Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Court File No.: CR-23-30000586
Date: 2025-03-27

Between:
His Majesty the King (Respondent)
and
Dennis Singh and Justin Sandassie (Applicants)

Heard: March 6, 2025

Before: K. Byrne

Appearances:
Brian Moreira and Ben Snow, for the Crown
Christopher Hicks and Tamaira Davidson, for Dennis Singh
James Miglin, for Justin Sandassie

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

[1] On November 28, 2024, the Applicants, Dennis Singh and Justin Sandassie (collectively, “the Applicants”), were found guilty by a jury of the first degree murder of Johann Persaud, indignity to human remains, and arson. The imposition of sentence has been adjourned and they now bring a constitutional challenge to s. 745(a) of the Criminal Code, which mandates a life sentence without eligibility for parole for 25 years for all adults convicted of first degree murder.

The Facts of the Offence

[2] Late on August 13 and into the early morning hours of August 14, 2021, Johann Persaud attended at 8 Lamay Crescent (“8 Lamay”) in the northeast part of Toronto. 8 Lamay was the home of the Applicant, Dennis Singh. Mr. Persaud, Mr. Singh, and the second Applicant, Justin Sandassie, were captured on video socializing in front of 8 Lamay on the driveway in front of the garage. The encounter seemed to be a happy one at first. The parties are seen drinking, smoking, laughing, and hugging one another.

[3] However, at some point, things took a turn. Mr. Persaud left 8 Lamay in his white Acura with Mr. Sandassie as his passenger. Upon their return a short time later, Mr. Singh was clearly upset, and he brandished an object which looked like a firearm. He prodded Mr. Persaud several times with it. Eventually, Mr. Persaud left. Mr. Persaud returned once in his car briefly after this and Mr. Singh approached and kicked it. He also appeared to drive by on one further occasion but did not stop.

[4] Shortly after 2 a.m., Mr. Persaud again returned to 8 Lamay. He exited his car and was immediately confronted by an angry-looking Mr. Singh. At several times, the video footage captures Mr. Singh getting into Mr. Persaud’s face and space. Mr. Sandassie initially got between Mr. Singh and Mr. Persaud. Mr. Sandassie then pushed Mr. Persaud multiple times. As Mr. Persaud turned to leave, Mr. Sandassie can be seen grabbing his arm and his shoulders to prevent him from returning to his car.

[5] Mr. Persaud was knocked to the ground by the two men and then got up and was pursued by both. As they followed him, they positioned themselves between Mr. Persaud and his motor vehicle and it can be inferred that both were trying to prevent Mr. Persaud from escaping.

[6] Mr. Sandassie then punched Mr. Persaud multiple times. Mr. Persaud appeared to counterpunch Mr. Sandassie in self-defence, and Mr. Sandassie fell to the ground, as did Mr. Persaud. Mr. Singh then kicked Mr. Persaud and both Mr. Singh and Mr. Sandassie got on top of him. Mr. Sandassie then got up and started to kick and stomp on Mr. Persaud while Mr. Singh was pinning him down on his back.

[7] About two and a half minutes later, Mr. Persaud momentarily broke free and tried to scramble away to escape. Both Mr. Sandassie and Mr. Singh pursued and restrained him, forcing him to the ground on the roadway. Over the next 8-10 minutes, Mr. Persaud was punched, kicked, stomped on, dragged about the roadway, and stabbed with a pair of scissors wielded by Mr. Sandassie.

[8] At several times, Mr. Persaud is seen trying to get up and get away, only to be beaten down again. The entire interaction was captured on the video surveillance of 8 Lamay and 10 Lamay Crescent.

[9] Mr. Persaud died in front of 10 Lamay Crescent. The pathologist, Dr. Pickup, determined the cause of death to be a stab wound that injured Mr. Persaud’s carotid artery. But he also noted 17 stab wounds to the head, two additional stab wounds to the neck, and four stab wounds to the right hand. As well, several other significant blunt force trauma injuries to the head, neck, and ribs were present. Setting aside the injury to the carotid artery, the totality of the other injuries may well have sufficed to kill Mr. Persaud. This could not be determined though because the carotid artery injury was the most lethal and fast-acting cause of death.

[10] Mr. Singh and Mr. Sandassie then attempted to conceal this murder. First, they brought out a tarp and placed it over Mr. Persaud’s body. Next, they loaded Mr. Persaud’s body into the trunk of his Acura. Then, they attempted to clean up the scene by power washing Mr. Persaud’s blood that was on the street and sidewalk. They then drove the Acura to a cornfield and set the car on fire, where eventually it was found with Mr. Persaud’s charred body inside the trunk.

Position of Parties

[11] The Applicants claim that this mandatory sentence is grossly disproportionate and amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in contravention of s. 12 of the Charter and is overbroad in contravention of s. 7 of the Charter. Further, they argue that it cannot be upheld under the reasonable limits clause in s. 1 of the Charter.

[12] The Respondent opposes this application. The Respondent’s position is that this court must apply the doctrine of stare decisis to dismiss this application. There is binding precedent from the Supreme Court of Canada upholding the constitutionality of this mandatory sentence. Moreover, they argue that there have been no material legal developments that can justify revisiting this longstanding body of jurisprudence.

[13] All parties have filed numerous cases in support of their respective positions, all of which I have thoroughly reviewed.

