Christopher Hicks

The accused was charged with first-degree murder following a home invasion where an 82-year-old woman was beaten to death.

At the close of the Crown's case, the defence moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on first-degree murder, arguing the jury should only be left with second-degree murder or manslaughter.

The Crown argued first-degree murder could be established through planning and deliberation or constructive murder based on forcible confinement.

The court granted the directed verdict application, finding no evidence to support planning and deliberation, nor evidence of a discrete act of forcible confinement separate from the killing itself.

The jury was directed to return a verdict of acquittal on first-degree murder and subsequently convicted the accused of second-degree murder.

The Crown brought an application to admit a video statement made by the accused to police following his arrest for second-degree murder.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary, alleging his will was overborne by persistent questioning, inducements, and delayed cautions.

The court found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary, noting the police did not offer inducements, the questioning was not oppressive, and the accused understood his rights.

The statement was ruled admissible subject to editing out specific prejudicial references.

This is a ruling on a Corbett application to determine the admissibility of the accused's criminal record for cross-examination on credibility during a trial for second-degree murder.

The court balanced the probative value and prejudicial effect of the record, considering the nature, similarity, and remoteness of previous convictions, and the need to prevent an unbalanced picture for the jury.

The judge decided to admit an edited version of the record, excluding drug offences, mischief over $5000, crimes indicating antipathy to the justice system (assault peace officer, escape lawful custody), sexual assaults, and possession of a firearm, while allowing crimes of dishonesty (theft, possession of stolen property) and some assaults and breaches of court orders, with aggravated assault reduced to assault.

During a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce an alternative theory of constructive first-degree murder based on criminal harassment under section 231(6) of the Criminal Code, arguing that the defendant's act of pointing a handgun at the victim with intent to scare constituted criminal harassment.

The defence challenged this, citing insufficient evidence and the late introduction of the theory after the evidentiary portion of the trial.

The court ruled against putting the alternative theory to the jury, finding that the facts did not meet the legal definition of criminal harassment, which requires a state of ongoing torment, and that the late introduction of the theory would prejudice the defendant's right to a fair trial.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder after shooting his step-mother.

During the trial, the defence applied for a directed verdict of acquittal on the first-degree murder charge, arguing there was no evidence that the killing was planned and deliberate.

The court reviewed the circumstantial evidence, including the accused's prior statements, his access to the firearm, and his post-offence conduct.

Applying the test for a directed verdict, the court found there was some evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could infer planning and deliberation.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder under s. 231(5)(b) of the Criminal Code on the theory that he intentionally killed the victim while committing sexual assault.

The appellant argued that first degree murder under s. 231(5)(b) requires physical domination of the victim and that a sexual assault arising from fraudulently obtained consent does not satisfy this requirement.

The appellant also challenged the Crown's cross-examination as improper and prejudicial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that domination is not a distinct element of s. 231(5)(b), that sexual assault by its nature involves unlawful domination, and that any improprieties in cross-examination were adequately remedied by the trial judge's jury instructions.

The appellant appealed dispositions of the Ontario Review Board dated June 23, 2016 and March 7, 2017 regarding her detention on a secure forensic unit.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment and related offences in 2005 and 2006.

She argued that the Board's finding that she poses a significant threat to public safety was unreasonable and that she should receive an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's finding that she remains a significant threat but found that the Board erred in summarily dismissing her request for a conditional discharge without further inquiry into her current behavioural status and without considering whether her risk could be managed through a conditional discharge with a consensual treatment order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder arising from a home invasion robbery of a drug dealer during which the victim was fatally stabbed.

The Crown's case relied heavily on testimony from the appellant's accomplice who pleaded guilty to manslaughter.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal concerning jury instructions: the failure to give a Vetrovec warning, the failure to give a W.(D.) instruction, the instruction on common purpose liability, and improper re-examination.

The appellant also appealed his sentence of life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 22 years.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that defence counsel's tactical decisions at trial were reasonable and that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in jury instructions.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder for shooting his half-brother in the back with a shotgun.

The appellant admitted to the shooting but claimed he only intended to scare his brother and shoot at the computer or stereo, not to kill him.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's jury instructions on the mens rea for murder contained serious legal errors, particularly regarding the treatment of evidence of mental illness and the distinction between a legal presumption and a permissible inference.

The trial judge incorrectly suggested that evidence of mental illness could only be relevant to sentencing and failed to properly instruct the jury that such evidence could negate the mental element required for murder.

The court also noted deficiencies in how the trial judge responded to the jury's request for clarification on the state of mind required for murder.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellants Collins and Newton were convicted of murder and attempted murder following a five-week trial before a judge and jury.

