Jennifer Woollcombe

The offender was found guilty by a jury of human trafficking, receiving a material benefit, and procuring.

The court sentenced the offender to 6 years and 2 months for human trafficking and 3 years concurrent for receiving a material benefit, with the procuring charge conditionally stayed.

The court applied the Tang/Miller factors, noting the offender's significant control and coercion over the vulnerable victim over an 18-month period.

The sentence was reduced by 153 days to account for Summers and Duncan credits for harsh pre-sentence custody, as well as mitigation for onerous bail conditions.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of attempting to import one kilogram of cocaine and attempting to possess it for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a three-year custodial sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered extensive social context evidence detailing the offender's experiences with anti-Black racism, poverty, and systemic disadvantages.

Finding that her moral culpability was reduced by her minor role as a courier and her significant rehabilitative efforts, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years of probation.

The two accused were jointly charged with importing cocaine after arriving at Pearson International Airport from Trinidad and Tobago with over 4.9 kilograms of cocaine concealed in their luggage.

Both accused testified that they believed they were smuggling money, jewellery, or documents for a friend, and had been repeatedly assured that no drugs were involved.

The court found that while the accused's evidence was troubling and not entirely believable, it raised a reasonable doubt as to their actual knowledge.

Furthermore, the Crown failed to prove wilful blindness, as the accused had made some inquiries that lowered their suspicions, and the court was not convinced they deliberately refrained from further inquiries to remain ignorant.

Both accused were acquitted.

The applicant, a police sergeant, sought a stay of criminal proceedings for assault and assault with a weapon, alleging abuse of process and violations of his Charter rights (ss. 7, 10(b), 15).

He argued that the police improperly re-investigated him after initially taking criminal charges "off the table" and compelling a statement under the Police Services Act, and that his solicitor-client consultation was improperly videotaped.

The court dismissed the application, finding no bad faith or ulterior motive in the re-investigation, that the compelled statement was inadmissible at trial, and that the inadvertent video recording without audio did not breach his Charter rights or privilege, thus not warranting a stay.

The applicant, Mary Thompson, sought a stay of proceedings for fraud over $5,000, alleging Charter violations (ss. 7 and 11(d)) due to the Crown's failure to obtain and disclose "handwritten calculated forms" essential for her defence.

The Crown argued the documents were never in their possession and were missing before the investigation began.

The court found no s. 7 breach by the Crown or police regarding the missing forms, as they were likely lost before the investigation began and were never in the Crown's possession.

The court deferred the application for a stay to the trial judge, emphasizing that such decisions are usually made at the end of the trial to better assess prejudice.

The court also rejected the applicant's submission that the Crown's decision to proceed without an independent forensic audit constituted an abuse of process.

The applicant, Omar Al-Rubaye, sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) right to a trial without unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial completion was 1762 days, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling set by R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed periods of defence delay and exceptional circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

After deducting 574 days of defence delay and 450 days attributable to the pandemic, the remaining delay was 738 days (24.26 months), falling below the presumptive ceiling.

The court found the applicant failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite proceedings and that the case took markedly longer than reasonable, particularly given the impact of the pandemic on court operations.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The applicant, Jahvar Green, charged with multiple firearms offences, brought a pre-trial application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude a firearm found in a car he was driving.

He argued arbitrary detention (s. 9) due to racial profiling and unreasonable search/use of force (ss. 7, 8).

The court found no racial profiling, as the officer did not see the applicant's race before the initial interaction.

The court also ruled that no detention occurred when the applicant fled from the officer's initial signal to stop, as there was no submission or acquiescence.

Detention began lawfully when the applicant was directed to stop in a Starbucks drive-thru.

The court further found the officer's belief that a firearm was in a satchel was objectively reasonable, justifying the search and use of force.

The application to exclude the firearm was dismissed.

The self-represented plaintiff, a tenant of the defendant, brought a motion for leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against the defendant's property to prevent its impending sale.

The plaintiff claimed an entitlement to a portion of the sale proceeds based on an alleged agreement.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff's claim for monetary damages did not constitute a proprietary interest in the land, which is a prerequisite for a CPL.

Costs were awarded to the defendant on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $17,606.64 due to the plaintiff's strategic attempt to thwart the sale.

The applicant, a victim of and witness to a shooting, brought an application to quash a search warrant and an assistance order for her cell phone.

The police had seized the phone during a lawful search of her vehicle and subsequently obtained a warrant to search the phone's contents, along with an assistance order compelling her to provide the password.

The applicant argued the seizure was unlawful, the warrant lacked grounds, and the assistance order violated her section 7 Charter right to silence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding the initial seizure lawful, the search warrant validly issued with sufficient grounds, and the assistance order constitutional as the applicant was not an accused or suspect.