Analysis

[14] For the reasons that follow, I find that the prohibition of parole ineligibility contained in s. 745(a) of the Criminal Code, which provides for a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole until the accused person has served 25 years of the sentence, is constitutionally valid.

[15] The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence for murder over the past several decades. It is of some note and relevance to this case, that the jurisprudence in this area has focused primarily on constructive first degree murder premised on underlying unlawful conduct. Accordingly, under the principle of vertical stare decisis, I find that this court is very much bound by those precedents.

[16] In R. v. Luxton, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 711, the Supreme Court specifically rejected a s. 12 challenge to the mandatory minimum penalty for constructive first degree murder. The Court held that the mandatory life sentence without eligibility for parole for 25 years mandated by what is now s. 745(a) (then s. 669(a)), was not grossly disproportionate. Rather, it was justified based on the utmost gravity of the offence and highest level of moral blameworthiness on the part of the offender. In particular, at p. 724, the court held:

[The mandatory minimum sentence] does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. [It constitutes] punishment of the most serious crime in our criminal law, that of first degree murder. This is a crime that carries with it the most serious level of moral blameworthiness, namely subjective foresight of death. The penalty is severe and deservedly so. The minimum 25 years to be served before eligibility for parole reflects society’s condemnation of a person who has exploited a position of power and dominance to the gravest extent possible by murdering the person that he or she is forcibly confining. The punishment is not excessive and clearly does not outrage our standards of decency. [Emphasis added.]

[17] For similar reasons, a s. 7 challenge to the mandatory sentence was rejected by a majority of the Supreme Court in the companion appeal of R. v. Arkell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 695. More importantly, in R. v. Safarzadeh‑Markhali, 2016 SCC 14, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 180, the court held that the principle of proportionality in relation to sentencing regarding the protection offered by s. 12 of the Charter, is the same as the protection offered by s. 7 of Charter, making a separate inquiry under s. 7 redundant.

[18] In 2001, a decade after Luxton, the Supreme Court once again upheld the mandatory life sentence for murder in R. v. Latimer, 2001 SCC 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3, despite the undeniable tragic circumstances attached to that case. Mr. Latimer took the life of his own severely disabled and long-suffering daughter. The Court acknowledged that Mr. Latimer “faced challenges of the sort most Canadians can only imagine,” but in deciding to end his daughter’s life, “the gravest possible consequences resulted from an act of the most serious and morally blameworthy intentionality”: at paras. 5, 84. Despite Mr. Latimer’s circumstances, the mandatory life sentence was upheld as not grossly disproportionate.

[19] Most recently, in R. v. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 597, released in May 2022, the Supreme Court affirmed the holding in Luxton, that the mandatory sentence for first degree murder does not infringe s. 12 of the Charter. The Court determined it was unconstitutional to impose consecutive, rather than concurrent, parole ineligibility periods of 25 years for multiple first degree murders. The Court proceeded to expressly contrast this finding with the persisting constitutionality of the mandatory sentence for a single first degree murder, stating at para. 86:

The 25-year parole ineligibility period reflects society’s condemnation of the commission of such a crime and does not outrage our standards of decency (Luxton, at pp. 724-25). Because of the 25-year mandatory ineligibility period, an elderly offender who is convicted of first-degree murder will thus have little or no hope of getting out of prison. As was decided in Luxton, that sentence is nonetheless compatible with s. 12 of the Charter, since it is within the purview of Parliament to sanction the most heinous crime with a sentence that sufficiently denounces the gravity of the offence, but that does not exceed constitutional limits by depriving every offender of any possibility of parole from the outset. [Emphasis added.]

[20] I am mindful that the applicant, Mr. Sandassie, argues that this statement made by the Supreme Court in Bissonnette amounts to nothing more than obiter dicta, and is therefore not authoritative on the point. However, even an obiter comment made by the highest court can still be binding on this court. R. v. Henry, 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 609, addresses the force of obiter comments made by the Supreme Court. In that case, the Court said that even when the Supreme Court makes a statement of law that is obiter and not essential to the ratio of the decision, it should still be treated as authoritative by lower courts. I acknowledge that there is a spectrum depending on how far afield from the ratio the Supreme Court is going from those comments, versus how closely tied the comments made are to that jurisprudential point. In Bissonnette, the Court was grappling with the constitutionality of a provision related to the mandatory minimum sentence in relation to first degree murder. And it is in this context that they specifically named, considered, and reaffirmed Luxton. The comment falls much closer to a key ratio position than a passing comment. As such, I find myself very much bound by it.

[21] I also find myself bound by the rule of horizontal stare decisis and judicial comity. There are numerous decisions from multiple courts across the country that have consistently upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum for murder. Those cases include, but are not limited to, the following: R. v. Mohiadin, 2023 ONSC 3066; R. v. Labrèche, 2024 QCCS 204; R. v. Berry, 2025 BCCA 14; and R. v. McKee, 2024 ONSC 4934. The only case departing from this overwhelming consensus is R. v. Mariani, 2025 BCSC 129, which in my view, I am not bound by.

Conclusion

[22] I find no basis to depart from the longstanding and binding precedent set out in Bissonnette that the mandatory minimum sentence in the context of a first degree murder is constitutionally valid.

[23] Accordingly, the application is dismissed.

K. Byrne
Released: March 27, 2025