano concedes that the necessity criteria of the principled exception to the hearsay rule is met. He opposes admissibility on a number of basis, all related to his submission that the Crown has not met its burden of establishing that the proposed evidence meets the reliability threshold to be admitted for the jury to consider.

Applicable Legal Principles

[20] The basic rule of evidence is that relevant evidence is admissible. There is an exception for hearsay evidence. Hearsay evidence is presumptively inadmissible, not because it is irrelevant, but, rather because of the difficulty in testing in. See: R. v. Khelawon, [2006] S.C.R. 787 at para. 34.

[21] As the Supreme Court of Canada set out in that decision, before embarking on a hearsay admissibility inquiry, there must be a determination of whether the proposed evidence is hearsay. I understand there to be no dispute that the utterances of Ms. Nugent to Ms. Wrigley are hearsay evidence when adduced through Ms. Wrigley for their truth. They are, therefore, presumptively inadmissible.

[22] The next step in the analysis is to determine whether the evidence falls into one of the traditional common law exceptions. If so, the evidence is admissible and it is not necessary to undergo the principled approach analysis. See R. v. Mapara, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 1 358 at para. 42.

[23] Hearsay evidence that does not fall into one of the common law exceptions may still be admissible if the dangers associated with hearsay evidence are sufficiently overcome to justify its admission. One way to do this is to demonstrate that there is no real concern about whether or not the statement is true because of the circumstances in which it came about. Another way to fulfil the reliability requirement is to demonstrate that its truth and accuracy can be sufficiently tested.

[24] Relatively recently, in R. v. F.C., 2015 ONSC 6428, [2015] O.J. No. 5383 (S.C.J.) Campbell J. provided a thorough summary of the law respecting reliability, which I adopt. At paras. 14-19 of that decision, he wrote:

14 On the issue of reliability, the relevant question is not whether the tendered hearsay evidence is actually true, or even probably true, but whether the evidence is sufficiently reliable to justify its admission for consideration by the trier of fact. In R. v. Khelawon, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the importance of the distinction between threshold and ultimate reliability, and clarified how the threshold requirement of reliability should be analytically viewed and practically applied. Delivering the unanimous judgment of the court, Charron J. held, at paras. 2-4, 49-55, 61-66, that this reliability requirement will generally be met in two situations, namely: (1) where the circumstances in which the hearsay statement came about are such that there is no real concern about the reliability of the statement, and contemporaneous cross-examination of the declarant would add little if anything to the process; and/or (2) where there is no real concern about the hearsay form of the statement because its truth and accuracy can be sufficiently tested by means other than contemporaneous cross-examination. See R. v. Couture, at para. 80; R. v. Blackman, 2008 SCC 37, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 298, at paras. 29-57.

15 Moreover, Charron J. held that on the admissibility inquiry, a functional approach should be adopted and all relevant factors should be considered, including the presence of supporting or contradictory evidence in appropriate cases. In reaching this conclusion, Charron J. thoroughly reviewed the jurisprudence on this subject and expressly stated, at paras. 4, 93-100, that comments to the contrary in previous decisions, including R. v. Starr, 2000 SCC 40, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144, should no longer be followed. See R. v. Couture, at para. 83; R. v. Badgerow, at paras. 155-176.

16 In Khelawon, Charron J. confirmed, at para. 92, that when the reliability requirement is met on the basis that the trier of fact has a sufficient basis to assess the statement's truth and accuracy, there is no need for the trial judge to inquire further into the likely truth of the statement. That issue is properly left to be determined entirely by the trier of fact. However, when reliability is dependent on the inherent trustworthiness of the statement, the trial judge must inquire into those factors tending to show whether the statement is true or not. In any event, as Charron J. noted, at paras. 2-3, it is the function and responsibility of the trial judge as "gatekeeper" to guard against the admission of hearsay evidence which is contextually unnecessary, or "the reliability of which is neither readily apparent from the trustworthiness of its contents, nor capable of being meaningfully tested by the ultimate trier of fact."

17 As noted in R. v. Hamilton, 2011 ONCA 399, 271 C.C.C. (3d) 208, at paras. 138-139, the Khelawon decision "advocates a holistic approach to the question of threshold reliability," and makes it clear that the threshold reliability is not limited to the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, but rather includes consideration of "the broader picture, including the existence of corroborative evidence" in deciding whether "the statement is inherently trustworthy and thus sufficiently reliable to warrant its reception." See R. v. Duong, 2007 ONCA 68, 84 O.R. (3d) 515, at para. 52; R. v. Post, 2007 BCCA 123, 66 B.C.L.R. (4th) 148, at paras. 46-52; R. v. Chretien, 2014 ONCA 403, 309 C.C.C. (3d) 418, at paras. 48-55.

