Michael Smyth

In an ongoing grievance arbitration under the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act, the parties failed to meet a previously established timetable regarding amounts the employer asserted were owing.

Following a hearing, the arbitrator ordered a new timetable, requiring the union to advise the employer of its position on amounts owing for the 2015-2019 period by November 20, 2020, and for the pre-2015 period by January 29, 2021.

The union grieved the employer's unilateral decision to restrict operational staff from starting work before 7:30 a.m., alleging it breached the collective agreement's provisions on start times and constituted bargaining in bad faith.

The Grievance Settlement Board dismissed the bad faith bargaining allegation, finding it fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ontario Labour Relations Board.

However, the Board held that the employer breached the collective agreement by imposing a blanket restriction on start times without engaging in the required individual meetings to consider business needs and seniority.

The grievance was allowed in part, and the employer was directed to consider start time requests on an individual basis.

The union grieved that the employer (WSIB) breached the collective agreement regarding organizational and technological changes.

The Grievance Settlement Board found that the employer breached Article 6.03(a) by failing to initiate discussions with the union as soon as possible during the planning of organizational changes.

The Board also found that the employer's notice under Article 6.03(c) did not comply with the collective agreement because it listed far more employees than positions affected.

Furthermore, the employer breached the agreement by placing employees in lower-salaried positions via Voluntary Exit matches without their consent.

Finally, while the collective agreement language did not preclude 'early bumps' (displacing less senior employees before the end of the notice period), the employer was estopped from doing so for the life of the current collective agreement due to past representations.

The union sought production of documents related to organizational and technological changes noticed in 2012.

The Grievance Settlement Board ordered the employer to produce all relevant documents received or created by its Executive Committee or Board of Directors regarding the planning or implementation of those changes.

The Union sought interim relief to halt the Employer's new expedited bumping practices during a period of organizational change, arguing it caused irreparable harm to employees who were bumped before their notice periods expired.

The Employer argued the Board lacked jurisdiction to grant substantive interim relief and that the balance of harm favoured the Employer.

Assuming jurisdiction without deciding it, the Vice-Chair dismissed the application, finding that the Union failed to establish that the balance of harm favoured granting the relief, as any harm could be adequately addressed with a remedial response at the conclusion of the proceeding.

The union filed an individual grievance alleging that the employer's new rule requiring operational staff to start work no earlier than 7:30 a.m. discriminated against the grievor on the basis of disability.

The grievor, who suffered from depression and had a long commute, requested an accommodation to start at 7:00 a.m.

The arbitrator dismissed the grievance, finding that the grievor's difficulties stemmed from her personal choices regarding her residence and flex-time schedule, and that there was no discriminatory effect.

The union grieved the employer's decision to impose a general rule that operational staff must commence work no earlier than 7:30 a.m., alleging it discriminated against the grievor on the basis of family status.

The grievor, who previously started work at 6:50 a.m., claimed the new schedule interfered with her ability to care for her 14-year-old son, who has ADHD and requires supervision after school.

The arbitrator applied the test for family status discrimination, which requires a serious interference with a substantial parental obligation.

The grievance was dismissed because the grievor had not explored or attempted to arrange any form of after-school supervision, failing to establish a serious interference with her family responsibilities.

The union filed a grievance alleging that the employer's new rule requiring operational staff to commence work no earlier than 7:30 a.m. discriminated against the grievor on the basis of family status.

The grievor, who previously started at 7:00 a.m., argued the change interfered with her ability to transport her special needs children to school.

The arbitrator applied the test for family status discrimination, requiring a serious interference with a substantial parental obligation.

The arbitrator found that the grievor and her husband were able to adjust their schedules to accommodate the half-hour change, and therefore no prima facie case of discrimination was established.

The grievance was dismissed.

The union grieved the employer's decision to impose a general rule that operational staff must commence work no earlier than 7:30 a.m., alleging it discriminated against the grievor on the basis of family status.

The grievor, who had worked from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. for 20 years, was the primary caregiver for her 91-year-old father and her husband.

The arbitrator applied the test for family status discrimination, requiring a serious interference with a substantial family obligation.

The arbitrator found that while an earlier start time would ease the grievor's schedule, the employer's rule did not amount to a serious interference with a substantial family obligation, and thus no duty to accommodate arose.

The grievance was dismissed.

The applicant alleged discrimination and reprisal after being asked by the respondent's staff to move from a park bench near its drop-in centre, pursuant to a 'good neighbour' policy.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing and dismissed the application, finding no reasonable prospect of success as the applicant failed to link the respondent's actions to a prohibited ground of discrimination or identify a reprisal for asserting Code rights.

The Grievance Settlement Board issued a procedural decision establishing a case management process for a policy grievance and 147 individual grievances concerning the implementation of flex-time language in the collective agreement.

The parties agreed that the Vice-Chair would take jurisdiction over the individual grievances, which would be heard at the grievors' work locations following a specific expedited process involving will-say statements.

The policy grievance will be heard in parallel proceedings.

The respondent requested that the human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of sex (pregnancy) be dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing that the substance of the application was already dealt with by an Employment Standards officer (ESO).

The Tribunal found that while the ESA complaint constituted another proceeding, the ESO's decision lacked sufficient analysis and did not appropriately deal with the substance of the human rights application, particularly regarding the timing of the pregnancy disclosure and the reprisal allegations.

The request to dismiss the application was denied.

The applicant faculty association sought judicial review of an arbitration award that dismissed a policy grievance regarding the university's publication of student evaluations of teaching (SET) scores.

The arbitrator had found that publishing the scores did not violate the collective agreement or the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA).

The Divisional Court applied the Dunsmuir framework, determining that the standard of review for the collective agreement interpretation was reasonableness, and for the FIPPA interpretation was correctness.

The court upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding her interpretation of 'personal information' in the collective agreement reasonable and her application of the employment-related records exclusion in FIPPA correct.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.