Christopher Hicks

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge upholding her conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the lower court judge thoroughly reviewed all arguments and provided compelling reasons.

Concluding that no issue of general importance was raised and the proposed issues lacked sufficient merit, the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal.

The appellants were convicted of possession of stolen property under $5,000 and fraud over $5,000 arising from the sale of a motorcycle containing stolen components.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding recent possession, wilful blindness, after-the-fact conduct, and the failure to give a Vetrovec warning.

They also appealed their conditional sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate when read as a whole and no Vetrovec warning was required.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentences were not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding after-the-fact conduct, causation, and relating evidence to the issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice from the lack of a Marinaro instruction on after-the-fact conduct, noting the causation instruction was actually unduly favourable to the appellant, and concluding the charge as a whole was fair.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and failing to comply with probation, arguing the trial judge misapprehended crucial evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the appellant's testimony regarding the position of a sofa bed and whether he forgot his parents' honeymoon.

The Court concluded that these misapprehensions figured prominently in the trial judge's credibility findings and reasoning process, thereby occasioning a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and using a firearm during an indictable offence, arising from a home invasion.

The Crown's case relied heavily on an accomplice's testimony, which the trial judge instructed the jury required confirmation.

The trial judge allowed the jury to use a witness's late, in-dock identification of the appellant as confirmatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in failing to caution the jury about the frailties of in-dock identification and in leaving it as capable of confirming the accomplice's testimony.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants were convicted of armed robbery and possession of a loaded restricted firearm following an incident at a clothing store where a third accomplice, who was armed, died in a confrontation with the storeowner.

On appeal, they challenged the jury instructions regarding the storeowner's evidence, the elements of armed robbery, and party liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals against the armed robbery convictions and sentences, finding the jury instructions adequate.

However, the court allowed the appeals regarding the firearm possession convictions, setting them aside and ordering a new trial because the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on the specific elements of that offence.

The appellant, a first offender, pleaded guilty to attempted murder, forcible confinement, robbery, and sexual assault after a brutal and prolonged attack on a young woman.

He was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentence was excessive and that the judge failed to apply the principle that first offenders should receive the shortest possible sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the shortest sentence principle does not apply to very serious and violent offences, and that the 15-year sentence was proportionate given the severe aggravating factors and the devastating, permanent injuries inflicted on the victim.

The appellant appealed her conviction, arguing the issue of bolus drinking.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the summary conviction appeal judge on the issue and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery and related offences following two trials.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that his s. 11(b) Charter rights were violated by a 56-month delay, that the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence and refusing to sever the charges, and that bad character evidence was improperly admitted.

He also appealed his sentence of life imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the delay was largely attributable to the appellant's own conduct and that the trial judge made no reversible errors in his evidentiary rulings or jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court holding that a life sentence was fit given the appellant's extensive violent criminal record, incorrigibility, and the need to protect the public.

The offender was convicted of aggravated sexual assault, wearing a disguise with intent, and uttering threats.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation.

The trial judge instead designated the offender as a long-term offender and imposed a 15-year sentence consecutive to his current sentence, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order.

Both the Crown and the offender appealed.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in relying on statistical evidence of age-related decline in risk to find a reasonable possibility of eventual control in the community.

The offender argued the 15-year sentence violated the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding the trial judge properly weighed the expert evidence and that the totality principle does not require a shorter sentence if it would preclude a long-term offender designation in favour of an indeterminate dangerous offender sentence.

The media applied to unseal search warrant materials related to a murder investigation.

The application judge ordered partial unsealing.

Both an accused (Gardiner) and the media appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Gardiner's appeal, finding no error in the partial release.

The Court also dismissed the media's appeal, noting that while the application judge's reasons were inadequate for appellate review, remitting the matter would interfere with a publication ban already imposed by the trial judge.

The appellant appealed a total sentence of 9 years and 1 month (including pre-trial custody credit) for robberies involving an imitation weapon.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was beyond the appropriate range, noting the appellant's prior record and rehabilitative prospects.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to 6 years, taking into account the 16 months credited for pre-trial custody, for an effective sentence of 7 years and 4 months.

The appellant appealed his sentence of three years' imprisonment and a lifetime driving prohibition for driving-related offences.

He argued the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to his guilty plea and failed to give 3:1 credit for pre-trial custody.

The Court of Appeal held that even if there were errors in principle, the three-year sentence was fit given the appellant's horrendous record for driving-related offences.

However, the Court varied the lifetime driving prohibition to a 10-year prohibition.

The sentence appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for eight firearm-related offences, arguing the convictions were unreasonable and the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) principles.

The appellant was arrested after police found a bag containing a firearm and ammunition in the back seat of a car he was leaning into.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the trial judge to conclude based on circumstantial evidence that the bag belonged to the appellant and that he was in possession of it.

The court also found no merit in the W.(D.) ground of appeal.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in a contract killing.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury that lies told by one of the appellants to the police could be used to infer his participation in a murder scheme, rather than merely a carjacking scheme as the defence argued.

The Court of Appeal held this was a misdirection, as the post-offence conduct had no probative value in determining the level of culpability between manslaughter and murder.

The error tainted the convictions of all three appellants.

The appeals were allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence for offences including being a party to pointing a loaded shotgun in a public place and possessing the weapon while subject to three firearms prohibitions and probation.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge correctly distinguished between the appellant and his brother when imposing sentence.

Given the gravity of the offences, the appellant's record, and other aggravating circumstances, the sentence was deemed fit and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his murder conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding the requisite intent for murder by reason of mental disorder falling short of insanity, and by leaving the defence of insanity to the jury over the objections of both counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's charge was fair and balanced, and that there was an air of reality to the insanity defence given the appellant's own doctor raised the issue.

The appeal from conviction was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault and his 12-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge failed to adequately address contradictions in evidence and failed to give proper reasons for credibility findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and complied with the standard for adequacy of reasons.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as a 12-month sentence for sexual assault involving a minor child and a breach of trust was not manifestly unfit.

The Crown appealed an order quashing a subpoena that required the respondent to testify at the preliminary inquiry of his brother and another co-accused, who were charged with first-degree murder.

The respondent, who was separately charged with the same murder, had given a video-taped statement implicating the co-accused but later backed away from it during his testimony.

The application judge quashed the subpoena, finding the Crown's predominant purpose was to obtain incriminating evidence against the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Crown had a legitimate purpose in examining the respondent to potentially admit his out-of-court statement under the KGB framework and to probe the co-accused's involvement.

The appellant appealed her conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and the expert's opinion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly rejected the appellant's improbable and inconsistent testimony and correctly assessed the factors proving the purpose of trafficking.