18 Subsequently, in R. v. Youvarajah, 2013 SCC 41, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 720, at para. 30, the Supreme Court of Canada re-affirmed that threshold reliability may be established by: (1) the presence of adequate substitutes for testing truth and accuracy (procedural reliability); and/or (2) sufficient circumstantial guarantees of reliability, or an inherent trustworthiness (substantive reliability), and noted that these two principal ways of demonstrating threshold reliability are "not mutually exclusive." See R. v. Devine, 2008 SCC 36, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 283, at para. 22; R. v. Singh, 2010 ONCA 808, 266 C.C.C. (3d) 466, at para. 34; R. v. Adjei, 2013 ONCA 512, 309 O.A.C. 328, at paras. 32-40; R. v. Carroll, 2014 ONCA 2, 304 C.C.C. (3d) 252, at paras. 99-105; R. v. M.C., 2014 ONCA 611, 314 C.C.C. (3d) 336, at paras. 52-57; R. v. Kanagalingam, 2014 ONCA 727, 315 C.C.C. (3d) 199, at para. 31; R. v. Napope, 2015 ABCA 27, at paras. 26-34; R. v. Nataucappo, 2015 SKCA 28, [2015] S.J. No. 155, at paras. 30-40.

19 In R. v. J.M., 2010 ONCA 117, 251 C.C.C. (3d) 325, at para. 54, Watt J.A., delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, observed that, where a party seeks to satisfy the requirement of reliability on the basis of the circumstances in which the hearsay statement was made, some of the relevant factors to be considered include: (1) the timing of the statement in relation to the event reported; (2) the absence of a motive to lie on the part of the declarant; (3) the presence or absence of leading questions or other forms of prompting; (4) the nature of the event reported; (5) the likelihood of the declarant's knowledge of the event, apart from its occurrence; and (6) confirmation of the event reported by physical evidence. Watt J.A. also noted that this inquiry involves a "functional" consideration of whether the circumstances in which the statement was made "have sufficiently allayed concerns about perception, memory, sincerity and narration, the traditional and inherent hearsay dangers." See R. v. D.(G.N.) (1993), 1993 CanLII 14712 (ON CA), 81 C.C.C. (3d) 65 (Ont.C.A.), at pp. 78-79, R. v. P.C.C., 2007 ONCA 236, [2007] O.J. No. 1171, at para. 6.

Analysis

Are the utterances admissible under the “present intentions” / “state of mind” hearsay exception?

[25] In R. v. Starr (2000) 2000 SCC 40, S.C.J. 40 the “present intentions” exception to the hearsay rule was explained in the following manner at paras. 67-68:

67 It is common cause that the "present intentions" exception may not be used to infer that a third party acted in accordance with the declarant's stated intention. Doherty J., as he then was, explained the permissible chain of inferences in P. (R.), supra, at p. 343:

Evidence of the deceased's state of mind may, in turn, be relevant as circumstantial evidence that the deceased subsequently acted in accordance with that avowed state of mind. When a deceased says, "I will go to Ottawa tomorrow", the statement affords direct evidence of the state of mind — an intention to go to Ottawa tomorrow — and circumstantial evidence that the deceased in fact went to Ottawa on that day. If either the state of mind, or the fact to be inferred from the existence of the state of mind is relevant, the evidence is receivable subject to objections based on undue prejudice.

Later at p. 344, Doherty J. wrote: "The evidence is not, however, admissible . . . to show that persons other than the deceased acted in accordance with the deceased's stated intentions, save perhaps cases where the act was a joint one involving the deceased and another person." Lamer C.J. adopted this statement of the joint act exception in Smith, supra, at pp. 926-27.

68 This exception simply recognizes basic principles of logic. As Professor R. J. Delisle explains in "R. v. Smith: The Relevance of Hearsay" (1991), 2 C.R. (4th) 260, at p. 264:

The statement of the declarant's then state of mind should be received as evidence of that state of mind. ... The next step in the chain — whether an inference should be drawn that the deceased acted in accordance with that state of mind, by himself, or jointly with another — presents a problem, not of hearsay, but of relevance and prejudicial value.

Doherty J. properly recognized this in P. (R.), supra, at pp. 346-49.

[26] In R. v. Griffin, 2009 SCC 28, [2009] 2 S.C.R 42 at para 59, Justice Charron, writing for the majority of the court, adopted a portion of the majority decision from Starr at para. 168 and held that “declarations of present state of mind are admissible under the traditional exception to the hearsay rule where the declarant’s state of mind is relevant and the statement is made in a natural manner and not under circumstances of suspicion.” She went on to observe, at para. 61, that “the state of the relationship between a deceased and an accused in the time period leading up to the former’s murder has been recognized as probative of the issue of motive”.

