Court File and Parties
MOTION HEARD: 20260324
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: Beatrice Demitro and Roberto Demitro, Plaintiffs
AND:
Joseph Woldetekie, Ewa Jolanta Toole, Toyota Credit Canada Inc. and RBC General Insurance Company, Defendants
BEFORE: Associate Justice B. McAfee
COUNSEL: A. Jayatilake, Counsel, for the Plaintiffs D. Bierstone, Counsel, for the Defendant Joseph Woldetekie J. Heeney, Counsel, for the Defendants, Ewa Jolanta Toole and Toyota Credit Canada Inc. A. Maunder, Counsel, for the Defendant RBC General Insurance Company
HEARD: March 24, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
1This is a motion brought by the defendant Joseph Woldetekie (“Woldetekie”) for an order removing Masgras Professional Corporation (“Masgras PC”) and Georgiana Masgras (“G. Masgras”) (collectively “Masgras”), or their successors, as lawyers of record for the plaintiffs Beatrice Demitro (Beatrice) and Roberto Demitro (Roberto) (collectively “the plaintiffs”) on the basis of a conflict of interest.
2The plaintiffs oppose the motion. The defendants Ewa Jolanta Toole (Toole), Toyota Credit Canada Inc. (Toyota) and RBC General Insurance Company (RBC) agree with the relief sought on this motion.
3This motion was originally returnable on February 27, 2025. On that date Masgras requested an adjournment of this motion on the basis that Masgras intended to bring their own motion to remove themselves from the record, had no instructions and were unable to respond. I granted the requested adjournment (see endorsement of Associate Justice McAfee dated March 7, 2025).
4On September 11, 2025, the motion of Masgras to remove themselves from the record was before Associate Justice Rappos. Associate Justice Rappos dismissed the motion without prejudice (see endorsement of Associate Justice Rappos dated September 11, 2025).
5Masgras subsequently advised defendants’ counsel that they resolved all outstanding issues with their clients and would no longer be proceeding with their own motion to remove themselves from the record.
6Woldetekie then renewed this motion to remove Masgras from the record. On or about March 11, 2026, Woldetekie served further material for this motion to remove Masgras from the record, including a new notice of motion returnable March 24, 2026.
7On or about March 11, 2026, the plaintiffs served a notice of change of lawyer appointing Anne Jayatilake (“A. Jayatilake”) of MPCO Law Professional Corporation (MPCO) as lawyers of record for the plaintiffs. From on or about August 18, 2022 to March 11, 2026, the plaintiffs’ lawyers of record had been Masgras.
8This action arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 30, 2012.
9The action was commenced by statement of claim issued on April 28, 2014. As set out in the statement of claim, the plaintiffs each claim $300,000.00 in general damages, $500,000.00 in pecuniary damages and other relief. Beatrice is alleged to be the operator of the motor vehicle in which Roberto was a passenger (the plaintiffs’ motor vehicle). Woldetekie is alleged to be the owner and operator of one of the motor vehicles involved in the accident. Toole is alleged to be the operator of one of the motor vehicles involved in accident. Toyota is alleged to be the owner of the Toole vehicle. RBC is alleged to be the insurer of the plaintiffs’ motor vehicle.
10At trial scheduling court, Justice D.A. Wilson ordered that all plaintiff expert reports be filed by May 10, 2023.
11According to the moving affidavit of T. Shea sworn March 10, 2026, on May 10, 2023, Masgras served medical-legal reports of Dr. M.K. Joseph Kwok, dated March 1, 2023, for each of the plaintiffs. The reports were written on the letterhead of Meditecs Medical Examinations (“Meditecs”).
12According to the responding affidavit of Beatrice sworn March 18, 2026, at paragraph 40 and according to the responding affidavit of Roberto sworn March 18, 2026, at paragraph 40:
- … Meditecs is a company owned and operated by the spouse of my former counsel, Ms. Georgiana Masgras.
