Laura M. Remigio

The appellant, Ricardo Francis, appealed his convictions for possessing a loaded firearm and possession of drugs for trafficking, and his seven-year sentence.

The convictions arose from vehicle and strip searches conducted after his arrest on an outstanding warrant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the searches lawful under s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal the sentence, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to adequately consider the principle of restraint for a youthful, first-time offender.

The sentence was varied from seven years to five years imprisonment.

The defendant brought a motion for directions on where and before whom he could bring a bail application.

The Court of Appeal had previously upheld his convictions but overturned his dangerous offender designation, directing a new sentencing hearing before a different judge.

Because no judge had yet been assigned to the new sentencing hearing, the defendant sought clarity on bail jurisdiction.

The Superior Court held that under section 523(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, since the defendant was currently being tried before 'a court' but no specific judge was conducting the trial, jurisdiction for the bail application rested with the Superior Court of Justice generally until a specific judge was assigned.

In a mid-trial ruling during a murder jury trial, the court permitted the Crown to expand its cross-examination of the accused after finding a material change in circumstances from an earlier pre-trial admissibility ruling.

The accused's testimony introduced a new issue by minimizing his possession of a revolver allegedly used in the homicide and claiming only temporary, reluctant possession on behalf of his brother.

Applying the principles governing cross-examination of an accused, the court held that questioning about the second handgun and cash depicted in edited cell phone photographs was directly relevant to testing the truthfulness of that account and had substantial probative value.

The court found the resulting prejudice manageable through a strong limiting instruction, but prohibited use of the photographs themselves before the jury.

During a first-degree murder trial, the Crown brought a mid-trial motion to admit recently disclosed wiretap intercepts as post-offence conduct.

The intercepts allegedly captured the accused attempting to influence co-accused and witnesses to testify under the protection of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court denied the motion, finding that while the evidence had probative value regarding consciousness of guilt, it was outweighed by significant prejudicial effects, including the need for complex jury instructions on the co-conspirator hearsay exception, the Canada Evidence Act, solicitor-client privilege, and bad character reasoning.

The appellant, a youthful first offender, appealed sentences imposed for four home invasion robberies, which resulted in a total term of nine years imprisonment (adult and youth sentences).

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to differentiate youth sentencing principles from adult ones, misapplying the paramountcy of individual deterrence and rehabilitation for youthful first offenders, and improperly using the appellant's youth as an aggravating factor.

The court reduced the global adult sentence from nine years to seven years, while affirming the one-year concurrent youth sentence as it was already spent.

In a pre-trial motion for a first-degree murder trial, the accused sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on racial bias, unconscious bias, and attitudes toward illegal firearms possession.

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Chouhan, the court revised its jury selection procedures, determining that the trial judge would ask the challenge questions and pre-instruct the panel.

The court permitted revised questions on racial and unconscious bias, and allowed a narrow question regarding the jurors' ability to follow limiting instructions on the accused's admitted prior possession of illegal firearms.

However, the court rejected proposed questions inquiring into jurors' beliefs about crime rates among Black men.

On a Crown appeal and accused's cross-appeal arising from convictions on two sexual assault counts and acquittals on other sexual and harassment counts, the court dismissed both appeals.

The court upheld exclusion of Facebook records because, although authenticity and best-evidence requirements for electronic documents could be met, the affidavits relied on to bring the records within the business records exception were fundamentally deficient and failed to connect the documents to the affiants.

The court further held that the trial judge properly applied the Kienapple principle to conditionally stay overlapping counts, committed no reversible error in acquitting on criminal harassment and other counts, and properly admitted bank security video.

The accused's challenge to the similar fact ruling failed because the incidents involving three complainants displayed a signature modus operandi making coincidence objectively highly improbable.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as moot because the sentence had been fully served.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm-related offences (robbery, aggravated assault, prohibited possession) and sought leave to appeal his 9-year sentence.

The conviction appeal argued that the trial judge erred by not conducting a fulsome post-verdict inquiry into a juror's comments, leading to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's determination that the record was sufficient and that the strong presumption of juror impartiality had not been rebutted.

