Emma Phillips

During a case management meeting, the Employer refused to participate if a specific Union representative, who was facing criminal charges related to the workplace, was present.

The arbitrator declined to order the representative to leave the virtual meeting, noting there was no basis to do so.

The arbitrator then directed the parties to agree on a timeline for addressing outstanding production issues and an Agreed Statement of Fact, which was subsequently issued as an order.

In a group grievance alleging unreasonable workload for Case Managers, both the Union and the Employer sought pre-hearing production of documents and particulars.

The Arbitrator ordered the Employer to produce data on medical leaves, performance improvement plans, and workforce analysis from 2014 and 2018-2024, finding them arguably relevant to the Union's claims.

The Union was ordered to produce redacted individual workload survey results and to provide particulars explaining its assertion that 2014 workload levels were safe compared to later years.

The Employer's request for grievors' medical records was denied as premature.

The Grievance Settlement Board issued a procedural decision adjourning a scheduled hearing and setting a new date for case management.

The Employer was directed to make best efforts to provide requested particulars and documents, and to review outstanding production requests.

The Union was ordered to provide particulars regarding the nature of the continuing breach alleged in the 2018 grievance.

The applicant sought judicial review of two Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decisions finding she breached the confidentiality and non-disparagement clauses of a settlement agreement by posting about her human rights complaint on LinkedIn.

The Tribunal had ordered the applicant to repay the full settlement amount as liquidated damages and granted an anonymization order protecting the respondents' identities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal's interpretation of the settlement agreement, its enforcement of the liquidated damages clause, and its decision to grant anonymization were all reasonable.

The Abortion Rights Coalition of Canada (ARCC) brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an application for judicial review.

The underlying application challenged the City of Hamilton's decision to reject an advertisement submitted by the applicants for display on the City's transit system.

The court applied the test for intervention and found that ARCC had a real, substantial, and identifiable interest in the issues, and would provide a useful and distinct perspective regarding the broader potential impact of the decision.

The motion for leave to intervene was granted subject to conditions limiting the scope and length of ARCC's submissions.

The parties requested a teleconference to discuss procedural matters in advance of scheduled hearing dates.

The arbitrator directed that the hearing proceed via videoconference on the Zoom platform.

The employer agreed to provide a compendium of documents and proceed first with its evidence.

The parties were granted leave to request an in-person hearing for later dates if circumstances permit.

The parties disputed the interpretation of Minutes of Settlement regarding the grievor's entitlement to reimbursement for travel expenses incurred prior to the settlement.

The Association argued the expenses were not addressed in the settlement, while the Employer argued the settlement resolved all outstanding issues.

The Arbitrator directed the Employer to reimburse the grievor $1445.95 for travel expenses.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment based on race and age.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Defer because the facts of the application were part of an ongoing union grievance filed by the intervenor on behalf of the applicant.

The respondent and intervenor supported deferral, while the applicant made no submissions.

The Tribunal deferred the application pending the completion of the grievance proceeding to avoid the possibility of inconsistent decisions on the facts or law.

The Complainant, an Oracle Business Analyst, was discharged after a forensic investigation of a USB key found in the workplace revealed his involvement in sending anonymous emails containing false allegations against his Branch Director.

The USB key, which belonged to the Complainant, contained both personal files and highly confidential government documents.

The Association argued that the Employer's search of the USB key violated the Complainant's privacy rights and section 8 of the Charter, seeking to exclude the evidence under section 24(2).

The Grievance Settlement Board held that the Complainant had a diminished expectation of privacy due to his use of the personal USB key for work-related purposes.

The Board found the Employer's search was reasonable, authorized by law, and minimally intrusive.

Even if a section 8 breach occurred, the Board concluded the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The motion to exclude the evidence was denied.

The Complainant's employment was terminated based on the contents of a USB stick found in the workplace.

At the hearing, the Association argued that examining the USB stick violated the Complainant's privacy rights and sought to exclude the evidence.

The Employer raised a preliminary objection, arguing the Association waived this right by not raising it earlier in the dispute resolution process as required by the collective agreement.

The Grievance Settlement Board dismissed the Employer's objection, finding that the privacy objection was a legal argument, not 'information' or 'facts' required to be disclosed under the collective agreement, and that the Association had not waived its right to challenge the admissibility of the evidence.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC), an intervenor in a case challenging the constitutionality of section 25(2.1) of the Human Rights Code, requested an extension of time to file an expert report in reply to the respondent's expert report on labour relations.

The respondent and the Attorney General opposed the request, citing prejudice and delay.