13On December 8, 2023, in an unrelated action, the decision of R.S.J. Edwards in Ashrafian v. Kavarana, 2023 ONSC 6944 (Ont. S.C.J.) was released. The reasons were supplemental to oral reasons given during the trial in which Justice Edwards ruled that the plaintiff’s loss of income expert could not be called as a witness because of a failure to comply with the timelines under Rule 53.03. The reasons also explain why Justice Edwards declared a mistrial because of “…a shocking conflict of interest involving the plaintiff’s law firm and the expert evidence that plaintiff counsel sought to adduce.” The plaintiff’s law firm in Ashrafian was Masgras PC and the plaintiff’s lawyer of record was G. Masgras. Masgras PC obtained the expert evidence of two medical experts through Meditecs Health Management and IME, a company owned by Omar Irshidat who is the spouse of G. Masgras.
14In Ashrafian, Justice Edwards states as follows:
[43] One of the aspects of the duty of loyalty includes a duty of candor to the client on matters that are relevant to the retainer. It is clear from the evidence in this case that Ms. Masgras clearly understood that she was in a conflict of interest as revealed in the conflict document that was sent to the plaintiff on April 2, 2021.
[44] The clear conflict arose from the fact that the Masgras law firm utilized Meditecs to retain the services of both Dr. Friedlander and Dr. Shahmalak. The obvious conflict arose from the fact that the owner of Meditecs was Ms. Masgras’ husband, Mr. Irshidat. This conflict was never revealed to the plaintiff until after he actually attended the assessments with Dr. Friedlander and Dr. Shahmalak. Both doctors assessed the plaintiff prior to the disclosure of the conflict. The conflict was not only not disclosed to the plaintiff until after the assessments, the conflict was never revealed to the defence until essentially the eve of trial and only as a result of information obtained by the defence, not information supplied by the Masgras law firm.
[45] What is particularly troubling from the evidence is the attempt by Masgras to have the conflict waived by the plaintiff after the fact i.e. after the plaintiff had been seen by Dr. Friedlander and Dr. Shahmalak. What is even more troubling is the suggestion that the plaintiff would be “deemed to have waived the conflict” if he did not respond within 15 days of the email of April 2, 2021 from the Masgras law firm. Deemed consent by silence as it relates to a lawyer’s conflict of interest can never be condoned by the court.
[46] What is particularly egregious from the facts as revealed by the voir dire is the fact that Meditecs more than doubled the invoice cost of Dr. Friedlander’s report. There is absolutely no evidence to support such an egregious increase in the cost of an expert’s report. As Mr. Irshidat confirmed in this evidence, the income that he derives from Meditecs is an income that would be shared within the family unit i.e. between himself and his wife, Ms. Masgras. Ms. Masgras was therefore the indirect beneficiary of the undisclosed doubling of Dr. Friedlander’s account to Meditecs.
[47] During the course of argument I asked Mr. Stoiko as to whether or not there was anything that he could offer the court that could lead the court to any conclusion other than the Masgras law firm was in direct conflict with its client, Mr. Ashrafian. Mr. Stoiko was entirely candid in his response to the court that he could offer no such evidence nor could he offer any explanation that would avoid the court ultimately concluding that the role of Meditecs and Masgras put plaintiff’s counsel in an irreconcilable conflict of interest.
[48] What is also extremely concerning as it relates to the obvious conflict as now conceded by Mr. Stoiko, relates to a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division in a case called Law Society of Ontario v. Ortiz, 2023 ONLSTH 60. Ms. Masgras is described as one of the respondents. Under the subheading “Ms. Masgras” at para. 20 Barbara Murchie writing for the panel of the Law Society Tribunal stated:
From the inception of her own practice in 2014, Ms. Masgras accepted clients who were treated or assessed at the clinics (Meditecs and Spinetec). Starting in 2015, as part of the retainer procedure, she required clients to sign voluntary written consents to her acting despite being advised of the potential conflict (consent form). She also made efforts to ensure pre-existing clients, like Mr. S. had signed the form. In March 2016, she stopped sending clients to or accepting referrals from the clinics. Existing clients continued to use the services of the clinics if already doing so. (emphasis added)
[49] The motor vehicle accident, which is the subject matter of this action occurred on June 28, 2016. There is no evidence that Mr. Ashrafian was a client of Masgras prior to June 28, 2016 and as such it is very difficult to reconcile Ms. Masgras’ apparent representation to the Law Society Tribunal that as of March 2016 (i.e. prior to Mr. Ashrafian’s motor vehicle accident) she had stopped sending clients to or accepting referrals from the clinics i.e. Meditecs. The evidence revealed by the voir dire makes crystal clear that Dr. Friedlander was retained by Meditecs as a result of a request made by the Masgras law firm.
