John B. Brennan

The appellant landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision finding that the Residential Tenancies Act applied to a waterfront lot leased to the respondent tenant.

The lot contained a cottage subject to a 99-year lease.

The landlord argued the property was exempt under section 5(a) of the Act as seasonal or temporary accommodation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that an annual rental of premises used seasonally does not fall within the section 5(a) exemption, which is intended for temporary accommodations for the travelling or vacationing public.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order regarding whether a court can issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation in the face of an arbitration agreement.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal.

As no costs submissions were made, no costs were ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its motion to enforce a share purchase agreement.

The parties negotiated a $100,000 purchase price for shares, and the respondent sent an unexecuted share purchase agreement to the appellant.

The appellant executed it, but the respondent did not.

The motion judge found that the agreement contained an enurement provision requiring execution by both parties to be effective, meaning there was no intention to contract until formal execution.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the parties intended to defer their obligations until a formal contract was executed.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 15.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking leave for the corporate defendants to be represented by a non-lawyer, specifically their Vice-President and property manager.

The court considered the relevant factors, including the complexity of the $5,000,000 claim and the fact that the proposed representative was not the sole shareholder.

The court concluded that the legal complexities required counsel and that granting leave would essentially grant a temporary license to practice law.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiffs, a husband and wife, brought an action for wrongful dismissal against the defendants, a restaurant corporation and its majority financial backer.

The wife also claimed a remedy for shareholder oppression under s. 248 of the OBCA.

The court found that the wife was not expressly or constructively dismissed, but rather had resigned from her employment.

The husband's wrongful dismissal claim was also dismissed as he had received adequate payment in lieu of notice.

On the oppression claim, the court found that the defendants' failure to provide annual audited financial statements and the majority backer's post-litigation correspondence violated the wife's reasonable expectations as a shareholder.

The court ordered the purchase of the wife's shares, valuing them at $1.00 as of the date of the original oppressive conduct in 2010, given the corporation's significant debt at that time.

Claims for unjust enrichment and fraudulent misrepresentation were dismissed, as was the defendants' counterclaim for defamation.

The appellants appealed an order granting the respondent leave to commence a derivative action on behalf of a closely held corporation.

The appellants argued that one of the claims for alleged overpayment of management fees was statute-barred and that the application judge erred in finding the action was in the best interests of the corporation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that there was an arguable case that the claim was not statute-barred and that the application judge's discretionary decision to grant leave was reasonable and entitled to deference, particularly given the overlapping oppression action.

The appellant tenant and respondent landlord disagreed over the interpretation of their commercial lease on two points: whether the leased premises included a parking area owned by the City of London and licensed to the landlord, and whether the landlord's right to exclusive use of office space permitted the landlord to lease that space to a third party.

The application judge found against the tenant on both points.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision regarding the parking area but reversed on the office space issue, finding that the lease language clearly distinguished between "use" (reserved exclusively to the landlord) and "access or entry" (afforded to the landlord and invitees), and therefore the landlord could not lease the office to a third party.

Following a successful urgent motion to compel the sale of commercial real estate, the court determined the costs payable by the unsuccessful co-owner who opposed the sale.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01(1) and the principle of proportionality.

Costs were awarded to the moving parties in the amount of $6,000 and to the supporting respondent in the amount of $3,350, payable by the opposing respondent.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination regarding a ban from the respondent library's premises.

After her adjournment request was denied, the applicant failed to attend the scheduled hearing or provide requested medical documentation.

The Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.

The defendants brought a motion to sever the issue of the plaintiff's standing to bring the action, seeking to have it determined in advance of trial.

The plaintiff opposed the motion.

The court reviewed the principles governing bifurcation, noting that a litigant has a basic right to have all issues resolved in one trial and that severance should only be ordered in the clearest of cases.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the issues were interconnected, severance would likely lead to appeals and delay, and the motion was brought late in the proceedings after significant resources had already been expended.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.

The respondent requested that the application be dismissed under section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code, arguing that the applicant had already commenced a civil action based on the same facts and seeking Code-related monetary compensation.

The Tribunal found that the civil proceeding and the application overlapped exactly as contemplated by section 34(11).

As the statutory bar is mandatory, the Tribunal concluded it had no jurisdiction to defer the matter and dismissed the application.