Christopher Hicks

The Court held that broad jury vetting consultations with police should not occur, that relevant jury-selection information from police must be disclosed, and that despite non-disclosure in this case there was no reasonable possibility the jury would have been differently constituted, no unfair trial, and no miscarriage of justice.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder for stabbing his wife to death and nearly decapitating her.

The court determined the appropriate period of parole ineligibility.

The court rejected the accused's claims of profound depression and PTSD, finding him manipulative and lacking remorse.

Considering the brutal nature of the domestic homicide, the vulnerability of the victim, and the need for denunciation and deterrence, the court set parole ineligibility at 15 years.

The appellant appealed his convictions and six-year sentence for offences related to the illegal possession of a loaded handgun.

He argued that the handgun evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to an unlawful investigative detention.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that under the Grant framework, the officer acted in good faith, the breach had minimal impact, and society had a strong interest in adjudicating the serious offences.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the six-year sentence, while at the high end of the range, was fit given the appellant's lengthy record and multiple weapons prohibitions.

In a murder trial, the accused sought a mistrial after the Crown’s opening address allegedly contained argument, rhetorical flourishes, and repetitive descriptions of the deceased’s injuries that were said to be inflammatory and prejudicial.

The court acknowledged that portions of the Crown’s opening exceeded the proper limits of a neutral overview and included some inappropriate commentary.

However, applying established principles governing mistrials, the court held that the improprieties were not so prejudicial that a jury would be incapable of disregarding them.

The court emphasized that mistrials are remedies of last resort and that juries are presumed to follow judicial instructions.

A corrective instruction to the jury was therefore sufficient to cure any potential prejudice.

In a murder trial where the accused admitted to cutting his wife's throat, the Crown sought to adduce a graphic autopsy photograph of the wound to assist the jury in determining the accused's intent.

The accused opposed the admission, arguing the photograph was highly prejudicial and had minimal probative value.

The court found that the photograph had considerable probative value in illustrating the force required to inflict the injury, which was central to the issue of intent.

The court concluded that the probative value outweighed any potential prejudicial effect and ruled the photograph admissible.

The accused, charged with second degree murder of his wife, sought to exclude statements made to police on the basis that they were involuntary and obtained in breach of his ss. 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights.

The accused argued that the police failed to provide a Dari interpreter promptly, delaying his ability to consult counsel.

The court found the statements voluntary despite a recording failure, as the officers' notes and an interpreter's statement provided a sufficient record.

The court also dismissed the Charter applications, finding the accused understood the reason for his arrest and his right to counsel in Hindi, and that the delay in securing a Dari interpreter was reasonable in the circumstances.

The statements were ruled admissible.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm.

The convictions arose from an incident where the appellant and his cousin were driving at excessive speeds in close proximity, resulting in the cousin's vehicle losing control and striking another car, killing the cousin and injuring two others.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on factual causation and tandem driving.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's discretionary decision to refuse the appellant's post-verdict application to re-open the defence case to adduce fresh evidence regarding a prosecution witness's credibility.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the resulting indeterminate sentence.

He argued the sentencing judge misapprehended evidence regarding his willingness to take Lupron to control his risk of reoffending, and improperly admitted expert reply psychiatric evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge's factual conclusions were supported by the record and the expert evidence was admitted on consent.

The accused was acquitted at trial of two counts of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in law by taking a piecemeal approach to the evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittals, holding that the trial judge did not fail to consider the evidence as a whole.

The Court clarified that a trial judge's assessment of evidence only constitutes an error of law allowing a Crown appeal from an acquittal in limited circumstances, such as when a reasonable doubt is tainted by a legal error.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge improperly used his silence as a basis for disbelieving his evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not rely on silence, but rather contrasted the appellant's trial testimony with a false story he provided at the scene of the accident.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder for the killing of a police officer.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge misdirected the jury regarding expert psychiatric evidence and that the Crown engaged in illegal jury vetting by seeking police officers' opinions on potential jurors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury instructions correctly explained how to weigh expert opinions based on hearsay without shifting the burden of proof.

The Court also held that the jury vetting process did not give the Crown an unfair advantage or create an appearance of bias, as the police opinions were not drawn from databases and the Crown had no obligation to disclose them.

The appellant appealed his 15-year sentence for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the 15-year sentence, finding it fit for a brutal aggravated homicide and noting the sentencing judge made no errors regarding parity or the appellant's role.

However, the Court found the sentencing judge erred in granting only 1.22 days of credit for pre-trial custody based on a lack of pre-charge programming.

The Court increased the pre-trial custody credit to the standard 2-for-1 ratio, reducing the remaining sentence to eight years and six months.

The Minister of Justice applied for the forfeiture of recognizances entered into by sureties for two individuals who failed to surrender into custody pending their extradition proceedings.

The Court of Appeal reconsidered the test for estreatment, rejecting both a strict rule of total forfeiture and a purely fault-based approach.

Instead, the court affirmed a broad discretionary approach where the surety's diligence is one of several factors, balanced against the need to maintain the 'pull of bail'.

Applying these principles, the court ordered full forfeiture for one surety who lacked diligence and was likely complicit, and partial forfeiture for the other sureties based on financial hardship, the subsequent apprehension of one fugitive, and the excessive amount of the original bail.

The accused was acquitted of first-degree murder after the trial judge excluded expert and lay evidence regarding the meaning of a teardrop tattoo the accused obtained after the murder.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in excluding the sociologist's expert evidence by applying the Daubert factors, which are suited for scientific evidence, to non-scientific specialized knowledge.

The trial judge also erred in excluding the lay evidence of gang members regarding the tattoo's meaning within their culture.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of incest against his developmentally challenged daughter.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in handling the issue of the complainant's motive to fabricate and that Crown counsel engaged in misconduct.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown improperly cross-examined witnesses on the complainant's motive to fabricate, made inflammatory comments in closing, and improperly injected personal opinion.

The trial judge failed to provide necessary corrective instructions.

The cumulative effect of these errors undermined the fairness of the trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge shifted the burden of proof and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof and made findings grounded in the evidence.

The sentence appeal, which sought a conditional discharge instead of the imposed fine and probation, was also dismissed as the trial judge made no error in principle.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter after arming himself with a handgun and shooting into a vehicle, killing the victim.

The trial judge characterized the offence as close to murder and imposed an effective sentence of 19 years (10 years plus 9 years pre-trial custody credit).

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing it was beyond the range and violated the parity rule, as the person who hired him received 14 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was within the range for a near-murder manslaughter and the higher sentence was justified by the appellant's role.

The appellant appealed his sentence of twelve years' imprisonment for two counts of sexual interference involving two young children.

He argued the trial judge failed to assist him as an unrepresented accused and that the sentence was manifestly unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first ground, finding the trial judge continually urged the appellant to retain counsel.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on the second ground, finding the twelve-year sentence was beyond the range for offences involving no violence or intercourse.

The sentence was reduced to nine years total, and the parole eligibility restriction was removed.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences related to a credit card fraud and manufacturing operation found in their home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge reasonably inferred knowledge and participation from the presence of false credit cards and manufacturing equipment.

The sentence appeal for the first appellant was dismissed, including a restitution order.

However, the sentence appeal for the second appellant was allowed in part to set aside the restitution order against her, as there was no evidence of her ability to pay.

The appellant appealed his conviction for pointing a firearm, arguing there was insufficient evidence for the trial judge to find the 'gun' was a 'firearm'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding sufficient evidence based on witness descriptions, the loading of the gun, the appellant's aggressive behaviour, and his threats to shoot the victims.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.