Jordan Katz

The plaintiffs, borrowers in a mortgage transaction, sued their own lawyers and the lender's lawyer.

The lender's lawyer brought a motion to strike the claim against her under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court granted the motion, finding that the lender's lawyer owed no duty of care to the borrowers and that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action against her.

The claim was struck without leave to amend, and substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the moving party.

The Law Society brought proceedings against the defendant for practicing law without a licence in breach of a court order.

The defendant previously consented to a contempt order and was penalized with community service and costs.

After failing to comply with the terms of the penalty order, a case conference was held.

The court gave the defendant one final opportunity to comply, setting new deadlines for obtaining approval for his community service organization and paying the balance of the costs.

The applicant sought a Norwich order against two lawyers to obtain transactional information regarding real estate purchases and transfers involving a judgment debtor, in order to enforce a $369,072.61 judgment.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing the applicant did not meet the test for a Norwich order and that the information was protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The court granted the Norwich order, finding that the applicant met the test and that the requested transactional information, such as the source of funds and true ownership of the properties, was not presumptively protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The court ordered the respondents to produce the non-privileged information and established a process for reviewing any specific claims of privilege.

The defendant vendors brought a motion to permanently stay the action, alleging the plaintiff purchasers failed to promptly disclose a settlement agreement reached with the co-defendant brokers.

The court found that the agreement was a 'simple settlement' involving only a without-costs dismissal and a standard release, with no terms requiring the brokers' cooperation against the vendors.

Applying recent appellate jurisprudence, the court held that the agreement did not entirely change the litigation landscape or the adversarial relationship between the parties, and therefore did not trigger the immediate disclosure requirement.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The Law Society of Ontario applied for a permanent injunction against a former paralegal whose license was revoked for misappropriation of trust funds.

Despite the revocation, the respondent continued to provide legal services and hold herself out as a licensed paralegal on social media.

The respondent did not appear at the hearing.

The court granted the permanent injunction under the Law Society Act and awarded costs to the applicant.

The applicant brought an application for a permanent injunction against the respondents, a plumber and his corporation, for holding themselves out as legal practitioners.

The individual respondent used a fake law firm name to send demand letters to plumbing customers and maintained a website offering legal services.

The court granted the injunction, finding the respondents' actions violated the Law Society Act, and ordered the corporation to change its name to remove any reference to legal services.

The applicant sought a declaration regarding the interpretation of a credit agreement and warrant certificate.

The applicant argued that the respondent could only exercise its share purchase warrants upon a liquidity event or additional security issuance.

The respondent argued the warrants could be exercised at any time.

The court applied principles of commercial contract interpretation, finding that the preamble clearly allowed exercise at any time and that restricting exercise to triggering events would lead to a commercial absurdity given the risk the respondent assumed.

The application was dismissed.

The parties attended a case conference to address the implementation of a prior order enforcing Letters of Request from a Florida court.

The court clarified that the prior order only applies to examinations conducted in Ontario, not to depositions held in Florida.

The court also ruled that the respondent's Ontario counsel is entitled to review documents generated by keyword searches for relevancy prior to production, provided they produce a log of all hits indicating their relevancy determinations.

The third parties moved to strike the self-represented defendant's third-party claim.

The defendant had previously alleged mortgage fraud against the plaintiff and the third parties, but a prior summary judgment motion found the mortgage valid and no evidence of fraud.

The defendant sought an adjournment, which the court denied due to a prior peremptory order and insufficient evidence of incapacity.

The court struck the third-party claim, finding it was issued late without leave, constituted an abuse of process as a collateral attack on the prior judgment, and disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order requiring him to attend an examination for discovery with accommodations, arguing his medical condition (vascular malformation and conversion disorder) made him physically unable to attend without serious risk of harm.

The plaintiff also appealed the Master's costs award, arguing the Master was functus officio when extending the time for the defendant's costs submissions.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Master made no palpable and overriding error in assessing the medical evidence and had the discretion to extend the time for costs submissions before a formal order was entered.

The applicant brought a motion to oppose the confirmation of an Assessment Officer's report assessing his former lawyers' accounts at $855,268.73.

The applicant argued the Assessment Officer lacked jurisdiction due to a contingency fee arrangement and disputed retainer terms, and alleged procedural unfairness, misapprehension of evidence, and reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Superior Court dismissed the motion, finding the applicant had consented to the Assessment Officer's jurisdiction, the retainer disputes were not legitimate, and the assessment process was fair and unbiased.

The report and certificate of assessment were confirmed.

The respondent law firm brought a motion to dismiss its former client's application to void a contingency fee agreement, arguing the application was commenced without her informed consent and constituted an abuse of process.

The former client, who suffered from a cognitive disorder following a motor vehicle accident, admitted during cross-examination that she did not understand portions of her affidavits.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that her inability to articulate detailed reasons did not vitiate her informed consent to commence the proceeding, and her evidence did not rise to the level of an abuse of process.