Paul Cavalluzzo

The Ontario government appealed a decision finding that the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which imposed a 1% cap on compensation increases for broader public sector employees, violated the right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the Act substantially interfered with the respondents' collective bargaining rights and was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as it was not minimally impairing and its deleterious effects outweighed its salutary effects.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to limit the declaration of invalidity to represented employees, as non-represented employees do not benefit from the same collective bargaining protections.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Election Finances Act that extended the pre-election restricted spending period for third-party political advertising from six to twelve months.

The court found that the 12-month restriction infringed freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Oakes test, the court held that while the objective of fostering fair elections was pressing and substantial, the 12-month period failed the minimal impairment test because the government's own experts indicated a six-month period was effective.

The impugned provisions were declared of no force or effect.

The applicants in a constitutional application requested leave to file factums exceeding the 30-page limit prescribed by the Practice Direction.

The Attorney General opposed the request.

The court denied the request, emphasizing that the 30-page limit is a serious policy intended to focus counsel on the issues, and that leave is exceptional and granted sparingly.

The court noted that since there was still a week before the factums were due, counsel had sufficient time to produce shorter, more focused versions.

In a priority dispute following the bankruptcy of a paving company, a bond company argued that funds held by the receiver in a project account were statutory trust funds under the Construction Lien Act and therefore excluded from the bankrupt's estate under s. 67(1)(a) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court dismissed the trust claim, finding that the funds lacked the certainty of subject matter required to constitute a true common law trust, as they were not identifiable or held separately prior to the receivership.

Consequently, the funds were to be distributed under the BIA scheme.

Following a successful constitutional challenge to back-to-work legislation, the applicants sought costs against the intervener, the employer.

The intervener sought costs against the applicants for a subsequent unsuccessful remedial motion.

The court analyzed the general rule that interveners are neither liable for nor entitled to costs, and the exceptions based on the intervener's direct private interest and level of participation.

The court found the intervener had a direct private interest in both proceedings.

The court ordered the intervener to pay $54,000 in costs for the main application, and ordered the applicants to pay $26,000 to the intervener for the remedial motion.