The appellant, a registered massage therapist, appealed his conviction for sexual assault against a client.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, misapprehended evidence, and erred in assessing credibility and the defence of mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge improperly used the complainant's prior police statement and absence of embellishment to bolster her credibility, and failed to make necessary factual findings regarding the appellant's evidence and whether he took reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

A new trial was ordered.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder for shooting his girlfriend three times, including while she was on the phone with a 911 operator.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 17 to 20 years, while the defence sought 10 to 12 years.

The court found the domestic nature of the homicide, the abuse of trust, the use of a firearm, and the callousness of the killing to be significant aggravating factors.

Mitigating factors included the accused's expressions of regret and the harsh conditions of his pre-trial custody during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court sentenced the accused to life imprisonment with a parole ineligibility period of 14 years.

The accused was charged with the first-degree murder of his intimate partner, whom he shot three times.

The defence argued that the accused was in a drug-induced psychosis at the time of the shooting and lacked the specific intent for murder, seeking a verdict of manslaughter.

The Crown argued the killing was planned and deliberate.

The court admitted various hearsay statements and preposterous utterances to assess the accused's state of mind.

The court rejected the defence's expert psychiatric evidence, finding the accused had the intent to kill.

However, the court found the Crown failed to prove the murder was planned and deliberate.

The accused was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The offender was convicted of impaired driving causing death and bodily harm, and criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm, after racing his vehicle while impaired and causing a fatal collision.

The Crown sought 5-6 years imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court found a conditional sentence inappropriate and sentenced the offender to 5 years in the penitentiary, alongside a 6-year driving prohibition, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The accused was charged with sexual assault after the complainant awoke to him having sexual intercourse with her.

The complainant testified she had no memory of returning to the accused's home due to intoxication and did not consent.

The accused claimed the complainant initiated the sexual activity while they were sleeping on the couch.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding the complainant lacked the capacity to consent while asleep and did not consent upon waking.

The court found no air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent and found the accused guilty.

The offender was convicted of four counts of sexual assault, one count of assault, and one count of forcible confinement against an intimate partner.

The offences occurred over a one-week period and involved forced sexual intercourse, physical violence, and manipulation.

The offender had a significant prior criminal record for similar offences against intimate partners and was on probation at the time.

Mitigating factors included an intellectual deficiency and restrictive bail conditions.

The court imposed a total sentence of 7 years, reduced by 221 days for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions, resulting in a net sentence of 6 years and 144 days.

The accused were charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and other offences following a traffic stop.

The driver threw a brick of cocaine out the window while the passenger resisted arrest.

The court rejected the driver's exculpatory testimony, finding him guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, but acquitted him of simple possession and dangerous driving.

The passenger was found guilty of possession of proceeds of crime and resisting arrest, but acquitted of the drug charges as there was insufficient evidence he knew the cocaine was in the vehicle.

During a joint criminal trial, one co-accused testified and implicated the other.

The implicated co-accused sought to cross-examine the testifying co-accused on a previously struck guilty plea and subsequently applied for severance.

The court ruled that cross-examination on a struck guilty plea is legally impermissible, as a struck plea must be treated as if it never happened to protect the presumption of innocence.

The court also dismissed the severance application, finding that a joint trial would not cause an injustice and that the implicated co-accused could still mount a full answer and defence without referencing the struck plea.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and sexual touching, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 28 months and 23 days.

The court deducted 58 days of defence delay, resulting in a net delay of 26 months and 21 days, which fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The court found that the applicant failed to establish that the delay was markedly longer than reasonably required, particularly given the scheduling challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought sole ownership of a jointly purchased property, where he had resided since 1991 and paid most expenses, arguing adverse possession under the Real Property Limitations Act, or alternatively, proprietary estoppel, unconscionability, or unjust enrichment.

The defendants, co-owners, sought partition and sale.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim for sole ownership, finding his possession was consensual and not adverse.

However, the court granted the defendants' request for partition and sale, but ordered an unequal distribution of proceeds (65% to the plaintiff, 35% to the defendants) based on unjust enrichment, recognizing the plaintiff's disproportionate financial contributions over 30 years.

The accused, Azar Sheikh, was charged with impaired driving causing death and bodily harm, drive over 80 causing death and bodily harm, dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm, and criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm following a fatal collision.

The Crown's case relied on inferences from eyewitness observations, expert toxicologist opinions regarding alcohol and MDMA levels, and accident reconstruction evidence.

The court found the accused guilty of impaired driving causing death and bodily harm, dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm, and criminal negligence causing death and bodily harm.

However, the accused was acquitted of the "drive over 80" charges due to reasonable doubt regarding the precise blood alcohol concentration at the time of the collision, given the variability in testing methods.

The court emphasized that the accused's impairment and excessive speed were significant contributing factors to the collision, well beyond de minimis.