[27] In my view, Ms. Nugent’s utterances are admissible as statements of her intention or state of mind.

[28] Applying the Griffin analysis, I conclude, first, that Ms. Nugent’s state of mind is likely to be relevant at this trial.

[29] I have no difficulty in concluding that Ms. Nugent’s state of mind is relevant to the issue of Mr. Copeland’s motive to kill her. There is no issue that the two of them were involved in some sort of relationship and that Mr. Copeland was staying at Ms. Nugent’s apartment. Had Ms. Nugent followed through on her stated intention to break things off with Mr. Copeland, this may have provided some motive to Mr. Copeland to be angry with her. While the Crown need not prove motive, it seems to me that this is a case in which Mr. Copeland’s motive to kill the person with whom he was in a relationship is likely to be significant.

[30] Moreover, given that it is anticipated that the defence will advance a position that Mr. Copeland acted in self-defence, I find that her state of mind is relevant to the issue of who, as between them, may have been the aggressor in whatever conflict may have emerged before she was killed. Her state of mind is an important factor to be considered when assessing the reasonableness of a claim of self-defence by him.

[31] Second, in my view, Ms. Nugent’s utterances were “made in a natural manner and not under circumstances of suspicion”. Ms. Wrigley’s evidence is that Ms. Nugent spoke about ending the relationship in a relatively unprompted manner, and in response to a question as to whether she needed a ride home. She was speaking to people with whom she was friendly, but not close. There is no basis upon which to conclude that she had any reason to mislead either Ms. Wrigley or Mr. Gibson about her relationship or her plan to end it. I did not understand there to have been any real argument made that this statement was made under “any circumstances of suspicion”.

[32] On the basis of this analysis, I find that Ms. Nugent’s utterances are admissible as evidence of her intention. They are direct evidence of her state of mind in the period very shortly before Mr. Copeland killed her. They are also circumstantial evidence as to what she may have said to Mr. Copeland in the period after leaving the bar before she was killed.

Are the utterances admissible under the principled approach to hearsay?

[33] In addition, it is my view that Ms. Nugent’s utterances are admissible under the principled approach to hearsay evidence.

[34] Mr. Sapiano has advanced a number of arguments in support of his position that the utterances are not sufficiently reliable to be admissible. I will address each of these.

[35] First, defence counsel makes much of the fact that Ms. Wrigley qualified her evidence from what it had been at the preliminary inquiry, which was that Ms. Nugent said she was going to break it off that night to evidence that she assumed Ms. Nugent was going to break it off that night even though Ms. Nugent did not say so. It is the defence position that without an assertion by Ms. Nugent about the timing, the evidence loses its probative force and, indeed, its relevance.

[36] I accept that there is a difference between what was said previously and Ms. Wrigley’s evidence on the voir dire. However, I am not persuaded that this means that the evidence is not relevant. Its relevance lies in the fact that Ms. Nugent had indicated that she intended to end the relationship, not the precise timing of when she planned to do so. As I have already discussed, the utterances are relevant to a potential motive for Mr. Copeland and to the issue of any claim he will make of having acted in self-defence. It may or may not be the case that Ms. Nugent told Mr. Copeland of her intention when he picked her up that night or the following morning at some point before she was killed. That will be for the jury to consider in light of what Ms. Nugent said to Ms. Wrigley. In my view, while the change in Ms. Wrigley’s might affect the impact that the utterances have on the jury, the change does not reduce the relevance of the evidence in a significant manner.

[37] Mr. Sapiano also raises a concern about the fact that the Crown did not call Ms. Wrigley’s boyfriend, Mr. Gibson, to testify on the voir dire as to what he heard. I understand his position to be that this results in a gap about the context in which Ms. Nugent’s utterances were made. He suggests that multiple accounts of the same utterance enhance the reliability of what was said and that in this case, the jury will have only Ms. Wrigley’s recollection. Further, the argument is made that the utterances are being tendered without context that is important to understand precisely what Ms. Nugent meant by the utterances.

[38] While I agree that it may have been helpful to hear from more than one witness as to what Ms. Nugent said, there is, as Mr. Sapiano concedes, no legal requirement that the Crown adduce evidence from everyone who may have heard Ms. Nugent’s utterances.

[39] In my view, Ms. Wrigley’s evidence was balanced and fair in that she acknowledged not having a perfect recollection of everything that was said or being able to repeat what was said verbatim. She also acknowledged not having been a party to the entire conversation. Really, what she recalls is that in response to being offered a ride home, Ms. Nugent said she did not need one, that the person with whom she as in a relationship was coming to get her, and that she was going to end the relationship and be free of him. There was no doubt from her evidence as a whole that Ms. Wrigley recalls these utterances having been made. I found that she had a good recollection of the critical components of the utterances. I do not accept that her memory is unreliable about these critical utterances. While a second person’s evidence as to what was said may well have enhanced the reliability of Ms. Wrigley’s evidence, I do not find the absence of Mr. Gibson’s evidence to be fatal to the reliability assessment of the utterances, given the clear recollection that Ms. Wrigley has of the critical components of what Ms. Nugent said.