[50] To allow plaintiff’s counsel to continue to act for Mr. Ashrafian in a situation where he had never consented to the conflict of interest between Masgras, Meditecs and Mr. Irshidat would, in my view, fundamentally reflect a lack of concern as it relates to the obligation that Ms. Masgras and the Masgras law firm had to their client, both as a fiduciary and as a solicitor. The duty of loyalty and the duty of candor were completely ignored by Ms. Masgras. The court cannot countenance such conduct. To do so would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. As such, I declared a mistrial.
15In the costs decision in Ashrafian 2024 ONSC 2420 (Ont. S.C.J.) Justice Edwards states as follows at paras. 3 and 28-31:
[3] The mistrial was declared largely as a result of the non-disclosure of a conflict of interest involving Ms. Masgras, her husband Mr. Irshidat, Mr. Irshidat’s company Meditecs and the retainer by Meditecs of two doctors who prepared medical legal reports for Ms. Masgras’ law firm (Masgras Law). These reports were then forwarded to the lawyers for the defendant without any disclosure of the aforesaid conflict. …
[28] The acknowledgement of Ms. Masgras that she continues to use Meditecs is concerning. I say this because she told the Law Society of Ontario as reflected in the Reasons of the Law Society Tribunal – see Law Society of Ontario v. Ortiz 2023 ONLSTH 80 at para 20 that, “In March 2016 she stopped sending clients to or accepting referrals from the clinics (Meditecs).” This assertion is in direct contrast with Ms. Masgras’ affidavit where she says she only retains Meditecs after she has the client’s informed consent. No where in her affidavit does Ms. Masgras dispute, she told the Law Society she had stopped sending clients or accepting referrals from Meditecs. I can only conclude that both versions can not be true.
[29] What is also troubling from the reasons of the Law Society in Ortiz is another apparent inconsistency in the story about how experts are retained by Masgras and how the apparent conflict of interest has been addressed by Masgras. The conflict of course is not just the conflict of interest as it relates to the solicitor client relationship but also the fact the conflict was never disclosed to the defence. In that regard at para 46-47 of Ortiz, The Law Society Tribunal noted as follows:
The LSO letter arose out of a prior inquiry into Ms. Masgras’ alleged conflict based on her relationship with Mr. Irshidat. In 2015, two insurers complained to the Law Society that Ms. Masgras acted in a conflict of interest when she acted for eight clients who received medical assessments at one of the clinics owned by her husband. The Law Society investigated.
In the December 5, 2017, LSO letter, the LSO investigator advised the investigations into the alleged conflict of interest complaints were being closed without initiating regulatory proceedings. In the letter, the investigator advised that the relationship between Ms. Masgras and her husband amounted to a conflict of interest but that regulatory proceedings were not warranted because Ms. Masgras had instituted procedures pursuant to which she disclosed the conflict to the insurer (insurer notification) and had her clients sign the consent form.” (emphasis added)
[30] It would appear that Ms. Masgras advised the Law Society that if and when she retained Meditecs not only did she get the consent of her client, but she went one step further and told the Law Society that she would disclose the conflict to the insurer as well. …
[31] Ms. Masgras told the Law Society that she would disclose the conflict to the insurer. There is also absolutely no evidence that Ms. Masgras ever advised counsel for the defendants in this case of the conflict. If that conflict had been disclosed at the time when Dr. Friedlander’s report was served on defence counsel, the issue of the conflict should never have materialized in the mistrial in this action. I say this because if the defence knew of the conflict it would have been incumbent on the defence to raise the conflict before the trial ever began.
16On January 29, 2024, and continuing on February 28, 2024, the pre-trial in the within action took place before Justice Glustein. The issue of the reports from Meditecs served in this action was addressed by Justice Glustein at the pre-trial conference. In his endorsement, Justice Glustein notes that the expert report is now subject of a removal motion based on the decision of Justice Edwards in Ashrafian.
