Heather Burnett

The General Manager of OHIP sought judicial review of a decision by the Physician Payment Review Board to hold a hearing regarding the denial of a physician's billing claims.

The General Manager argued the Board lacked jurisdiction to review denials made under s. 18(3) of the Health Insurance Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify judicial intervention before the Board had fully considered the jurisdictional issue and the true basis for the claim denials.

The applicants, Rupert Folkard and Joseph Goldfinger, jointly charged with fraud over $5000, sought a Rowbotham Order for state-funded legal counsel after being refused Legal Aid.

The court applied the three-part test for a Rowbotham Order, finding that while the applicants were indigent despite exceeding Legal Aid thresholds, their right to a fair trial would not be materially compromised if unrepresented.

The charges were serious, but the facts were not overly complex, and both applicants, despite lacking legal training, were intelligent, educated, and accustomed to financial documents.

The court dismissed the application, concluding that they possessed the necessary skills to represent themselves and that logistical issues with disclosure could be resolved without state-funded counsel.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action for malicious prosecution and other torts against multiple public servants and entities, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court considered the Rule 57.01 factors, noting the complexity of the case, the plaintiffs' unfounded allegations of malice and conspiracy, and the defendants' reasonable offers to settle.

The court fixed costs at $260,000 for the municipal defendants and $231,100 for the provincial defendants, representing an amount between partial and substantial indemnity.

A plaintiff, unsuccessfully prosecuted for murder, sued police investigators and Crown attorneys for various torts.

The motion judge dismissed the plaintiff's claim against the Crown due to prosecutorial immunity and struck a cross-claim for contribution, but allowed a cross-claim for indemnity based on negligent legal advice to proceed.

The Crown defendants sought leave to appeal this decision.

Leave to appeal was granted, as the motion judge failed to adequately consider policy reasons against recognizing a duty of care from Crown attorneys to police, which raised doubts about the correctness of the order.

The respondent Crown brought a motion to quash an appeal from a Superior Court order requiring the appellant to produce Youth Records under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The motion judge had ordered the appellant to produce specified Youth Records or face a stay of his proposed class action proceeding.

The appellant challenged the order as final rather than interlocutory, arguing the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory in nature—a production order with a sanction for non-compliance—and therefore any appeal lay to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appeal was quashed and costs were awarded to the Crown.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissing his complaint for a second time.

The Tribunal had previously reinstated the complaint but ordered the applicant to provide all supporting material within two weeks, which he failed to do.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the complaint for failing to comply with procedural orders was reasonable in the interests of procedural fairness and finality.

The Court also dismissed the applicant's allegations of bias, finding no cogent evidence to rebut the presumption of impartiality.

Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim regarding his sponsorship of his former spouse as a permanent resident.

The plaintiff sought a declaration that his former spouse was not entitled to social assistance she received and a return of monies confiscated due to his sponsorship obligation, arguing an implied term that repayment only applied to rightful payments and that estoppel applied.

The court, relying on Supreme Court precedent, held that a sponsor's statutory obligation to reimburse social assistance is absolute, regardless of whether the sponsoree obtained benefits fraudulently, and that estoppel does not apply against a statute.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff's action against Ontario was dismissed.

The plaintiffs owned a property that was intentionally set on fire by a tenant, resulting in severe injuries to occupants.

The police and fire marshal investigated and concluded the property was an illegal rooming house with multiple Fire Code violations that contributed to the spread of the fire.

The plaintiffs were charged with arson by negligence under s. 436 of the Criminal Code, but were discharged at the preliminary inquiry.

They subsequently sued the investigating police officer, fire marshal investigators, and their municipal employers for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, negligent investigation, and Charter breaches.

The Superior Court dismissed the action in its entirety, finding no evidence of malice or bad faith, and concluding that the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charges based on the evidence gathered.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application against the Law Society of Upper Canada and the Attorney General of Ontario as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by not reviewing the evidence filed in his supplementary application record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, endorsing the principle that Rule 2.1 is designed for summary dismissal based on the face of the pleadings and written submissions, and that resorting to evidence defeats the purpose of the rule.

This was a standalone costs decision following dismissal of two civil actions.

The successful defendants sought modest all-inclusive costs of $2,000 per action.

The court held the requested amount was reasonable, particularly when set off against earlier wasted costs previously awarded to the plaintiff on prior motions.

The plaintiff's submissions merely re-argued earlier motions and did not justify refusing costs.

Costs were awarded to the defendants as requested.

The defendants moved under Rule 21 to strike two actions brought by a self-represented plaintiff against tribunal members, the tribunal, and unnamed employees arising from prior residential tenancy proceedings.

The court held that the tribunal was not a suable entity apart from appeals and judicial review, and that the claims were impermissible collateral attacks and re-litigation of matters already determined.

The court further held that the pleadings did not disclose any viable cause of action and failed to allege material facts capable of displacing judicial or statutory good-faith immunity under s. 232(1) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006.

Both actions were dismissed without leave to amend.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice which held that the Landlord and Tenant Board was not a suable entity.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law in the motions judge's decision and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

The defendant tribunal brought a motion to dismiss a civil action alleging bias, denial of a fair hearing, and procedural unfairness in prior tenancy proceedings.

The court held that a statutory tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions is not a suable entity absent express legislative authority.

The action was also found to constitute an impermissible collateral attack on tribunal decisions that could only be challenged through internal review or judicial review.

In the alternative, the court held that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action under Rule 21.01(1)(b) because it failed to plead material facts or recognized legal causes of action.

The statement of claim was struck without leave to amend and the action dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to note the Crown in default and obtain default judgment after alleging that the defendant failed to deliver a statement of defence.

The court considered whether the plaintiff complied with the notice requirement in s. 7(1) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, which requires that notice of claim be served at least 60 days before commencing an action.

The court held that an action is commenced when the statement of claim is issued, not when it is served.

Because the claim was issued before the required notice period elapsed, the proceeding was a nullity and the statutory precondition to suing the Crown was not met.

In addition, the Crown had delivered a statement of defence before being noted in default, meaning it was not in default in any event.

Following dismissal of claims against several defendants in a civil action, the court determined the appropriate costs awards.

Multiple defendants sought substantial indemnity costs on the basis that the plaintiff had advanced serious and unfounded allegations attacking their integrity.

The court reviewed the governing principles for costs under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, emphasizing reasonableness and the expectations of the parties.

Although the allegations were serious and unsupported, the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the self‑represented plaintiff appeared misguided rather than malicious.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the successful defendants in varying amounts, payable within 30 days.

The self‑represented plaintiff commenced a new action against numerous parties, including her former employer, its insurers, opposing counsel, and her own former lawyers, arising from circumstances surrounding her termination and the settlement of an earlier wrongful dismissal action.

Multiple defendants brought motions to strike the statement of claim or obtain summary judgment, arguing the action was barred by abuse of process, the prior settlement and release, limitation periods, and failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court held that the plaintiff was attempting to re‑litigate issues resolved in the earlier action and that many claims were legally untenable, including claims against opposing counsel and insurers who owed no duty of care to an adverse party.

Claims alleging breach of privacy, breach of confidence, defamation, Charter violations, and Human Rights Code violations were also found to disclose no reasonable cause of action.

The statement of claim was struck against most defendants without leave to amend and summary judgment was granted dismissing the remaining claims of conspiracy and extortion against them.