Richelle Pollard

The defendants sought costs of a variance motion on a substantial indemnity scale against the plaintiff's former counsel, Monkhouse Law Professional Corporation.

The court found that while Monkhouse's conduct in the underlying action warranted a varied costs order, its conduct during the variance motion itself was professional and not reprehensible.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs and fixed costs at $30,000 all-inclusive, representing a mid-point between the parties' submissions.

The defendants in a decertified class action brought a motion to vary a $100,000 costs order to make Class Counsel, rather than the representative plaintiff, responsible for payment.

Class Counsel had refused to pay the costs, claiming they were not retained for 'collections' and refusing to disclose whether their retainer included a standard costs indemnity.

The court found it was not functus officio because the lack of a costs indemnity was new and critical evidence that contradicted the standard practice and representations made at certification.

Relying on Rule 59.06, its inherent jurisdiction, and section 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, the court varied the costs order to add Class Counsel as a party responsible for payment.

The respondent requested an order barring the applicant from adding new allegations to his human rights application through his witness statement and from seeking remedies beyond those set out in the application.

The Tribunal held that the applicant could only rely on allegations that were raised with some particularity in the Application or Reply.

Several new allegations in the witness statement were excluded.

However, the Tribunal granted the applicant's request to amend the monetary and non-monetary remedies sought, noting that the Tribunal retains discretion to determine appropriate remedies if a Code violation is found.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC), an intervenor in a case challenging the constitutionality of section 25(2.1) of the Human Rights Code, requested an extension of time to file an expert report in reply to the respondent's expert report on labour relations.

The respondent and the Attorney General opposed the request, citing prejudice and delay.

The Tribunal granted the extension, finding that the contents of the respondent's expert report could not have been fully anticipated and that procedural fairness favoured allowing the OHRC to provide rebuttal evidence regarding section 1 of the Charter.

The Tribunal concluded that the extension would not cause undue prejudice as the opposing parties would still have sufficient time to prepare for cross-examination.

The applicant alleged age discrimination under the Human Rights Code after his health benefits ended at age 65.

The Tribunal previously found that s. 25(2.1) of the Code is a complete defence unless it is found unconstitutional.

Two teachers' unions, OECTA and ETFO, sought intervenor status to address the constitutional issues.

The respondent and the Attorney General requested limitations on their participation, including a requirement to act jointly.

The Tribunal granted the unions full intervenor status without the requested limitations, finding that their perspectives on the administration of benefits and the impact on older workers would assist the Tribunal in this significant constitutional challenge.

The applicant alleged that the respondent school board breached the Human Rights Code on the basis of age when his health benefits ended at age 65.

The Tribunal previously found that s. 25(2.1) of the Code is a complete defence unless it is found to be unconstitutional.

The Ontario Confederation of University Faculty Associations (OCUFA) requested to intervene in the constitutional challenge.

The Tribunal granted the request, finding that OCUFA has a significant interest in the issues and will make a special contribution to the case given its longstanding advocacy regarding mandatory retirement and the rights of faculty working past age 65.

The applicant, a teacher, alleged age discrimination and reprisal after his health benefits ceased at age 65.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found that section 25(2.1) of the Human Rights Code provides a complete defence to the age discrimination claim regarding benefits, meaning it has no reasonable prospect of success unless the applicant's constitutional challenge to that section succeeds.

The Tribunal also dismissed the reprisal claim, finding no evidence that the respondent threatened or took adverse action against the applicant when it negotiated a bridge funding agreement with his union.

The applicant requested an adjournment of a scheduled summary hearing because his spouse was undergoing medical treatment for a life-threatening illness.

The respondent objected to the request.

The Tribunal found that the seriousness of the illness and treatment constituted extraordinary circumstances justifying the adjournment under its Practice Direction.

The adjournment was granted.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging age discrimination and reprisal, while also having an ongoing Small Claims Court action seeking damages for injury to dignity.

The Tribunal declined to defer the application to the civil proceeding because the respondent took the position that the court lacked jurisdiction due to the applicant's union membership.

However, the Tribunal raised the issue of whether section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code barred the application entirely while the civil action remained active, and directed the parties to provide further written submissions on this jurisdictional issue.