[40] Mr Sapiano also says that the utterances are open to more than one interpretation. He has provided a number of cases in which courts have concluded that because an accused’s utterances were open to multiple interpretations, they should not be permitted to be adduced before a jury.

[41] For instance, in R. v. Ferris, 1994 ABCA 120; affirmed 1994 CanLII 31 (SCC), [1994] S.C.J. 97, the trial judge ruled admissible the accused’s statement, allegedly overheard by a police officer while the accused was speaking with his father, that “I killed David”. Noting, at para. 17, that there were “no facts or context from which the true meaning of the words can be inferred”, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge had erred in admitting the utterance. The Court of Appeal concluded that because the utterances could have been in any context, and because neither the trial judge nor the jury could conclude the meaning of the words, they were not relevant and had no probative value.

[42] Similar comments about the significance of context to statements attributed to n accused were made by Goudge J.A., for the Court of Appeal, in R. v. Hunter, 2001 CanLII 5637 (ON CA), [2001] O.J. 2388, another decision relied upon by the defence. In that case, the trial judge admitted into evidence a statement alleged to have been made by the accused to his lawyer, and which was overheard by a passerby, that “I had a gun but I didn’t point it”. Goudge J.A. held, at para. 21, that without the surrounding words, it was impossible for the trier of fact to determine whether the utterance was an admission, or what it meant, and concluded that the statement should have been excluded.

[43] A similar conclusion was reached by Sproat J. in R. v. Mattson, [2012] O.J. No. 2276, another case relied upon by the defence, in which the accused’s allegedly inculpatory statement was found to lack context.

[44] In my view, Mr. Sapiano’s position lacks the same force in this case as it had in the cases relied upon by the defence.

[45] First, in those cases, the courts were considering allegedly inculpatory statements made by an accused. Out of context, these statements were admissions of having committed the offences alleged. It was critical, therefore, for the trier of fact to have the context, without which the prejudicial effect of the evidence greatly exceeded its probative value. It is noteworthy that courts in those cases were considering probative force versus prejudicial effect, that than threshold reliability.

[46] Second, and more importantly, I do not see this as a case in which there is an absence of necessary context. The context of the utterances was a casual conversation between people that were friendly and the end of a work shift. Ms. Wrigley and Mr. Gibson made the offer to Ms. Nugent of a ride home. Her response is that she did not need one. She then seems to have, somewhat spontaneously, added that she was going to break off the relationship with the person who was going to be driving her home. In my opinion, there is sufficient context from Ms. Wrigley to determine the meaning of what I find are straightforward utterances by Ms. Nugent. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what further context there might have been, or could be needed to understand that meaning of these utterances.

[47] In my opinion, the case before me is qualitatively different than those relied upon by Mr. Sapiano. This is a case in which the relevant context is present and in which I do not think the utterances lend themselves to ambiguity or misunderstanding. Certainly, no argument was advanced before me as to what that ambiguity might be or what further context was lacking.

[48] In my view, the circumstances in which these utterances were made suggest that the utterances are inherently trustworthy. I reach this conclusion after having considered all of the factors set out in the cases I have referred to above. In particular, bearing in mind the factors set out by Watt J.A. in J.M., I rely upon the following factors:

a. The circumstances in which the utterances were made was in response to an innocuous question. Ms. Nugent appears to have spontaneously and gratuitously, without prompting, said what she is alleged to have said. Certainly, there is an absence of any evidence that Ms. Nugent was asked any leading questions or prompted to even discuss her relationship with Mr. Copeland;

b. The utterances were made to people that Ms. Nugent knew, but not people she knew particularly well. There is no evidence that she would have had any motive or reason to falsely say that she was going to break up with Mr. Copeland;

c. Given the spontaneous manner in which the utterances were made, there is no reason to doubt their truthfulness;

d. There are no issues respecting Ms. Nugent’s condition at the time of her utterances;

e. Ms. Wrigley reported this utterance to the police very shortly after hearing that Ms. Nugent had been killed;

f. While there was little detail in the utterances, they indicate what can be described as a clear intention.

[49] I conclude that the hearsay utterances of Ms. Nugent are admissible through Ms. Wrigley for their truth.

Woollcombe J.

Released: June 1, 2018

COURT FILE NO.: 47/17

DATE: 20180601

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

– and –

Malcolm Copeland

REASONS FOR DECISION

Admissibility of hearsay statement of the deceased

Woollcombe J.

Released: June 1, 2018