The Tribunal granted the extension, finding that the contents of the respondent's expert report could not have been fully anticipated and that procedural fairness favoured allowing the OHRC to provide rebuttal evidence regarding section 1 of the Charter.

The Tribunal concluded that the extension would not cause undue prejudice as the opposing parties would still have sufficient time to prepare for cross-examination.

The applicant alleged age discrimination under the Human Rights Code after his health benefits ended at age 65.

The Tribunal previously found that s. 25(2.1) of the Code is a complete defence unless it is found unconstitutional.

Two teachers' unions, OECTA and ETFO, sought intervenor status to address the constitutional issues.

The respondent and the Attorney General requested limitations on their participation, including a requirement to act jointly.

The Tribunal granted the unions full intervenor status without the requested limitations, finding that their perspectives on the administration of benefits and the impact on older workers would assist the Tribunal in this significant constitutional challenge.

The applicant alleged that the respondent school board breached the Human Rights Code on the basis of age when his health benefits ended at age 65.

The Tribunal previously found that s. 25(2.1) of the Code is a complete defence unless it is found to be unconstitutional.

The Ontario Confederation of University Faculty Associations (OCUFA) requested to intervene in the constitutional challenge.

The Tribunal granted the request, finding that OCUFA has a significant interest in the issues and will make a special contribution to the case given its longstanding advocacy regarding mandatory retirement and the rights of faculty working past age 65.

The union grieved that the employer (WSIB) breached the collective agreement regarding organizational and technological changes.

The Grievance Settlement Board found that the employer breached Article 6.03(a) by failing to initiate discussions with the union as soon as possible during the planning of organizational changes.

The Board also found that the employer's notice under Article 6.03(c) did not comply with the collective agreement because it listed far more employees than positions affected.

Furthermore, the employer breached the agreement by placing employees in lower-salaried positions via Voluntary Exit matches without their consent.

Finally, while the collective agreement language did not preclude 'early bumps' (displacing less senior employees before the end of the notice period), the employer was estopped from doing so for the life of the current collective agreement due to past representations.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination and reprisal in employment.

The Faculty Association requested to intervene as the applicant's bargaining agent, which the Tribunal granted.

The respondent requested to defer the application pending an internal workplace investigation.

The Tribunal denied the deferral request, holding that an internal investigation is not a legal proceeding that could lead to inconsistent findings of fact or law.

The union sought production of documents related to organizational and technological changes noticed in 2012.

The Grievance Settlement Board ordered the employer to produce all relevant documents received or created by its Executive Committee or Board of Directors regarding the planning or implementation of those changes.

The Union sought interim relief to halt the Employer's new expedited bumping practices during a period of organizational change, arguing it caused irreparable harm to employees who were bumped before their notice periods expired.

The Employer argued the Board lacked jurisdiction to grant substantive interim relief and that the balance of harm favoured the Employer.

Assuming jurisdiction without deciding it, the Vice-Chair dismissed the application, finding that the Union failed to establish that the balance of harm favoured granting the relief, as any harm could be adequately addressed with a remedial response at the conclusion of the proceeding.

The York University Faculty Association brought a motion to be added as a party or intervenor in a judicial review application challenging a decision of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The applicant, who was self-represented, clarified during the hearing that he was abandoning any challenge to the Tribunal's decision regarding the Association's status or participation.

Based on this concession, the court found it was not necessary to add the Association as a party under Rule 5.03 to effectively adjudicate the issues.

The court dismissed the Association's motion and the applicant's cross-motion, with no costs awarded.

The respondents brought a Request for Order During Proceeding seeking the early dismissal of the human rights application on the basis that it was an abuse of process.

The applicant had engaged in extensive, duplicative litigation across multiple forums, including grievances, OLRB applications, and judicial reviews, repeatedly making unfounded allegations of bias and impropriety against decision-makers and opposing counsel.

The Tribunal found that the applicant was a vexatious litigant who was maintaining the proceeding for the ulterior purpose of harassing the respondents and preventing his termination.

The application was dismissed as an abuse of process.

The applicant faculty association sought judicial review of an arbitration award that dismissed a policy grievance regarding the university's publication of student evaluations of teaching (SET) scores.

The arbitrator had found that publishing the scores did not violate the collective agreement or the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA).

The Divisional Court applied the Dunsmuir framework, determining that the standard of review for the collective agreement interpretation was reasonableness, and for the FIPPA interpretation was correctness.

The court upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding her interpretation of 'personal information' in the collective agreement reasonable and her application of the employment-related records exclusion in FIPPA correct.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.