Citation

CITATION: Sarpong v. Law Enforcement Complaints Agency, 2026 ONSC 3525

DIVISIONAL COURT FILE NO. DC-25-00000308-00JR

DATE: 2026-07-22

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

DIVISIONAL COURT

S.T. Bale, O’Brien and Brownstone JJ.

BETWEEN:

Richard Sarpong

Applicant

– and –

Law Enforcement Complaints Agency (LECA)

Respondent

Counsel: Richard Sarpong, in person Joel Dubois, for the respondent

Heard: March 26, 2026, at Toronto, by video conference.

Reasons for Decision

S.T. BALE J.

OVERVIEW

1Richard Sarpong complained to the Complaints Director of the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency about the conduct of four Peel Regional Police officers: Ema Fogt, Kenaul Douglas, Davide Zara, and Torrence Bostock. He had been sitting in his car in a hotel parking lot, when the officers approached him, demanded that he produce identification, and threatened him with arrest, if he failed to do so.

2The Complaints Director referred the complaint to the chief of police of the Peel Regional Police for investigation. The complaint was assigned to an investigator who concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish officer misconduct, and that Mr. Sarpong’s complaints were therefore unsubstantiated.

3Mr. Sarpong was dissatisfied with the disposition of his complaint and requested that the Complaints Director review the investigator’s conclusions. In his request for review, he alleged that the police demand for identifying information was unlawful, that he had been unlawfully detained, and that police had used abusive language in speaking with him. Following his review, the Director confirmed the investigator’s conclusion that there was insufficient evidence of misconduct on the part of the officers.

4On this judicial review application, Mr. Sarpong requests that the decision of the Complaints Director be quashed, and that the complaint be remitted to him for redetermination. In support of that relief, he argues that the Director’s decision was unreasonable, that the investigation was procedurally unfair, and that there is a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the investigator which the Director failed to consider.

5For the following reasons, I would allow the application and remit Mr. Sarpong’s complaint to the Complaints Director for redetermination in accordance with these reasons. In my view, the Director’s decision was unreasonable, because he failed to adequately address Mr. Sarpong’s central arguments relating to the lawfulness of both the police demand for identifying information and the detention, he misapprehended or failed to account for the evidence, and he failed to address Mr. Sarpong’s allegation of reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the investigator.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The complaint

6The incident in question occurred on April 19, 2024, at approximately 7:16 p.m. In his complaint, Mr. Sarpong said:

• that the police officers had approached him and demanded that he produce identification when no apparent crime had been committed and there were no reasons for the demand under the Highway Traffic Act;
• that the officers’ given reason for demanding identification was that they thought he “looked sketchy” which was not a valid reason;
• that the police threatened to arrest and assault him, if he did not produce identification;
• that officer Zara became agitated when he asked why they needed his ID and said to the others: “this Dude has no idea of what he is doing or what he is talking about – what a dumbass!!”;
• that officer Bostock called him a “weirdo”, became agitated while he was locating his ID and yelled, “you are taking too long, hurry up!!!!”;
• that Officer Fogt became angry because he asked why they needed ID and said, “we already gave you the reason – I am not going to repeat myself 700 times!!!! Give us your ID NOW or I’m going to beat the living shit out of you!!”, and made a physical threat;
• that the officers gave him weird looks and pointed and laughed at him;
• that when he asked to leave the scene, the officers refused to allow him to leave, and threatened bodily assault and arrest, unless he provided ID;
• that he complied with the request for ID to avoid bodily harm or false arrest; and
• that the officers violated his rights under ss. 7, 8, 9 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

7Mr. Sarpong’s complaint was reviewed under the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 1, Sched. 1. Under s. 159(1) of the CSPA, the Director referred the complaint to the chief of police of Peel Regional Police. Under s. 159(6) of the Act, chiefs of police are required to cause such complaints to be investigated, and under s. 166(1), to cause the investigation to be reported on in a written report.

