Jordan Goldblatt

The plaintiff brought an action for breach of contract, conspiracy, and unjust enrichment against the defendants for failing to deliver seven luxury watches purchased for $141,500 USD and failing to remit proceeds from three consigned handbags valued at $61,000 USD.

The defendants, who were self-represented, failed to respond to a Request to Admit and sought an adjournment at trial which was denied as the matter was peremptory.

The court granted judgment against both defendants jointly and severally for the Canadian equivalent of $194,500 USD, with prejudgment and postjudgment interest, but dismissed the claim for punitive damages.

Costs were deferred to the judicial official who determines the outstanding counterclaim.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to amend their Statement of Defence to add a counterclaim and new parties, alleging breach of contract and copyright infringement related to the transfer of intellectual property.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing the proposed counterclaim was statute-barred.

The court found that the defendants knew or ought to have known the material facts giving rise to the claim more than two years prior to seeking the amendment.

The court dismissed the motion, concluding the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and that allowing the amendment would cause non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiffs given the imminent trial date.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to discontinue its defamation action.

The defendant argued that his intended anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act triggered an automatic stay, precluding the plaintiff's motion as a 'further step'.

The court held that the anti-SLAPP motion had not yet been 'made' as it had not been served.

Furthermore, relying on appellate authority, the court found that a motion to discontinue is not a prohibited 'step' under s. 137.1(5), as it achieves the anti-SLAPP goal of terminating the proceeding efficiently.

The court ordered the plaintiff's motion for leave to discontinue to be heard first.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) over a property acquired by a partnership for development.

The parties disagreed on the partnership agreement's interpretation after a zoning application was refused.

The court found a triable issue regarding an interest in land but declined to exercise its discretion to grant the CPL, noting the property was not unique, was acquired for investment, and damages would be an adequate remedy.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the defendants.

The plaintiff sued her mortgagee, its realtors, the purchasers, and the mortgagee's lawyer, alleging an improvident sale of her property under a power of sale.

The defendant lawyer moved to strike the claim against him under Rule 21.01(1)(b) for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to adequately plead the elements of unlawful act conspiracy, specifically failing to plead an unlawful act or that the lawyer's conduct was directed at her rather than simply advancing his client's interests.

The claim against the lawyer was struck without leave to amend.

The plaintiffs' motion for interlocutory injunctive relief and a certificate of pending litigation was dismissed.

The defendants and non-party Project Companies sought costs.

The plaintiffs opposed an award of costs or argued for a reduced amount, but failed to provide their own costs outline.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments to deny costs or defer them to the trial judge.

Applying the principle that an attack on costs without providing one's own dockets is an 'attack in the air,' the court found the claimed amounts reasonable and awarded partial indemnity costs of $65,000 to the defendants and $39,000 to the Project Companies.

The plaintiffs were granted a worldwide Mareva injunction against the defendant following allegations of a $2.8 million fraudulent transfer.

The court considered the appropriate costs order for the successful interlocutory motion.

Applying the principle that costs of an interlocutory injunction should generally be reserved to the trial judge to avoid injustice if the plaintiff ultimately fails, the court ordered costs of the motion to be in the cause.

The plaintiffs brought an omnibus motion for certification, settlement approval, notice approval, discontinuance against one defendant, and class counsel fee approval in a proposed class action regarding cancelled educational trips due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The defendants, travel insurers, agreed to pay 100% of the claims submitted by the class members.

The court granted certification for settlement purposes, approved the settlement as fair and reasonable, approved the notice plan nunc pro tunc, allowed the discontinuance against Arch Insurance, and approved class counsel fees of $435,000 to be paid by the defendants in addition to the class compensation.

The plaintiff, a newly formed lacrosse league, sought an interlocutory injunction to suspend the defendant's regulations that penalized players for participating in competing leagues.

The plaintiff argued the regulations constituted intentional interference with economic relations.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no serious issue to be tried as the defendant was merely enforcing long-standing rules and not intentionally targeting the plaintiff.

The court also found the balance of convenience favoured the defendant, as suspending the rules would destabilize its established organization.

The plaintiff brought a class action alleging that the defendant insurer wrongfully deprived insureds of trip cancellation benefits by offering non-monetary compensation such as credits or vouchers.

On consent, the court certified a single threshold common issue regarding the interpretation of the travel insurance policy and dismissed the claim against the parent bank.

The court found that certifying a single threshold common issue, with the possibility of further common issues later, was an efficient procedure akin to a Rule 21 motion.

