Stephen Aylward

A licensed paralegal sought leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal challenging the Law Society of Ontario's restrictions on the permitted scope of practice for paralegals in immigration matters.

The motion judge found the proposed intervener failed to identify how her intervention would assist the court beyond the contributions of the existing parties and three previously granted interveners.

The proposed intervener's own action against the LSO raising substantially similar issues had been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.

The motion was also brought well past the deadline for intervention motions.

Leave to intervene was denied with no order as to costs.

The appellant, a non-profit organization, sought public interest standing to bring nine applications for judicial review challenging decisions made by the Ontario Integrity Commissioner under the Lobbyists Registration Act.

The Divisional Court quashed the applications, finding the appellant lacked standing.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, agreeing that the applications did not raise a serious justiciable issue as they merely challenged individual exercises of discretion rather than statutory interpretation.

The Court also agreed that the applications were not a reasonable and effective means to bring the issues before the courts, as they would conflict with the statutory scheme and its strict confidentiality provisions.

Following a successful motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim as an abuse of process, the defendant sought substantial indemnity costs.

The court noted the defendant's initial failure to file a costs outline but accepted the late submission under Rule 57.01(5).

Given the finding of abuse of process and the plaintiff's failure to heed prior judicial warnings about the claim being a collateral attack on a criminal conviction, the court awarded the defendant substantial indemnity costs fixed at $12,000.

The defendant David Smith was successful on a motion for a permanent stay of the action against him due to the plaintiffs' failure to disclose settlement agreements.

The parties could not agree on costs.

The defendant sought full indemnity costs, arguing the plaintiffs' conduct was an abuse of process.

The court found the plaintiffs' conduct was misguided but not in bad faith, and awarded partial indemnity costs of $27,000 for the motion and $5,238.20 for the action.

The defendant moved to permanently stay the action as an abuse of process, arguing the plaintiffs failed to immediately disclose settlement and cooperation agreements reached with co-defendants.

The court found that the agreements fundamentally changed the litigation landscape from an adversarial to a cooperative relationship.

Applying the principles from Aecon and Handley Estate, the court held that the failure to immediately disclose these agreements constituted an abuse of process.

The action was permanently stayed against the moving defendant.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for court approval of four settlements totaling over $25 million with TD, RBC, Credit Suisse, and Deutsche Bank in a class action alleging price-fixing in the foreign exchange market.

The plaintiffs also sought approval of Class Counsel's fees of approximately $10.2 million.

The court found the settlements to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, noting the significant litigation risks and the substantial results achieved.

The court also approved the requested Class Counsel fees, recognizing the risk undertaken and the successful outcome.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify the action as a class proceeding for settlement purposes against TD, RBC, Credit Suisse, and Deutsche Bank in a case alleging a conspiracy to fix prices in the futures exchange market.

The court found that the criteria for certification under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 were met and granted the motion, approving the settlement agreements and the plan of dissemination.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Election Finances Act that extended the pre-election restricted spending period for third-party political advertising from six to twelve months.

The court found that the 12-month restriction infringed freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Oakes test, the court held that while the objective of fostering fair elections was pressing and substantial, the 12-month period failed the minimal impairment test because the government's own experts indicated a six-month period was effective.

The impugned provisions were declared of no force or effect.

The applicants in a constitutional application requested leave to file factums exceeding the 30-page limit prescribed by the Practice Direction.

The Attorney General opposed the request.

The court denied the request, emphasizing that the 30-page limit is a serious policy intended to focus counsel on the issues, and that leave is exceptional and granted sparingly.

The court noted that since there was still a week before the factums were due, counsel had sufficient time to produce shorter, more focused versions.

Class Counsel brought a motion for approval of a further instalment of fees in an ongoing competition law class action regarding alleged price-fixing in the foreign exchange market.

The plaintiffs had settled with fourteen groups of defendants and the action continued against the remaining non-settling defendants.

The court reviewed the risks undertaken, the results achieved, and the docketed time, finding the requested fees of $6,325,000, plus costs and disbursements, to be fair and reasonable.

The fee request was approved.

The plaintiffs in a class action regarding foreign exchange price fixing brought a motion to amend the Distribution Protocol for the $110 million settlement proceeds.

The proposed amendments included transferring unused funds from the Indirect Claims Fund to the Direct Claims Fund, setting a minimum $1,000 payout for approved Direct Claimants, and removing the requirement to consider compensation received in other jurisdictions.

The court granted the motion, finding the amendments were administrative, imposed no additional burden on the defendants, and fell within the court's broad discretion under section 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking repayment of a $400,000 loan advanced for the production of a film.

The borrower and guarantor argued that a separate agreement governing distribution of film revenues subordinated repayment of the loan until other liabilities were satisfied and effectively transformed the loan into a risk investment.

The court held that the loan agreement and promissory note clearly provided that the loan was payable on demand and were not modified by the revenue-sharing agreement.

The defendants’ interpretation would contradict the express contractual language and render the loan agreement meaningless.

Summary judgment was granted for the full loan amount plus interest.