The investigation and report

8Staff Sergeant John Farquharson of the Peel Regional Police Professional Standards Bureau conducted the investigation on behalf of the chief of police.

9He characterized the complaint as involving two allegations of misconduct under O. Reg. 407/23: Code of Conduct for Police Officers, filed under the CSPA:

• authorizing or making a physical or psychological detention of a person they knew or reasonably ought to have known was unlawful, contrary to s. 8(1) of the Code; and
• using abusive language or treating a person in a manner that is abusive, contrary to s. 12(1) of the Code.

10In his report, the investigator found both allegations to be “unsubstantiated.”¹

11With respect to the allegation of unlawful detention, he said that his investigation had established that the officers had “lawful authority to investigate the Complainant under the Trespass to Property Act”, and that there was no evidence of unlawful detention. It is unclear whether his finding was that Mr. Sarpong had not been detained, or that the alleged detention was lawful under that Act.

12With respect to the allegation of using abusive language or treating Mr. Sarpong in an abusive manner, the investigator said that he had determined, “through officers’ notes, BWC [body-worn camera] and video footage, that officers did not use abusive language or threaten the Complainant in any way.” It is unclear whether he found that the language complained of had not been used, or that the language did not amount to abusive language under s. 12(1) of the Code of Conduct for Police Officers.

13In the result, the investigator concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish reasonable grounds that misconduct had occurred. His report was reviewed by Inspector Bill Ford. Inspector Ford concurred with the investigator’s conclusion that there were insufficient grounds to establish misconduct and that the complaint was therefore unsubstantiated.

Request for review

14Under s. 167(1) of the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019, if, after considering the report on the investigation, the chief of police does not have reasonable grounds to believe that the conduct of the person who was the subject of the investigation constitutes misconduct, he or she must give written notice of the determination to the complainant, the person who was the subject of the investigation and the Complaints Director. Under s. 167(3) of the Act, the complainant may, no later than 30 days after receiving notice, apply to the Complaints Director for a review of the determination.

15Under s. 167(4) of the Act, the Director is then required to review the determination, taking into account any material provided by the complainant, the chief of police or the person who was the subject of the investigation. In doing so, the Director is required to consider two issues: first, whether the professional standards investigator adequately addressed the issues raised in the complaint; and second, whether the findings of the chief of police are supported by the available evidence: Boua v. Office of the Independent Police Review Director, 2024 ONSC 2172 (Div. Ct.), at para. 16.

16In his request for review, Mr. Sarpong reiterated his complaint while adding further details and made specific allegations of misconduct.

Further details of complaint

17Mr Sarpong said that upon arrival, the officers exited their vehicles with their hands on their holsters and yelled for him to roll down his windows. He complied. Officers then questioned him through both the driver’s side and passenger’s side windows. He says that his car was blocked in by the two police vehicles.

18He said that when questioned about why he was in the parking lot, he explained that he had just come from an event at the hotel. Officers then said that he was on private property and demanded that he produce identification. When asked what crime he was being investigated for or was suspected of committing, Cst. Fogt said that he was not committing a crime but that he was required to provide identification because he was on private property and the police had “trespass authority”.

19Mr. Sarpong said that when he asked whether he could leave, Cst. Fogt said that he was not going anywhere until he provided identification, and Cst. Zara threatened him, saying, that he would pull him out of the vehicle, if he did not provide ID. In these circumstances he provided the requested ID. While Cst. Zara was away from his car checking his ID, officers continued to question him and requested that he provide his vehicle ownership and proof of insurance. Cst. Zara then returned to the car with his ID and said, “okay are you going to be leaving!?” Mr. Sarpong then asked for clarification of the reason for his detention and was told that he had already been told five times and that he should watch his cell phone video to figure out the reason.