Collins was found guilty of first degree murder and attempted murder; Newton was acquitted of first degree murder but convicted of second degree murder and attempted murder.

Both appealed their convictions.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by failing to relate the evidence to the legal issues the jury had to decide, instead presenting evidence in a witness-by-witness format.

This error deprived the appellants of a fair trial.

The court rejected Newton's argument that his verdicts were unreasonable.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

An appeal from a conviction for assault causing bodily harm and the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown conceded that the trial judge erred in the conviction.

The Court of Appeal accepted the Crown's concession and set aside the conviction for assault causing bodily harm, substituting in its place a conviction for common assault.

The sentence had already been served.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of statements made by the accused, Jason Rodgerson, who is charged with second-degree murder.

The defence sought to exclude the statements, alleging violations of Charter Sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b), and arguing involuntariness.

The court found that a spontaneous utterance made upon arrest and the initial portion of a videotaped interview (by Detective Henderson) were admissible, as they were voluntary and obtained without Charter infringement.

However, the subsequent portions of the videotaped interview (by Detectives Dingwall and Hoard) were excluded under Section 24(2) of the Charter due to a violation of Section 9, as the police deliberately delayed bringing the accused before a Justice of the Peace on drug charges to continue the homicide investigation, even after the accused had asserted his right to silence and no new information justified further interrogation.

The Crown brought an application under section 123(1) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act seeking access to youth records of the accused for use in two separate Superior Court prosecutions (one involving four counts of attempted murder and one count of aggravated assault, and another involving a charge of first degree murder), as well as for transmission to the Parole Board of Canada.

The accused had previously been convicted of first degree murder and was serving a life sentence with parole ineligibility for twenty-five years.

The court dismissed the Crown's application as premature, finding that while the Crown had a valid and substantial interest in the records, access was not necessary in the interests of the proper administration of justice at that time.

The Court dismissed the Crown appeal and upheld an order for a new trial on second degree murder, holding that the jury charge contained reversible errors on the use of post-offence conduct evidence for intent and that the curative proviso did not apply.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a restricted firearm with ammunition and was sentenced to nine and one-half years' imprisonment.

He appealed his sentence, arguing that his prior youth conviction for the same offence should not trigger the enhanced mandatory minimum for a 'second or subsequent offence' under the Criminal Code due to the protections of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that because the adult offence was committed within the statutory access period for the youth record, the appellant lost the protection of the YCJA.

Consequently, the prior youth conviction constituted an earlier offence, and the enhanced mandatory minimum applied.

The Court held that broad jury vetting consultations with police should not occur, that relevant jury-selection information from police must be disclosed, and that despite non-disclosure in this case there was no reasonable possibility the jury would have been differently constituted, no unfair trial, and no miscarriage of justice.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder for stabbing his wife to death and nearly decapitating her.

The court determined the appropriate period of parole ineligibility.

The court rejected the accused's claims of profound depression and PTSD, finding him manipulative and lacking remorse.

Considering the brutal nature of the domestic homicide, the vulnerability of the victim, and the need for denunciation and deterrence, the court set parole ineligibility at 15 years.

The appellant appealed his convictions and six-year sentence for offences related to the illegal possession of a loaded handgun.

He argued that the handgun evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to an unlawful investigative detention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that under the Grant framework, the officer acted in good faith, the breach had minimal impact, and society had a strong interest in adjudicating the serious offences.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the six-year sentence, while at the high end of the range, was fit given the appellant's lengthy record and multiple weapons prohibitions.

In a murder trial, the accused sought a mistrial after the Crown’s opening address allegedly contained argument, rhetorical flourishes, and repetitive descriptions of the deceased’s injuries that were said to be inflammatory and prejudicial.

The court acknowledged that portions of the Crown’s opening exceeded the proper limits of a neutral overview and included some inappropriate commentary.

However, applying established principles governing mistrials, the court held that the improprieties were not so prejudicial that a jury would be incapable of disregarding them.

The court emphasized that mistrials are remedies of last resort and that juries are presumed to follow judicial instructions.

A corrective instruction to the jury was therefore sufficient to cure any potential prejudice.

The accused, charged with second degree murder of his wife, sought to exclude statements made to police on the basis that they were involuntary and obtained in breach of his ss. 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights.

The accused argued that the police failed to provide a Dari interpreter promptly, delaying his ability to consult counsel.

The court found the statements voluntary despite a recording failure, as the officers' notes and an interpreter's statement provided a sufficient record.

The court also dismissed the Charter applications, finding the accused understood the reason for his arrest and his right to counsel in Hindi, and that the delay in securing a Dari interpreter was reasonable in the circumstances.

The statements were ruled admissible.