17Justice Glustein granted the plaintiffs’ request to deliver a new medical expert report to avoid the risk of the removal of Masgras from the record. Justice Glustein ordered the plaintiffs to deliver new expert medical reports (limited to scope of initial reports) by May 31, 2024, or by that date to advise the defendants if the plaintiffs intended to rely on the initial reports. If the plaintiffs intended to rely on the initial reports, the defendants were to schedule a removal motion. No new medical reports were permitted to be delivered after May 31, 2024. In addition, the plaintiffs’ request to deliver a future cost of care report was denied (see endorsement of Justice Glustein dated February 28, 2024).
18The plaintiffs did not deliver new medical expert reports by the deadline ordered by Justice Glustein. The plaintiffs did not appeal Justice Glustein’s order.
19The plaintiffs then sought to bring a motion for leave to deliver further medical expert reports after the deadline ordered by Justice Glustein, together with a future cost of care report.
20On July 15, 2024, the issue on the plaintiffs’ proposed motion was before Justice Koehnen on a case conference. As set out in his endorsement, Justice Koehnen dismissed the motion. Justice Koehnen references the Ashrafian decision and states that similarly the plaintiffs served a medical report from Meditecs without having disclosed that Meditecs is owned by G. Masgras’ husband and that G. Masgras is the managing partner of the firm that represents the plaintiffs. Justice Koehnen found that the plaintiffs were essentially asking to overturn Justice Glustein’s ruling which was a matter for an appellate court. Justice Koehnen states that even if he had the power to overturn Justice Glustein’s order, he would not be inclined to do so. Justice Koehnen states that a party cannot fail on an issue before one Judge and then bring the same issue before a different Judge in the hope of getting a different result (see endorsement of Justice Koehnen dated July 15, 2024).
21G. Masgras is currently suspended by Law Society of Ontario for a period of 9 months that commenced on February 20, 2026. While the focus of the LSO’s underlying decision was unrelated contested allegations, the decision also references a revised agreed statement of facts wherein G. Masgras admitted to contravening Rules 3.4-1 and 3.4-2 by representing a client despite a conflict of interest and without obtaining the client’s consent. The client had been receiving services from Spinetec and Meditecs. The client did not provide written consent that the lawyer act for the client despite the potential conflict arising from G. Masgras’ relationship with the Mr. Irshidat. Masgras was found to have contravened the conflict of interest rules as alleged and admitted. (Law Society of Ontario v. Masgras-Irshidat, 2024 ONLSTH 56; 2025 ONLSTH 32; appeal dismissed 2026 ONLSTA 1; endorsement January 22, 2026).
22The overarching test to be applied on a motion to remove a lawyer from the record is stated in Karas v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2011 ONSC 5181 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 26:
[26] … whether a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice requires the removal of the lawyer. This determination is very fact specific and based on an examination of all the factors in the case and the specific reason why the motion is being brought. The task of the Court is to uphold and preserve the integrity of the justice system while ensuring that litigants are not deprived of their counsel of choice without good cause (see Gaeten Chip Stand Inc. v. Twp. Of North Glengarry, (SCJ) at para 8 citing Everingham v. Ontario (1992), , 8 O.R. (3d) 121 (Div. Ct) at p. 127 and see Macdonald Estate v. Martin, , [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1235 at paras 16, 47-51 and 65-66).
23In an appropriate case, a lawyer may be removed from the record if the lawyer cannot discharge their duty as an independent officer of the court because of a direct and personal interest in the litigation (Karas at para. 52).
24As stated in Thompson v. KPMG Peat Marwick Thorne, (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 26:
[26] Courts must ensure that confidence in the administration of justice is maintained by avoiding any appearance of impropriety by counsel so that not only will justice be done but that it is seen to be done.
25The conflict of interest before me is the same as in Ashrafian. Masgras served medical-legal reports obtained from a company owned and operated by G. Masgras’ spouse. Masgras failed to disclose that matrimonial relationship and conflict to the defendants.