Specific allegations of misconduct

20In his request for review, Mr. Sarpong made several specific allegations of misconduct, including:

• that the officers’ demand for identifying information was unlawful, because they had no grounds to suspect that he was committing an offence, and that by doing so, they had infringed or denied his rights or freedoms under the Charter, contrary to s. 6(1) of the Code of Conduct for Police Officers;
• that by demanding that he roll down his windows, by blocking his car with their vehicles, and by threatening to drag him from his car and arrest him, they had unlawfully detained him, contrary to s. 8(1) of the Code of Conduct for Police Officers; and
• that the officers had used abusive language in speaking with him, contrary to s. 12(1) of the Code of Conduct for Police Officers.

Decision of the Complaints Director

21Following his review, the Complaints Director concluded that there was insufficient evidence to establish reasonable grounds to believe that the officers’ conduct constituted misconduct. He found that the investigator had correctly identified and investigated the allegations of misconduct, that his findings were consistent with the available evidence, and that “he clearly laid out his reasoning path in support of his conclusions.”

Application for judicial review

22On this application for judicial review, Mr. Sarpong requests an order quashing the Director’s decision and remitting the complaint to him for redetermination, after full disclosure of the materials relied upon, and with meaningful engagement with his central arguments and video evidence.

23In support of this remedy, Mr. Sarpong argues:

• that in his reasons for decision, the Complaints Director failed to explain his conclusion that the Trespass to Property Act authorized the officers to detain him and compel identifying information under threat of arrest;
• that the “trespass authority” relied on by the officers did not authorize them to detain him and compel identifying information;
• that when he asked the officers what offence he was suspected of committing, they told him that they were not saying that he was suspected of committing an offence;
• that it was unlawful for the officers to detain him and compel identifying information, absent reasonable grounds to suspect that he was committing an offence;
• that his allegations concerning coercion and threats of arrest, and the constitutional framing of his complaint, were not meaningfully grappled with, despite being central throughout the complaint and review process;
• that both the initial complaints process and the review process were procedurally unfair, because they relied on officer statements and notes and other materials that had been withheld or materially redacted, undermining his ability to know and meet the case; and
• that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias, based on the conduct and comments of the investigator, and the Director’s uncritical adoption of the investigator’s conclusions in the face of contrary video evidence.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

24The standard of review of the Director’s decision is reasonableness: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653, at para. 23; Rossi v. Ontario Independent Police Review Director, 2024 ONSC 1310 (Div. Ct.), at para. 5. To be reasonable, a decision must demonstrate a rational chain of analysis and be justified by the relevant facts and law: Vavilov, at para. 102.

25Administrative decision makers may assess and evaluate the evidence before them, and absent exceptional circumstances, a reviewing court will not interfere with their factual findings. The reviewing court must refrain from reweighing and reassessing the evidence. However, the reasonableness of a decision may be jeopardized where the decision maker has fundamentally misapprehended or failed to account for the evidence before it: Vavilov, at paras. 125-126.

26Administrative decision makers are not expected to respond to every argument or possible line of analysis, however subordinate. However, their reasons must meaningfully account for the central issues and concerns raised by the parties: “[R]easons are the primary mechanism by which decision makers demonstrate that they have actually listened to the parties” (emphasis original). “[A] decision maker’s failure to meaningfully grapple with key issues or central arguments raised by the parties may call into question whether the decision maker was actually alert and sensitive to the matter before it”: Vavilov, at paras. 127-128.

ANALYSIS

Complaints of unlawful demand for identifying information and unlawful detention

27In my view, the Complaints Director’s decision was unreasonable, because it did not demonstrate a rational chain of analysis justified by the relevant law and facts. The Director failed to grapple with the key issues and central arguments raised by Mr. Sarpong, and failed to account for the evidence before him.

28In his report, the investigator found that the officers were authorized to investigate Mr. Sarpong and that there was no evidence of unlawful detention. He based that finding on a document entitled “Authorization Pursuant to Trespass to Property Act” provided by the “occupier”² of the hotel to Peel Regional Police. The document provided that Peel police officers were authorized to enter the hotel property for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Trespass to Property Act; and, “in particular, section 2(1)(b) which gives the occupier the authority to extend authorization for persons other than the occupier to direct persons to leave the premises.”

