Christopher Hicks

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to prohibit cross-examination on his prior testimony at a co-accused's trial, in admitting psychiatric evidence of his predisposition to violence, and in instructing the jury on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly ruled that cross-examination would be vetted under s. 13 of the Charter, properly admitted the psychiatric evidence after the defence opened the door, and accurately instructed the jury on circumstantial evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the basis of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter and the admissibility of evidence seized pursuant to a wiretap authorization and search warrants.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge reasonably applied the Morin framework to find no s. 11(b) violation.

The Court also upheld the wiretap authorization, finding that jailhouse telephones are not places ordinarily used by solicitors under s. 186(2) of the Criminal Code, and that investigative necessity was established.

Finally, the Court held that the police inspection of the appellant's personal belongings held by jail authorities did not violate his reasonable expectation of privacy under s. 8 of the Charter.

The appeals from conviction were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for the rape of a 15-year-old girl.

He argued the trial judge erred in refusing to order production of the complainant's psychiatric records under s. 278.5 of the Criminal Code and in failing to set out the theory of the defence to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the likely relevance test for the records was not met and the defence theory was speculative.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the serious nature of the offence required a penitentiary term despite the appellant's health and immigration consequences.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on self-defence, post-offence conduct, and admitting evidence of the deceased's peaceful disposition.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the jury instructions regarding sections 34(1), 34(2), and 37 of the Criminal Code.

The court also upheld the trial judge's treatment of post-offence conduct and the admission of evidence regarding the deceased's peaceful disposition, noting the defence had opened the door to it.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter in the stabbing death of a frail, vulnerable friend and sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in principle by denying two-for-one credit for pre-trial custody based on the appellant's change of counsel, and by holding that provocation could not mitigate the sentence.

The Court held the appropriate range was 8 to 12 years due to numerous aggravating factors.

Factoring in proper pre-trial custody credit and provocation, the sentence was reduced to 9 years' imprisonment.

The appellant was convicted of sexual touching and sexual assault against his 13-year-old sister-in-law and sentenced to 10 months' imprisonment followed by three years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by considering his youth record for sexual assault, contrary to s. 45 of the Young Offenders Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed this was an error in principle.

However, upon reassessing the sentence, the Court found that actual imprisonment remained the most appropriate disposition given the breach of trust, the vulnerability of the victim, and the need for general deterrence and denunciation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking following a police search of an apartment and a vehicle.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, including the validity of the search warrant, jury instructions on the burden of proof (the W.(D.) instruction), and the reasonableness of the verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the first appellant, finding the jury instructions adequate and the verdict reasonable based on the evidence found in his vehicle.

However, the Court allowed the appeal of the second appellant, concluding that the verdict was unreasonable as there was insufficient evidence connecting him to the drugs found in the apartment, especially given his acquittal on the trafficking charge.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder for shooting his wife 13 times and was sentenced to life imprisonment with 15 years of parole ineligibility.

On appeal, he argued that the trial was rendered unfair because the Crown retained and obtained notes from a psychiatrist initially consulted by the defence, breaching privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that privilege was likely waived and no prejudice resulted since the Crown did not lead the evidence.

The Court also dismissed arguments regarding jury instructions on automatism, section 16, and reasonable doubt.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and parole ineligibility was reduced to 13 years because the trial judge improperly relied on unproven hearsay evidence of a prior attempted murder as an aggravating factor.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a sentence imposed after guilty pleas to sexual assault and sexual exploitation involving prolonged sexual abuse of a child by a parent in the family home.

The Court of Appeal held that a conditional sentence was demonstrably unfit given the controlling principles of denunciation and specific and general deterrence, the vulnerability of the victim, the breach of trust, the repeated acts over an extended period, and the respondent's prior sexual assault record.

The court further found that the sentencing judge erred by failing to impose house arrest as a term of the conditional sentence.

Leave to appeal was granted and the sentence was increased to two years less a day imprisonment, with credit for the portion of the conditional sentence already served, while probation remained unchanged.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery, forcible confinement, and related offences, arguing that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury on alibi and failed to give an adequate Vetrovec warning regarding the evidence of an accomplice and an admitted perjurer.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, with the majority adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal.

