W. H. Peter Madorin

The appellant, Susan Opal McKay, appealed the dismissal of her claim for adverse possession over an eight-foot wide strip of land adjacent to her property, which is owned by the respondent, Joel Paul Vautour.

The dispute arose after the respondent removed an old paddock fence and replaced it with a fence on the surveyed boundary line.

The appellant argued that the paddock fence established the true boundary and that her predecessors in title had acquired possessory title prior to the land being converted to the land titles system in 2003.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the appellant failed to meet the burden of proof for adverse possession, specifically lacking cogent evidence of open, notorious, constant, continuous, peaceful, and exclusive use with the intention to exclude the true owner for any ten-year period before June 16, 2003.

The court also found that the existence of another wooden fence on the actual boundary line and the ambiguous nature of the paddock fence's purpose undermined the appellant's claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

This action concerned a boundary dispute where the plaintiff claimed ownership of an 8-foot strip of land by adverse possession.

The properties were converted to the land titles system on June 16, 2003, requiring the plaintiff to prove 10 years of adverse possession by her predecessors in title prior to that date.

The court found insufficient evidence of open, notorious, constant, continuous, peaceful, and exclusive possession by the plaintiff's predecessors.

Crucially, the existence of a wooden fence built by a predecessor on the surveyed lot line, rather than the informal 'paddock fence' relied upon by the plaintiff, indicated knowledge of the true boundary.

The plaintiff's claim for adverse possession was dismissed with costs.

The plaintiffs sought a declaration that a lease agreement, attached as a schedule to an expired option agreement for quarry operations, was void.

The defendant sought the opposite declaration and substantial damages.

The court found that the option agreement had expired, the lease was never activated due to unfulfilled conditions precedent, and the lease terms themselves were unconscionable, particularly regarding property description, access rights, and allocation of rehabilitation and licensing costs.

The court declared the lease void and awarded the defendant only the expenses incurred after the option agreement's expiry, rejecting claims for expenses incurred during the option period as they were at the defendant's risk.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff’s action, the court addressed costs submissions from the defendants.

The Township of Puslinch sought costs previously fixed at $23,400, which the plaintiff challenged as excessive and duplicative.

The court accepted that a portion of the Township’s costs duplicated a prior motion award and reduced the amount accordingly.

The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the award should be limited due to the plaintiff’s financial circumstances.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation also sought costs for the action and motion, which the court found reasonable in light of the extensive materials and history of the proceeding.

Following dismissal of claims against several defendants in a civil action, the court determined the appropriate costs awards.

Multiple defendants sought substantial indemnity costs on the basis that the plaintiff had advanced serious and unfounded allegations attacking their integrity.

The court reviewed the governing principles for costs under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, emphasizing reasonableness and the expectations of the parties.

Although the allegations were serious and unsupported, the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the self‑represented plaintiff appeared misguided rather than malicious.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the successful defendants in varying amounts, payable within 30 days.

The self‑represented plaintiff commenced a new action against numerous parties, including her former employer, its insurers, opposing counsel, and her own former lawyers, arising from circumstances surrounding her termination and the settlement of an earlier wrongful dismissal action.

Multiple defendants brought motions to strike the statement of claim or obtain summary judgment, arguing the action was barred by abuse of process, the prior settlement and release, limitation periods, and failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court held that the plaintiff was attempting to re‑litigate issues resolved in the earlier action and that many claims were legally untenable, including claims against opposing counsel and insurers who owed no duty of care to an adverse party.

Claims alleging breach of privacy, breach of confidence, defamation, Charter violations, and Human Rights Code violations were also found to disclose no reasonable cause of action.

The statement of claim was struck against most defendants without leave to amend and summary judgment was granted dismissing the remaining claims of conspiracy and extortion against them.

The plaintiff brought a negligence action against a municipality after stepping into a crack or pothole in a municipal parking stall and sustaining a knee injury.

The municipality argued that it met the regulatory minimum maintenance standards for municipal highways and that the roadway was intended primarily for vehicular traffic.

The court held that where a municipality creates designated parking stalls, it is reasonably foreseeable that pedestrians will walk between parked vehicles to access the curb and sidewalk.

The municipality failed to prove it complied with inspection requirements under the Minimum Maintenance Standards for Municipal Highways and failed to inspect the area used by pedestrians.

The longitudinal pothole created an unreasonable risk of harm and the municipality was found liable.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding an agreement to make a second mortgage loan.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in concluding that the written terms of the agreement were the only terms.

The Court held that the conduct of the parties established an implied term that the second mortgage transaction would not be completed if it triggered a default under the first mortgage.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim for specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale of land.

The appellants had failed to pay the deposit within the stipulated five days, and the vendors treated the agreement as at an end.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge was entitled to conclude that the appellants knew an oral comment by the vendors' representative was not legally binding to amend the agreement or waive rights.

The appellant school bus operator appealed the dismissal of its motion for a declaration that its insurer had a duty to defend it in the main action.

The underlying action alleged the operator failed to ensure a student was safely on board, resulting in severe weather exposure and amputation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding a possible duty to indemnify under the policy, which triggered the duty to defend.

The court dismissed the request for separate representation, finding no sufficient conflict on the pleadings, but awarded the appellant solicitor-and-client costs until the insurer takes over the defence.