Christopher Hicks

In a murder trial where the accused admitted to cutting his wife's throat, the Crown sought to adduce a graphic autopsy photograph of the wound to assist the jury in determining the accused's intent.

The accused opposed the admission, arguing the photograph was highly prejudicial and had minimal probative value.

The court found that the photograph had considerable probative value in illustrating the force required to inflict the injury, which was central to the issue of intent.

The court concluded that the probative value outweighed any potential prejudicial effect and ruled the photograph admissible.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm.

The convictions arose from an incident where the appellant and his cousin were driving at excessive speeds in close proximity, resulting in the cousin's vehicle losing control and striking another car, killing the cousin and injuring two others.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on factual causation and tandem driving.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's discretionary decision to refuse the appellant's post-verdict application to re-open the defence case to adduce fresh evidence regarding a prosecution witness's credibility.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge improperly used his silence as a basis for disbelieving his evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not rely on silence, but rather contrasted the appellant's trial testimony with a false story he provided at the scene of the accident.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder for the killing of a police officer.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding expert psychiatric evidence and that the Crown engaged in illegal jury vetting by seeking police officers' opinions on potential jurors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions correctly explained how to weigh expert opinions based on hearsay without shifting the burden of proof.

The Court also held that the jury vetting process did not give the Crown an unfair advantage or create an appearance of bias, as the police opinions were not drawn from databases and the Crown had no obligation to disclose them.

The appellant appealed his 15-year sentence for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the 15-year sentence, finding it fit for a brutal aggravated homicide and noting the sentencing judge made no errors regarding parity or the appellant's role.

However, the Court found the sentencing judge erred in granting only 1.22 days of credit for pre-trial custody based on a lack of pre-charge programming.

The Court increased the pre-trial custody credit to the standard 2-for-1 ratio, reducing the remaining sentence to eight years and six months.

The accused was acquitted of first-degree murder after the trial judge excluded expert and lay evidence regarding the meaning of a teardrop tattoo the accused obtained after the murder.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in excluding the sociologist's expert evidence by applying the Daubert factors, which are suited for scientific evidence, to non-scientific specialized knowledge.

The trial judge also erred in excluding the lay evidence of gang members regarding the tattoo's meaning within their culture.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of incest against his developmentally challenged daughter.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in handling the issue of the complainant's motive to fabricate and that Crown counsel engaged in misconduct.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown improperly cross-examined witnesses on the complainant's motive to fabricate, made inflammatory comments in closing, and improperly injected personal opinion.

The trial judge failed to provide necessary corrective instructions.

The cumulative effect of these errors undermined the fairness of the trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after arming himself with a handgun and shooting into a vehicle, killing the victim.

The trial judge characterized the offence as close to murder and imposed an effective sentence of 19 years (10 years plus 9 years pre-trial custody credit).

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing it was beyond the range and violated the parity rule, as the person who hired him received 14 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was within the range for a near-murder manslaughter and the higher sentence was justified by the appellant's role.

The appellant appealed his sentence of twelve years' imprisonment for two counts of sexual interference involving two young children.

He argued the trial judge failed to assist him as an unrepresented accused and that the sentence was manifestly unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first ground, finding the trial judge continually urged the appellant to retain counsel.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on the second ground, finding the twelve-year sentence was beyond the range for offences involving no violence or intercourse.

The sentence was reduced to nine years total, and the parole eligibility restriction was removed.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences related to a credit card fraud and manufacturing operation found in their home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge reasonably inferred knowledge and participation from the presence of false credit cards and manufacturing equipment.

The sentence appeal for the first appellant was dismissed, including a restitution order.

However, the sentence appeal for the second appellant was allowed in part to set aside the restitution order against her, as there was no evidence of her ability to pay.

The appellant appealed his conviction for pointing a firearm, arguing there was insufficient evidence for the trial judge to find the 'gun' was a 'firearm'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient evidence based on witness descriptions, the loading of the gun, the appellant's aggressive behaviour, and his threats to shoot the victims.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge upholding her conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the lower court judge thoroughly reviewed all arguments and provided compelling reasons.

Concluding that no issue of general importance was raised and the proposed issues lacked sufficient merit, the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal.

The appellants were convicted of possession of stolen property under $5,000 and fraud over $5,000 arising from the sale of a motorcycle containing stolen components.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding recent possession, wilful blindness, after-the-fact conduct, and the failure to give a Vetrovec warning.

They also appealed their conditional sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate when read as a whole and no Vetrovec warning was required.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentences were not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and failing to comply with probation, arguing the trial judge misapprehended crucial evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the appellant's testimony regarding the position of a sofa bed and whether he forgot his parents' honeymoon.

The Court concluded that these misapprehensions figured prominently in the trial judge's credibility findings and reasoning process, thereby occasioning a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and using a firearm during an indictable offence, arising from a home invasion.

The Crown's case relied heavily on an accomplice's testimony, which the trial judge instructed the jury required confirmation.

The trial judge allowed the jury to use a witness's late, in-dock identification of the appellant as confirmatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in failing to caution the jury about the frailties of in-dock identification and in leaving it as capable of confirming the accomplice's testimony.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of armed robbery and possession of a loaded restricted firearm following an incident at a clothing store where a third accomplice, who was armed, died in a confrontation with the storeowner.

On appeal, they challenged the jury instructions regarding the storeowner's evidence, the elements of armed robbery, and party liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals against the armed robbery convictions and sentences, finding the jury instructions adequate.

However, the court allowed the appeals regarding the firearm possession convictions, setting them aside and ordering a new trial because the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the specific elements of that offence.

The appellant, a first offender, pleaded guilty to attempted murder, forcible confinement, robbery, and sexual assault after a brutal and prolonged attack on a young woman.

He was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentence was excessive and that the judge failed to apply the principle that first offenders should receive the shortest possible sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the shortest sentence principle does not apply to very serious and violent offences, and that the 15-year sentence was proportionate given the severe aggravating factors and the devastating, permanent injuries inflicted on the victim.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery and related offences following two trials.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that his s. 11(b) Charter rights were violated by a 56-month delay, that the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence and refusing to sever the charges, and that bad character evidence was improperly admitted.

He also appealed his sentence of life imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the delay was largely attributable to the appellant's own conduct and that the trial judge made no reversible errors in his evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court holding that a life sentence was fit given the appellant's extensive violent criminal record, incorrigibility, and the need to protect the public.

The media applied to unseal search warrant materials related to a murder investigation.

The application judge ordered partial unsealing.

Both an accused (Gardiner) and the media appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Gardiner's appeal, finding no error in the partial release.

The Court also dismissed the media's appeal, noting that while the application judge's reasons were inadequate for appellate review, remitting the matter would interfere with a publication ban already imposed by the trial judge.

The appellant appealed a total sentence of 9 years and 1 month (including pre-trial custody credit) for robberies involving an imitation weapon.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was beyond the appropriate range, noting the appellant's prior record and rehabilitative prospects.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to 6 years, taking into account the 16 months credited for pre-trial custody, for an effective sentence of 7 years and 4 months.