26After the defendants raised the conflict of interest issue, Masgras produced copies of consent forms. The forms are appended to the moving affidavit T. Shaw at Exhibit C. The form purportedly signed by Roberto is incomplete, does not indicate the name of the person signing and is unwitnessed. The form purportedly signed by Beatrice is unwitnessed and undated and indicates that she had not yet decided whether to obtain independent legal advice.
27Much of the plaintiffs’ responding motion material responds to a motion to dismiss for delay; however, there is no such relief sought on this motion.
28In their respective affidavits, the plaintiffs refer to G. Masgras as both their current and previous counsel (see paras. 23 and 40, see also para. 26).
29In their respective affidavits the plaintiffs each depose at para. 40:
- During the course of this litigation, I am advised by my counsel and verily believe that various medical-legal reports were obtained and served, including reports coordinated through a company known as Meditecs. I am aware, and recall being advised, that Meditecs is a company owned and operated by the spouse of my former counsel, Ms. Georgiana Masgras. This information was disclosed to me in the course of my retainer for the purpose of transparency. I understood that I was not required to utilize Meditecs and that alternative providers were available to arrange such assessments without any impact on my legal representation. My decision to proceed with assessments arranged through Meditecs was made voluntarily, with the primary objective of obtaining timely access to qualified medical professionals so that my claim could progress without unnecessary delay. At all times, I understood that the medical experts were independent practitioners who would provide their opinions based solely on their professional judgment, and I did not believe that the involvement of Meditecs affected the integrity of the assessments or my ability to advance my claim fairly.
30In their affidavits, the plaintiffs do not specifically reference the term conflict of interest or their consent to the conflict of interest. The plaintiffs do not mention the above-noted consent forms in their respective affidavits. I am not satisfied that the plaintiffs have provided a fully informed consent to waive the conflict. Even if the conflict had been waived by the plaintiffs, the conflict was not disclosed to the defendants and ought to have been so disclosed.
31G. Masgras and Masgras PC are no longer lawyers of record. Had they remained lawyers of record, I would have removed them from the record based on a conflict of interest.
32I am satisfied that a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice requires the removal of the current lawyers of record, A. Jayatilake and MPCO, based on a conflict of interest.
33The change of lawyer to the current lawyers of record does not adequately address the conflict of interest. A. Jayatilake of MPCO was a lawyer at Masgras PC. The lawyer who attended on behalf of the plaintiffs on the original return date, O. Miketic, was a lawyer at Masgras PC and is now a lawyer at MPCO. The Kitchener office address and phone number are the same for MPCO as they were for Masgras PC. I am satisfied that it is just to remove the current lawyers of record, A. Jayatilake and MPCO, being successors to G. Masgras and Masgras PC.
34Any formal order taken out shall also include the provisions of Rule 15.04(16) and (17).
35With respect to the issue of costs of this motion, if successful on the motion Woldetekie seeks costs of the motion payable by the plaintiffs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $9,899.37. Toole and Toyota seek costs of the motion for their attendance in the amount of $750.00. RBC seeks costs of the motion for their attendance in the amount of $260.00.
36Woldetekie was successful on the motion and is entitled to costs. Toole and Toyota and RBC attended and made brief submissions in support of the motion. Although they did not deliver material, I am satisfied that they are entitled to some costs for their attendance. Having regard to the circumstances of this motion, a fair and reasonable amount that the plaintiffs could expect to pay for costs is the all-inclusive amount of $7,500.00 payable to Woldetekie, the total all-inclusive amount of $450.00 payable to Toole and Toyota and the all-inclusive amount of $250.00 payable to RBC. Costs are payable within 30 days.
37Order to go as follows:
The plaintiffs’ lawyers of record Anne Jayatilake and MPCO Law Professional Corporation are removed as lawyers of record for the plaintiffs.
Costs of this motion are fixed on a partial indemnity basis in the all-inclusive amount of $7,500.00 payable to Woldetekie, in the total all-inclusive amount of $450.00 payable to Toole and Toyota and in the all-inclusive amount of $250.00 payable to RBC, all payable within 30 days.
Associate Justice B. McAfee
Date: July 23, 2026