Aaron Gold

The accused was charged with possessing a firearm without a licence under sections 91(1), 92(2), and 95(1) of the Criminal Code.

He was arrested following execution of a search warrant at his residence, though the warrant was originally directed at his son.

The accused brought a Garofoli application to set aside the search warrant and exclude the firearms seized from his home, arguing there was insufficient evidentiary basis in the Information to Obtain to support reasonable grounds that his son was in unlawful possession of a firearm and that the residence was his son's dwelling house.

The Crown conceded the redacted ITO was insufficient and requested a step-six procedure involving judicial summary review of unredacted portions.

The court found that on the available information, including unredacted paragraphs and the judicial summary, it was open to the issuing justice to find reasonable grounds that the son was in unlawful possession of a firearm and had sufficient residential attachment to the address to justify the warrant.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and refusal to provide a breath sample.

The Crown conceded the impaired operation charge.

The defendant challenged the refusal charge on Charter grounds, arguing a violation of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) and seeking exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The court found no Charter breach, concluding that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to contact counsel of his choice and deliberately delayed the investigative process.

The defendant was convicted of refusal to provide a breath sample.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired and over the legal limit, resisting arrest, and assault with intent to resist arrest, following her arrest at a banquet hall parking lot.

The Crown alleged the accused was found behind the wheel of her vehicle after leaving a Christmas party.

The accused applied for Charter relief alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter applications but acquitted the accused on the impaired and over 80 charges, finding she had rebutted the statutory presumption of care and control and that no realistic risk of danger existed.

The accused was convicted of resisting arrest but acquitted of assault with intent to resist arrest.

The accused, driving a tractor-trailer southbound on a snow-covered highway, attempted to pass another vehicle in poor visibility and whiteout conditions.

He collided with a northbound tractor-trailer, resulting in the death of the other driver.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that he lost control due to an unexpected whiteout, finding instead that he deliberately initiated an unsafe pass without checking for oncoming traffic.

The court concluded this manoeuvre was a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable driver and found the accused guilty of dangerous driving causing death.

Allen Taylor appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's decision to exclude only the second breath sample under s. 24(2) of the Charter, following a s. 10(b) right to counsel breach.

The appellant argued both breath samples should have been excluded and that the remaining evidence was insufficient for conviction.

The Superior Court found the trial judge erred in not excluding both breath samples, applying the principles from R. v. Pino regarding evidence obtained prior to a Charter breach.

However, the court upheld the impaired driving conviction, finding that even without the breath samples, the remaining eyewitness and police observation evidence was compelling and sufficient to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicants, three police officers charged with sexual assault, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to delay.

The Crown had obtained a direct indictment, moving the trial to the Superior Court without a preliminary inquiry.

The applicants argued the 18-month presumptive ceiling from Jordan should apply because they were denied a preliminary inquiry.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the 30-month ceiling applies to all cases tried in the Superior Court, regardless of whether a preliminary inquiry actually occurs.

As the anticipated delay was 28 months, falling below the 30-month ceiling, the application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused, Terrence Kum, brought an application for a stay of proceedings, alleging abuse of process due to the Crown's historical and deliberate non-disclosure of relevant information and the loss of evidentiary material.

The application centered on alleged police misconduct within the Toronto Airport Drug Enforcement Unit (TADEU), specifically concerning Officer Ross Adair's involvement in a prior investigation (Project E-Plug) where notes were falsified.

The defence argued that the Crown's disclosure regarding TADEU corruption was insufficient and prejudiced the accused's right to make full answer and defence.

The court found that while the Crown could have provided more comprehensive disclosure, the information provided was sufficient to put previous defence counsel on notice.

The court determined that the defence failed to exercise due diligence in pursuing further disclosure and that the misconduct, while egregious, did not relate directly to the accused's case (Project O’Cook) to the extent that it warranted a stay.

The court dismissed the application, concluding that the conduct did not meet the "clearest of cases" threshold for a stay, and the Court of Appeal's order for a new trial provided an adequate alternative remedy.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath test results under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to demand a breath sample and that the accused was properly informed of the reasons for detention and arrest.

However, the court found that the breath technician breached the accused's right to counsel under section 10(b) by withholding the first breath test result, thereby preventing the accused from making an informed decision about whether to seek legal advice.

The second breath test result was excluded.

The accused was convicted of impaired operation based on the totality of the evidence, including observations of poor driving, physical signs of impairment, and the first breath test result.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The accused calculated the total delay as exceeding thirteen months from arrest to trial date, arguing it exceeded the Morin guideline of eight to ten months.

The court dismissed the application, finding that pre-charge delay cannot be included in the section 11(b) analysis, that a reasonable intake period must be deducted for the extensive disclosure requests, and that the remaining institutional delay of approximately ten months fell within the guideline.

The court also found little evidence of actual prejudice and emphasized the strong societal interest in a trial on the merits for drinking and driving offences.

The defendant pleaded guilty to eight criminal offences including possession of ephedrine for export, selling a natural health product without a licence, possession of proceeds of crime exceeding $1.3 million, money laundering of $8.9 million, and tax fraud against the Canadian government.

The offences occurred over an extended period from 2007 to 2010 and involved a sophisticated, large-scale commercial operation.

The defendant was the directing mind of the enterprise, not merely a courier.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less one day in a provincial reformatory, followed by two years probation and a ten-year firearms ban, rejecting the defence submission for a conditional sentence despite mitigating factors including the defendant's guilty plea, cooperation with authorities, first-time offender status, and family support.

The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter after originally being charged with second degree murder in the death of his common law spouse.

Psychiatric evidence established that the offender suffered from a persecutory-type delusional disorder that significantly diminished his moral culpability.

The court considered the sentencing range for domestic manslaughter and the mitigating effect of mental illness, concluding that denunciation and deterrence carried reduced weight where the offence arose from severe psychiatric impairment.

The court imposed a custodial sentence within the agreed range and addressed the proper credit for pre‑sentence custody under s. 719 of the Criminal Code following amendments introduced by the Truth in Sentencing Act.

The offender received enhanced credit of 1.2:1 for time spent in pre‑sentence custody based on the particular circumstances of detention, including mental health considerations and institutional conditions.