29In confirming the investigator’s findings, the Director did no more than refer to the investigator’s determination that the police were authorized to enforce provisions of the Trespass to Property Act, and to his finding that the officers conducted a reasonable investigation and were legally authorized to investigate Mr. Sarpong’s purpose for being on the property. Missing from the analysis is any explanation of how one gets from the provisions of the Act, and the conclusion that the officers were legally authorized to investigate Sarpong’s purpose, to the conclusion that he had not been unlawfully detained.

30In R. v. Le, 2019 SCC 34, [2019] 2 S.C.R. 692, at para. 130, the court said the following about the extent of the authority given by s. 2(1)(b) of the Trespass to Property Act to persons authorized by the occupier:

No statute authorized these police officers to detain anyone in the backyard. At trial, the police invoked the Trespass to Property Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. T.21, as a source of authorization to enter to assess whether the young men were trespassing. However, as a matter of law, the Act does not authorize the police to engage in investigative detentions on private property. Rather, it provides authorization only for the police to arrest individuals where there are reasonable and probable grounds to believe that they are trespassing (s. 9). No such grounds existed.

31More recently, in R. v. Virk, 2025 ONSC 5790, at para. 23, the court held that police authority under the Trespass to Property Act is restricted to directing persons to leave the property:

As an aside, although the police were undoubtedly entitled to speak with Mr. Virk to determine if he was a trespasser, they did not have the power to detain him if he was. Under the Trespass to Property Act, even if he could not account for his presence at the school, that would have only entitled the police to request that he leave the property. Under that Act, the only "detention" power is the authority to arrest a trespasser who refuses to leave when directed: see Trespass to Property Act, s.2(1)(b) and s. 9(1).

32The central argument raised by Mr. Sarpong in his request for review was that in the absence of reasonable suspicion that he was committing an offence, it was unlawful for the police to demand identification on threat of arrest. The Director failed to grapple with this argument.

33With respect to Mr. Sarpong’s complaint that the police demand for identifying information was unlawful, the Director should consider the applicability of “Collection of Identifying Information in Certain Circumstances – Prohibition and Duties”, being O. Reg. 400/23, under the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019.

34With respect to Mr. Sarpong’s complaint that he had been unlawfully detained, the relevant law would include R. v. Mann, 2004 SCC 52, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 59 and R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353.

35In Grant, at para. 44, the court held that a detention occurs when a physical or psychological restraint results in a suspension of an individual’s liberty interest. “Psychological detention is established either where the individual has a legal obligation to comply with the restrictive request or demand, or a reasonable person would conclude by reason of the state conduct that he or she had no choice but to comply.”

36In Mann, at para. 45, the court held that police may detain a person for investigative purposes where “there are reasonable grounds to suspect in all the circumstances that the individual is connected to a particular crime and that such a detention is necessary.”

37The relevant evidence for which the Director failed to account would include the following.

38Mr. Sarpong’s car was blocked by two police vehicles and police officers attended at both the driver-side and passenger-side windows demanding that he produce identification. He resisted the demand and questioned the officers’ authority to make it. Their answer was that he was on private property and that they had “trespass authority”. When he continued to resist the demand for identification, the officers threatened to arrest him.

39Mr. Sarpong recorded the incident on his cell phone. In the video he provided, he is heard asking Officer Fogt whether he could “just leave”, to which she answered “no.” Officer Zara is then heard to say that if he continued to refuse to provide identification, they would pull him out of the car. In a memorandum from Officer Zara to the investigator, he says: “After numerous demands for his ID, I advised him [Mr. Sarpong] he would be forcefully removed from the vehicle and arrested if he did not comply. At that point he identified himself.”

Complaint of abusive language or treatment

40In oral argument, Mr. Sarpong argued that the language used by the police officers was “insulting”, “disrespectful” and “unprofessional”. However, the question to be determined was whether that language was “abusive” as that term is used in s. 12(1) of the Code of Conduct for Police Officers. In the present case, the line between abusive, and “insulting”, “disrespectful” and “unprofessional”, was drawn so as to exclude the language complained of. In my view, it was not unreasonable for the line to be drawn in that way.