Two dissenting justices would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the basis that the Vetrovec warning was inadequate.

The appellant appealed his convictions and the total sentence of ten years imposed for three offences.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to assess the complainant's credibility based on the totality of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the Court found the ten-year sentence was beyond the appropriate range and exceeded the Crown's suggested sentence.

The sentence appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to six years concurrent for each offence, taking into account pre-trial custody.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple charges, including aggravated assault endangering life arising from a police chase where he repeatedly drove his vehicle at police officers, causing permanent disability to one officer.

He was sentenced to a total of 7 years and 9 months.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in admitting certain evidence at the sentencing hearing, that the sentence for aggravated assault was excessive, and that the global sentence violated the totality principle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the evidence relevant to deterrence, the sentence fit given the viciousness of the conduct and prior record, and the global sentence appropriate.

The appellants were convicted of importing heroin and possession for the purpose of trafficking after 42 kilograms of heroin were found hidden in the washrooms of their flight.

They appealed their convictions and sentences on several grounds, including that a mistrial during jury selection should have annulled the trial judge's pre-trial Charter rulings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, holding that a mistrial during jury selection does not affect pre-trial rulings made under s. 645(5) of the Criminal Code.

The court also upheld the admission of a video re-enactment, the jury's access to the heroin exhibits, and the 18-year sentences given the massive quantity of drugs involved.

The appellants appealed their sentences of 18 and 16 years imprisonment for a violent 11.5-hour carjacking, kidnapping, and robbery.

The Court of Appeal upheld the severity of the sentences and the parole ineligibility orders, finding the offences to be among the worst group of offences committed by the worst group of offenders.

However, the Court reduced each global sentence by two years to account for pre-trial custody that the trial judge had intended to credit but failed to deduct.

The Court also restructured the sentences for one appellant to correct an error regarding the mandatory minimum for robbery with a firearm.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and aggravated assault, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on the mens rea for attempted murder, failed to adequately answer a jury question on intent, and erred in not instructing the jury that his rage could raise a reasonable doubt about intent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the jury instructions were correct and adequate, noting that the mens rea for attempted murder is an intention to kill.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the court noting the severe nature of the domestic abuse.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with 13 years' parole ineligibility.

He appealed both conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred by delivering an improper jury exhortation, admitting out-of-court statements, failing to relate evidence to the defence theory, improperly instructing on reasonable doubt, and giving inadequate Vetrovec warnings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings, and upholding the period of parole ineligibility as fit.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and related offences following a second trial for a home invasion.

He appealed his convictions and his eight-year sentence, arguing that the trial judge provided inadequate jury instructions regarding his alibi defence, failed to give a sufficient Vetrovec warning for an accomplice and a perjured witness, and erred in instructions on identification and prior bad acts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate, fair, and balanced, and that the sentence was fit given the circumstances of the offence and the appellant's record.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for unlawfully in a dwelling house, fraud, and attempted fraud.

The Court of Appeal quashed the convictions for unlawfully in a dwelling house and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge failed to consider the counts separately, address legal issues regarding the appellant's status upon entry, and assess the reliability of the complainants' evidence.

The fraud convictions were upheld, but the sentences were varied because the original sentences exceeded the two-year maximum.

The court imposed a total sentence of 27 months for the fraud and attempted fraud counts, noting the appellant's terrible record of preying on elderly citizens.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder.

He argued the trial judge erred by not leaving manslaughter or provocation with the jury, that the Crown improperly elicited prior out-of-court statements to rebut recent fabrication, and that the Crown improperly cross-examined him on the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

He also sought to adduce fresh evidence regarding a forged arrest warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence to support provocation, that the prior statements were admissible, that any prejudice from cross-examination was cured by instructions, and that the fresh evidence was collateral.

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of an escape plot and relying on it for psychiatric assessments.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence of his progress in prison to be designated a long-term offender instead.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the escape plot evidence was admissible and relevant to the experts' risk assessments.

Furthermore, the fresh evidence did not establish a reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community, precluding a long-term offender designation.