Christopher Hicks

The appellant appealed his convictions and 11-year sentence for a series of violent robberies.

He argued that the 16.5-month delay to trial violated his s. 11(b) Charter rights and that the trial judge misapprehended DNA evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the delay was not exceptional and there was no misapprehension of evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 11-year sentence was fit given the gratuitous violence, the vulnerability of the victims, and the appellant's prior record.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, using a firearm in the commission of an aggravated assault, and pointing a firearm after shooting an intruder who was stealing marijuana plants from his property.

The intruder was rendered a permanent paraplegic.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding the burden of proof, propensity reasoning, and the treatment of defence expert evidence.

The appellant also appealed his eight-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting the devastating consequences to the victim and the need to denounce and deter the use of firearms to protect illegal grow operations.

The appellant appealed his convictions for arson-related offences and his sentence as a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, noting the appellant conceded causing fire damage to four properties and was inevitably reckless as to whether the residential properties were inhabited.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding ample evidence to support the dangerous offender designation given the intractability of the appellant's pyromania and his lack of motivation for treatment.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because they failed to articulate a satisfactory basis for the conviction, particularly regarding the central issue of the complainant's credibility.

The trial judge failed to resolve crucial points undermining the complainant's evidence, such as the timing of when she started crying and evidence suggesting a friendlier relationship with the appellant than she admitted.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions arising from a jury trial involving allegations of sexual assault, threatening, assault, attempting to obstruct justice, and breach of bail.

The court held that the trial judge's charge on sexual assault was inaccurate and confusing because it failed to confine the jury's analysis to the first sexual encounter, misapprehended the timing of an alleged threat, and wrongly instructed that the threat could vitiate consent under the Criminal Code.

The court also found reversible error in the failure to instruct on the mens rea for threatening and in the inadequate charge on attempting to obstruct justice.

Because the evidence on the remaining counts was intertwined with the tainted counts, all convictions were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The accused, a black man, was charged with robbing an East Indian man.

At trial, the judge permitted the defence to challenge potential jurors for cause based on potential bias against a black accused, but refused to extend the challenge to include the race of the complainant.

The accused was convicted and appealed, arguing he was deprived of his right to an impartial jury.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge did not err in the exercise of his discretion.

The Court declined to take judicial notice of a general theory of race-based 'natural sympathy' between jurors and complainants of the same race.

The appellant appealed his sentence for offences including possession of a fully loaded handgun while prohibited under a section 109 order, breach of probation, and drug trafficking.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit, emphasizing the appellant's lengthy criminal record and the serious risk to society posed by the combination of guns and drugs.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were jointly tried and convicted of robbery and aggravated assault, with one appellant also convicted of attempted murder.

The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in refusing to sever the trials so that one co-accused could call the other as a witness.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in principle by assessing the reliability and credibility of the proposed co-accused witness, which is a function for the jury.

The appeal of the first appellant was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appeal of the second appellant, who argued the defence of duress should have been left to the jury, was dismissed as there was no air of reality to the defence.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for killing his ex-girlfriend.

At trial, he conceded guilt for manslaughter but argued his intoxication and emotional state raised a reasonable doubt regarding the specific intent for murder.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by using a two-step 'capacity' and 'actual intent' charge for intoxication, and by improperly answering a jury question about the difference between the intent for murder and manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury charge did not mislead the jury into believing capacity was the only relevant inquiry, and the trial judge correctly answered the jury's question.

The appellant was acquitted at trial on two counts of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario set aside the acquittals and entered convictions, finding that on the admitted facts and factual findings of the trial judge, consent to sexual intercourse within the meaning of s. 273.1(1) of the Criminal Code was not given.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the Court of Appeal's conclusion and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable due to weak eyewitness identification evidence and that the trial judge made several errors in his jury charge and evidentiary rulings.

The Crown's case relied on the complainant's selection of the appellant from a photographic line-up, supported by circumstantial evidence including the appellant's residence near the park, his ownership of a dog matching the assailant's dog, and post-offence conduct evidence from his hairdresser.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the verdict reasonable and concluding that the trial judge's instructions on eyewitness identification and his evidentiary rulings were adequate and did not render the trial unfair.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting out-of-court statements from a child witness, misdirecting the jury on unanimity, and refusing a mistrial.

The Court of Appeal found the child's statements were improperly admitted as the Crown failed to establish necessity, leading to the quashing of the unlawful confinement convictions.

However, the sexual assault conviction was upheld by applying the curative proviso.

The court dismissed the appeal regarding jury unanimity and the dangerous offender designation, affirming the indeterminate sentence.

The appellant appealed a four-year sentence for robbery.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge made two errors in principle: treating the unproven likelihood of a gun as an aggravating factor, and failing to apply the principle that a young offender's first penitentiary sentence should be as short as possible.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to two years and three months, in addition to nine months of pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held that the sentence was entirely fit in the circumstances.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully reviewed all appropriate factors and the sentence was not manifestly unfit nor did it reflect any error in principle.

The court noted that the appellant's rehabilitation efforts were a matter for parole authorities.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indefinite sentence for sexual assault upon a child.

The sole issue was whether the sentencing judge erred in finding that the long-term offender amendments to the Criminal Code, which came into force after the appellant's conviction but before his sentencing hearing, did not operate retrospectively.

The Crown conceded that, based on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Johnson, the legislation applies retrospectively.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the dangerous offender designation, and ordered a new sentencing hearing.

The appellant was convicted of multiple sexual offences involving five complainants and designated a long-term offender.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting bad character evidence without a limiting instruction against propensity reasoning and by allowing inadmissible reply evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the admission of highly prejudicial evidence regarding the appellant's character, combined with the Crown's closing address and the trial judge's failure to caution the jury, rendered the trial unfair.

The curative proviso could not apply.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions and long-term offender designation were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for kidnapping.

He argued that proceeding with the charge in Ontario after a related charge was dismissed in Montreal was an abuse of process, that the trial judge erred in excluding evidence of the complainant's subsequent work as a prostitute, and that the Vetrovec warning was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no abuse of process, that the excluded evidence had no probative value, and that the Vetrovec warning was satisfactory.

The sentence was also found to be fit.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple property-related offences, including break and enters.

At trial, there was a joint submission for a three-year sentence, but the trial judge rejected it and imposed a five-year sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the proposed three-year sentence was within the appropriate range, given the appellant's youth, lack of prior lengthy sentences, and efforts to overcome addiction.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to three years by making certain sentences concurrent.

The appellant appealed from a conviction and sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of the relevant evidence in the trial judge's thorough reasons and no error of principle in the sentence imposed.

The appeals against conviction and sentence were dismissed.