Procedural fairness

41Mr. Sarpong argues that the investigation was procedurally unfair, because in coming to his conclusion, the investigator relied upon materials that had not been produced to him. These materials included the officers’ notes and memoranda which included the officers’ responses to the complaint. He says that as a result, he was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to know and meet the case, and to “make focused submissions that the investigative synthesis was unreliable on chronology and sequence.” For the following reasons, I disagree and find that the failure of the investigator to provide Mr. Sarpong with copies of the officers’ notes and memoranda was not procedurally unfair.

42In Boua, at para. 16, this court held that there is no legal requirement to interview a complainant during a police conduct complaint investigation, saying: “Complainants are entitled to a comparatively low level of procedural fairness with respect to investigations because they are not facing a concrete impact to their rights and interest. It is the police officers who are at risk of findings of misconduct and the resulting consequences.”

43In Cozzi v. Office of the Independent Police Review Director, 2016 ONSC 627 (Div. Ct.), this court held that while s. 62 of the Police Services Act required the chief of police to give prompt notice of the substance of a complaint to the subject officer, there was no reciprocal statutory requirement to produce the officer’s response to the complainant.³ At para. 6, the court reasoned:

It is important to note that the investigation is not a hearing and the right to disclosure that would accrue at the hearing stage of the process does not accrue at the investigative stage, which is not an adjudication. Providing all witnesses with access to the statements of other witnesses raises the spectre of tainting and collusion (both advertent and inadvertent) and could delay what is meant to be an efficient process. Because of the potential jeopardy faced by the subject officer, the legislature has mandated disclosure to that officer.

Reasonable apprehension of bias

44In my view, the decision of the Complaints Director was unreasonable, because he failed to respond to Mr. Sarpong’s allegation that the investigator was biased.

45The test for reasonable apprehension of bias is whether an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, and having thought the matter through, would think it is more likely than not that the decision-maker, whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly: Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2003 SCC 45, at para. 60.

46In his request for review, Mr. Sarpong submitted that there was blatant bias on the part of S/Sgt. Farquharson. In particular, he alleged:

• that as he described the facts of his complaint to the investigator, the investigator interrupted him and said that he was not being honest and had made the whole incident up;
• that the investigator suggested that he was “looking to get a big chunk of money one day” by making the complaint;
• that the investigator suggested that he could be charged with public mischief for making false allegations;
• that the investigator told him that if he refused to resolve his complaint informally, the investigation would go nowhere, and he would find the complaint to be unsubstantiated; and
• that the investigator said that he had done a background check on him and determined that he “is not very credible.”

Cell phone recordings of Mr. Sarpong’s conversations with the investigator support these allegations.

47While administrative decision makers are not expected to respond to every issue raised by a complainant, the Complaints Director ought to have responded to the allegation of bias in this case.

DISPOSITION

48For the reasons given, I would remit Richard Sarpong’s request for review to the Complaints Director of the Law Enforcement Complaints Agency, for a redetermination in accordance with these reasons.

Footnotes

1. 1The term “unsubstantiated” comes from the Police Services Act which governed police complaints arising from incidents occurring before April 1, 2024. Under s. 66(2) of that Act, the question was whether the chief of police “is of the opinion that the complaint is unsubstantiated”. However, for complaints arising from incidents occurring on or after April 1, 2024, the governing legislation is the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019. Under ss. 167 and 168 of the CSPA (which governs the present case), the question is whether the chief of police has “reasonable grounds to believe that the conduct of the person who was the subject of the investigation constitutes misconduct”.
2. 2“Occupier” is defined in the Act to include (a) a person who is in physical possession of premises or (b) a person who has responsibility for and control over the condition of premises or the activities there carried on, or control over persons allowed to enter the premises.
3. 3Section 157(1) of the Community Safety and Policing Act, 2019 is to the same effect.