Christopher Hicks

The appellant appealed convictions for assault, assault with a weapon, possession of a weapon, and failing to comply with a probation order.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in admitting a witness statement as past recollection recorded, as the witness could not definitively say he was telling the truth when he gave it.

Without this statement, several convictions were unreasonable or lacked corroboration.

The court also found the trial judge materially misapprehended identification evidence on another count.

The appeal was allowed, acquittals entered on some counts, and a new trial ordered for the remainder.

The respondents were convicted of extortion with a firearm and other offences, which carry mandatory minimum sentences.

The trial judge gave the respondents credit for time spent on strict pre-trial bail (house arrest), reducing their sentences below the statutory minimums.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that while time spent in pre-sentence custody can be credited against a mandatory minimum sentence, time spent on strict bail does not constitute a 'punishment of imprisonment' under the Criminal Code and cannot be used to reduce a mandatory minimum sentence.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after causing the victim's death through severe internal injuries inflicted during a sexual assault.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting a statement made to police at the scene, in instructing the jury on the defence of accident, in failing to limit the use of post-offence conduct, and in instructing on sexual arousal and mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the statement was voluntary as the appellant was not detained or a suspect.

While the trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury that post-offence conduct could not be used to determine the level of culpability between murder and manslaughter, the court applied the curative proviso as the error caused no substantial wrong.

The appellant pleaded guilty to a 1995 home robbery after being arrested over ten years later.

The Crown and defence made a joint submission for a six-month custodial sentence, but the sentencing judge rejected it and imposed an 18-month sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge failed to explain how the joint submission was contrary to the public interest or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, as required by R. v. Cerasuolo.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to the jointly submitted six months.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to seven years and one month imprisonment.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code, the interplay of self-induced intoxication, the application of W.(D.) principles to his police statements, and the exclusion of evidence regarding the deceased's prior argument.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the vicious and unrelenting nature of the attack.

The appellant appealed his convictions for kidnapping, sexual assault, and criminal harassment of his former partner, as well as his 54-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred by refusing to admit evidence of prior sexual activity with the complainant, by allowing evidence of his prior discreditable conduct to show motive, and by failing to leave the defence of mistaken belief in consent to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the procedural requirements for admitting prior sexual history, properly instructed the jury on the highly probative discreditable conduct evidence, and correctly concluded there was no air of reality to the mistaken belief defence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed the quantum of a restitution order imposed at sentencing.

The parties agreed the original order exceeded the complainant's actual loss, contrary to s. 738(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and should be reduced to at least $59,496.99.

The appellant argued for a further reduction to $43,240, asserting the disputed $16,256.99 related to transactions where goods were actually delivered.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the Crown failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the additional amount related to the offences for which the appellant was convicted.

The appeal was allowed and the restitution order was reduced to $43,240.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of child pornography, sexual interference, and sexual assault, as well as his sentence.

He argued that the destruction of a videotaped interview prejudiced his right to make full answer and defence, and alleged ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to seek a stay, failing to request counselling records, and failing to advance a fabrication defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice from the lost videotape, no merit to the ineffective assistance claims, and no error in the trial judge's consideration of evidence or the sentence imposed.

The applicant, charged with murder and attempted murder, sought an order directing a review of his detention order under s. 680 of the Criminal Code.

The Chief Justice found no realistic likelihood that a panel of the Court of Appeal would find the bail judge erred in detaining the applicant on the secondary ground.

The applicant's request to introduce fresh evidence was declined, with the Chief Justice noting that material changes in circumstances should generally be brought as a renewed bail application before the Superior Court.

The application was dismissed without prejudice to renewing the application in the Superior Court.

The appellant appealed the two-year driving prohibition imposed as part of his sentence for dangerous driving.

The appellant had no prior criminal or driving record and operated a self-employed business that required driving.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence on consent showing the prohibition would force the sale of his business.

Finding the two-year prohibition excessive and a particular hardship, the Court allowed the appeal and reduced the driving prohibition to one year.

The respondent was convicted of manslaughter after stabbing his landlady 107 times while intoxicated.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of 11 years, deducting pre-trial custody for a net sentence of 4.5 years.

The Crown appealed, arguing the sentence was manifestly unfit and that the trial judge erred by treating the 8 to 12 year range for 'aggravated manslaughter' established in R. v. Clarke as an immutable cap.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while subcategorizing manslaughter is not a useful sentencing approach, the trial judge did not fetter his discretion and imposed a fit sentence based on all relevant circumstances.

The appellant was convicted of assault, assault with a weapon, and sexual assault against his wife.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting prior discreditable conduct evidence, reversing the burden of proof, misusing the complainant's statements to her doctor, and failing to consider good character evidence.

He also appealed his 30-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or evidentiary rulings.

While the trial judge erred in stating a penitentiary sentence was mandatory, the Court of Appeal upheld the 30-month sentence as fit given the serious domestic violence context.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial judge failed to properly address the Long-Term Offender (LTO) question.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the medical experts were not examined on the LTO issue and the trial judge did not effectively decide the question.

The court concluded that a new hearing was necessary.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment and the sentence imposed.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in convicting the appellant based on a single communication on the date specified, as the offence requires repeated communication.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The Court also varied a probation condition regarding child access, holding that the Family Court was capable of properly supervising the appellant's relationship with his children.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding he intended to mislead the court at his bail hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding that the appellant presented evidence he knew was dishonest to advance his position was supported by the evidence, and that the evidence did not need to be on a material point.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking in crack cocaine.

He argued the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds for his arrest and that the Crown failed to prove possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the subjective and objective tests for reasonable and probable grounds and reasonably inferred the purpose of trafficking.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed based on fresh evidence of the appellant's rehabilitation, reducing the 18-month sentence to time served plus two years' probation.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 11-year sentence for a series of violent robberies.

He argued that the 16.5-month delay to trial violated his s. 11(b) Charter rights and that the trial judge misapprehended DNA evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the delay was not exceptional and there was no misapprehension of evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 11-year sentence was fit given the gratuitous violence, the vulnerability of the victims, and the appellant's prior record.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, using a firearm in the commission of an aggravated assault, and pointing a firearm after shooting an intruder who was stealing marijuana plants from his property.

The intruder was rendered a permanent paraplegic.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding the burden of proof, propensity reasoning, and the treatment of defence expert evidence.

The appellant also appealed his eight-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury charge.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting the devastating consequences to the victim and the need to denounce and deter the use of firearms to protect illegal grow operations.

The appellant appealed his convictions for arson-related offences and his sentence as a dangerous offender.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, noting the appellant conceded causing fire damage to four properties and was inevitably reckless as to whether the residential properties were inhabited.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding ample evidence to support the dangerous offender designation given the intractability of the appellant's pyromania and his lack of motivation for treatment.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant based on a finding that he moved a hose and reel toward the victim, but simultaneously rejected the victim's evidence that the appellant threw the reel.

The Court of Appeal held that without the victim's rejected evidence, there was no evidence to support the trial judge's finding.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal was entered.