The sentence appeal argued that the 9-year sentence was unfit and disproportionate to co-accused sentences.

The Court granted leave to appeal sentence but dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the seriousness of the home invasion, the appellant's role (shooting the victim, using a handgun, breach of prohibition), and the justified distinctions from co-accused who pleaded guilty and had lesser roles.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of breaching the conditions of his Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO) by consuming prohibited substances.

The first breach involved alcohol consumption in January 2019, and the second involved smoking a joint laced with crystal methamphetamine in October 2019.

A third alleged breach involving incidental contact with crystal methamphetamine was found not proven beyond reasonable doubt following a Gardiner hearing.

The court imposed a sentence of 14 months less presentence custody, with enhanced credit for the harsh conditions of presentence detention and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, challenging the constitutionality and retrospective application of legislative amendments that abolished peremptory challenges and substituted the presiding judge for lay triers in challenges for cause.

The Court of Appeal held that the amendments did not violate the appellant's rights under ss. 7, 11(d), or 11(f) of the Charter.

However, the Court found that while the change to the challenge for cause procedure was purely procedural and applied retrospectively, the abolition of peremptory challenges affected substantive rights and applied prospectively.

Because the appellant's right to a jury trial vested before the amendments came into force, the abolition of peremptory challenges should not have applied to his trial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

Taha Shaikh pleaded guilty to multiple charges including assault causing bodily harm, uttering threats, assault, and failure to comply with a recognizance.

The court considered aggravating factors such as intimate partner violence, the victim's vulnerability, and the commission of offences while on a peace bond and house arrest.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, genuine remorse, family support, employment prospects, and sparing the victim from testifying at trial.

The court also addressed the "Coke Rule" regarding subsequent convictions and the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit (Duncan credit) for harsh jail conditions.

A global sentence of two years was deemed appropriate, but due to pre-sentence custody credit, the final sentence was one day in custody followed by three years probation with specific conditions.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence (a loaded handgun, ammunition, and illegal drugs) found during a vehicle search incident to arrest and a subsequent strip search at the police station, alleging violations of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the application, finding both the vehicle search (justified as incident to arrest and an inventory search) and the strip search (justified as incident to arrest and for custodial safety) were lawful.

The court also upheld the validity of the telewarrants used for a later search of the vehicle, finding the grounds for their issuance and the resort to the telewarrant process were reasonable.

The accused, facing multiple firearm and drug charges, brought an application to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during his trial, arguing the dock would negatively impact the presumption of innocence and impede interaction with counsel.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the customary position of the accused is in the dock and that juries are adequately instructed on the presumption of innocence to prevent any prejudice.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of a sex-trade worker.

The Crown's case was based on circumstantial evidence including DNA evidence, cell phone records, security footage, and evidence of post-offence conduct.

The trial judge sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment with 25 years of parole ineligibility.

On appeal, the appellant challenged four aspects of the trial judge's charge to the jury: the characterization of the cause of death as strangulation, instructions on non-fatal injuries, examples of circumstantial evidence, and instructions on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

This decision addresses multiple pre-trial motions in a large-scale drug trafficking prosecution, focusing on Charter violations related to search and seizure (s.8) and the right to counsel (s.10), as well as the voluntariness of an utterance.

The court found the initial warrantless search for cocaine unconstitutional and excluded the evidence.

The initial search warrant for the Warwick premises was quashed, but other evidence seized under it was admitted.

Covert camera evidence was admitted despite an unlawful installation, but references to it were excised from subsequent Informations to Obtain (ITOs).

Tracking warrants and general warrants for other properties were largely upheld after excising unconstitutionally obtained information.

An accused's utterance was found voluntary and admitted, despite a s.10 Charter violation, as the impact on Charter rights was deemed slight and exclusion would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and with care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant was found sitting in the driver's seat of a parked vehicle with the engine off and keys in the cupholder.

The Crown relied on a statutory presumption of care and control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant rebutted the presumption by establishing on a balance of probabilities that he did not occupy the driver's seat for the purpose of setting the vehicle in motion.

The court found that even if the presumption applied, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant created a realistic risk of danger.

The charges were dismissed.