Following a trial where the plaintiff employer was awarded $537,885 in compensatory damages for an employee's fraudulent kickback scheme, the plaintiff sought supplementary orders for a constructive trust over the employee's property and punitive damages.

The court granted a constructive trust, finding a direct link between the stolen funds and the property, but stayed the order for 30 days to allow the defendant to pay the judgment.

The court also awarded $200,000 in punitive damages, emphasizing the need for deterrence and denunciation of employee theft.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment claiming damages for wrongful dismissal, aggravated damages, and punitive damages.

The defendant employer initially terminated the plaintiff for cause but later withdrew the allegation, relying instead on a without cause termination provision in her employment agreement.

The court found the termination provision void for lack of consideration and held that the employer's conduct—including creating a toxic workplace, suspending her, and making unfounded cause allegations—amounted to a repudiation of the contract.

The court awarded 11 months' reasonable notice, $50,000 in aggravated damages, and $25,000 in punitive damages.

The applicant brought a motion to strike the respondent's affidavit evidence due to misconduct during a virtual cross-examination.

The applicant alleged that the respondent's wife and son were in the room off-camera, coaching the respondent with hand and facial gestures.

The court accepted the evidence of the independent interpreter, who confirmed the presence and coaching by the family members.

Finding this to be a deliberate abuse of process that tainted the entire testimony, the court struck the respondent's affidavit.

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action against the developers of a cancelled pre-construction condominium project, alleging breach of contract and bad faith in invoking an early termination condition.

Following a settlement meeting and document review, the parties agreed to a without-costs discontinuance.

The court approved the consent motion to discontinue the action under section 29 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, finding that the discontinuance would not prejudice the putative class members, who had not yet been notified of the proceeding and could still pursue individual claims before the expiry of the limitation period.

The parties attended a case conference to address the implementation of a prior order enforcing Letters of Request from a Florida court.

The court clarified that the prior order only applies to examinations conducted in Ontario, not to depositions held in Florida.

The court also ruled that the respondent's Ontario counsel is entitled to review documents generated by keyword searches for relevancy prior to production, provided they produce a log of all hits indicating their relevancy determinations.

At a case conference in a proposed class action regarding denied trip cancellation benefits due to COVID-19, the court determined the sequencing of a proposed Rule 21 motion by the defendant bank and the plaintiff's certification motion.

The court held that hearing the Rule 21 motion prior to certification would not substantially narrow the issues, as the substantive claims against the co-defendant insurer would remain identical.

Exercising its discretion under section 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, the court ordered the Rule 21 motion to be heard at the same time as the certification motion.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim for a real estate commission after a mini-trial, the defendants sought costs.

The defendants had made a Rule 49 offer to settle for $10,000, which the plaintiff rejected.

The court found that the plaintiff's decision to proceed to trial despite the clear evidence and the settlement offer justified the costs claimed.

The court awarded the defendants $143,931.31 in costs, representing partial indemnity up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity thereafter.

The defendants (plaintiffs by counterclaim) brought an urgent motion for interim injunctive relief to stop the plaintiffs and their principals from engaging in a relentless campaign of online harassment and defamation via Instagram.

The dispute originated from a failed transaction involving luxury handbags and watches, which previously led to ex parte Mareva and Anton Piller orders against the defendants.

The court found that the principals of the plaintiff corporation had posted highly defamatory statements, threats, and images obtained from the execution of the court orders.

Applying the stringent test for defamation injunctions, the court granted the requested relief, ordering the removal of the posts and restraining further contact and publication.

The defendants/plaintiffs by counterclaim brought an urgent motion for an interim injunction to restrain the plaintiffs/defendants to the counterclaim from publishing defamatory statements and images on Instagram and other internet platforms, and from contacting them.

The court found that the moving parties met the stringent test for an interlocutory injunction in a defamation context, noting the extensive and vitriolic nature of the posts, which included threats and the improper use of information obtained through ex parte Anton Piller and Mareva orders.

The motion was granted.

The respondents brought a motion to strike an oppression remedy application under Rule 21.01(1)(b), arguing the applicant trust lacked standing, the respondents were not affiliates under the OBCA, the claim offended the rule in Foss v. Harbottle, and the applicant had no reasonable expectation regarding the respondents.

The court found that while a trust is not a justiciable entity and the respondents were not affiliates, the rule in Foss v. Harbottle did not strictly bar the claim due to the closely held nature of the corporation.

However, the application failed to plead facts establishing a reasonable expectation vis-à-vis the third-party respondents.

The motion to strike was granted, but the applicant was given 45 days to amend the pleadings.